Montage Enterprises Pvt Ltd vs Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt Ltd on 27 April, 2026

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    Delhi District Court

    Montage Enterprises Pvt Ltd vs Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt Ltd on 27 April, 2026

         IN THE COURT OF SHRI DEVENDER KUMAR, DISTRICT JUDGE
                 (COMMERCIAL COURT-01), EAST DISTRICT
                     KARKARDOOMA COURTS : DELHI
    
    
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024
    
    
    M/s Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.
    C-53, Shashi Garden, Near Pocket-V
    Gurudwara, Mayur Vihar, Phase-1
    New Delhi-110091                                                       ................Plaintiff
    
                      Versus
    
    1. Shree Anjaneya Agro-Tech Pvt. Ltd.
    Office at: RMC Link Road, Bamboo Bazar,
    Davangree, Karnataka-577004
    through its Director                                                   ...........Defendant No. 1
    
    2. Patanjali Ayurved Ltd.
    Patanjali Food & Herbal Park
    Vill-Padartha, Haridwar - Laksar Road
    Haridwar-249404, Uttarakhand
    Through its Managing Director                                          ................Defendant No.2
    
             Date of institution                            :        01.03.2024
             Date of arguments                              :        17.04.2026
             Date of judgment                               :        27.04.2026
    
                 (Suit for recovery of Rs. 21,38,985/- alongwith interest)
    
    JUDGMENT :

    1. Vide this judgment, I shall dispose off this suit for recovery of Rs.
    21,38,985/- alongwith interest @ 24% per annum filed by the plaintiff
    against the defendants. Brief facts of the case are as under:

    SPONSORED

    Digitally
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 signed by
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA 1/48
    DEVENDRA KUMAR
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
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    2. Plaintiff is a company incorporated under the Companies Act and is
    being represented through its authorized representative Mr. Sanjay Kumar
    Singh, who is authorized to sign, verify and institute this suit on behalf of
    the plaintiff through board resolution dated 03.09.2018. It is further alleged
    that the defendants are also a Private Limited Companies incorporated
    under the Companies Act. It is further alleged that the defendants are
    manufacturers of refined cooking oils like rice oil, mustard oil and coconut
    oil etc. and approached to the plaintiff through AR/director of the defendant
    no.1 for supply of flexible laminates of different variants and placed
    purchase order of multilayer plastic films dated 01.06.2017. It is further
    alleged that the plaintiff agreed to supply material to the defendant no.1
    against purchase orders including order dated 01.06.2017 and supplied the
    material against invoices dated 28.02.2017, 16.03.2017, 23.03.2017 and
    31.05.2017. It is further alleged that the defendants also paid amount time
    to time and last payment was made through RTGS on 20.12.2017.

    2.1. Plaintiff has further alleged that the plaintiff company maintained a
    running accounts of the defendant no.1 in ordinary course of business, as
    per which, the defendant no.1 has outstanding liability of Rs. 21,38,985/-.
    It is further alleged that the defendants failed to pay outstanding amount
    despite various telephonic calls and reminders. It is further alleged that the
    plaintiff also served a legal notice dated 12.02.2019 thereby demanding
    outstanding amount of Rs. 21,38,985/-, which was duly replied by the
    defendant no.1 vide reply dated 19.02.2019 and refused to pay amount. It is
    further alleged that the defendants have failed to pay amount deliberately
    due to they are liable to pay interest @ 24% per annum against outstanding

    Digitally
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 signed by
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA 2/48
    DEVENDRA KUMAR
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
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    amount. It is further alleged that the defendants also dispatched a letter
    dated 01.05.2019 thereby seeking to pay demurrage charges, loading/
    uploading and other expenses for supply of defective material of M/s
    Patanjali Ayurved thereby alleging that the material was still lying in their
    godown since June, 2017.

    2.2. Plaintiff has further alleged that the company supplied the material to
    the defendants according to design approved by third party i.e. M/s
    Patanjali Ayurved Ltd. and the defendants are trying to shift blame of
    supply of defective goods upon the plaintiff to avoid their liability to pay
    due amount. It is further alleged that the defendants have falsely alleged
    that the material supplied against invoice dated 30.07.2017 was supplied
    without purchase order, whereas it was supplied against verbal order on
    urgent basis and purchase order dated 01.06.2017 was issued subsequently.

    It is further alleged that this suit is within limitation and even this court also
    have territorial jurisdiction to entertain this suit. Plaintiff has prayed for a
    decree of suit amount of Rs. 21,38,985/- along with interest 24% per
    annum.

