Supreme Court – Daily Orders
Rekhaben Abhalbhai Bambhaniya vs The State Of Gujarat on 18 May, 2026
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ITEM NO.55 COURT NO.12 SECTION III-B
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).16089/2025
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 03-03-
2025 in LPA No. 321/2025 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at
Ahmedabad]
REKHABEN ABHALBHAI BAMBHANIYA Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. Respondent(s)
IA No. 305597/2025 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
IA No. 139846/2025 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
IA No. 46209/2026 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
Date : 18-05-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ MISRA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIPUL M. PANCHOLI
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Abhimanue Shrestha, AOR
For Respondent(s) : Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, AOR
Mr. Sankalp Suman, Adv.
Mr. Mayank Kshirsagar, AOR
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2. This petition seeks leave to impugn the order of the
High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad dated 03.03.2025 by which
Signature Not Verified
the writ appeal of the petitioner against the order of the
Digitally signed by
HARPREET KAUR
Date: 2026.05.20
17:16:54 IST
Reason: learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition of the
petitioner impugning the order of her removal from the post
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of Sarpanch, under Section 57(1) of the Gujarat Panchayat
Act, 1993, has been dismissed.
3. The petitioner was served a show cause notice levelling
six charges relating to misuse of authority as Sarpanch of
Gram Panchayat. Amongst those six charges, charge nos. 5 and
6 relate to award of contracts to a firm in which
petitioner’s husband was a partner. The petitioner submitted
her response to the show cause notice. In respect of charge
nos.5 and 6, the petitioner’s case was that such contracts
were awarded after inviting public tender and upon finding
the bidder to be the lowest.
5. The District Development Officer considered the
representation of the petitioner and concluded: “It is
proved on record that her husband Ebhalbhai Mathurbhai
Bambhaniya despite being a partner of Maruti Stone, he got
personal benefit by paying Rs.13,52,350/- and thus by
taking frivolous decisions you have committed frequent
mistakes and by misusing your designation, you have got
personal benefit for your husband means the member of the
family and thereby it is proved that you have misused the
post of Sarpanch.”
6. The petitioner questioned the order passed by the
District Development Officer before the Additional
Development Commissioner in an appeal which was dismissed.
7. Against the appellate order, a writ petition was
preferred before the High Court. The learned Single Judge
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dismissed the writ petition against which the writ appeal
was filed, which too was dismissed.
8. The submission of the learned counsel for the
petitioner is that a bare perusal of the order passed by the
District Development Officer would indicate that after
receipt of representation from the petitioner, he had called
for a report from the Taluka Development Officer. The
decision was taken thereafter. It is the case of the
petitioner that this report was an adverse material
considered by the District Development Officer and,
therefore, before relying upon the same, the petitioner
should have been provided a copy of the said material to
enable her to submit a response. As such material was not
supplied to the petitioner, principles of natural justice
have been violated and, therefore, the order is liable to be
set-aside.
9. The High Court rejected the aforesaid contention on the
ground that the charge of providing contractual benefits to
her own husband is not denied by the petitioner and,
therefore, merely on the ground that certain additional
material was taken into consideration, no prejudice has been
caused. Besides, principles of natural justice are not to be
applied mechanically. Therefore, if no prejudice is caused
by non-supply of any material, and the ultimate decision is
sustainable on the admitted position, interference with the
final decision is not required.
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10. Before us, the learned counsel for the petitioner has
submitted that there is no prohibition either under the
Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 or under the rules framed
thereunder proscribing a Sarpanch, or any member of the
Panchayat, to award a contract of a Panchayat to any member
of his/ her family. Moreover, the contract concerned was
awarded after inviting public tender and by a resolution of
the Panchayat premised on the fact that his bid was the
lowest. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the
petitioner had misused her position as a Sarpanch.
11. In response to the above submission, the learned
counsel for the respondent has invited our attention to
Section 30 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act. Section 30(1) (g)
provides as under:
“30. Disqualification of. – (1) No person shall be
a member of a panchayat or continue as such who –
…
(g) has directly or indirectly, by himself
or his partner, any share or interest in any
work done, by order of the panchayat, or in
any contract with, by or on behalf of, or
employment with or under the panchayat”
12. It has been pointed out that a similar provision came
up for interpretation before this Court in Virendrasing vs.
