24485) on 18 May, 2026

Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur

Urn: Crlmp / 4674U / 2019Kishan Lal vs State Of Rajasthan (2026:Rj-Jd:24485) on 18 May, 2026

Author: Farjand Ali

Bench: Farjand Ali

[2026:RJ-JD:24485]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
        S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 2030/2019

Kishan Lal S/o Bishna Ram, Aged About 66 Years, By Caste Jat,
Resident Of Ward No.22, Suratgarh District Sri Ganganagar
                                                                    ----Petitioner
                                    Versus
1.       State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
2.       Mahendra S/o Ram Rakh, By Caste Jat, Resident Of
         Ratanpura Police Station Sangaria, District Hanumangarh
                                                                 ----Respondents


For Petitioner(s)         :     Mr. S.K. Vyas
For Respondent(s)         :     Mr. Sameer Pareek, AGA
                                Mr. P.K. Rawla for R-2



                HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI

Order

18/05/2026

1. The instant Misc. Petition has been preferred assailing the

order dated 23.05.2018 passed by the learned ACJM, Suratagarh

in Regular Criminal Case No.377/2016 whereby charges came to

be framed against the petitioner for the offence punishable under

Section 420 of the IPC. The Criminal Revision No.43/2018

instituted against the said order also came to be dismissed vide

order dated 15.02.2019 passed by the learned Additional Sessions

Judge, Suratgarh District Sri Gananagar. Consequently, both the

aforesaid orders have been laid under challenge before this Court

by way of the present misc. petition.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended

that the dispute inter se the parties is overwhelmingly and

predominantly of a civil complexion arising out of an agreement to

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sell pertaining to a parcel of land and that the essential

ingredients constituting the offence of cheating are conspicuously

absent from the material collected during investigation. It was

urged that merely because the petitioner subsequently executed a

sale deed in favour of another person, the same by itself would

not ipso facto attract criminal liability under Section 420 IPC

unless there existed a dishonest and fraudulent intention at the

very inception of the transaction. It was further canvassed that

continuation of criminal proceedings in the facts of the present

case would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

3. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor as well as learned

counsel appearing for the complainant supported the impugned

orders and submitted that the petitioner, despite having received

an advance amount from the complainant pursuant to the

agreement to sell, deliberately resiled from the commitment and

alienated the property in favour of a third person, thereby causing

wrongful loss to the complainant and corresponding unlawful gain

unto himself. It was thus contended that the learned courts below

have rightly proceeded to frame charges against the petitioner.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

material available on record with the circumspection which the

controversy in hand warrants.

5. Upon a careful and comprehensive scrutiny of the factual

matrix emerging from the record, this Court finds that it is not in

serious dispute that the parties had entered into an agreement for

sale in respect of a piece of land and, pursuant thereto, an upfront

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consideration amount was allegedly paid by the complainant to

the petitioner. The gravamen of the accusation is that despite

entering into such agreement, the petitioner subsequently

executed a registered sale deed in favour of another individual,

thereby breaching the understanding allegedly arrived at between

the parties. However, what assumes significance for the purpose

of attracting the offence punishable under Section 420 IPC is not

merely the subsequent conduct of breach or non-performance, but

the existence of fraudulent or dishonest intention at the inception

of the transaction itself. The distinction between a mere breach of

contractual obligations giving rise to civil consequences and a

culpable act constituting the offence of cheating has consistently

been recognized by judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court as well as this Court. Criminal law cannot be

permitted to be employed as an instrumentality for enforcing

purely contractual liabilities unless the foundational ingredients of

mens rea are demonstrably present from the very inception of the

transaction.

5.1. This Court is further of the considered view that while

undertaking the exercise of framing of charge, a meticulous

appreciation and roving examination of evidence is undoubtedly

not warranted; nevertheless, the Court is under a solemn

obligation to ascertain whether the basic and indispensable

ingredients constituting the alleged offence are prima facie

discernible from the material collected during investigation. The

jurisdiction at the stage of framing of charge cannot be exercised

mechanically or as a matter of course merely because allegations

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have been levelled in the complaint. Even at such preliminary

stage, the Court is required to apply judicial mind to determine

whether the allegations, if accepted at their face value, satisfy the

legal constituents of the penal provision sought to be invoked. In

absence of material suggestive of initial fraudulent intent, the

criminal prosecution risks degenerating into a coercive mechanism

for settlement of private civil disputes.

