Crla / 379U / 1997Rajasthan Board … vs M/S Dhariwal Textiles And Another … on 13 May, 2026

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    Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur

    Urn: Crla / 379U / 1997Rajasthan Board … vs M/S Dhariwal Textiles And Another … on 13 May, 2026

    [2026:RJ-JD:24282]
    
          HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                           JODHPUR
                         S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 229/1997
    
    Rajasthan Board For Prevention And Control of Pollution, 4,
    
    Industrial Area, Jhalana Dungri, Jaipur
    
                                                                          ----Appellant
                                            Versus
    1. M/s Dhariwal Textiles, Mahaveer Udyog Nagar, Pali
    
    2. Shri Sampatraj Dhariwal, Partner
    
                                                                        ----Respondent
    
    
    For Appellant(s)             :     Mr. Manish Sisodia, Sr. Advocate,
                                       assisted by Mr. Piyush Chauhan
    For Respondent(s)            :     --
    
    
    
                 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL BENIWAL

    Judgment

    13/05/2026

    SPONSORED

    1. The present criminal appeal has been filed under Section 378

    of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, “CrPC“),

    against the judgment dated 23.12.1993, passed by learned

    Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Environment, Pali, Rajasthan,

    in Criminal Complaint no. 57/1992, whereby the Respondent

    accused were acquitted from offences under Sections 24, 25 and

    26 read with Sections 43 and 44 of the Water (Prevention and

    Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (hereinafter, “Act of 1974”).

    2. Brief facts of the present case are that Respondent No. 1 is a

    partnership firm and Respondent No. 2 is alleged to be a partner

    therein. The Respondent firm is engaged in the business of

    dyeing, printing, mercerising since 1975.

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    2.1 On 20.08.1976, Respondent firm submitted an application for

    obtaining consent for discharge of trade effluents. Another letter

    dated 08.11.1976 (Exh. P-3), was submitted wherein it was stated

    that a treatment plant would be installed within one year.

    Thereafter, on 20.12.1976, the consent order (Exh. P-4) for

    discharge of trade effluents under Section 25 and 26 of Act of

    1974 was provisionally granted, subject to certain conditions

    which are as follows:

    “(i) The Consent is granted for a period upto JUNE, 1977.

    (ii) Daily quantity of trade effluent shall not exceed _______
    litres per day. Discharge shall be regularly measured by a
    suitable flow measuring device.

    (iii) The Industrial effluent shall be treated by suitable method so
    as to conform to the tolerance limits as per I.S. 2490-Part-I,
    1974 (as adopted by the Board).

    The treatment method along with design should be intimated to
    the Board with full details.

    A copy of the Standards adopted by the Board is also enclosed
    for your informations.

    Enclosed

    (i) ANNEXURE.

    (ii) STANDARDS ADOPTED BY THE BOARD.”

    2.2 The provisional consent was further extended till

    31.12.1978. On 17.03.1979, a notice for inspection (Exh.P-6) was

    issued in the name of Respondent No. 2 under Rule 30(2), Water

    (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Rules, whereby Mr. D.C.

    Sharma – Junior Chemist (PW-2) and Mr. A.K. Maheshwari were

    appointed as the inspection officers. They were directed to

    conduct inspection of the factory and disposal system of the firm.

    Consequently, the inspection was carried out and a ‘notice of

    intimation to have sample analysed’ (Exh.P-8) was served upon

    the Respondent No.1, then and there, which mentions that sample

    was collected from “final outlet” on 19.03.1979. The sample was

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    collected, sealed, marked in the presence of inspection officer, Mr.

    D. C. Sharma. The signatures of Mr. Sampatraj Dhariwal

    (Respondent No.2) were also obtained on the said notice.

