Gauhati High Court
Chabiya @ Sabiya Begum @ Sabia Nessa vs The Union Of India And 6 Ors on 25 May, 2026
Author: S.K. Medhi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Medhi
Page No.# 1/17
GAHC010173462019
2026:GAU-AS:7180
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/5513/2019
CHABIYA @ SABIYA BEGUM @ SABIA NESSA
W/O- BACHU MIYA @ BADSHA, D/O- LATE MOWAB ALI @ NOWAB ALI @
NOBAB ALI, VILL- HARIHAKUCHI (SARIAHKUCHI), P.S- SARTHEBARI,
DIST- BARPETA, ASSAM
VERSUS
THE UNION OF INDIA AND 6 ORS
REP. BY SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF INDIA, THE MIN OF HOME
AFFAIRS, NEW DELHI
2:THE STATE OF ASSAM
REP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM
HOME DEPTT, DISPUR, GUWAHATI- 06
3:THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE (ADMN)
ASSAM, ULUBARI, GUWAHATI- 07
4:THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (B)
BARPETA, ASSAM
5:THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE(B)
BARPETA, DIST- BARPETA
ASSAM
6:ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA
NEW DELHI- 01
7:COORDINATOR
NRC ASSAM, ACHYUT PLAZA
BHANGAGARH
GHY- 0
Page No.# 2/17
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRANJAL DAS
Advocate for the petitioner : Shri P. A. Ahmed, Advocate.
Advocates for the respondents : Ms. A. Verma, SC- Home Deptt.
Shri G. Sarma, SC, NRC;
Shri P. Sarma, GA, Assam;
Shri N. Kalita, Advocate;
(on behalf of Shri A. I. Ali, SC, ECI).
Shri S. S. Roy, CGC.
Date on which judgment is reserved : 14.05.2026 Date of pronouncement of judgment : 25.05.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the
judgment? : NA
Whether the full judgment has been pronounced? : Yes
Judgment & Order
(S.K. Medhi, J.)
The extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be invoked
by filing this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by putting
to challenge the opinion rendered vide impugned order dated 17.11.2018
passed by the learned Member, Foreigners Tribunal III, Barpeta in F.T. Case
No.1192(III) of 2013 declaring the petitioner as a foreigner u/s 2 (a) of the
Foreigners’ Act, 1946. By the impugned judgment, the petitioner, who was the
proceedee before the learned Tribunal, has been declared to be a foreigner post
25.03.1971.
Page No.# 3/17
2. The facts of the case may be put in a nutshell as follows:
(i) A reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (B), Barpeta
District, against the petitioner giving rise to the aforesaid F.T. Case
No. 1192 (III)/2013.
(ii) As per requirement u/s 9 of the Foreigner’s Act, 1946 to prove that
the proceedee is not a foreigner, the petitioner had filed the written
statement on 23.03.2018 along with certain documents and adduced
evidence through 5 nos. of DWs.
(iii) The learned Tribunal, after considering the facts and circumstances
and taking into account of the provisions of Section 9 of the
Foreigners’ Act, 1946 had come to a finding that the petitioner, as
opposite party, had failed to discharge the burden cast upon her and
accordingly, the opinion was rendered declaring the petitioner to be
a foreign national post 25.03.1971.
3. We have heard Shri P. A. Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner. We
have also heard Ms. A. Verma, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department;
Shri G. Sarma, learned Standing Counsel, NRC; Shri P. Sarma, learned GA,
Assam, Shri N. Kalita, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Shri A. I. Ali,
learned Standing Counsel, Election Commission of India and Shri S. S. Roy,
learned CGC. We have also carefully examined the records which were
requisitioned vide order dated 30.10.2019.
4. Shri Ahmed, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
petitioner could prove her case with cogent evidence and in view of the fact that
there was no rebuttal evidence, the learned Tribunal should have accepted the
said proof and accordingly hold the petitioner to be a citizen of India. In this
Page No.# 4/17
regard, he has referred to the evidence of the 5 nos. of DWs and also the
following documentary evidence.
(i) Ext-A – Certified copy of voter list 1966.
(ii) Ext-B – Certified copy of voter list 1970.
(iii) Ext-C – Certified copy of voter list 1985.