5.2. An elaborate exposition upon the distinction between civil

liability and criminal culpability in matters arising out of

agreements to sell and contractual transactions has been rendered

by this Court in the case of Reema Vs. State of Rajasthan S.B.

Criminal Revision Petition No. 581/2025, decided on 22.01.2026.,

wherein it was held that though a detailed order is not mandated

at the stage of framing of charge, the order must nonetheless

reflect conscious application of judicial mind and cannot be cryptic

or non-speaking. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to

reproduce the relevant extract which is as under:

“9. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that this Court,
in S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 1675/2025 , an
earlier matter involving analogous facts and
circumstances, had occasion to examine the legality of an
order framing charge, wherein detailed observations were
made regarding the scope of judicial scrutiny at the stage
of framing of charge, the requirement of meaningful
application of mind, and the impermissibility of mechanical
framing of charges.

10. The said order is being reproduced hereunder for
ready reference:

1. By way of filing the instant revision petition, the petitioner
calls in question the order dated 06.11.2025 passed by the
learned Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, No. 1,
Udaipur, in Special Sessions Case No. 46/2025 (State v.

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Ganpatlal Sharma & Anr.), arising out of FIR No. 157/2024,
CPS ACB Jaipur, whereby charges have been framed against
the petitioner under Section 07 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended in 2018) and Section
61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, despite gross violation
of the mandatory provisions of Sections 230, 249, 250(1) and
250(2) of the BNSS, resulting in serious miscarriage of justice
and infringement of the petitioner’s fundamental rights
guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of
India, rendering the impugned order illegal, arbitrary and
unsustainable in law.

2. The brief facts of the present are that the petitioner is
Accused No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as “A-1”) in the
Sessions Case titled State v. Ganpat Lal Sharma & Anr.,
arising out of FIR No. 157/2024 registered at Central Police
Station (CPS), Anti Corruption Bureau (ACB). Upon
completion of investigation, Charge-sheet No. 221/2025 was
filed against the petitioner for the offence punishable under
Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as
amended up to 2018) and Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita. The present Criminal Revision Petition is
directed against the order dated 06.11.2025, whereby
charges have been framed against the petitioner in blatant
violation of Sections 230, 249, 250(1), 250(2) and 252(1) of
the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) and Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The charge-sheet was
submitted on 21.08.2025 before the learned Special Judge,
Prevention of Corruption Act, No. 1, Udaipur, by Respondent
No. 2, the Additional Superintendent of Police, ACB, Special
Unit, Udaipur.

3. Thereafter, the matter was placed before the learned Special
Judge on 17.09.2025, and on the same day, cognizance of
the alleged offence was taken, as reflected in the order sheet
dated 17.09.2025.

4. Subsequently, on 06.11.2025, the learned Special Judge
proceeded to take a decision to frame charges against the
petitioner. The order sheet dated 06.11.2025 records that
after hearing arguments on charge and perusal of the record,
a prima facie case under Section 7 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act and Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 was found to be made out, and charges were
accordingly framed, read over and explained to the accused,
who pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Directions were
further issued for summoning prosecution witnesses and for
leading prosecution evidence.

5. That the present S.B. Criminal Revision Petition is confined to
assailing the order dated 06.11.2025, whereby the decision to
frame charges and the consequent framing of charges against
the petitioner were undertaken, despite non-compliance with
the mandatory statutory safeguards contained in Sections
230, 249, 250(1), 250(2) and 252(1) of the BNSS, thereby
resulting in grave prejudice to the petitioner and causing
violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

6. Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone
through the materials available on record.

