Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Urn: Cw / 26101U / 2024M/S Giri Transport … vs The Appellate Authority For Advance … on 20 May, 2026
[2026:RJ-JD:24464-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13071/2024
M/s Giri Transport Company, Through Its Proprietor Sh. Sunil Giri
S/o Shri Bal Giri Aged About 30 Years Having Its Office At M/s
Giri Transport Company, Near Swami Dharamshala, Ward No. 12,
Suratgarh - 335804 (Rajasthan)
----Petitioner
Versus
1. The Appellate Authority For Advance Ruling, Rajasthan,
Goods And Services Tax, Ncr Building, Statute Circle, C
Scheme, Jaipur, Rajasthan - 302005.
2. The Rajasthan Authority For Advance Ruling, Goods And
Services Tax Kar Bhawan Ambedkar Circle, Jaipur,
Rajasthan - 302005.
3. The Deputy Commissioner, State Tax Department, Circle
Suratgarh Ward-I, Zone Ganganagar, Kar Bhawan, Near
Sadar Police Station, Hanumangarh Road, Suratgarh,
Rajasthan 335804.
4. The Joint Commissioner, State Tax Department, Circle
Suratgarh Ward I, Zone Ganganagar Kar Bhawan, Near
Sadar Police Station, Hanumangarh Road, Suratgarh,
Rajasthan - 335804.
5. State Of Rajasthan Through The Finance Secretary
(Revenue), Finance Department, Government Of
Rajasthan, 1St Floor, Main Building, Government
Secretariat, Janpath, Jaipur, Rajasthan - 302005.
6. The Principal Commissioner, Cgst And Cx/st Jodhpur, G-
105 Road No. 5, Aiims Hospital, New Industrial Area,
Basni, Near Diesel Shed, Jodhpur, Rajasthan - 342003.
7. Union Of India, Through The Revenue Secretary, Ministry
Of Finance, North Block, New Delhi - 110001.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr.Sanjay Jhanwar, Sr. Advocate
assisted by Mr. Wilson Joy
For Respondent(s) : Mr.Mahaveer Bishnoi, AAG assisted by
Mr.Harshvardhan Singh Chundawat.
Mr.Kuldeep Vaishnav with Mr.Arpit
Yoganandi.
Mr.Nilesh Choudhary.
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HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL BENIWAL
Order
Reportable
Judgment Reserved on :- 07/04/2026
Pronounced on :- 20/05/2026
By the Court (Per, Arun Monga, J) :-
1. Impugned herein is an order dated 01.07.2024 passed by the
Chief Commissioner (SGST), Jaipur, whereby the preliminary objections
raised by the petitioner on the pending appeal filed by the Department
against the Advance Ruling dated 16.06.2022 were overruled. The
pending appeal was thus directed to be heard on merits.
FACTS
2. In order to comprehend the issue failing for our consideration,
relevant facts are first required to be noticed.
2.1. The petitioner, a Goods Transport Agency, filed an application
under Section 97 of the RGST Act, 2017 seeking an advance ruling on
whether the value of diesel supplied free of cost (FOC) by the service
recipient is liable to be included in the taxable value of transport
services.
2.2. In the said proceedings, respondent No.3, being the jurisdictional
as well as the concerned officer under Section 98 of the RGST Act,
participated in his official capacity and supported the case of the
petitioner.
2.3. He (respondent No.3) took a categorical stand that GST is not
leviable on FOC diesel supplied by the service recipient when such
goods remain within the contractual scope of the recipient.
2.4. Respondent No.2 i.e. Rajasthan Authority for Advance Ruling,
Goods and Service Tax, Kar Bhawan Ambedkar Circle, Jaipur passed an
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Advance Ruling dated 16.06.2022 holding that the value of such diesel
is not includable in the taxable value of goods transport services.
2.5. Thereafter, two appeals were filed against the said Advance
Ruling, one by respondent No.6 and second by respondent No.3 itself.