(iv) Ext-D – Certified copy of voter list 1989.
(v) Ext-E – Certified copy of voter list 1997.
(vi) Ext-F – Elector Photo Identity Card of 2013.
(vii) Ext-G – Gaonburah Certificate.
(viii) Ext.-H – Gaon Panchayat Certificate.
(ix) Ext. I - Affidavit.
(ix) Ext.-J - Elector Photo Identity Card of 2013.
(x) Annexure-1 - Copy of NRC details of 1951
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the written
statement, all material disclosures were made. He has submitted that the
petitioner was born in the year 1960 and her marriage was in the year 1994. He
has referred to the Voters List of 1966 containing the name of her father as
Mowab Ali. He has also referred to the Voters List of the year 1970 containing
the names of her parents and grandmother. It is submitted that due to river
erosion, the family had to shift to village Kaltoli and in the Voters List of 1985,
the names of the father and two siblings had appeared under village Kaltoli.
6. The next voters list is of the year 1989 containing the names of the
parents, one brother and sister-in-law followed by the Voters List of 1997
wherein there is an addition of another brother and a different sister-in-law.
Reference is also made to the Voters List of 1994 with the name of the
petitioner.
Page No.# 5/17
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the Gaonburah
Certificate dated 10.05.2017 read with the deposition by the Gaonburah as DW
5. It is highlighted that the DW 5 had deposed that he has been the Gaonburah
since 1975 and since the certificate had disclosed the link with the father, the
petitioner had discharged her burden. Similar submission had also been made in
respect of the certificate of the Gaon Panchayat dated 10.06.2015 read with the
evidence of the Panchayat Secretary as DW 4.
8. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner has
relied upon the following decisions:
i. AIR 1959 SC 914 (Dol Gobinda Paricha Vs. Nimai Charan
Misra and Ors.)ii. (2008) 4 SCC 75 (Bant Singh and Anr. Vs Niranjan Singh
(Dead) by LRS. And Anr.)iii. (2019) 5 SCC 534 (Sirajul Hoque Vs. State of Assam and
Ors.)iv. 2021 (4) GLT 664 (Sujab Ali (Md) Vs. Union of India & Ors.)
v. 2021 (3) GLT 85 (Haidar Ali Vs. Union of India & Ors.)
9. The cases of Dol Gobinda (supra) and Bant Singh (supra) have been
cited in the context of the evidence adduced by the DW 2 (mother) and DW 3
(brother) and has submitted that evidence of family members on the
relationship cannot be discarded. The case of Sujab Ali (supra) is on the same
subject. The case of Haider Ali (supra) is on the aspect of the presentation of
the written statement and also evidence to be adduced by a proceedee. The
case of Sirajul Hoque (supra) has been cited in which the Hon’ble Supreme
Page No.# 6/17
Court had held that minor inconsistencies in the Voters Lists can be ignored.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner accordingly submits that in view of
the availability of the aforesaid materials, the impugned opinion could not have
been rendered against the petitioner and therefore, the same requires
interference.
11. Per contra, Ms. Verma, the learned Standing Counsel, Home Department
has categorically refuted the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner. He submits
that a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners
(Tribunals) Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the
proceedee is a foreigner or not. Therefore, the relevant facts are especially
within the knowledge of the proceedee and accordingly, the burden of proving
citizenship rests absolutely upon the proceedee, notwithstanding anything
contained in the Evidence Act, 1872 and this is mandated under Section 9 of the
aforesaid Act, 1946. However, in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to
discharge the burden. It is also submitted that rebuttal evidence is not
mandatory in every case and would be given only if necessary. She further
submits that the evidence of a proceedee has to be cogent, relevant, which
inspire confidence and acceptable and only thereafter, the question of adducing
rebuttal evidence may come in.
12. The learning Standing Counsel has further submitted that the written
statement is the basic document which is supposed to lay down the foundation
of the case of the proceeding and the written statement in the instant case
lacks details and is totally vague. There is no date or year of the birth of the
petitioner and the date of her marriage. There are no details of the family
members. In this connection, she has relied upon the following observations
Page No.# 7/17
made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal vs.
Union of India reported in (2005) 5 SCC 665:
“17. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon
the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country.