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OBSERVATIONS
A. Scope of Judicial Scrutiny at the Stage of Framing of
Charge

7. At the outset, it is necessary to recapitulate the well-settled
contours governing judicial scrutiny at the stage of framing of
charge. The Court, while exercising jurisdiction under
Sections 250 (Discharge) and 251 (Framing of charge) of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), is neither
expected to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence
nor to weigh the probative value of the material as would be
done after a full-fledged trial. Equally, the Court is not to act
as a mere conduit for endorsing the opinion of the
investigating agency.

8. The seminal judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr., AIR
1979 SC 366, authoritatively lays down that while framing
charge, the Judge has the undoubted power to sift and weigh
the material for the limited purpose of finding out whether a
prima facie case exists. The Court is duty-bound to apply its
judicial mind to the broad probabilities of the case, the total
effect of the material placed on record, and to ascertain
whether the accusation is not frivolous. The expression
“ground for presuming” does not imply proof beyond
reasonable doubt but nevertheless requires existence of
legally admissible material capable of supporting the essential
ingredients of the alleged offence.

9. At the same time, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanti
Bhadra Shah & Anr. v. State of West Bengal, (2000) 1
SCC 722, clarified that framing of charge does not require a
detailed or elaborate order akin to a judgment of acquittal or
discharge, the order must nonetheless reflect conscious
application of mind. The Court is not obliged to write lengthy
reasons while framing charges; however, it must demonstrate
that it has examined whether the basic ingredients of the
offence are disclosed from the material on record. Thus, the
law strikes a delicate balance: brevity is permissible,
mechanical endorsement is not.

B. Mandatory Nature of Procedural Safeguards under BNSS

10. The BNSS consciously preserves and strengthens
procedural safeguards at the pre-trial stage, recognising that
deprivation of liberty commences not merely upon conviction
but from the moment the criminal process is set in motion.
Sections 230 (Supply to accused of copy of police report and
other documents), 249 (Opening case for prosecution), 250
(Discharge) and 251 (Framing of charge) of the BNSS are not
empty formalities; they are statutory manifestations of the
constitutional guarantee of a fair procedure under Articles 14
and 21 of the Constitution of India.

11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that
where a statute prescribes a particular procedure, it must be
followed in that manner or not at all. Procedural compliance is
not a matter of convenience but of jurisdiction.
C. Non-Compliance with Section 230 BNSS – Supply of
Documents

12. Section 230 of the BNSS mandates that in cases
instituted on a police report, the Court shall, without delay,

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and in no case beyond fourteen days, furnish to the accused
copies of all documents forwarded with the police report
under Section 193(6) BNSS.

13. From the record, it emerges that although the order
sheet dated 17.09.2025 records that copies of the charge-
sheet “along with CD” were supplied, there is prima facie
substance in the grievance that all documents forming part of
the police report were not furnished, and that the supply was
effected through the investigating agency without judicial
verification or grant of reasonable time to the accused to
ascertain completeness.

14. More importantly, where the prosecution case
substantially rests upon electronic evidence, compliance with
Section 230 BNSS assumes heightened significance. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Gopalakrishnan @ Dileep v.
State of Kerala, (2020) 9 SCC 161, has categorically held
that the original memory card constitutes a document, and
the accused is entitled to receive its authenticated clone copy
prepared in accordance with law. Supply of an uncertified CD,
not prepared through hash-value authentication, does not
fulfil the statutory mandate.

15. The furnishing of incomplete or legally unrecognised
copies strikes at the very root of the accused’s right to
effectively invoke the remedy of discharge under Section 250
BNSS.

D. Failure to Conduct Prosecutorial Opening under Section
249 BNSS

16. Section 249 BNSS obligates the Public Prosecutor to
“open the case” by describing the charge and stating by what
evidence the prosecution proposes to establish guilt. The
phrase “shall open” is peremptory and admits of no
discretion.

17. The record of proceedings dated 06.11.2025 does not
reflect that any such prosecutorial opening was undertaken.
Absence of this statutory exercise deprives the Court of an
informed basis to assess whether the materials relied upon
correspond to the essential ingredients of the offence alleged.
Framing of charge without such prosecutorial articulation
reduces the judicial exercise to a formal endorsement of the
charge-sheet, which the law expressly prohibits.
E. Curtailment of the Right to Seek Discharge under Section
250 BNSS

18. For ready reference section 250 BNSS is reproduced
herein below-

Section 250 Discharge
(1) The accused may prefer an application for discharge
within a period of sixty days from the date of commitment of
the case under section 232.