2.6. Upon the petitioner seeking clarification from the office of
respondent No.2, it was revealed that the ruling was dispatched in June
2022 and duly delivered to the concerned officers within the same
month. The ruling was also uploaded on the GST portal on 17.06.2022,
thereby constituting valid communication under the provisions of the
Act.
2.7. Notwithstanding, both appeals were filed on 12.08.2022 (by
respondent No.6) and 14.10.2022 (by respondent No.3) i.e. beyond the
prescribed limitation period, and without any proper application for
condonation of delay.
2.8. Detailed preliminary objections on the maintainability of the
appeals on multiple grounds, including limitation, procedural
irregularities, lack of jurisdiction, expiry of statutory timelines for
adjudication, and impermissibility of the department taking
contradictory stands were raised.
2.9. This is second foray of the petitioner before this Court. The
petitioner had earlier approached this Court vide CWP No.14009/2022
which was disposed of vide order dated 22.09.2022 directing that
aforesaid preliminary objections be decided prior to adjudication on
merits.
2.10. Thereafter, the matter remained dormant for more than a year,
leading the petitioner to reasonably believe that the proceedings had
been dropped. However, the appellate proceedings were abruptly
revived in March 2024 and respondent No.1 proceeded to pass the
impugned order dated 01.07.2024 rejecting all preliminary objections,
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inter alia, by treating statutory timelines as directory, condoning delays,
and accepting the changed stand of the department.
2.11. Hence, the instant petition.
3. ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
3.1. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the impugned order
dated 01.07.2024 passed by respondent No.1 is ex facie illegal,
perverse, arbitrary, contrary to the facts on record and the settled
provisions of law, and has been passed in gross violation of the
principles of natural justice. Respondent No.1 has gravely erred in
assuming jurisdiction to proceed with the appeals despite the expiry of
the statutory time limit prescribed under Section 101(2) of the RGST
Act, thereby rendering the entire proceedings non-est in the eyes of
law.
3.2. He submitted that the use of the expression “shall” in Section
101(2) clearly makes the requirement of passing the order within 90
days mandatory, and a plain reading of the provision mandates strict
adherence to the prescribed timeline, failing which the proceedings
stand vitiated.
3.3. Learned counsel for the petitioner further stated that Chapter XVII
of the RGST Act, dealing with advance ruling, is a complete code in
itself prescribing strict timelines for expeditious adjudication. The
absence of expressions such as “as far as possible” or “where it is
possible” in Section 101(2), unlike other provisions, reflects a clear
legislative intent to make the 90-day period mandatory.
3.4. He submitted that no proceedings were conducted for more than
1.2 years after filing of the appeals and preliminary objections, and
therefore, the proceedings are vitiated on account of inordinate delay.
3.5. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the appeals filed by
respondent No.3 and respondent No.6 are barred by limitation, having
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been filed beyond the statutory period prescribed under Section 100(2)
of the RGST Act, and that respondent No.1 has no authority to condone
delay beyond the permissible period.
3.6. He submitted that the Advance Ruling dated 16.06.2022 was duly
communicated in June 2022 through Speed Post as well as by uploading
on the GST portal, which constitutes valid service under Section 169 of
the Act, and therefore, the appeals filed thereafter are time-barred.
3.7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that material
evidence regarding the date of communication, including the India Post
tracking report and the letter dated 15.09.2022 issued by respondent
No.2 confirming service through Speed Post dated 21.06.2022, has
been disregarded without assigning reasons, while the version of
respondent No.3 has been accepted without verification.
3.8. He submitted that respondent No.6 lacks locus standi to file the
appeal as it is neither the ‘jurisdictional officer’ nor the ‘concerned
officer’ within the meaning of the RGST Act, and had not participated in
the advance ruling proceedings.
