Punjab-Haryana High Court
Jasbir Kaur vs State Of Punjab on 18 May, 2026
Author: Rajesh Bhardwaj
Bench: Rajesh Bhardwaj
CRR-3299-2025 1
149
THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRR-3299-2025
Reserved on: 17.03.2026
Pronounced on: 18.05.2026
Uploaded on: 19.05.2026
Jasbir Kaur ..... Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab
..... Respondent
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH BHARDWAJ
Present: Mr. Sidhant Vermani, Advocate for the petitioner(s).
Mr. K.D. Sachdeva, D.A.G., Punjab.
RAJESH BHARDWAJ, J.
1. Present revision petition has been filed by the petitioner
against the order dated 12.12.2025, whereby application filed by the
petitioner for grant of default bail was dismissed by learned trial Court, in
view of order dated 27.11.2025 passed by the learned Judge, Special
Court, Amritsar, whereby the application filed by the prosecution for
extension of time for filing the challan under Section 36(A)(4) of NDPS
Act in a case bearing FIR No.106, dated 04.06.2025, under Sections 21,
21(c), 29, 61, 85 of NDPS Act, registered at Police Station Chheharta,
Amritsar, was allowed.
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CRR-3299-2025 2
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
petitioner has been falsely implicated in case bearing FIR No.106, dated
04.06.2025, under Sections 21, 21(c), 29, 61, 85 of NDPS Act, registered
at Police Station Chheharta, Amritsar and was arrested on 04.06.2025. He
has submitted that after registration of the FIR, the statutory period for
filing the challan expired on 30.11.2025. He has submitted that since
then, he is in custody for a period of more than 180 days, but the challan
was not presented within this period, which gave her indefeasible right of
being released on default bail under Section 187(3) of BNSS (earlier
Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.). He has submitted that the Investigating Agency
on 15.11.2025 moved an application seeking extension of time for
presentation of challan and the learned trial Court had illegally allowed
the application vide order dated 27.11.2025 with extension of two months
time. He has submitted that the pendency of FSL report is not a
compelling ground to extend the custody of the petitioner beyond the
period of 180 days. He has further submitted that after the completion of
180 days, the petitioner moved an application praying for the grant of
default bail under Section 187(3) Cr.P.C. (earlier Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.)
before the learned trial Court, however, the learned trial Court, dismissed
the application filed by the petitioner for default bail vide order dated
12.12.2025. He submits that the Investigating Agency has not given any
specific ground as to why the detention of the petitioner was required
beyond the period of 180 days. To buttress his arguments, learned
counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision passed by this
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CRR-3299-2025 3
Hon’ble Court in ‘Mahender Vs. State of Haryana, CRR-662-2023‘;
‘Punma Ram Vs. State of Haryana, CRR-1427-2023’; ‘Sahid Vs. State
of Haryana, CRR-2697-2023 and CRR-2696-2023’; ‘Sanjay Kuma
Kedia @ Sanjay Kedia vs. Intelligence Officer, Nrcotic Control Bureau
and another‘; ‘Gulam Navi @ Gami Vs. State of Haryana, CRR-1528-
2023 and CRM-M-27369-2023′ and ‘Navneet Vs. State of Haryana,
CRR-1759-2023’. He has thus, submitted that order dated 27.11.2025
whereby the application for extension of time for filing the challan was
allowed as well as order dated 12.12.2025, vide which the application of
the petitioner for default bail was dismissed, passed by the trial Court
have been passed without appreciating the real facts and as such the same
are liable to be set aside.