(2) If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the
documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the
submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf,
the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the
accused and record his reasons for so doing.

19. Section 250(1) BNSS confers upon the accused a
valuable right to prefer an application for discharge within

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sixty days from the date of commitment. In cases under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, where the Special Judge takes
cognizance directly, the date of cognizance effectively marks
the commencement of this statutory period.

20. Learned counsel for the accused-petitioner, namely Mr.
C.S. Kotwani, Ms. Preeti Sharma and Mr. Manoj Chaudhary,
vehemently urged that the defence was in the process of
preparing an application for discharge and had unequivocally
expressed its intention to avail the statutory remedy under
Section 250 BNSS. It was submitted that despite such clear
inclination, the learned court proceeded to frame charges
without granting reasonable and adequate time to the
accused to exercise the liberty expressly conferred by law.

21. Although Section 250(1) BNSS provides a discretion to
the accused to prefer an application for discharge within sixty
days, the grant of such statutory period cannot be termed as
unreasonable or dilatory, as the same flows directly from the
legislative mandate. While it may be correct that in every
case the court is not denuded of power to consider the
question of discharge only upon the formal filing of an
application by the accused, yet where the accused manifests
a clear and bona fide intention to invoke the remedy of
discharge, the court is duty-bound to afford a meaningful
opportunity to do so. Denial of such opportunity, particularly
when the statute itself prescribes a specific time frame,
amounts to rendering the statutory right illusory and defeats
the very object of Section 250(2) BNSS, which obligates
judicial consideration of the sufficiency of grounds before
proceeding to frame charges.

22. In the present case, charges came to be framed on the
50th day from the date of cognizance, thereby truncating the
statutory window available to the accused.

23. Further, Section 250(2) BNSS mandates the Court to
consider the record and hear the submissions of the accused
even where no formal discharge application is filed, and to
record reasons for declining discharge. The impugned order
does not reflect such consideration or reasoning.
F. Mechanical Framing of Charge and Absence of Meaningful
Judicial Application of Mind

24. The impugned order dated 06.11.2025, when
examined on the anvil of the statutory framework and the
settled principles governing framing of charge, discloses a
manifest deficiency in judicial reasoning and application of
mind. The order sheet merely records, in a highly cursory and
omnibus manner, that arguments on charge were heard, the
record was perused, and a prima facie case under Section 7
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended in
2018) and Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita was
found to be made out. Beyond this ritualistic recital, the order
is conspicuously silent as to what material, what
circumstances, or what factual substratum weighed with the
learned Trial Court in forming such an opinion.

25. It is no doubt correct that at the stage of framing of
charge, the Court is not expected to write a detailed or
elaborate order as would be warranted at the stage of
discharge or final adjudication. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in

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Kanti Bhadra Shah & Anr. v. State of West Bengal
(2000) 1 SCC 722 has clarified that framing of charge does
not require a reasoned order akin to a judgment. However,
the said principle cannot be misconstrued to legitimise a
mechanical or non-speaking exercise, devoid of even minimal
articulation of judicial satisfaction. Brevity is permissible;
opacity is not.

26. The distinction between a brief order and a mechanical
order is well recognised in criminal jurisprudence. Even while
framing charges, the Court must indicate, albeit succinctly,
that it has adverted to the material on record and that such
material, if taken at face value, discloses the existence of
the essential ingredients of the offence alleged for
which charges has to be framed. A mere reproduction of
statutory sections or a bare assertion that an offence is
“prima facie made out” does not fulfil this requirement.

27. This requirement assumes greater significance in
prosecutions under the Prevention of Corruption Act post the
2018 amendment. The legislative transformation of Section 7
has introduced the element of “improper or dishonest
performance of public duty” as a sine qua non. Therefore,
even at the threshold stage, the Court is expected to advert,
howsoever briefly to the existence of material indicating
demand or acceptance of undue advantage in connection with
such improper or dishonest performance. In the absence of
even a skeletal reference to such material, the order betrays
a presumption rather than a judicial satisfaction.