3.9. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that
permitting respondent No.6 to file the appeal is contrary to the scheme
of Sections 98 and 100, the FAQs issued by CBIC, and Section 6(2)(b)
of the CGST Act, and would result in multiplicity of proceedings despite
the matter having been dealt with by the jurisdictional officer, i.e.,
respondent No.3.
3.10. He submitted that respondent No.6 has, in any case, not pursued
its appeal by participating in the proceedings or filing replies, and the
same deserves to be treated as non-est.
3.11. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that respondent No.3,
having represented the department and supported the petitioner’s case
before the Advance Ruling Authority, cannot be permitted to take a
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contradictory stand in appeal, particularly in the absence of any
material showing lack of authority at the relevant time.
3.12. He further submitted that the explanation regarding absence of
approval from higher authorities is unsupported by any evidence and
cannot justify either the change in stand or the delay in filing the
appeal.
3.13. Learned counsel for the petitioner also stated that the
condonation of delay by respondent No.1 is mechanical and without
recording satisfaction regarding the existence of sufficient cause, as
required under law.
3.14. He submitted that the appeals have not been filed in accordance
with the prescribed procedure, as they were filed in hard copy instead
of electronically as mandated under Section 100(3) read with Rule 106,
and no sufficient cause has been shown for such deviation.
3.15. Learned counsel for the petitioner further stated that the
impugned order has been passed without furnishing the documents
relied upon and without granting an effective opportunity to rebut the
same, thereby violating the principles of natural justice.
3.16. He submitted that the advance ruling provisions are special
provisions intended to provide clarity on tax issues in a time-bound
manner, and therefore, the limitation periods prescribed therein must
be strictly construed.
3.17. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in terms of
Section 103 of the CGST/SGST Act, an advance ruling is binding in
personam, and permitting multiple or parallel appeals would defeat the
object of the statutory scheme.
3.18. He submitted that the Advance Ruling dated 16.06.2022 is a
well-reasoned and speaking order passed after considering all relevant
facts and does not warrant interference.
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3.19. Learned counsel for the petitioner also stated that this Court had
earlier granted liberty to challenge the order deciding the preliminary
objections, and hence, the present petition is maintainable.
3.20. Lastly, he submitted that the issuance of the personal hearing
notice dated 03.07.2024 immediately after passing the impugned order,
without granting reasonable time to challenge the same, is arbitrary and
unsustainable, and respondent No.1 cannot proceed further without
affording the petitioner an opportunity to avail appropriate legal
remedies.
4. ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
4.1. The respondents have filed reply opposing the writ petition. The
stand taken by them, inter alia, is that the writ petition is founded
entirely on hyper-technical grounds and deserves to be dismissed in
limine. On the merits of the underlying issue, the respondents contend
that diesel is an essential and indispensable component of GTA service,
without which no transportation service can be rendered. The value of
FOC diesel provided by the service recipient falls squarely within the
definition of “consideration” under Section 2(31) of the Act and is also
includable in the value of supply under Section 15(2)(b).
4.2. The respondents further point out that the petitioner has been
filing returns showing zero tax liability since registration on 08.03.2022,
which raises doubts about the genuineness of the advance ruling
application, which was based on a hypothetical and unexecuted
contract. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Chhattisgarh High
Court in M/s Shree Jeet Transport v. Union of India1, wherein it
has been held that FOC diesel must be included in the value of GTA
service for GST purposes.
1. 2023 SCC OnLine Chh 5982.
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4.3. On the question of the 90-day time limit under Section 101(2),
the respondents submit that the word “shall” is directory and not
mandatory, as no consequence for non-compliance has been prescribed,
and the provision cannot be construed to defeat the right of appeal.
Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Municipal Committee, Charkhi Dadri v. Ramji Lal Bagla2.
4.4. The respondents have stated that the delay in disposal of the
appeals was caused by the petitioner itself. The petitioner approached
the High Court instead of filing preliminary objections before the AAAR,
and despite directions dated 22.09.2022, did not file such objections
until 07.03.2024. The earlier communications claimed to be preliminary
objections were not received in the AAAR office. The petitioner, having
contributed to the delay, cannot seek relief on that ground.