3. Notice of motion.
4. On asking of the Court, Mr. K.D. Sachdeva, D.A.G., Punjab
appears and accepts notice on behalf of the respondent-State. He, however,
has opposed the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner. He has
submitted that in the absence of the chemical report, it is not possible for
investigating agencies to present the challan in the Court. He has
submitted that the petitioner was arrested on 04.06.2025 and her custody
of 180 days was going to expire on 30.11.2025 and the application for
extension of time for filing the challan was moved on 15.11.2025, which is
well before the expiry of the same and the learned Judge, Special Court,
Amritsar had rightly allowed the same vide order dated 27.11.2025. He
has submitted that the petitioner moved an application for
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CRR-3299-2025 4
default bail on 12.12.2025 which was beyond statutory period of 180
days and after application for extension of time filed by the prosecution
was accepted by the trial Court and two months time was granted to the
investigating agency for filing of challan/final report. He has further
submitted that since the application for extension of time was allowed,
therefore, petitioner was not entitled for default bail and his application
was rightly dismissed. He has further submitted that the orders passed by
the learned Judge, Special Court, Amritsar suffer from no illegality or
irregularity and thus, the present revision petition is liable to the
dismissed.
5. Heard.
6. Admittedly, the present FIR was registered on 04.06.2025
and the petitioner was also arrested on the same day. The period of 180
days of custody of the petitioner was going to expire on 30.11.2025,
however, the challan was not filed within the statutory period. As the
report from the chemical examiner was not received, the Investigating
Agency moved an application on 15.11.2025 for extension of time for
filing the challan. The learned trial Court allowed the same vide its order
dated 27.11.2025. The learned trial Court has opined that there is every
possibility of delay may have occasioned in obtaining the report of
chemical examiner and thus to this, there is a delay of filing the challan
and further period of two month was extended to present the challan. A
perusal of the record would show that the petitioner moved an application
for default bail on 12.12.2025, however, the same was dismissed by
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learned trial Court by observing that the application for extension of
presentation of challan had already been allowed on 27.11.2025 and as
such the application for grant of default bail, was not maintainable.
7. For resolving the controversy involved in the present case,
appreciation of Section 187(3) of BNSS and Section 36-A of the NDPS
Act, is essential, which reads as under:-
“Section 187(3)- The Magistrate may authorise the detention
of the accused person, beyond the period of fifteen days, if
he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but
no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused
person in custody under this sub-section for a total period
exceeding-
(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence
punishable with death, imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term of ten years or more;
(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other
offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days,
or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be
released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail,
and every person released on bail under this sub-section
shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of
Chapter XXXV for the purposes of that Chapter.”
“36A. Offences triable by Special Courts:-
x x x x x x x
(4) In respect of persons accused of an offence punishable
under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A or for
offences involving commercial quantity the references in
sub-section (2) of section 167 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), thereof to “ninety days”,
where they occur, shall be construed as reference to “onePOOJA SHARMA
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CRR-3299-2025 6hundred and eighty days”: Provided that, if it is not
possible to complete the investigation within the said period
of one hundred and eighty days, the Special Court may
extend the said period up to one year on the report of the
Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation
and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused
beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days.’
8. From the bare reading of the above-said Sections, it is clear
that after completion of mandatory period required for completion of
investigation and presentation of challan before the competent Court i.e.
within 180 days, indefeasible right accrues to the accused to be released
on default bail. However, in the present case, the statutory period of 180
days for filing the challan was to expire on 30.11.2025, and the
Investigating Agency moved an application seeking extension of time for
filing the challan on 15.11.2025 and the same was allowed on
27.11.2025. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application for grant of
default bail on 12.12.2025 and at this stage, no challan was filed,
however, the application filed by the prosecution was allowed and two
months further time was extended for filing the challan whereas the
application filed by the petitioner was dismissed vide order dated
12.12.2025.
9. Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Uday Mohanlal Acharya vs.
State of Maharashtra‘, 2001(2) RCR (Criminal) 452 while relying upon
several judgments recorded its conclusion as under:-
x x x x x x x
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“1. Under sub-section (2) of Section 167, a Magistrate
before whom an accused is produced while the police is
investigating into the offence can authorise detention of the
accused in such custody as the Magistrate thinks fit for a
term not exceeding 15 days in the whole.