28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v.

Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr., AIR 1979 SC 366, has
categorically held that the Judge cannot act merely as a post
office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution. The Court must
consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of
the evidence and documents produced, and any basic
infirmities apparent on the face of the record. The impugned
order, however, reflects no such exercise and instead appears
to have proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the
filing of a charge-sheet ipso facto warrants framing of charge.

29. Further, the expression “arguments on charge heard”

recorded in the order sheet, without even a fleeting reference
to the nature of such arguments or the reasons for their
rejection, renders the exercise under Sections 250 and 251 of
the BNSS illusory. Such recording, unaccompanied by any
demonstrable consideration, amounts to an empty formality,
which has been consistently deprecated by constitutional
courts. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kranti Associates
Pvt. Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan (2010) 9 SCC 496 has
held that “rubber-stamp reasons” or pretence of reasoning
cannot be equated with a valid judicial decision-making
process.

30. This Court, in H.G. Grover v. State of Rajasthan
(S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 1356/2022), has
reiterated that although meticulous appreciation of evidence
is not required at the stage of framing of charge, the Trial
Court must nonetheless satisfy itself that the material on
record discloses the essential ingredients of the offence and
must reflect such satisfaction in the order. The absence of

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such reflection renders the order vulnerable to judicial
correction.

31. Thus, the impugned order dated 06.11.2025, viewed
holistically, suffers from procedural superficiality and lack of
discernible judicial reasoning. It does not demonstrate that
the learned Trial Court applied its independent judicial mind
to the statutory ingredients of the offences alleged, nor does
it indicate how the material on record satisfies the threshold
of “ground for presuming” as contemplated under Section 251
BNSS. Such an order, though brief, crosses the impermissible
line into mechanical adjudication and therefore cannot be
sustained in law.

32. At this juncture, it is of crucial significance to
underscore that Section 250 BNSS expressly enables the
accused to avail a statutory period of sixty days to prefer an
application for discharge. The provision is not merely
directory but confers a substantive procedural right upon the
accused to invoke judicial scrutiny of the sufficiency of
grounds before being compelled to face a full-fledged trial.
Once the defence, through its counsel, categorically conveys
its intention to exercise such right, the Court is obligated to
facilitate and receive such application, rather than foreclose
the statutory remedy by prematurely proceeding to frame
charges.

33. This Court is conscious of the fact that the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita is a relatively new procedural code,
and situations may arise where the accused expressly seeks
to avail the entire statutory window of sixty days for moving
an application for discharge. Such procedural contingencies
are inherent in the legislative scheme and may, in future,
warrant authoritative pronouncement by constitutional courts.

34. However, since the precise contours of such situations
do not presently fall for exhaustive adjudication, this Court
refrains from making any broader or final comment on the
issue. Nonetheless, so long as the statutory provision stands
on the statute book, adherence thereto is not optional but
mandatory. It is incumbent upon the Court, at the very least,
to examine whether the mandate of Section 250 BNSS has
been complied with in letter and spirit. The failure to do so,
particularly in the face of an expressed intent by the accused
to invoke the said provision, vitiates the procedural fairness
of the proceedings and strikes at the root of the statutory
safeguard envisaged by the legislature.

G. Nature of Present Observations and Consequential
Directions

35. It is clarified, with utmost circumspection, that the
foregoing discussion is purely academic and procedural in
nature. This Court has consciously refrained from expressing
any opinion on whether the material on record ultimately
warrants framing of charge against the petitioner or not. The
merits of the prosecution case are left completely open to be
left upon the learned trial court to adjudge whether charges
are liable to be framed or not.

36. In view of the cumulative procedural infirmities noticed
hereinabove, the impugned order dated 06.11.2025 cannot

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be sustained. The matter deserves to be remanded to the
learned Special Judge for fresh consideration.