4.5. On limitation, the respondents submit that respondent No. 6
received the advance ruling along with the AAR’s letter dated
15.09.2022 and filed the appeal on 14.10.2022 within 30 days thereof.
The appeal filed by respondent No.6 (CGST) on 11.08.2022 was within
the permissible extended period of 60 days and the condonation
granted is in accordance with law.
4.6. It is further submitted that the procedure prescribed under Rule
106 for filing appeals is directory in nature and does not bar manual
filing. Rule 107 permits filing of appeals manually, and therefore, the
objection regarding filing of appeal in hard copy is untenable.
4.7. On the issue of jurisdiction, it is submitted that the ‘concerned
officer’ and ‘jurisdictional officer’ are distinct authorities. Under the GST
framework, both Central GST and State GST officers exercise territorial
jurisdiction over a taxable person, and therefore, both are entitled to
file appeals against an advance ruling. In the present case, the SGST
2. (1995) 5 SCC 272.
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officer is the jurisdictional officer and the CGST officer is the concerned
officer.
4.8. The respondents further submit that the petitioner, instead of
participating in the proceedings before the AAAR and making
submissions on merits, has approached this Court at a premature stage
on technical grounds. The impugned order only calls upon the petitioner
to appear and make submissions, and therefore, the writ petition
deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone.
4.9. It is submitted that the petitioner has taken contradictory stands
by simultaneously challenging the appeal of the State on limitation and
disputing the locus of the CGST officer to file the appeal, thereby
attempting to delay the adjudication of the matter.
4.10. The respondents submit that the CGST department, being a
‘concerned officer’, is entitled to file an appeal under Section 100(1) of
the CGST Act, and the appeal filed within 56 days from the date of the
advance ruling is within the permissible period of 30 days plus an
additional 30 days, which has been rightly condoned by the Appellate
Authority in accordance with law.
5. We have learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
available on record.
6. First and foremost, before proceeding further, for understanding
as to what weighed on the mind of the learned authority, the impugned
order be seen. Perusal thereof, inter alia, reveals that the Appellate
Authority for Advance Ruling, Rajasthan, vide order dated 01.07.2024,
considered and rejected all five preliminary objections raised by the
respondent against the departmental appeals filed challenging the AAR’s
ruling dated 16.06.2022, which had held that FOC diesel provided by
the service recipient is not includable in the value of GTA services.
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6.1. On the first objection that the 90-day time limit under Section
101(2) had expired, the Authority held that “shall” in that provision is
directory and not mandatory, as construing it as mandatory would
extinguish the very right of appeal the provision was designed to
protect. The statute prescribes no consequence for non-compliance with
the timeline, further affirming its directory nature, relying upon a
catena of Supreme Court judgments.
6.2. On the second objection of limitation under Section 100(2), the
Authority found that appellant No. 1 (CGST, Jodhpur) received the
ruling on 29.06.2022 and filed its appeal on 12.08.2022, with delay of
21 days which was condoned. Appellant No. 2 (SGST, Suratgarh)
received the ruling on 15.09.2022 and filed its appeal on 14.10.2022,
which was within the statutory 30-day period. Both appeals were held
to be within time.
6.3. On the third objection regarding hard copy filing, the Authority
held that Rule 107A of the CGST Rules expressly saves manual filing,
and online filing is merely a facilitative measure and not a jurisdictional
requirement.
6.4. On the fourth objection challenging the locus of the CGST
authority, the Authority held that “concerned officer” and “jurisdictional
officer” are two distinct authorities under Sections 98 and 100, ibid of
CGST Act, one from Central GST and one from State GST, and both are
independently entitled to file appeals, making the CGST appeal perfectly
maintainable.