In order to establish one’s citizenship, normally he may be required to
give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his
parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Sometimes the place of
birth of his grandparents may also be relevant like under Section 6-A(1)
(d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the
personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of
the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State
authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if
necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a
person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but
almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points.
This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the
Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the
knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.”
13. She has submitted that since it can be deduced that the year of birth of
the petitioner was about 1960, there should have been a Voters List containing
her name in the year about 1981. She has further submitted that in the Voters
List of 1966 relied upon, the mother’s name is missing which raises a serious
doubt on the relationship claimed. From 1970 to 1985 quo the Voters lists
produced, there is a long gap which is unexplained. In the written statement,
there is name of only one brother whereas it appears from other materials that
there are three brothers and two sisters. She has submitted that the Voters List
Page No.# 8/17
relied upon are not relevant by which the petitioner has discharged her burden.
So far as the Gaonburah Certificate is concerned, she has submitted that
admittedly, the same has been issued on the basis of a Voters List of the year
1997 furnished by the petitioner and that the petitioner had shifted to that
village only in the year 1985. It is also submitted that the Gaon Panchayat
Certificate is not relevant. She has pointed out that there is a disclaimer at the
foot of the certificate itself that the same was issued only for the purpose of
NRC. She has submitted that the oral evidence of the projected brother and
mother without any documentary support would not be relevant, as have been
held by a number of decisions of this Court.
14. In support of her submission that a certificate has to be proved from
contemporaneous records, the learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the
judgment passed in the case of Romila Khatun vs. Union of India reported
in 2018 (4) GLT 373 and the following observations have been pressed into
service.
“20. It is trite that documentary evidence would have to be proved on the basis
of the record and the contemporaneous record must substantiate and prove the
contents of the document. Proof of document is one thing and proof of contents
is another. Not only the document would have to be proved but its contents
would also have to be proved. That apart, the truthfulness of the contents of the
document would also have to be established from the record. A document or the
contents of the document cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge.
…”
15. She has also drawn the attention of this Court to the case of Nur Begum
vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2020 (3) GLT 347 wherein certain
observations regarding exercise of certiorari jurisdiction have been made which
Page No.# 9/17
read as follows:
“9. On the available materials, we find that the Tribunal rendered
opinion/order upon due appreciation of the entire facts, evidence and
documents brought on record. We find no infirmity in the findings and opinion
recorded by the Tribunal. We would observe that the certiorari jurisdiction of
the writ court being supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction, this Court would
refrain from reviewing the findings of facts reached by the Tribunal. No case is
made out that the impugned opinion/order was rendered without affording
opportunity of hearing or in violation of the principles of natural justice and/or
that it suffers from illegality on any ground of having been passed by placing
reliance on evidence which is legally impermissible in law and/or that the
Tribunal refused to admit admissible evidence and/or that the findings finds no
support by any evidence at all. In other words, the petitioner has not been able
to make out any case demonstrating any errors apparent on the face of the
record to warrant interference of the impugned opinion.”
16. She has also relied upon the case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Rupajan Begum vs. Union of India reported in (2018) 1 SCC 579, wherein
it has been laid down that a certificate has to be proved on two aspects, firstly,
the authenticity of the same and secondly, the authenticity of the contents.
17. The learned Standing Counsel has accordingly submitted that the writ
petition be dismissed and the interim order be vacated.
18. The learned counsel for the other respondents have supported the
submissions advanced on behalf of the Home Deptt. & NRC and have prayed for
dismissal of the writ petition. They have submitted that this Court in exercise of
its Certiorari jurisdiction does not act as an Appellate Court and it is only the
Page No.# 10/17
decision making process which can be the subject matter of scrutiny. It is
submitted that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality in the decision
making process and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed.
They have further submitted that the procedure adopted for adjudication of a
reference by a Foreigners Tribunal is summary in nature and there is also a time
frame for completion. It is also submitted that there is a question of national
security by the unabated influx of foreign nationals and before any action is
taken, the proceedee is given an opportunity whereby he or she is required to
prove the citizenship.
19. The rival submissions made have been duly considered and the materials
placed before this Court including the records of the Tribunal have been
carefully perused.