37. Accordingly, the instant revision petition is allowed in
part and the impugned order dated 06.11.2025 is set aside.
The matter is remitted with directions that:

▪ the learned Trial Court shall afford adequate opportunity to
both parties;

▪ the petitioner shall be granted ten days’ further time, if so
advised, to move an application for discharge;
▪ the learned Special Judge shall thereafter pass an appropriate
order strictly in accordance with law, keeping in view the
statutory scheme of the BNSS and the settled legal position.

38. The learned Trial Court shall remain entirely free and
uninfluenced by any observation made herein and shall
decide the matter independently on the basis of the material
available on record and the submissions advanced before it.

11. A careful comparison of the facts of the present case
with those considered in the aforesaid order reveals that
the present case is squarely covered by the principles laid
down therein.

12. In the present matter also, the impugned order dated
18.03.2025 reflects a mechanical exercise of jurisdiction.
The learned Trial Court has merely recorded that
arguments on charge were heard and, upon perusal of the
record, found sufficient grounds to frame charge under
Section 302 IPC, without even minimal indication as to
what material or circumstances weighed with it for forming
such opinion.

13. It is trite law that though a detailed appreciation of
evidence is not required at the stage of framing of charge,
the Court is nonetheless obliged to apply its judicial mind
to the material on record and satisfy itself that the
essential ingredients of the alleged offence are prima facie
disclosed. A cryptic and omnibus order, bereft of
discernible reasoning, falls foul of the settled principles
governing framing of charge.

14. In the present case, the impugned order does not
reflect consideration of the peculiar factual backdrop,
including the role attributed to the petitioner in the FIR,
her consistent version in the Parcha Bayan and statement
under Section 164 Cr.P.C., and the circumstances under
which the investigating agency reversed the role of the
parties while filing the charge-sheet. The order, therefore,
gives an impression of having been passed as a matter of

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routine, rather than as a result of an informed judicial
exercise.

15. The infirmity noticed is not merely cosmetic but goes
to the root of the matter, as the framing of charge marks a
serious stage in criminal proceedings, carrying grave
consequences for the liberty and reputation of an accused.
Such an order must withstand the minimal requirement of
judicial scrutiny.

16. This Court is conscious of the fact that it is not
required, at this stage, to enter into the merits of the
prosecution case or to weigh the probative value of the
evidence. Accordingly, this Court refrains from expressing
any opinion on whether a charge under Section 302 IPC is
ultimately made out or not. All such issues are left open to

be examined by the learned Trial Court.”

The principles enunciated in Reema (Supra) unequivocally

govern the controversy involved in the present case. Applying the

aforesaid exposition of law to the factual matrix at hand, this

Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned orders are

vitiated by manifest non-application of judicial mind. The courts

below failed to undertake the requisite judicial scrutiny of the

material available on record and proceeded in a mechanical

manner without recording cogent reasons reflecting prima facie

satisfaction regarding fulfilment of the essential ingredients

constituting the alleged offences. The orders impugned herein are

conspicuously bereft of analytical reasoning and do not disclose

due consideration of the settled legal parameters governing the

issue. Such cryptic and non-speaking orders, passed in absence of

meaningful evaluation of the material and the governing legal

principles, cannot be permitted to sustain in the eyes of law.

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6. In view of the foregoing discussion and having regard to the

peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the

opinion that the matter deserves reconsideration by the learned

trial Court in light of the legal principles governing the field.

Consequently, the instant misc. petition deserves to be partly

allowed.

7. Accordingly, the misc. petition is partly allowed. The order

dated 23.05.2018 passed by the learned ACJM, Suatgarh in

Regular Criminal Case No.377/2016 framing charges against the

petitioner for the offence under Section 420 IPC as well as the

revisional order dated 15.02.2019 passed by the learned

Additional District & Sessions Judge, Suratgarh, District Sri

Gananagar in Criminal Revision No.43/2018 affirming the same

are hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded back

to the learned ACJM with a direction to afford an opportunity of

hearing to the parties afresh and thereafter pass an appropriate

order in accordance with law, uninfluenced by the previous orders

and keeping in view the principles enunciated in the judgment

referred to hereinabove.

8. The stay petition and all pending applications, if any, also

stand disposed of accordingly.

(FARJAND ALI),J
32-Mamta/-

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