6.5. On the fifth objection of estoppel, the Authority held that there is
no estoppel against the State or against a statute, and that the initial
stand taken by the subordinate State GST officer without approval of
higher authorities was not binding on the department. The appeal filed
after due consideration by competent higher authorities was held to be
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maintainable. All preliminary objections were accordingly rejected and
the appeals were held to be maintainable and directed to be heard on
merits.
DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS
7. Having given our thought to the rival arguments and the appellate
order as well as having also gone through the order passed by the
advance ruling authority we of the opinion that no interference is
warranted under the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court. Let us see
how. Though, suffice it would be to observe that we find ourselves in
agreement with sound logic and reasoning adopted by learned Appellate
Authority and thus, we need add no more than to simply reiterate the
same but our reasons along with the discussion are recorded in the
succeeding part of the instant order.
8. On the contention, the 90-day time limit under Section 101(2)
being mandatory; that no proceedings were conducted for over one and
a half years and; the appeals therefore stood extinguished, it must be
noted that delay in adjudication by a quasi-judicial authority, however
regrettable, does not have the effect of annulling proceedings or giving
finality to an order that is validly under challenge. There is no provision
in the CGST or RGST Act that provides for automatic lapsing of an
appeal upon expiry of the 90-day period, nor does the Act prescribe any
consequence for non-compliance with this timeline. The absence of a
penal consequence for delay is itself a strong indicator that the
provision is directory. The petitioner’s reliance on mere passage of time,
without any prejudice demonstrated, cannot be a ground to shut out a
legitimate appeal on merits.
8.1. For ready reference Section 101(2) is reproduced is hereinbelow:-
“Section 101-Orders of Appellate Authority
(1) The Appellate Authority may, after giving the parties to the appeal or
reference an opportunity of being heard, pass such order as it thinks fit,
confirming or modifying the ruling appealed against or referred to.
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(2) The order referred to in sub-section (1) shall be passed within a
period of ninety days from the date of filing of the appeal under section
100 or a reference under sub-section (5) of section 98.
(3) Where the members of the Appellate Authority differ on any point or
points referred to in appeal or reference, it shall be deemed that no
advance ruling can be issued in respect of the question under the appeal
or reference.
(4) A copy of the advance ruling pronounced by the Appellate Authority
duly signed by the Members and certified in such manner as may be
prescribed shall be sent to the applicant, the concerned officer, the
jurisdictional officer and to the Authority after such pronouncement.”
8.2. The argument that the absence of the phrase “as far as possible”
in Section 101(2), unlike in Sections 101C and 107 of CGST Act,
demonstrates a conscious legislative intent to make the timeline
mandatory is a purely textual argument. No doubt, ordinarily word
‘shall’ prima-facie is used as an imperative. However, the settled
principle is that legislative intent is also to be gathered from the statute
as a whole and not just from the presence or absence of particular
phrases in isolation. More importantly, the petitioner’s interpretation
leads to an absurd and unjust consequence, that the right of appeal
conferred upon the jurisdictional and concerned officers by Section 100
is automatically extinguished by the mere passage of time, regardless
of the reasons for delay and regardless of whether the parties were
even heard. A provision whose strict construction destroys the very
right it was designed to protect cannot be read as mandatory. The 90-
day period is therefore directory, being an outer limit to ensure
expeditious disposal and not a jurisdictional condition precedent to the
exercise of appellate power.
8.3. The use of the word “shall” in a statute does not by itself thus
render a provision mandatory in every case. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court has also held in Mohan Singh v. International Airport
Authority of India3, Bachahan Devi v. Nagar Nigam Gorakhpur 4,
and Dinesh Chandra Pandey v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh 5,
3. (1997) 9 SCC 132.
4. (2008) 12 SCC 372.
5. (2010) 11 SCC 500.
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context, the object of the provision, the scheme of the statute, and the
consequences that would flow from the interpretation thereof.