2. Under the proviso to aforesaid sub-section (2) of Section
167, the Magistrate may authorise detention of the accused
otherwise than the custody of police for a total period not
exceeding 90 days where the investigation relates to offence
punishable with death, imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and 60
days where the investigation relates to any other offence.
3. On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days,
as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in
favour of the accused for being released on bail on
account of default by the Investigating Agency in the
completion of the investigation within the period
prescribed and the accused is entitled to be released on
bail, if he is prepared to and furnish the bail, as directed
by the Magistrate.
4. When an application for bail is filed by an accused for
enforcement of his indefeasible right alleged to have
accrued in his favour on account of default on the part of
the Investigating Agency in completion of the
investigation within the specified period, the
Magistrate/Court must dispose of it forthwith, on being
satisfied that in fact the accused has been custody for the
period of 90 days or 60 days, as specified and no charge-
sheet has been filed by the Investigating Agency. Such
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prompt action on the part of the Magistrate/Court will
not enable the prosecution to frustrate the object of the
Act and the legislative mandate of an accused being
released on bail on account of the default on the part of
the Investigating Agency in completing the investigation
within the period stipulated.
5. If the accused is unable to furnish bail, as directed by the
Magistrate, then the conjoint reading of Explanation I and
proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167, the continued
custody of the accused even beyond the specified period in
paragraph (a) will not be unauthorised, and, therefore, if
during that period the investigation is complete and charge-
sheet is filed then the so-called indefeasible right of the
accused would stand extinguished.
6. The expression ‘if not already availed of’ used by this
Court in Sanjay Dutt‘s case (supra) must be understood to
mean when the accused files an application and is prepared
to offer bail on being directed. In other words, on expiry of
the period specified in paragraph (a) of proviso to sub-
section (2) of Section 167 if the accused files an application
for bail and offers also to furnish the bail, on being directed,
then it has to be held that the accused has availed of his
indefeasible right even though the Court has not considered
the said application and has not indicated the terms and
conditions of bail, and the accused has not furnished the
same.”
10. Similarly in ‘Enforcement Directorate Government of
India vs. Kapil Wadhawan and another etc.’, 2023(2) RCR (Criminal)
474, Hon;ble Supreme Court held as under:-
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“50. Since there exists vacuum in the application and details
of section 167 CrPC, 1973 we have opted for an
interpretation which advances the cause of personal liberty.
The accused herein were remanded on 14.05.2020 and as
such, the chargesheet ought to have been filed on or before
12.07.2020 (i.e. the sixtieth day). But the same was filed,
only on 13.07.2020 which was the 61st day of their custody.
Therefore, the right to default bail accrued to the accused
persons on 13.07.2020 at 12:00 AM, midnight, onwards. On
that very day, the accused filed their default bail applications
at 8:53 AM. The ED filed the chargesheet, later in the day, at
11:15 AM. Thus, the default bail Applications were filed
well before the chargesheet. In Ravindran(supra) and
Bikramjit (supra), which followed the Constitution Bench in
Sanjay Dutt(supra) it was rightly held that if the accused
persons avail their indefeasible right to default bail before
the chargesheet/final report is filed, then such right would
not stand frustrated or extinguished by any such subsequent
filing. We therefore declare that the stipulated 60/90 day
remand period under section 167 CrPC, 1973 ought to be
computed from the date when a Magistrate authorizes
remand. If the first day of remand is excluded, the remand
period, as we notice will extend beyond the permitted 60/90
days’ period resulting in unauthorized detention beyond the
period envisaged under section 167 CrPC, 1973. In cases
where the chargesheet/final report is filed on or after the
61st/91st day, the accused in our considered opinion would
entitled to default bail. In other words, the very moment the
stipulated 60/90 day remand period expires, an indefeasible
right to default bail accrues to the accused.”
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11. The undisputed facts of the present case are detailed herein
below:-
S. Date Annexure
No.
1. 04.06.2025 Annexure P-1 The petitioner was arrested in FIR
No.0106, dated 04.06.2025, under
Sections 21(c) of NDPS Act, registered at
Police Station Chheharta, District Police
Commissionerate, Amritsar.