    3. Defendant No. 1 has filed WS thereby denying its liability to pay
    outstanding amount and has alleged that this court has no territorial
    jurisdiction to entertain this case. It is further alleged that this suit is
    without cause of action and is also barred by limitation and is liable to be
    dismissed. It is further alleged that the plaintiff has concealed the material
    facts from this court and is not entitled for any relief. It is further alleged
    that the defendant no.1 was a Private Limited Company and was doing

    Digitally
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 signed by
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA 3/48
    DEVENDRA KUMAR
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
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    business of packaging of edible oils under brand name of M/s Patanjali
    Ayurved Ltd., Haridwar and the packaging material was sourced by the
    plaintiff under the requirement of the defendants but its design and make
    was finalized by the plaintiff and M/s Patanjali Ayurved Ltd. It is further
    alleged that the defendant no.1 was making payments under the instructions
    of M/s Patanjali Ayurved Ltd. after due satisfaction of quality and
    confirmation of the material by the defendant no.2.

    3.1. Defendant no.1 has further alleged that on 01.06.2017, the defendant
    no.1 agreed to receive the material under the instructions of M/s Patanjali
    Ayurved Ltd. and issued purchase order for supply of 10 tons of RBO films
    but M/s Patanjali Ayurved instructed that new laminates were not suitable
    for packaging. It is further alleged that invoice no. 1031 of Rs. 20,87,248/-

    was raised by the plaintiff on 31.05.2017, whereas the material was
    dispatched through transporter M/s Swarn Road Lines Pvt. Ltd. on
    31.05.2017, which was prior to the date of purchase and even no transport
    receipt has been placed on record. It is further alleged that the material was
    received by the defendant no. 1 after 32 days on 02.07.2017 against order
    on 31.05.2017, whereas standard practice of delivery was within 8-10 days.
    It is further alleged that M/s Patanjali Ayurved Ltd. instructed the defendant
    no.1 not to use said material with incorrect print and the material is still
    lying with the defendant no.1.

    3.2. Defendant no.1 has further alleged that AR of the plaintiff sent an e-
    mail dated 10.07.2017 to M/s Patanjali Ayurved and it was revealed that it
    was a pre-existing dispute between the plaintiff and M/s Patanjali Ayurved

    Digitally
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 signed by
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA 4/48
    DEVENDRA KUMAR
    KUMAR Date:

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    regarding said material and both the parties had already discussed on
    29.04.2017 regarding defective material but still the plaintiff dispatched
    said material to the defendant no.1 by citing space crunch. It is further
    alleged that the defendant no.1 also dispatched a letter dated 12.03.2018 to
    the plaintiff asking to take back defective material lying in its godown for
    the last more than 9 months and also to pay suitable demurrage charges and
    loading/ uploading expenses, which was followed by reminder dated
    01.11.2018, but still the plaintiff did not respond. It is further alleged that
    the plaintiff has initiated insolvency proceedings against the defendant no.1
    besides filing of this suit. Defendant has denied all the allegations of the
    plaintiff and has prayed that this suit is liable to be dismissed.

    4. During pendency of this suit, the plaintiff moved an application
    under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC to implead the defendant No. 2 M/s
    Patanjali Ayurved Limited, which was allowed and M/s Patanjali Ayurved
    Limited was added as the defendant no. 2.

    5. Defendant no.2 has filed written statement thereby denying all the
    facts of this case and has alleged that entire suit is based upon false and
    fraudulent averments and has failed to disclose any cause of action and
    same is liable to be dismissed. It is further alleged that the defendant no. 2
    is not a necessary party to this case, as no relief has been claimed against it,
    due to suit is liable to be dismissed. It is further alleged that many
    commercial transactions took place between the plaintiff and defendant no.
    1, whereas the defendant no. 2 is a third party to all such transactions and
    has no privity of contract with the plaintiff, due to the defendant is not

    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 Digitally
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. signed by 5/48
    DEVENDRA
    DEVENDRA KUMAR
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
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    liable to pay any amount. It is further alleged that the defendant no. 1 was
    responsible for production of edible oils and the plaintiff was supplying
    packaging material but there was no transaction between the plaintiff and
    the defendant no.2. It is further alleged that the defendant No. 2 had
    disclosed to the plaintiff that the material supplied to the defendant no.1
    was defective and was against specific instructions and could have not been
    used for packaging, though there was no direct dealing with the plaintiff
    and the defendant No. 2. It is further alleged that the defendant no.2 has no
    concerned with payment of the plaintiff and has further alleged that this
    court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this case. Defendant No. 2
    has denied all the allegations of the plaintiff and has prayed that this suit is
    liable to be dismissed.

    6. Plaintiff has filed replication to written statements thereby denying
    all allegations of the defendants and has reaffirmed its pleadings.