9. On the question of limitation for filing the appeals, the Appellate
Authority has rightly relied upon the dates of actual receipt of the
advance ruling as communicated to the respective appellants, namely
29.06.2022 for Appellant No.1 and 15.09.2022 for Appellant No.2. The
petitioner’s reliance on India Post tracking data and the portal upload
date of 17.06.2022 as constituting valid communication under Section
169 does not automatically override documentary evidence of actual
receipt by the office of the concerned officer. For ready reference
Section 169 of the CGST Act, 2017 is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“Section 169. Service of notice in certain circumstances.-
(1) Any decision, order, summons, notice or other communication under
this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be served by any one of the
following methods, namely
(a) by giving or tendering it directly or by a messenger including a courier
to the addressee or the taxable person or to his manager or authorised
representative or an advocate or a tax practitioner holding authority to
appear in the proceedings on behalf of the taxable person or to a person
regularly employed by him in connection with the business, or to any adult
member of family residing with the taxable person; or
(b) by registered post or speed post or courier with acknowledgement due,
to the person for whom it is intended or his authorised representative, if
any, at his last known place of business or residence; or
(c) by sending a communication to his e-mail address provided at the time
of registration or as amended from time to time; or
(d) by making it available on the common portal; or
(e) by publication in a newspaper circulating in the locality in which the
taxable person or the person to whom it is issued is last known to have
resided, carried on business or personally worked for gain; or
(f) if none of the modes aforesaid is practicable, by affixing it in some
conspicuous place at his last known place of business or residence and if
such mode is not practicable for any reason, then by affixing a copy
thereof on the notice board of the office of the concerned officer or
authority who or which passed such decision or order or issued such
summons or notice.
(2) Every decision, order, summons, notice or any communication shall be
deemed to have been served on the date on which it is tendered or
published or a copy thereof is affixed in the manner provided in sub-
section (1).
(3) When such decision, order, summons, notice or any communication is
sent by registered post or speed post, it shall be deemed to have been
received by the addressee at the expiry of the period normally taken by
such post in transit unless the contrary is proved.”
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9.1. Section 169 prescribes modes of service, but communication for
the purpose of limitation must be reckoned from the date of actual
receipt where such date is specifically established. Appellant No.2
received the order on 15.09.2022 and filed the appeal on 14.10.2022,
which is squarely within 30 days. Appellant No.1 received the order on
29.06.2022 and filed the appeal on 12.08.2022 with a request for
condonation of delay, which was duly considered and condoned.
9.2. On the alleged contradictions in respondent No. 6’s case regarding
date of receipt and the improbability of filing an appeal on the day after
receipt, these are at best factual contentions that go to the weight of
evidence and do not constitute legal grounds for dismissing the appeal
as non-maintainable. The Appellate Authority, having examined the
material, accepted the date of 15.09.2022 as the date of
communication to Appellant No.2 and found the appeal to be within
time. This is a finding of fact that does not warrant interference in writ
jurisdiction merely because the petitioner disputes the veracity of the
claimed date of receipt.
9.3. Furthermore, the condonation was not mechanical, the Authority
applied its mind to the cause shown and exercised the discretion
conferred by the proviso to Section 100(2). For ready reference Section
100 of the CGST Act, 2017 is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“100- Appeal to Appellate Authority:-
(1) The concerned officer, the jurisdictional officer or an applicant aggrieved
by any Advance Ruling pronounced under sub-section (4) of Section 98, may
appeal to the Appellate Authority.
(2) Every appeal under this section shall be filed within a period of thirty
days from the date on which the ruling sought to be appealed against is
communicated to the concerned officer, the jurisdictional officer and the
applicant:
Provided that the Appellate Authority may, if it is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by a sufficient cause from presenting the appeal
within the said period of thirty days, allow it to be presented within a
further period not exceeding thirty days.
(3) Every appeal under this section shall be in such form, accompanied by
such fee and verified in such manner as may be prescribed.”