2. 15.11.2025 Annexure P-3 Application under Section 36A(4) of
NDPS Act for extension of time for filing
the final report/challan was filed by the
public prosecutor concerned on the
ground that the investigation is
multidimensional and evidence is
scattered and thus, could not be completed
within stipulated period.
3. 26.11.2025 Annexure P-4 Reply to the application under Section
36A(4) of NDPS Act for extension of
period for filing the final report/challan
under Section 193 BNSS
4. 27.11.2025 Annexure P-5 Application filed by the State for
(Impugned extension of period for filing the final
order) report/challan under Section 193 BNSS
was allowed and a period of two month
was granted to complete the
investigation.
5. 30.11.2025 Expiry of statutory period of 180 days
6. 12.12.2025 Annexure P-2 Application filed by the petitioner
under Section 187(3) of BNSS
(erstwhile Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.) for
the grant of default bail were dismissed.
12. The issue which needs determination is whether the reasons
given for allowing the application under Section 36A(4) of NDPS Act, to
extend the time period by two month for permitting the prosecution to
complete the investigation and for presentation of the challan and thus,
defeating the statutory right of the petitioner for grant of default bail are
valid and sufficient to prolong incarceration of the petitioner. The
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relevant para of the impugned order dated 27.11.2025 reproduced as
under:
“I have gone through the rival contentions raised by both the
sides besides and gone through the record carefully. In the
present case, accused Jasbir Kaur was arrested on 04.06.2025
and period of 180 days of custody are going to expire on
30.11.2025. The application for extension of time for
presentation of challan has been preferred by the Ld. Addl. PP
on 15.11.2025 i.e. well before the expiry of 180 days and the
recitals of the application explains the reasons for extension of
time. It is averred in the application that as investigation is
multifaceted and multidimensional and evidence is scattered,
investigation could not be completed within stipulated period
and the recovery effected in the present FIR falls in the category
of commercial quantity. Further it is averred in the
application that report Chemical Examiner is yet to be
received and it is not mandatory as per the provisions of
Section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act that application should be
accompanied by an extra report or in a particular format.
The objective of an application under Section 36A(4) of the
NDPS Act is to require the public prosecutor to intimate the
Court regarding the progress of the investigation and the
specific reason for the detention of the accused beyond a
period of 180 days. The validity of the application and the
soundness of the reasons is not to be assessed. Henceforth,
this court is of the considered view that the application for
seeking extension of time is in accordance with the provision of
Section 36 of the NDPS Act. In view of aforesaid reasons, the
application for extension of time to present the challan stands
allowed and further period of two months is extended from the
date of order. The application is disposed of accordingly. .”
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CRR-3299-2025 12
13. A perusal of the relevant portion of the impugned order
dated 27.11.2025 would show that the application for extension of time
beyond 180 days moved by the prosecution was allowed by giving
specific reason that chemical examiner report is awaited and the
investigation is multifaceted and multidimensional and evidence is
scattered. It is pertinent to mention here that the application for extension
signed by the Investigating Officer cannot be construed as a report of the
Public Prosecutor as envisaged in Proviso to sub section (4) of Section
36A of the NDPS Act and the Public Prosecutor has only given reason
that the investigation is multifaceted and multidimensional, however,
neither any grounds/reasons for detention of the petitioner beyond the
statutory period of 180 days was mentioned nor the progress of trial has
been explained in the same. It is a settled position of law that report by
Public Prosecutor is not a mere formality but requires due application of
mind as to the ground for delay in filing challan and the reasons for
further detention of accused.
14. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in ‘Hargobind Singh vs.
