Supreme Court Lays Down Guidelines For Summary Judgment In Commercial Suits under Order XIII-A CPC of Commercial Courts Act

1. Leave granted.

2. In between the twin sayings of ‘justice delayed is justice

denied’ and ‘justice hurried is justice buried’, lies a golden mean

which this Court must adopt to resolve the present case. It is in this

balanced perspective that the provisions of Order XIII-A of the Code

of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter “CPC”) fall to be interpreted and

applied.

3. The present appeal arises out of the impugned order dated

09.06.2025 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi (hereinafter

“High Court”) in I.A. No. 6914 of 2022 in CS (COMM) No. 582 of

2021, whereby the application filed by the appellant seeking

summary judgment under Rule 4 of Order XIII-A of the CPC came

to be dismissed.

4. The brief facts necessary for adjudication are that a public

notice was issued on 21.03.2007, by the Respondent – Delhi

Development Authority (hereinafter “DDA”) announcing a public

auction for various freehold commercial plots, including Plot No. 13

at the Non-hierarchical Commercial Complex, Jasola, New Delhi

(hereinafter “Subject Plot”), whose land-use was earmarked as

“Multi-level Parking/Commercial (No Multiplex).”

5. The appellant herein, being interested in acquiring the

Subject Plot, submitted its bid in respect thereof on 23.03.2007,

offering the amount of Bid/Lease Premium being Rs.

164,91,00,000/- (INR One hundred and sixty-four crores ninety-one

lakhs only) in respect of the same. The appellant also deposited 25%

(twenty-five percent) of the reserve price of the Subject Plot, i.e. a

sum of Rs. 42,25,00,000/- (INR Forty-two crores twenty-five lakhs

only) vide Demand Draft with the respondent towards earnest

money in respect of its bid, pursuant to the terms and conditions of

the auction.

6. The appellant was the highest bidder for the Subject Plot, and

the DDA, by its letter dated 07.06.2007, informed the appellant that

its bid has been accepted, and called upon to deposit the balance

sum of Rs. 122,66,00,045/- (INR One hundred and twenty-two

crores sixty-six lakhs and forty-five only), including the

documentation charges, within a period of 90 (ninety) days.

7. On 12.07.2007, the appellant paid the balance sum of Rs.

122,66,00,045/- in respect of the Subject Plot, followed by payment

of Rs. 9,89,46,025/- (INR Nine crores eighty-nine lakhs forty—six

thousand twenty-five only) towards the Stamp Duty and Transfer

Duty in respect of execution of the Conveyance Deed on 03.12.2007.

In this light, DDA called upon the appellant to take possession of

the Subject Plot on or before 15.01.2008.

8. Upon due completion of all necessary pre-requisites by the

appellant, including the payment of the entire sale consideration,

Stamp Duty and Transfer Duty; DDA executed the Conveyance Deed

dated 06.02.2008 in favour of the appellant for the Subject Plot on

a free-hold basis. The said Conveyance Deed was duly registered on

07.03.2008 at the office of the Sub-Registrar-VII, Delhi having

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Registration No. 4,300 in Additional Book No. 1, Volume No. 2,886

at pages 83 to 86.

9. From the year 2008 onwards, pursuant to the execution of

the Conveyance Deed in respect of the Subject Plot in its favour, the

appellant, between assessment years of 2008-09 to 2017-18, also

made payments of a sum amounting to Rs. 24,00,036/- (INR

Twenty-four lakhs thirty-six only) towards property tax in respect of

the Subject Plot.

10. In the year 2015, unknown to the appellant herein, one Simla

Devi, claiming to be the erstwhile owner of the Subject Plot before

acquisition of the land by the DDA on behalf of the State, had filed

a Writ Petition being W.P. (C) No. 5688 of 2015 before the High

Court, seeking a declaration that the acquisition of land (hereinafter

“Subject Land”) had lapsed on account of the provisions of Section

24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land

Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter

“Fair Compensation Act, 2013”).

11. The High Court, vide judgement dated 15.11.2016 in W.P. (C)

No. 5688 of 2015, held as under: –

“2. Though the respondents claimed that possession of the

said land was taken on 05.03.1997, the petitioner disputes

this and maintains that physical possession has not been

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taken. However, insofar as the issue of compensation is

concerned, it is an admitted position that it has not be paid.

3. Without going into the controversy of physical possession,

this much is clear that the Award was made more than five

years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act and the

compensation has also not been paid…

4. As a result, the petitioner is entitled to a declaration that

the said acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act

in respect of the subject land are deemed to have lapsed. It is

so declared.

5. The writ petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. There

shall be no order as to costs.”

12. On 27.11.2016, the appellant claimed that some unknown

people, led by one Sachin Bidhuri, trespassed into the Subject Plot,

broke the boundary wall and damaged the pillars under

construction; and forcibly took illegal possession of the property

claiming to be the rightful owner of the Subject Land of which the

Subject Plot was a part.

13. Pursuant to the same, the appellant filed a police complaint

dated 13.12.2016 under Diary No. 54-B with Police Station Sarita

Vihar, Delhi, complaining of the aforementioned offences of

unlawful criminal trespass and causing loss of property, etc. On

02.01.2017, the appellant also wrote to the DDA intimating them

about the nuisance created by Mr. Sachin Bidhuri and others, as

well filing of the police complaint, and sought necessary

intervention.

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14. On 03.04.2017, the DDA filed a Special Leave Petition being

SLP (C) No. 8526 of 2017 before this Court, challenging the order

dated 15.11.2016 passed by the High Court.

15. It ought to be noted that the appellant claims that even at this

stage, it was not intimated by DDA of the aforesaid order of High

Court or the proceedings filed before this Court, and was, as such,

not aware of the same.

16. The above SLP (C) No. 8526 of 2017 was converted to Civil

Appeal No. 6345 of 2017 and was dismissed by this Court vide

judgment dated 04.05.2017, wherein it was held as under: –

“5. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the

appellant is given a period of six months to exercise its liberty

granted under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation

and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Act, 2013 for initiation of the acquisition

proceedings afresh.