    7. On the basis of pleadings of the parties following issues were framed
    vide order dated 11.09.2025 as under:

    ISSUES

    1. Whether the suit is within limitation? OPP

    2. Whether this court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain this
    suit? OPP

    3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of Rs. 21,38,985/- as
    prayed? OPP

    4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for interest against the decretal
    amount as prayed, if so, at what rate and for what period? OPP

    5. Relief.

    Digitally
    signed by
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 DEVENDRA
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA KUMAR 6/48
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
    16:11:02
    +0530

    8. To discharge the onus, the plaintiff has examined PW1 Sh. Sanjay
    Kumar Singh, who has deposed in verbatim of the plaint and has relied
    upon documents Ex.PW1/1 to Ex. PW1/9.

    8.1. During cross examination, PW1 has deposed that he has been
    working with the plaintiff company since 2007 and has personal knowledge
    regarding transactions between the parties. It is further deposed that the
    plaintiff supplied the material to the defendants against purchase orders
    Ex.PW1/2 placed at Haridwar, whereas corporate office of the plaintiff
    company is at C-20/22, Sector-57, Noida-201301, Gautam Buddha Nagar,
    UP and all marketing operations of the plaintiff company are being
    conducted therefrom. It is further deposed that he did not remember how
    many invoices were issued by the plaintiff regarding supply of material to
    the defendant no. 1, whereas last invoice was dated 31.05.2017 by which
    material was supplied. It is admitted that transport receipt Ex. PW1/3
    (Colly.) does not indicate the date of delivery of the material but it bears
    stamp and signature of the defendant no. 1. It is further deposed that two
    months credit period was orally agreed between the parties from the date of
    issuance of invoice, though as per invoice dated 31.05.2017, due date of
    payment was by 30.07.2017.

    8.2. PW1 has further deposed that the parties were at good terms and
    were also communicating so the plaintiff waited for payment till 2024
    before institution of this suit. It is further deposed that he did not remember
    whether the material supplied against invoice dated 31.05.2017 were
    misprinted. It is further deposed that he did not remember that there was

    Digitally
    signed by
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 DEVENDRA
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA KUMAR 7/48
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
    16:11:10
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    some pre-existing misprinting dispute between the parties or that e-mails
    dated 01.06.2017, 06.07.2017 and 10.07.2017 were exchanged. It is denied
    that there was a direction by the defendant no. 2 to the plaintiff company
    not to supply goods/material against invoice dated 31.05.2017 to the
    defendant no. 1. It is further denied that there was a direction of the
    defendant no. 2 to the plaintiff company to supply material against invoice
    dated 31.05.2017 to Shree Enterprises, or that the material against invoice
    dated 31.05.2017 was supplied to the defendant no. 1 by citing space
    constraints in the plant of the defendant no. 2. It is further deposed that he
    did not remember whether material against invoice dated 31.05.2017 was
    supplied to the defendant No. 1 on 02.07.2017.

    8.3. PW1 has further deposed that the material was supplied against
    purchase order dated 01.06.2017 and invoice was also issued but he did not
    remember whether he has placed on record copy of such purchase order
    dated 01.06.2017. It is further deposed that he did not remember whether
    there was a delay in supply of material against invoice dated 31.05.2017. It
    is admitted that there was no existing liability of the defendants on account
    of misprinting in packaging material. It is denied that the defendants are not
    liable to pay interest @ 24% per annum.

    9. Defendants have examined DW1 Athani Kotrappa Prashant, who has
    deposed in verbatim of written statement and has relied upon documents
    Ex.DW1/1 to Ex. DW1/8.

    Digitally
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 signed by
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA 8/48
    DEVENDRA KUMAR
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
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    9.1. DW1 has deposed during cross examination that he has not placed on
    record any Board Resolution to authorize him to appear before the court to
    depose or to file written statement. It is further deposed that he was
    instructed by the defendant No. 2 through e-mail dated 10.07.2017 and
    purchase order dated 01.06.2017 to receive the material from the plaintiff.
    It is admitted that he has no document to prove any arrangement between
    the plaintiff and defendant no.2 to finalize design and make of the material.
    It is further deposed that he did not remember whether there was any
    communication from M/s Patanjali Ayurved to raise purchase order dated
    01.06.2017 (Ex.DW1/2) and no such communication has been placed on
    record. It is admitted that he did not raise any objection regarding invoice
    dated 31.05.2017 before issuance of purchase order. It is further admitted
    that he did not raise any objection about delay of 32 days in delivery of the
    material but he raised objection before the defendant no.2.

    9.2. DW1 has further deposed that the defendant no. 2 sent e-mails dated
    06.07.2017 thereby stating not to use packaging material, whereas e-mail
    dated 06.07.2017 was not communicated to him personally but
    representative of the defendant No. 2 Nitesh Kumar Sharma communicated
    said e-mail to the defendant No. 2. It is further deposed that there was a
    direct written communication by the defendant No. 2 to the defendant
    No. 1 whereby the defendant No. 1 was asked not to use the material.