20. With regard to the aspect of burden of proof as laid down in Section 9 of
the Act of 1946, the law is well settled that the burden of proof that a
proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and never shifts.
In the said Section, there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the
Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is
extracted hereinbelow-
“9. Burden of proof.–If in any case not falling under Section 8 any question
arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction given
thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner or is or is not a foreigner
of a particular class or description the onus of proving that such person is not a
foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case
may be, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such person.”
Page No.# 11/17
21. In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration [AIR 1963 SC 1035] which
followed the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of
Ghaus Mohammad Vs. Union of India [AIR 1961 SC 1526] in the context
of Foreigners Act, 1946 would be relevant which is extracted hereinbelow-
“22. This Act confers wide ranging powers to deal with all foreigners or with
respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or description of
foreigner for prohibiting, regulating or restricting their or his entry into India or
their presence or continued presence including their arrest, detention and
confinement. The most important provision is Section 9 which casts the burden
of proving that a person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such
particular class or description, as the case may be, shall lie upon such person.
Therefore, where an order made under the Foreigners Act is challenged and a
question arises whether the person against whom the order has been made is a
foreigner or not, the burden of proving that he is not a foreigner is upon such a
person. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi
served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as he
was a Pakistani national. He challenged the order before the High Court which
set aside the order by observing that there must be prima facie material on the
basis of which the authority can proceed to pass an order under Section 3(2)(c)
of the Foreigners Act, 1946. In appeal the Constitution Bench reversed the
judgment of the High Court holding that onus of showing that he is not a
foreigner was upon the respondent.”
22. Before embarking to adjudicate the issue involved vis-a-vis the
submissions and the materials on record, we are reminded that a Writ Court in
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would
Page No.# 12/17
confine its powers to examine the decision making process only. Further, the
present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings
based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be
interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction.
23. Law is well settled in this field. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after
discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ
of certiorari, in the recent decision of Central Council for Research in
Ayurvedic Sciences and Anr. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors [Civil Appeal No.
3339 of 2023] has laid down as follows:
“49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something important
in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law governing exercise of
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly
when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari.
50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it
comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High
Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or
reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal
purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without
jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for
those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of
law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high
prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking.
51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or
order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High
Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to
Page No.# 13/17upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226
of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially
discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ
court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest
dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced
from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is
to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting
right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court
would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and
mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other
approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not.”
24. In the instant case, the written statement is vague and apparently, has not
met the requirements, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Sarbananda Sonowal (supra). There is a requirement to disclose the
following:
(i) date of birth,
(ii) place of birth,
(iii) name of the parents,
(iv) their place of birth and citizenship.
Further, there may be a requirement to give the details of the grandparents. It
has been stated that all these facts would necessarily be within the personal
knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State.
25. So far as the Voters Lists are concerned, there are numerous
inconsistencies both in the names and age. While the name of the projected
father in the Voters Lists of 1966 and 1970 was Mowab Ali, in the Voters List of
1985, the name is Nobab Ali Mia. The age of the father in 1970 was stated as
Page No.# 14/17
39 years whereas in the year 1985 it is 65 years which is inconsistent.
26. There is not even a single Voters List of the petitioner with her projected
parents or siblings despite the fact that the petitioner claims to have been born
in the year 1960. We also find that Voters Lists are selectively produced before
the learned Tribunal and there is no regularity or continuity. It may be
mentioned that after the Voters List of 1970, the next Voters List is of the year
1985. Similarly, there is a long gap between the Voters Lists of 1989 and 1997.
There is no explanation with regard to the disappearance of existing names in
the Voters Lists and entry of new names. The Voters List of 1994 is not relevant
as the same is not even a certified copy.
27. So far as the Gaonburah Certificate dated 10.05.2017 is concerned though
the same was sought to be proved by the DW 5, he had clearly stated that the
same was issued on the basis of a Voters List of 1997 produced by the
petitioner. It also reveals that neither the issue register nor the
contemporaneous records were produced and proved. Similarly, so far as the
certificate dated 10.06.2015 by the Gaon Panchayat was concerned, DW 4, the
Secretary of the Gaon Panchayat had deposed that the certificate was issued by
the earlier Secretary, who had retired. No issue register or contemporaneous
records were proved in connection with the said certificate. It is settled law that
certificates of the aforesaid nature are required to be proved by
contemporaneous records as the issue is of immense public importance
touching upon the national security.