6. We make it clear that in case no fresh acquisition

proceedings are initiated within the said period of six

months from today by issuing a Notification under

Section 11 of the Act, the appellant, if in possession,

shall return the physical possession of the land to the

owner.”

17. The appellant, claiming ignorance of the above proceedings,

made representation dated 25.04.2017 to DDA to address its

grievance. It is also claimed that a further representation dated

16.06.2017 was made.

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18. At this juncture, it may be noted that the period of six

months, as stipulated in the order dated 04.05.2017 passed by this

Court for initiation of fresh acquisition proceedings, expired on

04.11.2017, however, admittedly, no action was initiated by DDA.

19. On 05.12.2017, the appellant claims that when its

representative visited the office of DDA to follow up on its earlier

representations, he was purportedly handed over a letter dated

20.11.2017, whereby the appellant was intimated the following: –

“Kindly refer to this officer letter of even number dated

04.10.2017 and its subsequent reminder dated 20.10.2017

drawing your attention to the order dated 04.052017 passed

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in SLP No. 8526/2017

with reference to the above mentioned property/plot giving

direction therein for initiation of fresh acquisition proceedings

under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and

Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Act; 2013 within a period of six months from the

date of issue of order. The case has been processed and

examined by the Land, Management Deptt., DDA has advised

to seek commitment from allottee to bear additional financial

lability, on account of payment, of compensation under LARR

Act, 2013.

You are once again requested to submit an undertaking

within seven days from the date of issue of this letter on nonjudicial

stamp paper duly attested by Magistrate 1st Class

with confirmation that you will bear additional financial

liabilities on account of reacquisition proceedings of land to

enable DDA to initiate process of the reacquisition immediately

failing which you will be liable to face legal consequences

arising out of the directions of Hon’ble Supreme Court dated

04.05.2017.”

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20. The appellant claims that in furtherance to the aforesaid

letter and the visit by its representative, it was informed for the very

first time of the legal proceedings that had ensued in respect of the

Subject Plot; including the order dated 04.05.2017 passed by this

Court in Civil Appeal No. 6345 of 2017. In light of the same, on

28.12.2017, the appellant wrote to DDA highlighting that it had

never received the aforementioned letters dated 04.10.2017 and

20.10.2017, and the letter dated 20.11.2017 was received by it only

on 05.12.2017, being much after lapse of the time period of six

months granted by this Court for initiating fresh acquisition

proceedings. In its letter, the appellant further emphasized as

follows: –

“8. …You will appreciate that we have in the year 2007 paid

the entire consideration for the said Plot and complied with the

auction terms. It was failure on your part by not paying the

compensation to the original land owner resulting in lapsing of

the said acquisition of the said Plot under the said auction

program no. XIV.

9. The order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court was passed on

04.05.2017, and since then a period of six (6) months have

already elapsed, however, to our knowledge, no fresh

acquisition proceedings has been initiated by you.

10. In the circumstances, we request to refund the full

consideration of Rs.164.91 crore paid by us towards purchase

of the subject Plot along with Rs.9,98,46,000/- paid towards

purchase of the subject Plot along with Rs.9,89,46,000/- paid

towards the stamp duty and `Rs.22,12,927/- paid towards

property tax together with interest at the rate of 15% PA from

the date of the said payments till realisation.”

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21. Admittedly, from the date of the aforesaid communication, the

officials of the appellant consistently followed-up with the DDA for

refund of the above amounts. Further, the appellant also sent

multiple reminders for the refund vide letters dated 10.12.2018 and

07.08.2019.

22. Thereafter, the DDA filed a Review Petition before this Court

being R.P. No. 29817 of 2017 in the above mentioned Civil Appeal

No. 6345 of 2017. By order dated 17.10.2019, this Court dismissed

the review petition in the following terms: –

“There is delay of 807 days in filing the Review Petition for

which no satisfactory explanation has been given. Even

otherwise, we do not find any merit in the Review Petition. The

Review Petition is dismissed on the ground of delay as well as

merits.”

23. In continuation to its earlier letters, the appellant further

issued a letter dated 18.07.2020 reiterating its demand for refund

of all amounts paid to DDA along with interest. A reminder dated

19.10.2020 was also issued.

24. Ultimately, on 02.11.2020, the appellant filed a civil suit

being CS (Comm.) No. 582 of 2021 before the High Court for recovery

of the amount paid as sale consideration, Stamp Duty, Property Tax,

etc. for the Subject Plot. The aforesaid suit was filed after due notice

under Section 53B of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 as well as

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mandatory mediation as prescribed under Section 12A of the

Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The suit so filed sought recovery of

an amount of Rs. 459,73,61,098/- with pendente lite interest which

included the following:

(i) Sale consideration of Rs. 164,91,00,000/-

(ii) Stamp & transfer duty of Rs. 9,89,46,025/-

(iii) Property Tax paid from FY 2008-09 to FY 2017-18 of

Rs 24,00,036/-

(iv) Interest @ 12% p.a. till date of filing suit i.e.

31.12.2020 being Rs 284,93,15,053/- and pendente

lite interest @12% р.а.

25. In the meanwhile, the DDA filed Curative Petition (C) No. 70

of 2021 before this Court, which came to be dismissed vide order

dated 19.05.2022. Thus, it is clear that this Court’s order in Civil

Appeal No. 6345 of 2017 has attained finality.

26. During such time period, on 18.01.2022, DDA filed its Written

Statement in the suit for recovery before the High Court. The

respondent primarily contended therein that the appellant had not

returned the possession of the Subject Land in order to claim

refund. It was further contended that the claim is time barred and

that the suit also suffers from non-joinder of Simla Devi i.e., the

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original owner. On 07.03.2023, the appellant filed Replication to the

Written Statement of DDA in the civil suit.

27. Finally, on 27.04.2022, the appellant an application being I.A.

No. 6914 of 2022 in CS (Comm) No.582 of 2021, seeking summary

judgment under Rule 4 of Order XIII-A of the CPC.

28. The Single Judge of the High Court, vide impugned order

dated 09.06.2025 dismissed the application for summary judgment.

For ready reference, certain observations of the High Court are

reproduced below: –

“52. The Court is therefore, of the considered opinion that

without offering possession of ‘plot’ back to the DDA, or at least

establishing that the rightful owner is already in possession of

the ‘plot’, the plaintiff cannot claim refund of consideration

amount paid by it.

53. Ergo, the defence put forth. by the defendant cannot be

said to be baseless and illusory. The summary procedure as

prescribed in Order XIII-A CPC is to be resorted to by the

Courts for passing of judgment in commercial disputes, where

it could be disposed of without recording of oral evidence,

which is ·not possible in. the present case. Recording of oral

evidence appears to be imperative as regards the issue of

possession, which this Court finds to be contentious and

triable.

54. Thus, the suit cannot be determined in a summary

manner. The plaintiff in the present application has failed to

meet the twin tests that – (a) the defendant has no real

prospect of successfully defending the claim and; (b) there is

no such compelling reason why the claim should not be

disposed of before recording of oral evidence.

55. As this Court has opined that recording of oral evidence is

necessary and summary judgment cannot be passed, all other

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issues are left open for the parties to be raised at the

appropriate stage.

56. In the overall conspectus of facts noted above, the present

application deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.”

29. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgement of the High Court, the

present appeal has been preferred before this Court.

30. In the meanwhile, the DDA allegedly filed an application being

CM Appl. No. 50807 of 2023, alleging that the original owner Simla

Devi had played fraud on the Court since there was a dispute on her

identity. Perusal of the record indicates that the aforesaid

application was dismissed vide a detailed judgment dated

03.07.2024 by the Division Bench of the High Court. It was held

that after verifying the detailed submissions of both sides, no case

was made out by the DDA.

31. This aforesaid judgement of the Division Bench of the High

Court was challenged before this Court in SLP (C) Dairy No. 53900

of 2025. This Court, vide order dated 15.10.2025, while dismissing

the Special Leave Petition, granted time to DDA to re-acquire the

land within one year in terms of the directions passed in DDA v.

Tejpal, (2024) 7 SCC 433. While doing so, this Court recorded as

below:

“2. We have heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner as

well as learned Senior Counsel for the private respondent, who

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is on caveat, and carefully perused the material placed on

record.

3. In our considered view, no case to interfere with the

impugned judgement dated 03.07.2024, passed by the High

Court of Delhi, is made out.

4. All the contentions sought to be raised before us are

essentially disputed question of facts, which were

unsuccessfully raised before the High Court. Knowing the

scope of our consideration under Article 136 of the

Constitution, we cannot entertain and determine such

questions.

xxx xxx xxx

8. It is clarified that the extension of one year, as granted to

the Authorities for completion of acquisition in paragraph 88.1

reproduced above, will commence from the date of this order.”

32. We have heard learned senior counsels, Mr. Shyam Divan for

the appellant and Mr. Kailash Vasdev for the respondent herein.

33. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perusing

the records, the issue at hand is “whether the Appellant herein is

entitled for a summary judgment under Order XIII-A of the CPC, in the

present facts and circumstances?”

Winds of change

34. Before we address the issue at hand, there is a need to

address certain values inherent to the Indian judicial system. There

is no doubt that our justice delivery system is premised on being

fair, independent, and just. However, it is often criticized for delay.

Ordinary citizens complain about the cost and delay associated with

civil disputes. There are many instances in India which have the

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bearings of the infamous fictional case of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, as

recounted by Charles Dickens in his novel ‘Bleak House.’

35. The effectiveness of private arbitration, once seen as a solace

cannot be the panacea for all disputes. There is a need, as well as

growing support, for developing new extensive pre-trial processes.

A conventional trial no longer reflects modern reality and requires

re-calibration. In this light, to ensure balance, there is a

requirement of simplified and proportionate tools for efficacious

adjudication. This implores our system to adopt and embrace a shift

in the culture of efficiency in dispute resolution.

36. An effective justice system must enable a judge to adjudicate

the issue by ascertaining the necessary facts and applying the

appropriate legal principle in a fair and effective manner. However,

such adjudicatory processes cannot be meaningful unless they are

accessible. Accessibility, in this context, must be assessed in terms

of affordability, timeliness, and proportionality. The principle of

proportionality requires that procedural mechanisms be tailored to

the nature, complexity and stakes of the litigation; while ensuring

optimal use of judicial time and resources. In this context, a

summary judgement assumes significance as an important

procedural tool. It advances access to justice by providing a swift

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and cost-effective alternative to a full-fledged trial, especially in

cases where prolonged adjudication would serve no real purpose.

37. In such a background, the scheme of Order XIII-A of the CPC

required to be analysed. Order XIII-A of the CPC was brought by

way of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The relevant portion of

statement or objections and reason of the Commercial Courts Act

2015 is as under: –

“to have a streamlined procedure which is to be adopted for

the conduct of cases in the Commercial Courts and in the

Commercial Divisions by amending the Code of Civil Procedure

1908, so as to improve the efficiency and reduce delays

in disposal of commercial cases. The proposed case

management system and provisions for summary

judgment will enable disposal of commercial disputes in

a time bound manner.”

(emphasis supplied)

38. The need for fast-track procedures in adjudication of

commercial suits was first expressed in the 188th Report of the Law

Commission on the ‘Proposals for constitution of Hi-tech Fast-Track

Commercial Divisions in High Courts.’ Thereafter, the aforesaid

subject matter was extensively considered in 253rd Report of the Law

Commission and examined the rules in jurisdictions such as the

United Kingdom and Singapore to formulate a draft bill which

contained provisions concerning summary procedure. This Report

emphasised that a new procedure for summary judgement be

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brought into effect for the purpose of streamlining trial proceedings

with the intent to improve efficiency and reduce delay in disposal of

commercial cases. Accordingly, Act 14 of 2016 was passed, bringing

into force the ‘Commercial Courts Act, 2015.’ Order XIII-A was

introduced under the schedule to be added in the Civil Procedure

Code of 1908.

39. Discussing the pro-active approach brought by way of the

Commercial Courts Act, this Court in Ambalal Sarabhai

Enterprises Ltd. v. K. S. Infraspace LLP and Another, (2020) 15

SCC 585, observed as follows: –

“As per Justice R. Banumathi (concurring)

34. The Schedule to the Commercial Courts Act amends

various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and thereby

makes significant departure from the Code. After Order 13 of

the Code, Order 13-A “Summary Judgment” has been inserted.

Order 13-A contains the scope and classes of suits to which

Order 13-A applies, grounds for summary judgment,

procedure to be followed, evidence for hearing of summary

judgment, orders that may be made by Court in such

proceedings for summary judgment, etc. After Order 15 of the

Code, Order 15-A-“Case Management Hearing” has been

inserted. Order 15-A provides for first case management

hearing (Rule 1); recording of oral evidence on a day-to-day

basis (Rule 4); powers of the court in a case management

hearing (Rule 6); adjournment of case management hearing

(Rule 7); consequences of non-compliance with orders (Rule 8).

By way of amendment, several rules have been incorporated

to make the matters of commercial disputes on fast track. In

Order 20 of the Code “Judgment”, Rule 1 has been substituted

that within ninety days of the conclusion of arguments, the

Commercial Court/Commercial Division/Commercial

Appellate Division to pronounce the judgment and copies

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thereof shall be issued to all the parties to the dispute through

electronic mail or otherwise.

35. Various provisions of the Act, namely, case management

hearing and other provisions makes the court to adopt a proactive

approach in resolving the commercial dispute. A new

approach for carrying out case management and strict

guidelines for completion of the process has been introduced

so that the adjudicatory process is not delayed. I have referred

to the various provisions of the Act and the Schedule bringing

in amendments brought to the Civil Procedure Code to deal

with the commercial disputes, only to highlight that the trial of

the commercial dispute suits is put on fast track for disposal

of the suits expeditiously. Various provisions of the Act

referred to above and the amendments inserted to the Civil

Procedure Code by the Schedule is to ensure speedy resolution

of the commercial disputes in a time bound manner. The intent

of the legislature seems to be to have a procedure which

expedites the disposal of commercial disputes and thus

creates a positive environment for investment and

development and make India an attractive place to do

business.”

40. The evolution of summary judgments was aimed to resolve a

persistent challenge of common law litigation that often results in

considerable delays and large expenses. There is no gainsaying that

summary judgments did not exists in common law earlier, it evolved

through numerous statutory interventions under the English law as

a response to social and economic pressures. The evolution of

summary judgment was dependent on factual clarity and evidence;

it was granted only to plaintiffs in cases seeking factual certainty.

In this regard, the emergence of summary judgment under Indian

procedural law represents a significant ‘change of winds’, steering

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the country’s litigation chapters to meet the contemporary demands

of factual certainty and judicial efficiency. Although fast-track

procedure existed under the CPC by way of Order XXXVII, it was

only applicable for limited purpose.

41. Order XIII-A of the CPC consists of eight rules, detailing the

procedure and substance for rendering a summary judgment. Rule

1 states that the summary judgement procedure can be adopted for

deciding the entire suit/counter claim, or a part of a claim or even

a particular question on which a claim (whether in whole or in part)

depends. It was further clarified that the summary procedure was

also applicable to suits filed under Order XXXVII of CPC.

42. Rule 2 of Order XIII-A of the CPC observes that application for

summary judgement is time bound and can be made any time after

the summons has been served on the defendant and before the

issues are framed.

43. Rule 3 of Order XIII-A of the CPC is the heart of the aforesaid

order and reads as under: –

“3. Grounds for summary judgment.— The Court may give

a summary judgment against a plaintiff or defendant on a

claim if it considers that–

(a) the plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim

or the defendant has no real prospect of successfully

defending the claim, as the case may be; and

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(b) there is no other compelling reason why the claim should

not be disposed of before recording of oral evidence.”

In such light, this Rule 3, as applicable to commercial disputes,

empowers the Court to grant a summary judgement against the

defendant where the Court considers that the defendant has no real

prospect of successfully defending the claim and there is no other

compelling reason why the claim should not be disposed of before

recording of oral evidence. The aforesaid provision is identical to

Rule 24.3 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 1998 as applicable in the

United Kingdom. The same reads as under: –

“24.2. The court may give summary judgement against

a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or on

an issue if–

(a) It considers that the party has no real prospect of

succeeding on the claim, defence or issue; and

(b) There is no other compelling reason why the case or issue

should be disposed of at a trial.”

44. Rule 4 of Order XIII-A of the CPC prescribes the procedural

aspects concerning the format of pleadings and other requirements

necessary for the Court to consider an application under the said

Order in the following manner: –

“4. Procedure.—

(1) An application for summary judgement to a Court shall

in addition to any other matters the applicant may

deem relevant, include the matters set forth in subclauses

(a) to (f) mentioned hereunder:–

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(a) the application must contain a statement that it is

an application for summary judgement made under

this Order;

(b) the application must precisely disclose all material

facts and identify the point of law, if any;

(c) in the event the applicant seeks to rely upon any

documentary evidence, the applicant must,–

(i) include such documentary evidence in its

application, and

(ii) identify the relevant content of such

documentary evidence on which the applicant

relies;

(d) the application must state the reason why there are

no real prospects of succeeding on the claim or

defending the claim, as the case may be;

(e) the application must state what relief the applicant

is seeking and briefly state the grounds for seeking

such relief.

(2) Where a hearing for summary judgement is fixed, the

respondent must be given at least thirty days’ notice

of:–

(a) the date fixed for the hearing; and

(b) the claim that is proposed to be decided by the

Court at such hearing.