    2.3 On 19.03.1979, an inspection was conducted by the

    inspection officers and an inspection report (Exh. P-7) was

    prepared by Mr. D. C. Sharma (PW-2). It mentions that

    Respondent No. 2 was a partner in the firm. It was found that no

    treatment plant had been installed and untreated trade effluent

    was being discharged via two outlets, one for dyeing and another

    for mercerising and printing. Moreover, 15,000 litres of trade

    effluent was being discharged by the firm per day which ultimately

    joins Bandi river. The samples collected from the firm, were sent

    for analysis to the State Board Analyst. On 07.04.1979, a report

    was issued by the Board Analyst stating that the sample was

    received by him on 20.03.1979 and the condition of the seal,

    fastening and container on receipt was “intact”.

    2.4 According to testimony of PW-1, K.L. Goel (Member

    Secretary), on 26.05.1979, permission to initiate prosecution

    against the Respondent firm was granted. On 07.08.1979, a

    complaint was presented before the Court. The statements of Mr.

    K.L. Goel, Member Secretary and Mr. D.C. Sharma, Junior Chemist

    were recorded and on 08.01.1988, the charges under Sections 24,

    25 and 26 read with 43 and 44 of Act of 1974 were framed against

    the accused.

    2.5 The prosecution evidences were closed on 08.08.1993. On

    20.12.1993, the statements of Respondent accused were recorded

    under Section 313, CrPC wherein Respondent No.2 gave the

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    statement that he had never been officer in-charge of the

    Respondent firm nor had he ever been involved in the

    management thereof. Respondent accused did not produce any

    evidences.

    2.6 The issues before the learned Trial Court were :

    (i) Whether Respondent firm was liable under Section 24 r/w

    Section 43 of Act of 1974 on account of discharging untreated

    trade effluents in Bandi river and thereby, polluting it.

    (ii) Whether Respondent firm was liable under Section 25 r/w

    Section 44 of Act of 1974 on account of establishing any new

    outlet or initiating any new discharge.

    (iii) Whether Respondent firm was liable under Section 26 r/w

    Section 44 of Act of 1974 on account of discharging the trade

    effluent without obtaining consent order.

    2.7 After examination of witnesses and evidences adduced by

    the parties, the learned Trial Court, vide judgment dated

    23.12.1993 acquitted the Respondents on benefit of doubt.

    2.8 Hence, the present criminal appeal.

    3. Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that the learned

    Magistrate has gravely erred in holding that the Respondent

    accused were prejudiced on account of not being afforded an

    opportunity to further cross-examine PW-1 due to his death during

    trial. According to the Appellant, the said finding is wholly contrary

    to Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which expressly

    renders previous testimony admissible where the witness cannot

    be produced on account of death.

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    3.1 Learned counsel further submits that the learned Magistrate

    has misdirected himself in doubting compliance of Section 21 of

    the Water Act while collecting the sample of trade effluent.

    Attention of this Court is invited to the testimony of PW-2, which

    unequivocally establishes that all procedural formalities, including

    issuance of notices prior to inspection and sampling, obtaining

    signatures of the occupiers, collection and sealing of samples,

    preparation of inspection report and dispatch of the samples to the

    Board Laboratory, were duly carried out by him in accordance with

    law.

    3.2 Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that Section 21(3)

    (a) of Act of 1974 provides that notice is required to be served

    forthwith, on the person in-charge or the occupier of the premises.

    The notice is required to be served only on the occupier of the

    premises and not upon every accused person. The notice was duly

    served on Respondent no. 1. Therefore, service of notice on

    Respondent no. 1 was sufficient compliance of Section 21 of Act of

    1974.

    3.3 Learned counsel for the Appellant further submits that, with

    regard to division of samples obtained during inspection, Section

    21(5) of the Act of 1974 provides that the sample may be divided

    into two parts at the request of the occupier. In the absence of

    such request, the sample is required to be placed in a sealed

    container marked and signed by both the inspecting authority and

    the occupier. In the present case, the sample was collected from

    the final outlet and, since Respondent No. 6 did not request

    division of the sample, PW-2 Mr. D.C. Sharma placed the sample

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    in a sealed container, duly marked the same and obtained the

    signatures of Respondent No. 6 thereon.

    3.4 Learned counsel further submits that the Board had duly

    adopted IS-2490 Part-I standards and that the same were

    specifically communicated to the accused vide Exhibit P-4, thereby

    rendering such standards and conditions binding under Sections

    25 and 26 of the Act.

    3.5 Learned counsel submits that the prosecution was only

    required to prove discharge of poisonous, noxious or polluting

    matter into a stream, sewer or land without consent of the State

    Board. The drain into which the trade effluent was discharged

    clearly fell within the definition of “stream” under Section 2(j) of

    the Act. Hence, it was wholly unnecessary for the prosecution to

    prove that the effluent had ultimately reached River Bandi,

    especially when the topography of the area itself demonstrated

    such flow.

    3.6 Learned counsel further submits that the finding regarding

    non-liability of Respondent No.2 is perverse and contrary to the

    evidence on record. The material on record clearly demonstrates

    that Respondent No.2 had been acting as partner and person in-

    charge of the affairs of Respondent No.1 firm from the very

    inception, including submission of consent applications,

    correspondence with the Board and participation during inspection

    dated 19.03.1979.

    4. Heard learned counsel for the Appellant and perused the

    material available on record.

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    5. The present case being an appeal against acquittal, this

    Court is required to examine whether the findings of the learned

    Trial Court suffer from any error of fact or law, illegality, infirmity,

    or perversity. This Court finds that there were several procedural

    lapses in the conduct of the inspection and collection of samples.

    5.1 On perusal of the inspection report (Exh. P-6), it is observed

    that it is a typed report and does not contain the date when it was

    prepared. PW-2 in his cross examination stated that he had

    prepared notes of inspection on a rough paper and then he

    prepared this typed report, later in time. The rough paper was not

    produced as evidence before the learned Trial Court. This Court is

    of the opinion that the inspection officer must have prepared the

    report on site and obtained signatures of the agent or occupier

    thereof present at the time of inspection. Therefore, this raises

    doubts regarding the authenticity and reliability of the inspection

    report prepared by PW-2.

    5.2 According to section 23(2), the entry and inspection must be

    conducted in consonance with the provisions of CrPC for search,

    inspection and seizure. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the

    inspection officer to associate at least two independent witnesses

    during the inspection proceedings.

    5.3 The association of independent witnesses was necessary,

    particularly because certain objections raised by the learned

    counsel for the Respondent-accused during trial could not be

    effectively rebutted by the Appellant-complainant. Firstly, the

    burden of proving that no request for division of sample was made

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    by Respondent No. 2, lay upon the Appellant. However, this fact

    could not be proved to the satisfaction of the Court.

    5.4 Exh.P-16 further mentions that the sample was sealed,

    marked and signed in the presence of inspection officer, D. C.

    Sharma (PW-2) and bears signatures of Respondent No.2.

    However, on perusal of the Exhibits it appears that in the

    application for consent the signatures of Mr. Sampat are in

    English. However, the signatures purportedly obtained from the

    alleged partner on the inspection and sampling notices appear in

    Hindi.

    5.5 In his cross-examination, PW-2 deposed that he had

    collected the sample in only one container and had not obtained

    the signatures of any person on the inspection report. He further

    stated that he had conducted the inspection alone and, therefore,

    did not obtain the signatures of Mr. A.K. Maheshwari. PW-2

    admitted that he had not personally verified the identity of Mr.

    Sampat. He further deposed that, after collecting the sample, he

    affixed the seal prescribed by the State Board. However, neither

    the specimen impression of the seal was produced before the

    learned Trial Court nor was the same brought on record by the

    Appellant.

    5.6 The learned Trial Court further noted that although PW-1 was

    cross-examined before framing of charge, after framing of charge

    the Respondent-accused did not get an opportunity to further

    cross-examine him due to his death. Consequently, the

    Respondent-accused was deprived of the valuable right of further

    cross-examination.