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9.4. Thus, on the question of limitation, the appeal filed by the CGST
authority on 12.08.2022 against the AAR order dated 16.06.2022 falls
squarely within the maximum permissible period prescribed under
Section 100(2), ibid. The provision allows filing of an appeal within 30
days, extendable by a further 30 days upon sufficient cause being
shown, making the outer limit 60 days. The CGST authority filed its
appeal within 56 days, which is well within this outer limit. The
Appellate Authority has dealt with this aspect in detail in the impugned
order and the condonation granted is neither mechanical nor arbitrary,
it is a valid exercise of statutory discretion in accordance with the
proviso to Section 100(2), ibid.
9.5. In light of the above, no further elaborate reasons are required to
be recorded for condonation of a delay of merely 15 to 21 days in a
matter involving a question of law of significance to the entire State.
There is no infirmity in this finding.
10. As regards the locus standi of respondent No.6, it is clear from
the plain language of Sections 98 and 100 of the Act that the terms
“concerned officer” and “jurisdictional officer” refer to two distinct
authorities, one from Central GST and one from State GST. For ready
reference Section 98 is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“98. Procedure on receipt of application-
(1) On receipt of an application, the Authority shall cause a copy thereof to
be forwarded to the concerned officer and, if necessary, call upon him to
furnish the relevant records:
Provided that where any records have been called for by the
Authority in any case, such records shall, as soon as possible, be returned
to the said concerned officer.
(2) The Authority may, after examining the application and the records
called for and after hearing the applicant or his authorised representative
and the concerned officer or his authorised representative, by order, either
admit or reject the application:
Provided that the Authority shall not admit the application where
the question raised in the application is already pending or decided in any
proceedings in the case of an applicant under any of the provisions of this
Act:
Provided further that no application shall be rejected under this
sub-section unless an opportunity of hearing has been given to the
applicant:
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[2026:RJ-JD:24464-DB] (16 of 19) [CW-13071/2024]Provided also that where the application is rejected, the reasons for
such rejection shall be specified in the order.
(3) A copy of every order made under sub-section (2) shall be sent to the
applicant and to the concerned officer.
(4) Where an application is admitted under sub-section (2), the Authority
shall, after examining such further material as may be placed before it by
the applicant or obtained by the Authority and after providing an
opportunity of being heard to the applicant or his authorised representative
as well as to the concerned officer or his authorised representative,
pronounce its advance ruling on the question specified in the application.
(5) Where the members of the Authority differ on any question on which the
advance ruling is sought, they shall state the point or points on which they
differ and make a reference to the Appellate Authority for hearing and
decision on such question.
(6) The Authority shall pronounce its advance ruling in writing within
ninety days from the date of receipt of application.
(7) A copy of the advance ruling pronounced by the Authority duly signed
by the members and certified in such manner as may be prescribed shall
be sent to the applicant, the concerned officer and the jurisdictional officer
after such pronouncement.”
The Act does not restrict the right of appeal to whichever of the
two happened to participate in the advance ruling proceedings. The
statute confers the right of appeal on both, and this right cannot be
extinguished on the ground that one of them did not appear or
represent the department before the AAR. Jurisdiction and right of
appeal are statutory, they do not depend upon prior participation in the
proceedings below.
11. Also, on the question of jurisdiction and locus standi, the
petitioner’s argument that the CGST authority was neither the
concerned officer nor the jurisdictional officer is directly answered by
the plain language of Section 100(1), ibid, which confers the right of
appeal upon the concerned officer, the jurisdictional officer, or the
aggrieved applicant. Under the GST framework, two officers exercise
territorial jurisdiction over every taxable person, one from CGST and
one from SGST. They occupy distinct roles and cannot be treated as one
and the same. This is further evident from the AAR’s own letter at page
207 of the writ petition, which clearly identifies the SGST officer as the
jurisdictional officer and the CGST officer as the concerned officer. Both
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[2026:RJ-JD:24464-DB] (17 of 19) [CW-13071/2024]
are therefore independently entitled to file an appeal, and the CGST
authority’s appeal is perfectly maintainable under Section 100(1), ibid.