(3) The respondent may, within thirty days of the receipt

of notice of application of summary judgement or notice

of hearing (whichever is earlier), file a reply addressing

the matters set forth in clauses (a) to (f) mentioned

hereunder in addition to any other matter that the

respondent may deem relevant:–

(a) the reply must precisely–

(i) disclose all material facts;

(ii) identify the point of law, if any; and

(iii) state the reasons why the relief sought by the

applicant should not be granted;

(b) in the event the respondent seeks to reply upon any

documentary evidence in its reply, the respondent

must–

(i) include such documentary evidence in its reply;

and

(ii) identify the relevant content of such

documentary evidence on which the

respondent relies;

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(c) the reply must state the reason why there are real

prospects of succeeding on the claim or defending

the claim, as the case may be;

(d) the reply must concisely state the issues that

should be framed for trial;

(e) the reply must identify what further evidence shall

be brought on record at trial that could not be

brought on record at the stage of summary

judgement; and

(f) the reply must state why, in light of the evidence or

material on record if any, the Court should not

proceed to summary judgement.”

45. Rule 5 relates to the evidentiary aspect of adjudicating

applications under Order XIII-A of the CPC. This has been inducted

to ensure that summary judgments are rendered in terms of Rule 3

by adducing any additional evidence in the following manner: –

“5. Evidence for hearing of summary judgement.–

(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Order, if the

respondent in an application for summary judgement

wishes to rely on additional documentary evidence

during the hearing, the respondent must:–

(a) file such documentary evidence; and

(b) service copies of such documentary evidence on

every other party to the application at least fifteen

days prior to the date of hearing.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in this Order, if the

applicant for summary judgement wishes to rely on

documentary evidence in reply to the defendant’s

documentary evidence, the applicant must:–

(a) file such documentary evidence in reply; and

(b) serve a copy of such documentary evidence on the

respondent at least five days prior to the date of

hearing.

(3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, sub-rules (1)

and (2) shall not require documentary evidence to be:–

(a) filed if such documentary evidence has already

been filed; or

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(b) served on a party on whom it has already been

served.”

46. Rule 6 provides the different types of discretion available with

the Court while considering an application under Order XIII-A of the

CPC and the same includes: –

“6. Orders that may be made by Court.–

(1) On an application made under this Order, the Court

may make such orders that it may deem fit in its

discretion including the following:–

(a) judgement on the claim;

(b) conditional order in accordance with Rule 7

mentioned hereunder;

(c) dismissing the application;

(d) dismissing part of the claim and a judgement on

part of the claim that is not dismissed;

(e) striking out the pleadings (whether in whole or in

part); or

(f) further directions to proceed for case management

under XV-A.

(2) Where the Court makes any of the orders as set forth

in sub-rule (1)(a) to (f), the Court shall record its reasons

for making such order.”

47. Rule 7 and Rule 8 of Order XIII-A of the CPC provide specific

provisions on conditional orders and costs, respectively.

48. At the outset, the scheme of Order XIII-A of the CPC portrays

an adversarial adjudication. It cannot be inquisitorial, meaning that

a summary judgment under this Order cannot be upon the

inquisition of the Court. It is mandatory to serve the defendant, as

elucidated in Rule 2 of this Order.

23

49. At this point, it will not be out of context to note that the

consequences of ‘rejection of plaint’/’return of plaint’ and ‘summary

judgment’ are different. Res judicata operates only on the latter.

Accordingly, the test of adjudication must also be different between

Order VII Rule 11 and Order XIII-A of the CPC. Consequently, the

scope of enquiry for a Court under Order XIII-A of CPC is larger than

that Order VII Rule 11.

50. Coming back to the Order necessary for adjudication of the

present case, Rule 3 of Order XIII-A of the CPC provides that the

Court, while adjudicating an application for summary judgement,

has to bear in mind two things –

(i) the Court considers –

(a) whether the plaintiff has any real prospect of

succeeding on the claim or issue; or

(b) whether the defendant has any real prospect of

successfully defending the claim or issue; and

(ii) there is no other reason why the case or issue should

be allowed to go to trial.

51. This brings us to the expression ‘real prospect of success’, as

used in Rule 3 of Order XIII-A of the CPC. This phrase is, by its very

nature, self-explanatory and admits of no further interpretation. It

24

postulates that the likelihood of success must be real and

substantial, as opposed to being merely fanciful or speculative. In

other words, the standard envisages a degree of certainty higher

than that of a claim which is merely arguable. Accordingly, where

the Court finds that a claim or defence is so weak that it prima-facie

discloses no reasonable prospect of success, it is neither necessary

nor desirable to subject the parties to the rigours of a full-fledged

trial. The provision, thus, empowers the Court to arrest such

proceedings at the threshold, thereby preventing undue expenditure

use of judicial time and resources. At the same time, the provision

reflects the broader obligation of the Court to ensure expeditious

delivery of justice. In this regard, reference can be made to the

decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal in Swain v.

Hillman, [2001] 1 All ER 91, which set the standard for summary

judgement under Part 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 1998 of the

United Kingdom. In this case, it was held that the power of

summary judgement is to be exercised where it is just and expedient

to do so, enabling parties to know their legal position without being

compelled to endure a trial.

52. The question then arises regarding the scope of enquiry under

Order XIII-A of the CPC. At one end of spectrum, it is to follow the

25

test laid out in Wenlock v. Moloney, [1965] 1 WLR 1238, wherein

the English Court of Appeal adopted rigid standard to state that: –

“…this summary jurisdiction of the court was never

intended to be exercised by a minute and protracted

examination of the documents and facts of the case, in

order to see whether the plaintiff really has a cause of

action. To do that is to usurp the position of the trial judge,

and to produce a trial of the case is chambers, on affidavits

only, without discovery and without oral evidence tested by

cross-examination in the ordinary way. This seems to me to

be an abuse of the inherent power of the court and not a

proper exercise of that power.”

53. A less stringent standard was adopted in William and

Humbert Ltd. v. W & H Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd., [1986] AC

368, wherein the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit observed that a Court should, as a general rule, decline to

proceed with the argument unless it not only harbours doubts about

the soundness of the pleadings but, in addition, is satisfied that

striking out will obviate the necessity for a trial or will substantially

reduce the burden of preparing for the trial or the burden of the trial

itself.

54. In Three Rivers District Council v. Governor and company

of the Bank of England, [2001] UKHL 16, the House of Lords was

considering a suit for damages against the Bank of England for

misfeasance in public office arising from collapse of Bank of Credit

26

and Commerce International SA. While considering the application

of the defendant for summary judgement, it was held that: –

“95. I would approach that further question in this way. The

method by which issues of fact are tried in our courts is well

settled. After the normal processes of discovery and

interrogatories have been completed, the parties are allowed

to lead their evidence so that the trial judge can determine

where the truth lies in the light of that evidence. To that rule

there are some well-recognised exceptions. For example, it

may be clear as a matter of law at the outset that even if a

party were to succeed in proving all the facts that he offers to

prove he will not be entitled to the remedy that he seeks. In

that event a trial of the facts would be a waste of time and

money, and it is proper that the action should be taken out of

court as soon as possible. In other cases it may be possible to

say with confidence before trial that the factual basis for the

claim is fanciful because it is entirely without substance. It

may be clear beyond question that the statement of facts is

contradicted by all the documents or other material on which

it is based. The simpler the case the easier it is likely to be

take that view and resort to what is properly called summary

judgment. But more complex cases are unlikely to be

capable of being resolved in that way without

conducting a mini-trial on the documents without

discovery and without oral evidence. As Lord Woolf said

in Swain v Hillman, at p 95, that is not the object of the rule. It

is designed to deal with cases that are not fit for trial at all.”

55. Closer to the home, various High Courts have rendered their

opinions primarily on a cautionary note in adjudicating summary

judgments, which have been held to be applicable in exceptional

cases. Reference in this regard can be made to Bright Enterprises

Pvt. Ltd. v. MJ Bizcraft LLP & Anr., 2017 SCC Online Del 6394

and Su-kam Power Systems Ltd. v. Mr. Kunwer Sachdev & Anr.,

2019 SCC Online Del 10764.

27

56. If a case before the Court gives rise to a neat point of law or

construction, and if the Court is satisfied that it has all evidences

necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the

parties have had an adequate opportunity to address their

arguments; it should grasp the nettle and decide the same. While it

is simply not enough for the defendant to argue that something may

come up in trial, at the same time the defendant has to show from

the documents available on record, or portray that such evidence

likely exists and can be expected to be made available during the

trial.

57. There is no gainsaying that the Court ought not to conduct a

mini-trial in this regard, rather take the statements and facts on

the face, until any contemporaneous document indicates otherwise.

In doing so, the Court ought to not only take into account the

evidence actually available on the record, but also the evidence that

can be reasonably be expected to be available in the process of trial.

58. It may not be out of context to note that the use of summary

judgment will not be against the interest of justice if it will lead to a

fair and just result, and serve the goals of timeliness, affordability

and proportionality in light of the litigation as a whole.

59. Therefore, while considering an application for summary

judgment under Order XIII-A of the CPC, the following nonexhaustive  guidelines have to be complied –

(i) That the procedural mandate under Order XIII-A,CPC be strictly complied.

(ii) The Court should consider,

(a) Whether Plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; or

(b) Whether the defendant has no real prospect of

successfully defending the claim or issue; and

(iii) The Court should also consider whether there is no

other reason why the case or issue(s) should be

allowed to go to trial.

(iv) While ascertaining above, the Court does not have to

take everything on the face value, but it must also not

conduct a mini trial at the same time.

(v) That the Court has to differentiate between a cause

of action/defence respectively, which is real as

opposed to fanciful prospect.

29

(vi) That the Court ought to grasp the nettle, when

dealing with the summary judgment applications to

decide short points of law and interpretations.

(vii) The Court must take into account not only the

evidence before it but also the evidence that can

reasonably be expected to be led/available at the

trial.

(viii) That the Court’s usage of power under Order XIII-A,

CPC is exceptional as it cuts short the process of trial

and ought to be exercised where oral evidence and

full trial is not required.

(ix) In order to ascertain the need for full trial over

summary judgment, the Court has to see whether, in

the interest of justice, it is more suited to conduct

trial to –

(a) Weigh the evidence,

(b) Evaluate the credibility of a deponents,

(c) Draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.

Grasping the nettle

60. The case of the appellant herein is simple. It is undisputed

that it purchased the Subject Plot through public auction by paying

30

valuable consideration way back in the year 2007. Further, it is an

admitted position that the acquisition of the Subject Land was

challenged before the High Court by the original owner i.e., one

Simla Devi in W.P. (C) No. 5688 of 2015. It is a matter of record that

the High Court by order dated 15.11.2018, declared that the

aforesaid acquisition had lapsed. There is also no dispute that the

when this order was challenged before this Court in Civil Appeal No.

6345 of 2017, the appeal came to be dismissed vide order dated

04.05.2017 while giving DDA a last opportunity to re-acquire the

Subject Plot within six months. There is no dispute that even these

six months as provided by this Court expired on 04.11.2017,

without re-acquisition of the Subject Land. Moreover, it is a matter

of record that the Review Petition filed by DDA before this Court was

dismissed by order dated 17.10.2019, followed by dismissal of a

Curative Petition vide order dated 19.05.2022. Further, the lapse is

again confirmed in the order dated 15.10.2025 passed by this Court

in SLP (C) Dairy No. 53900 of 2025, with a further option given to

DDA to re-acquire the Subject Land within one year.

61. In light of the above admitted and conclusive facts, the

appellant herein instituted a suit for recovery of amount paid as

consideration with interest, before the High Court being C.S.

31

(Comm) No. 582 of 2021. In this context, an application being I.A.