State of Punjab‘ 2014(3) RCR (Criminal) 73, has held as under:
“15. In the first instance, it may be recorded that there has
been a non-compliance of the provisions contained in Section 36-
A of the Act. The provision mandates a report of the Public
Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation as also the
specific and compelling reasons for seeking the detention of the
accused beyond a period of 180 days. A perusal of the application
preferred by the prosecution seeking extension of time under
Section 36-A of the Act at Annexure P2 would reveal that the basis
for seeking extension was two-fold, i.e. (i) the investigation has to
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CRR-3299-2025 13
cover various parts of India as also Pakistan, England and Canada
and (ii) the Chemical examination report of Forensic Science
Laboratory, Chandigarh is yet awaited. On such application,
the trial Court granted the extension of 30 days vide order
dated 11.2.2014 at Annexure P4 by merely re-producing the
bald averments made at the hands of the prosecution in the
application seeking extension. This Court would have no
hesitation in observing that the order dated 11.2.2014 passed
by the trial Court granting extension of 30 days for completion
of investigation was done in a routine and mechanical
fashion.”
15. While relying upon a decision rendered in ‘Sanjay Kumar
Kedia @ Sanjay Kedia vs. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control
Bureau and another‘, 2010 (1) RCR (Criminal) 942 by Hon’ble the
Supreme Court, a Coordinate Bench of this Court in ‘Joginder Singh vs.
State of Haryana‘, 2022 (3) RCR (Criminal) 99 has held as under:
“In the case in hand, the application for extension signed
by the Investigating Officer cannot be construed as a report of
the Public Prosecutor as envisaged in Proviso to sub section (4)
of Section 36A of the NDPS Act for the reason that Public
Prosecutor had only appended his signatures at the bottom of
the page, that too, without even making an endorsement that he
had perused the grounds and that, he was satisfied about the
progress of investigation and reasons set out for extension of
time to complete the investigation. Further, the report did not
disclose the progress of investigation. It is a settle proposition
of law that report is not a mere formality but requires due
application of mind as to the ground for delay in filing challan
and the reasons for further detention of accused. In the
considered view of this Court, the application/report filed by the
prosecution did not meet the aforesaid requirements envisaged
in Proviso to Section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act. It can safely bePOOJA SHARMA
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CRR-3299-2025 14held that the application for seeking extension of time was
nothing but a transmission of request of an Investigating
Officer. The report did not reflect the steps taken for obtaining
FSL report during the period of first 180 days.
In similar circumstances, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
in the case of Sanjay Kumar Kedia (supra) held as under:-
“10. The maximum period of 90 days fixed under Section
167(2) of the Code has been increased to 180 days for several
categories of offence under the Act but the proviso authorizes a
yet further period of detention which may in total go upto one
year, provided the stringent conditions provided therein are
satisfied and are complied with. The conditions provided are :
(1) a report of the public prosecutor,
(2) which indicates the progress of the investigation, and
(3) specified the compelling reasons for seeking the detention of
the accused beyond the period of 180 days, and
(4) after notice to the accused. xx xx xx xx 14. A bare perusal of
the application shows that it has been filed by the
investigating officer of respondent No.1 and does not indicate
even remotely any application of mind on the part of the
public prosecutor. It further does not indicate the progress of
the investigation, nor the compelling reasons which required
an extension of custody beyond 180 days. This application
was allowed by the Special Judge on 2nd August, 2007 i.e. on
the day on which it was filed which also reveals that no
notice had been issued to the accused and he was not even
present in Court on that day.”
Record clearly reveals that the impugned order(s)
lack satisfaction of aforesaid mandatory conditions of Section
36A(4) of the NDPS Act. In the absence of an appropriate
report, the court would have no jurisdiction to deny an accused
his indefeasible right to be released on bail on account of the
default of the prosecution to file the challan within the
prescribed time if an accused seeks and is prepared to furnish
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CRR-3299-2025 15
the bail bonds as directed by the court. Moreover, no extension
can be granted to keep an accused in custody beyond the
prescribed period except to enable the investigation to be
completed and as already stated above, before any extension is
granted, the accused must be put on notice and permitted to
have his say so as to be able to object to the grant of extension.