28. In the case of Sufia Khatun Vs Union of India [WP(C)/3961/2019
disposed of 16.09.2019] the following observations have been made by a
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Coordinate Bench in the context of a Gaonburah Certificate and evidence
adduced, which we respectfully endorse:
“6. …Therefore, the entries made in the Gaonbura’s Certificate appears to
be based on faulty knowledge of the DW-3 and not based on any public
records maintained by his office in regular course of duty attached to his
office. The Executive Instructions appended to the Assam Land and
Revenue Regulation, 1886, does not cast any duty to the Gaonbura to
maintain record of citizens born in the Lot under his charge or register
containing names of females in Lot under his charge who are married to
persons outside the Lot under his charge.”
29. The petitioner as DW 1 had replied to the question put by the learned
Tribunal that names of the siblings were not stated in the written statement.
Similarly, DW 2, the projected uncle had responded to the Tribunal that the
names of the three sons and three daughters were not mentioned in the chief
examination. Further, DW 3, the projected brother had admitted that though
they were three brothers and three sisters, he had mentioned only one brother’s
name in his affidavit.
30. So far as the case law relied upon by the petitioner, the cases of Dol
Gobinda (supra) and Bant Singh (supra) of the Hon’ble Supreme Court were
in the context of Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act. The subject matter of
those two cases was entirely different from the present subject matter which is
on the determination of foreigners. As discussed above in details, the burden of
proof in a case of the present nature is on the proceedee and Section 9 starts
with a non obstante clause vis-Ã -vis the Indian Evidence Act.
Page No.# 16/17
31. So far as the case of Haider Ali (supra) is concerned, the observations
made therein appear to be not in consonance with the law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra). The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in clear terms has laid down the necessity of putting up
the defense by a proceedee which has to be understood to be in the form of a
written statement followed by credible and acceptable evidence and the
requirement of rebuttal evidence would come only when necessary. The case of
Sirajul Hoque (supra) is clearly distinguishable on facts and in fact the Hon’ble
Supreme Court had made an observation that all other aspects were consistent
except the name of the grandfather of the proceedee which varied from
“Kematullah” to “Kefatullah”.
32. In the case of Momin Ali vs Union of India reported in 2017 (2) GLT
1076, a Coordinate Bench had made the following observations which we
endorse:
“12. This written statement of the petitioner was wholly inadequate and did not
disclose any material facts. As noticed above, it was the allegation of the State
that petitioner was a foreigner. Therefore, as per mandate of Section 9 of the
Foreigners Act, 1946, it was the bounden duty of the petitioner to have
disclosed all material facts which were specifically within his knowledge in the
written statement but he did not do so. Petitioner neither mentioned his date of
birth nor his age. He was silent regarding the name of his mother and identity
of his grandparents – both paternal and maternal. He did not mention anything
about his brothers and sisters or about his marital status. On the basis of such a
written statement, it cannot be said that petitioner had stated anything
substantial to show that he was not a foreigner but a citizen of India.
Page No.# 17/17
13. It is a settled proposition of law that where a party fails to set up a case in
his pleadings, he would be debarred from adducing evidence in his support at
the stage of trial. As a matter of principle, variance between pleading and proof
is not permissible.”
33. In the case of Bijoy Das vs UOI reported in 2018 (3) GLT 118, this Court
has laid down that in proceedings of this nature, oral evidence alone would not
be enough and such evidence is required to be supported and corroborated by
documentary evidence and contemporaneous records. However, in this case, the
same has not been able to be done by the petitioner. We are of the view that
the petitioner as proceedee had failed to discharge her burden to prove her
citizenship.
34. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion
that the impugned order dated 17.11.2018 passed by the learned Foreigners
Tribunal III, Barpeta in F.T. Case No. 1192 (III) of 2013 does not call for any
interference.
35. The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. Interim order passed earlier
stands vacated. The actions consequent upon the opinion rendered by the
learned Tribunal would follow in accordance with law.
36. The records of the learned Tribunal be returned forthwith, along with a
copy of this order.
JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant