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    5.7 In his statement under Section 313, CrPC, it was submitted

    by the Respondent No. 2 that he had never been officer in-charge

    of the Respondent firm nor had he ever been involved in the

    management thereof. It was deposed by PW-2 in his cross

    examination that, at the time of inspection, no material was

    sought by PW-2 to ensure as to who were the partners. The notice

    for inspection (Exh. P-6) also does not mention the name of the

    partners in the firm. Certain correspondences have been placed on

    record to show that Respondent No. 2 was a partner, however, the

    partnership deed or document of registration of the firm were not

    produced as evidence before the learned Trial Court nor was it

    brought on record before this Court. Since, it is not fully

    established that Respondent No. 2 was partner in the Respondent

    firm, prosecution could not have been initiated against him.

    5.8 Furthermore, Exh.P-16 has been produced to show that

    sample was collected on 19.03.1979, however, the sample was

    received by the State Board Analyst on 20.03.1979 i.e. 1 day after

    the sample was collected. With regard to the process of collection

    of sample and transmission thereof, there is no independent

    evidence to establish that the sample was not tampered with,

    during transit to the laboratory. It was pertinent to establish

    proper custody of sample till it reached the Board Analyst.

    5.9 Therefore, the lapses in ensuring the integrity of the sample,

    bring the report of Board Analyst under the umbrella of doubt as

    there is no independent evidence to show that the sample was

    received by the Board Analyst in original condition. This further

    casts a shadow on the prosecution’s case.

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    5.10 The Appellant failed to prove that the IS-2490 norms which

    were alleged to have been violated were legally enforceable. In

    the present case, out of the two witnesses examined by the

    complainant, none had stated when and what standards had been

    prescribed by the Board for discharge of effluents or whether such

    standards were prescribed in accordance with law. Moreover, no

    copy of the standards had been placed on record. Therefore, the

    learned trial Court rightly observed that merely on the basis of the

    chemical analyst’s report (Exh. P-9) it could not be concluded

    whether Respondent firm was discharging trade effluents contrary

    to the standards or in conformity therewith.

    5.11 Moreover, the prosecution failed to establish that the alleged

    effluent ultimately reached the Bandi River or any “stream” within

    the meaning of the Act of 1974. No evidence, either through

    inspection notes, maps, or witness testimony, was produced to

    show that the discharge from the unit ultimately entered a natural

    water body. This is an essential ingredient of the offences charged

    and cannot be presumed.

    5.12 Consequently, the offence under Section 24 read with

    Section 43 of the Act of 1974 is not made out, as the prosecution

    case is founded entirely upon an inspection and sampling process

    whose legality and reliability remain doubtful owing to the

    procedural deficiencies discussed hereinabove.

    5.13 For proving the charge under Section 25 of the Act of 1974,

    the prosecution ought to have established what outlet points had

    been altered by the accused industry after constitution of the

    Board and what outlet points existed previously. In the absence of

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    clear evidence on this aspect, the matter remains ambiguous. In

    the present case also, the prosecution witnesses could not disclose

    what new outlet points had been opened or altered by the accused

    industry after constitution of the Board. In the absence of clear

    and cogent evidence on this aspect, the ingredients of the offence

    under Section 25 read with Section 44 of the Act of 1974 remain

    unproved.

    6. At this juncture, it would appropriate to refer to the

    landmark judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, Mallappa and

    Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka; (2024) 3 SCC 544, wherein it

    was observed that:

    “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the
    promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All
    the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law,
    are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles
    which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal
    could be summarized as:

    (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal
    trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive –
    inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary;

    (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in
    a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;

    (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that
    two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall
    ordinarily be followed;

    (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view,
    mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the
    reversal of acquittal;

    (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal
    in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must
    specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court
    for acquittal and must cover all the facts;

    (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the
    appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or
    error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.”

    7. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that the

    learned Trial Court rightly appreciated the evidence and legal

    position and came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not

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    proved the charges beyond reasonable doubt. This Court finds no

    error of law or fact, illegality, or perversity in the impugned

    judgment. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.

    8. The judgment dated 23.12.1993, passed by learned

    Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Environment, Pali. in Criminal

    Complaint no. 57/1992 is affirmed.

    9. All pending applications stand disposed of.

    (SUNIL BENIWAL),J

    1-skm/-

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