No. 6914 of 2022 was filed by the appellant seeking summary

judgment under Rule 4 of Order XIII-A of CPC. In the said

application, the appellant pleaded that conveyance of the Subject

Plot in its favour was wholly dependent upon the validity of the

acquisition of the underlying land by the respondent DDA. It is an

admitted position that such acquisition stood rendered void-abinitio

due to failure of DDA to pay compensation to the original

landowners, resulting in lapse under Section 24(2) of the Fair

Compensation Act, 2013. In this regard, reliance was placed on the

judgement of the High Court dated 15.11.2016, as affirmed by this

Court in its judgement dated 04.05.2017, as well as the subsequent

review and curative proceedings. It was further contended that the

DDA failed to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings withing the

stipulated time period. In view of the aforesaid, despite payment of

the entire sale consideration, stamp duty, property tax and other

charges, the appellant was left with no subsisting right on the

Subject Plot. Thus, the suit and consequent application were filed

claiming that the amounts paid were liable to be refunded with

interest, for reasons solely attributable to the respondent. It was

also averred that despite repeated representations by the appellant,

32

no response was elicited from the respondent. It was only informed

belatedly vide a letter dated 20.11.2017 of the aforesaid

developments along with furnishing an undertaking to bear all

additional responsibility for re-acquisition, which was well beyond

the time period granted by the Courts.

62. It is, thus, clear from the pleadings and documents in the

application and the plaint, that the appellant is able to discharge

his burden in showing a real prospect of success. Now we must

examine the respondent’s position to see whether the defence

exhibits any actual prospect of success to mandate a trial.

63. The first defence of the DDA is that the appellant continued

the possession and lost the same due to some miscreants.

According to the respondent herein, in order for the appellant to

maintain a claim for refund, the appellant is first bound to handover

the peaceful possession of the subject land to the DDA. Therefore,

the aspect of possession is an issue to be adjudicated in trial.

64. Although this argument of the respondent appears to be

enticing, however the same has to be rejected for having no basis in

law. The history of litigation clearly indicates that the question of

lapse of acquisition has been conclusively put to rest by this Court

in view of dismissal of the Curative Petition. The fact that

acquisition has lapsed means that the situation as it existed before

initiation of the land acquisition process has been brought back.

There is nothing left for the respondent DDA to seek in the land.

Legally, the implication of lapse of acquisition is that the title flows

back to the erstwhile owner. But, the DDA has no interest to retain

the same. Moreover, the order dated 04.05.2017 passed by this

Court in Civil Appeal No. 6345 of 2017 was categorical that if the

re-acquisition is not carried out in six months, then the possession

be returned to the original owners i.e., Simla Devi and others.

65. The defence of the DDA herein is fanciful as they seek to claim

the possession from the appellant herein, whereas it is now for the

erstwhile owners to seek appropriate remedies. In addition, it is

necessary to observe that once, on a petition filed by the erstwhile

owner, lapsing of the acquisition was directed with liberty of reacquisition,

the auction proceedings have lost their efficacy. In

consequence, the Conveyance Deed of the Subject Plot, for which

the deposit of consideration was made, is required to be refunded

in order to revert the clock to the position as it existed on the date

of the auction. Further, in view of the orders passed by this Court,

it can well be perceived that in case the DDA decides to re-acquire

the land, they may have an occasion to auction the same, otherwise,

the title of the subject land will be lost by them. Hence, DDA does

not have any right to retain the bid amount which was deposited

well within time by the appellant.

66. In light of the above, the High Court completely erred in

reading the issue of refund as contingent to handing over of the

possession. There is nothing in law or fact to show that possession

is sine qua non for refund. The DDA is not able to dislodge the fact

that the acquisition lapsed by orders of this Court. A necessary

corollary is that refund has to be initiated for the auction purchaser.

Further, there is no valid reason portrayed by the respondent to

refuse refund or retain the amount any longer.

67. The High Court seems to have misdirected itself in finding a

triable issue on fact without adjudicating the relevancy of the

aforesaid issue to the case at hand. Even assuming that factum of

physical possession is contentious, the High Court failed to examine

as to how such fact affects the issue of refund.

68. The analysis of the High Court in equating possession to a

level ownership is completely misguided. Such understanding

renders categorical findings of this Court in the earlier round otiose.

Further, such examination provides the DDA a ruse to re-open the

litigation settled earlier by this Court. If such re-opening is allowed,

then there is no certainty of the judgments of this Court, more so

when the Curative Petition has already been dismissed against the

respondent herein.

69. Is this context, the letter dated 20.11.2017 sent by DDA to

the appellant herein is instructive, wherein the respondent has

itself admitted that by order dated 04.10.2017 of this Court, the

earlier acquisition lapsed and fresh direction for acquisition was

provided by the Court.

70. In addition, the order in Civil Appeal No. 6345 of 2017 was

an in rem adjudication. Any aspect dealt therein operates as a res

judicata on the party to re-agitate the aforesaid issue. The

adjudication was on the status of land acquisition over the Subject

Land, which has been categorically held to have been lapsed. In this

regard, the respondent cannot be allowed to re-agitate the issue

indirectly in a suit on issues which have been well-settled by way of

orders of this Court.

71. Viewed from the standpoint of restitution, the respondent has

sought to raise a defence of alleged ‘counter-restitution

impossibility.’ Notwithstanding the manner in which the defence

has been articulated, it is liable to be rejected. There exists no

corresponding benefit with the appellant that can be restored to the

respondent. Inasmuch as the acquisition itself has lapsed; no right,

title or benefit in respect of the Subject Land subsists with the

appellant, which can be the subject matter of counter-restitution.

The plea of restitution, insofar as it seeks to predicate a return of

possession, is thus wholly illusory and misconceived. Any

independent claim, including that of the original owner in respect

of possession, is extraneous to the present proceedings and may be

pursued in accordance with law in appropriate proceedings. On this

ground as well, the defence set up by the respondent is liable to fail.

72. The aforementioned issue of possession is also confirmed in

the proceedings before this Court vide order dated 15.10.2025 in

SLP (C) Dairy No. 53900 of 2025, wherein the DDA was directed to

initiate re-acquisition within one year. This order, in essence,

confirms that the earlier acquisition had lapsed, meaning that the

respondent is left with no choice but to refund the amount to the

appellant. The possibility of fresh acquisition cannot impede the

appellant herein from claiming their legitimate refund. The

consequence of respondents’ defence is that the parties would be

involuntarily bound by transactions to which they do not consent.

This Court cannot accept such bad faith arguments as it amounts

to abuse of process in coercing party to accept new transaction. It

is in this regard that liberty is preserved for the DDA to initiate

acquisition again and/or conduct fresh auction for the same, if they

deem it appropriate.

73. In light of the aforesaid analysis, since the issue of possession

is completely alien to the present adjudication, therefore, the

second defence of non-joinder of the original owners is not pertinent

to the present set of litigation.

74. The third defence specifically taken by the respondent in the

written statement is the issue of limitation. At the cost of repetition,

it can be noticed that the lapse of land acquisition was upheld by

this Court on 04.05.2017. The further six months’ period for the

acquisition ended on 04.11.2017. Thereafter, the appellant sent

various representations dated 28.12.2017, 10.12.2018 and

07.08.2019, which were not replied to by the respondent

authorities. Moreover, the Review Petition was dismissed by this

Court on 17.10.2019, followed by dismissal of the Curative Petition

on 19.05.2022.

75. The respondent has argued that the question of limitation is

a mixed question of law and facts, therefore the same cannot be

adjudicated as a summary judgment under Order XIII-A of the CPC.

In our view, such objection taken by the respondent is ex facie to

be rejected. The respondent does not dispute the existence of this

Court’s order dated 04.05.2017 in Civil Appeal No. 6345 of 2017.

The right to seek refund in terms of the order starts to accrue from

04.11.2017, when the time limit of six months, as provided by this

Court, expired. The argument of DDA that the limitation started to

accrue from 2016 is fanciful and nothing turns on the same. The

High Court fell short in this regard to decipher the fanciful defence

over the arguable and real ones.

76. There can be no dispute that limitation is ordinarily a mixed

question of law and fact, particularly where foundational facts are

in contest. In the present case, however, the issue of limitation rests

on admitted and undisputed material, particularly the order of this

Court dated 04.05.2017 and the expiry of the six-month period

stipulated therein. In such circumstances, no further factual

inquiry is warranted. This Court must, therefore, address the issue

decisively at this stage. To permit the matter to proceed to a full

trial, despite the clarity of the material on record, would be contrary

to the principle of proportionality and would needlessly prolong

litigation that is otherwise ripe for determination by way of

summary judgment.

77. Even under Rule 24.2 of Civil Procedural Rules of the United

Kingdom, the English Courts have adjudicated the issue of

limitation where there is no requirement of oral evidence and

extensive trial. In Graham Frank Davy v 01000654 Ltd., [2018]

EWHC 353 (QB), it was held as follows: –

“13. In applying the relevant principles to the summary

judgment limb of the Application I therefore bear in mind the

warning against conducting a mini-trial and also any

reasonable prospect there might be of further evidence,

beyond that filed on the Application, later coming before the

court. Those two propositions affirmed by the Easy Air

decision feed into the further point that, even in cases where

the summary judgment application does not appear to signal

the existence of any obvious conflict of fact or an issue for trial

of any great complexity, the court should be wary of granting

summary judgment where reasonable grounds exist for

believing that a fuller investigation at a trial (or, as

appropriate, a trial of a preliminary issue) might well produce

a different outcome between the parties. However, against

this guidance which might loosely be described as

amounting to giving the respondent the benefit of any

reasonable grounds for doubt, the same principles also

sound a note of caution against undue timidity in

engaging with the application and the evidence filed on

it. Caution which is justified by the need for the

respondent to engage with the “realistic” rather than

the “fanciful” and for the court to test whatever factual

assertions he is making against such contemporaneous

documents as are before it.”

(emphasis supplied)

78. In light of these facts, the suit for refund filed by the appellant

on 02.11.2020 cannot be said to be barred by limitation. Moreover,

even after filing the suit, the DDA continued to litigate the Review

Petition, followed by the Curative Petition before this Court.

Therefore, the defence of the suit being time-barred is completely

misplaced and fictitious. Thus, it is clear that there is nothing in

this issue that requires facts to be ascertained by oral evidence or

requires full trial.

Conclusion

79. Coming to the relief to be granted, the appellant has sought

refund under two heads, i.e., the consideration paid and property

tax paid along with 12% interest. During the oral arguments before

this Court, learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shyam Divan appearing for

the appellant gave up the prayer concerning stamp duty/transfer

duty i.e., Rs. 9,89,46,025/- and property tax i.e., Rs. 23,12,927/-.

Accordingly, the amount of initial consideration paid by the

appellant which amounts to Rs. 164,91,00,000/- needs to be

decreed as refund.

80. Consequentially, it is necessary that this Court set aside the

registered Conveyance Deed dated 06.02.2008 to do complete

justice, by exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution of

India, as mutual restitution would be necessary to bring an end to

this dispute once and for all. Accordingly, the registered

Conveyance deed dated 06.02.2008, duly registered at the office of

Sub-Registrar-VII Delhi having Registration No. 4300 in Additional

Book No. 1 Volume 2886 at Pg. 83 to 86 dated 07.03.2006, executed

by the respondent in favour of appellant herein is set aside.

81. Although the amount of refund is claimed with 12% interest

from the date of payment of consideration till the final payment by

respondent, however, we deem it appropriate to reduce the interest

to 7.5% in the interest of justice and accordingly, award 7.5%

interest on the aforesaid amount from 12.07.2007 being the date

of complete payment of consideration by the appellant herein, till

the date of actual payment.

82. It was brought to our notice that by order dated 14.10.2024

before the High Court in I.A. No. 36226/2024, the respondent has

deposited a Fixed Deposit Receipt of Rs. 186,00,00,000/- (INR One

hundred eighty-six crores) before the High Court. The appellant

herein is at liberty to withdraw the said amount forthwith. The

balance amount in terms of this order be paid to appellant herein

within eight weeks. If the balance payment is not paid in the

stipulated time, the amount be computed at the prevailing prime

lending rate of the Reserve Bank of India.

83. Keeping in view the aforesaid findings and mandate of law,

the present appeal is allowed, however there shall be no order as to

costs. Accordingly, the suit is decreed in the above terms. The

Registry of this Court is directed to draw up the decree in the above

terms.

….…………………………J.

[J.K. Maheshwari]

….…………………………J.

[Atul S. Chandurkar]

New Delhi;

29th April, 2026