Additional Commissioner and Ors. (2023) 18 SCC 438. In that
case, the member of the Zila Parishad had been part of the
decision-making process whereunder contract was awarded to
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his son.
13. The concerned Zila Parishad Act provided for
disqualification in certain circumstances enumerated in
Section 16 thereof, which reads as under:
“16. Disqualifications. – (1) Subject to the
provisions of sub-section (2), a person shall be
disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a
Councillor –
(i) if he has directly or indirectly by
himself or by his partner any share or
interest in any work done by order of the
Zilla Parishad or in any contract with, by or
on behalf of, the Zilla Parishad; …”Section 40 of that Act provided as follows:-
“40. Disqualification of Councillors during
term of office. – (1) Subject to the provisions of
sub-section (2) of Section 62, if any Councillor
during the term of his office –
* * * * * *
[(2) If any question whether a vacancy has
occurred under this section is raised either by
the Commissioner suo motu or on an application
made to him by any person in that behalf, the
Commissioner shall decide the question [as far as
possible] within ninety days from the date of
receipt of such application; and his decision
thereon shall be final. Until the Commissioner
decides that the vacancy has occurred, the
Councillor shall not be disabled from continuing
to be a Councillor:
Provided that, no decision shall be given
6against any Councillor without giving him
reasonable opportunity of being heard.]”
14. Interpreting the aforesaid provisions in paragraph 17,
this Court observed:
“17. The legislature in its wisdom has defined the
grounds for disqualification in expansive terms
under Section 16(1)(i) of the said Act. Thus, the
use of the terminology – ”directly or indirectly”,
“by himself or by his partner”, “any share or
interest in any work done”, by “order of Zilla
Parishad or in any contract with”, and “by or on
behalf of the Zilla Parishad”. All eventualities
where the Councillor can be said to have any
financial connection with the work of the Zilla
Parishad were sought to be included, with the
object of discouraging the practice of financial
patronage that is inherently beneficial to the
elected representatives.”
(Emphasis supplied)
15. The Court, thereafter, in paragraphs 20 and 23,
observed as follows:
“20. Despite these factual differences, we find
that the common principle that can be culled out
from the aforementioned cases is that this Court
had cautioned against interpreting
disqualification provisions in an overly
restrictive or narrow manner. In both cases, this
Court had noted that the salutary purpose of such
provisions was to ensure the purity of
administration in Municipal Committees.
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23. We believe that probity in such financial
transactions should be the rule rather than the
exception. The appellant had a greater
responsibility as a father to make sure that his
son does not enter into a contract that is
sanctioned by the Zilla Parishad itself. We may
note the finding of fact by courts below that
nothing had been placed on record to show even a
separation of residence between the son and the
father, other than a ration card purporting to
show that the son was living with his grandmother.
It was rightly observed that this was neither here
nor there, more so when the son had just completed
his education.”
16. After observing as above, this Court upheld the
disqualification of that member in view of the provisions of
Section 40 read with Section 16.
17. In the instant case also, we find a similar provision
as came for interpretation before this Court in Virendrasing
vs. Additional Commissioner and Ors. (Supra).
18. No doubt, the petitioners’ case is that the award of
contract to her husband was through a public tender but
there is nothing on record to show that there was separation
between her and her husband.
18. In such circumstances, too restrictive an
interpretation to the disqualification clause would
frustrate the very object for which it is incorporated in
the statute.
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19. In such view of the matter, though we are not dealing
with the issue of disqualification, based on the admitted
position, we do not find it to be a fit case to interfere
with the finding returned by the authorities that the
petitioner misused her position as Sarpanch in awarding
contracts to her own family. As a sequitur, the order passed
by the High Court calls for no interference.
20. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
21. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
(HARPREET KAUR) (SAPNA BANSAL) COURT MASTER (SH) COURT MASTER (NSH)