As regards Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., it creates an indefeasible
right in an accused person, on account of the ‘default’ by the
investigating agency in the completion of the investigation
within the maximum period prescribed or extended, as the case
may be, to seek an order for his release on bail. It is for this
reason that an order for release on bail under proviso (a) of
Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. is generally termed as an “order-on-
default” as it is granted on account of the default of the
prosecution to complete the investigation and file the challan
within the prescribed period. As a consequence of amendment,
an accused after the expiry of 180 days from the date of his
arrest becomes entitled to bail irrespective of the nature of the
offence with which he is charges, where the prosecution fails to
put up challan against him on completion of the investigation.
Thus, in the considered view of this Court, as per Section
167(2) Cr.P.C., an indefeasible right to be enlarged on bail
accrues in favour of the accused, if the police fails to complete
the investigation and put up a challan against him in
accordance with law under Section 173 Cr.P.C. An obligation,
in such a case, is cast upon the Court, when after the expiry of
the maximum period during which an accused could be kept in
custody, to decline the police request for further remand. There
is yet another obligation also which is cast on the court and that
is to inform the accused of his right of being released on bail
and enable him to make an application in that behalf. This legal
position has been very ably stated in Aslam Babalal Desai Vs.
State of Maharashtra, 1993 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 600,
where speaking for the majority, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
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referred the law laid down in Rajnikant Jivanlal Patel &
another Vs. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, New
Delhi, AIR 1990 Supreme Court 71, wherein it was held that:-
“The right to bail under Section 167(2) proviso (a) thereto is
absolute. It is a legislative command and not court‟s discretion.
If the investigating agency fails to file chargesheet before the
expiry of 90/96 days, as the case may be, the accused in custody
should be released on bail. But at that stage, merits of the case
are not to be examined. Not at all. In fact, the magistrate has no
power to remand a person beyond the stipulated period of 90/96
days. He must pass an order of bail and communicate the same
to the accused to furnish the requisite bail bond.”
The record clearly deciphers that application for extension of
time was allowed without any notice to the petitioner. The
liberty of the accused is at stake and cannot be taken away in a
casual manner without affording an opportunity of hearing.
The other ingredients inasmuch as specific reasons for
extension of time, the progress of the investigation and
compelling reasons for detention of the petitioner beyond
the period of 180 days have not been spelt out in the order
extending time for completion of investigation or in the
order declining default bail to the petitioner relying on
extension of time to complete investigation.”
16. Similar view has been taken by a Coordinate Bench of this
Court in ‘Ravinder @ Bhola vs. State of Haryana‘, 2023 NCPHHC
140642 and ‘Gurmej Singh and others vs. State of Haryana and
others‘, 2023(1) RCR (Criminal) 339.
17. Keeping in view the anvil of the law settled in the above
mentioned judgments rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court as well as
by this Court, the reasons given for seeking extension of time by the
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CRR-3299-2025 17
prosecution does not meet parameters as laid down under Section 36A(4)
of NDPS Act and non receipt of the chemical examiner report could not
be stated to be a valid reason for seeking detention of accused beyond the
statutory period of 180 days.
18. In view of the overall facts and circumstances of the present
case, the extension of time granted vide order dated 27.11.2025 was not
in accordance with law and thus, the impugned order dated 27.11.2025 is
liable to be set aside. Accordingly, application of the petitioner filed
under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. which creates an indefeasible right in an
accused person on account of the default by the investigating agency,
deserves to be allowed.
19. Keeping in view the abovesaid facts and circumstances, the
present petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 27.11.2025
passed by learned Judge, Special Court, Amritsar, is hereby set aside
along with order dated 12.12.2025, whereby, application for default bail
filed by the petitioner was dismissed. The petitioner is held to be entitled
for default bail subject to her furnishing bail/surety bonds the satisfaction
of learned trial Court/Duty Magistrate, if not required in any other case.
20. Nothing said herein shall be treated as an expression of
opinion of the merits of the case.
18.05.2026 (RAJESH BHARDWAJ)
ps-I JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
POOJA SHARMA
2026.05.19 13:51
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