12. On the argument that reliance on correspondences dated
31.05.2024, 05.06.2024, and 12.06.2024 without supplying copies to
the petitioner violated natural justice, it must be noted that these
communications were internal inquiries directed to the appellants
themselves for ascertaining the dates of receipt of the advance ruling, a
purely procedural step to adjudicate the limitation objection raised by
the petitioner itself. The substance of these communications and the
findings drawn therefrom have been fully disclosed in the impugned
order. The petitioner cannot complain of prejudice when the very
objection of limitation was raised at its instance and the Authority
merely verified the factual position before deciding it. Natural justice
does not require that every piece of internal administrative
correspondence be furnished to the opposite party before a finding is
recorded, so long as the final decision discloses the material relied upon
and the party had a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the issue.
13. On the question of estoppel i.e. respondent No.3 having taken a U-
turn, it is a settled and fundamental principle of constitutional and
administrative law that there is no estoppel against the State in matters
of taxation and statutory duty. A representation or stand taken by a
subordinate officer without due authority and without proper application
of mind by the competent authority cannot bind the State or the
department. The Supreme Court has consistently held that promissory
estoppel operates only where the representation was within the
competence of the authority making it. The stand taken by the
jurisdictional officer before the AAR was admittedly without the approval
of higher authorities and was subsequently found to be legally incorrect
by those authorities. The department’s right to correct such an error
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[2026:RJ-JD:24464-DB] (18 of 19) [CW-13071/2024]
through the statutory remedy of appeal cannot be defeated by the
doctrine of estoppel.
14. On the procedural objection regarding filing of appeals in hard
copy, Rule 107A of the CGST Rules expressly saves manual filing of
applications, replies, and other documents notwithstanding any
provision requiring electronic filing. This is a complete answer to the
procedural objection and the petitioner’s contention that no relaxation
has been provided in law is factually incorrect. Rule 107A is reproduced
hereinbelow:-
“107A-Manual filing and processing:-
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, in respect of any
process or procedure prescribed herein, any reference to electronic filing
of an application, intimation, reply, declaration, statement or electronic
issuance of a notice, order or certificate on the common portal shall, in
respect of that process or procedure, include manual filing of the said
application, intimation, reply, declaration, statement or issuance of the
said notice, order or certificate in such Forms as appended to these
rules.”
14.1. Thus, Rule 107A of the CGST Rules expressly permits manual
filing of documents notwithstanding any provision that prescribes
electronic filing. Rule 106 prescribes the procedure for filing an appeal
on the common portal but does not prohibit or invalidate manual filing.
A procedural prescription cannot be elevated into a jurisdictional bar,
and the appeals cannot be thrown out on this purely technical ground.
15. Aside all of above, the impugned order dated 01.07.2024 does
nothing more than reject the preliminary objections and request the
petitioner to appear and make submissions on merits before the
Appellate Authority. The petitioner, instead of availing this opportunity
and participating in the merits adjudication, has rushed to this Court for
the second time, the first occasion being when the appeal was filed, at
which time also this Court directed that the preliminary objections be
decided first. Having obtained that direction, and having had all
preliminary objections decided and rejected on well-reasoned grounds,
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[2026:RJ-JD:24464-DB] (19 of 19) [CW-13071/2024]
the petitioner has once again approached this Court on the same
technical grounds that have already been examined and repelled by the
Appellate Authority. This conduct reveals a clear attempt to indefinitely
delay the final adjudication on merits. The petitioner cannot be
permitted to use the writ jurisdiction of this Court as an instrument of
delay.
CONCLUSION
16. As an upshot, the writ petition is bereft of any merit. The
petitioner ought to join proceedings under appeal and appear before the
Appellate Authority.
17. The writ petition is dismissed accordingly.
18. All pending application(s) stand disposed of accordingly.
(SUNIL BENIWAL),J (ARUN MONGA),J
1-Raksha/-
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