    9.3. DW1 has further deposed that the rejected material was lying at the
    factory of the defendant No. 1 till the period factory was taken over by
    Canara Bank under Sarfaesi Act in the year, 2018, whereas the plaintiff was

    Digitally
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 signed by
    DEVENDRA
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA KUMAR 9/48
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
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    not intimated by the defendant no.1 to lift the material, however letters
    dated 12.03.2018 & 01.11.2018 were sent to inform the plaintiff that
    operation of the defendant no. 1 was shut down and requested to lift the
    material. It is admitted that the material lying in the factory was neither
    sold nor used by the defendant No. 1 but was taken over by Canara Bank
    while taking over the possession of the factory and assets. It is further
    deposed that he was not aware about value of the material fetched by the
    banker from the material lying in the factory of the defendant no. 1. It is
    admitted that he has not made payment against invoice dated 31.05.2017 of
    Rs. 20,87,284/- as the material was defective. It is further deposed that all
    payments to the plaintiff were under the instructions of the defendant no. 2
    but the defendant no. 2 did not issue any instruction to make payment of
    invoice dated 31.05.2017, as the material was defective.

    9.4. DW1 has admitted that he has not placed on record ledger accounts
    of the plaintiff but there was no amount outstanding on the part of the
    defendant no. 1 towards the defendant no. 2 except invoice dated
    31.05.2017 of Rs. 20,87,284/-. It is further deposed that ledger accounts for
    the years 2016-17 and 2017-18 of the plaintiff company is Ex.DW1/9
    showing debit amount of Rs. 20,87,284/-, as debit note was issued to the
    plaintiff. It is further deposed that he sent debit note to the plaintiff through
    post but neither postal receipt has been placed on record nor he can produce
    it. It is denied that ledger accounts Ex. DW1/9 is forged and fabricated but
    it was never communicated to the plaintiff and has been shown the
    plaintiff/court for the first time.

    Digitally
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 signed by
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA 10/48
    DEVENDRA KUMAR
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
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    9.5. DW1 has further deposed that email dated 01.06.2017 (Ex. DW1/10
    (colly)) was regarding invoice Ex. DW1/1 but new stock was received on
    02.07.2017. It is further deposed that copy of possession notice taking over
    possession of immovable and movable property of the defendant no. I is
    Ex. DW1/11 (colly) issued by Canara Bank and State Bank of India. It is
    further deposed that balance sheets for the financial year 2016-17 and
    2017-18 is Ex. DW1/12 (colly) but he has not brought details of individual
    list of creditors, whereas consolidate amounts of sundry creditors has been
    shown in balance sheet. It is further deposed that schedule for sundry
    creditors for the financial years 2016-17 and 2017-18 is Ex.DW1/13
    (colly). He has failed to reply as to how balance of Rs 21,39,323/- shown
    due on 31.03.2017 reduced to nil on 31.03.2018 in list of creditors
    Ex.DW1/13 (colly).

    9.6. DW1 has further deposed that he did not remember whether debit
    note dated 30.06.2017 was sent to the plaintiff or not, but debit note was
    communicated on 13.08.2018 through email Ex.DW1/10 (colly), whereas
    debit notice was not annexed with email dated 13.08.2017. It is further
    admitted that debit note was dated 30.06.2017 as mentioned in statement of
    accounts, whereas email was sent on 13.08.2017, as actual e-mail was
    dated 08.12.2017 and its sequel email was dated 13.08.2017. It is admitted
    that entry of amount of Rs. 6,66,311/- shown in ledger Ex. DW1/9 (colly)
    is pertaining to the defendant no. 2 and not to the defendant no. 1 and
    amount was paid directly to the plaintiff. It is further admitted that he has
    not annexed any proof of the payment of Rs. 6,66,311/- to prove that
    payment was made by the defendant no. 2 to the plaintiff as shown in

    Digitally
    signed by
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 DEVENDRA
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA KUMAR 11/48
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
    16:11:28
    +0530
    ledger accounts. It is further admitted that he has not annexed statement of
    the defendant no. 2 on record. It is further deposed that he did not receive
    back four rolls sent to Shree Enterprises under the instruction of the
    defendant no. 2 and has not shown transfer of these rolls in his statement of
    accounts.

    9.7. DW1 has further deposed that he wrote a letter dated 20.11.2025 (Ex.

    DW1/14) to the Chief Manager, Canara Bank to provide details of total
    amount recovered by sale of the plant, machinery, land, building and other
    assets under Sarfaesi Act, but did not receive any response. However, assets
    were taken over by the bank for a value of Rs. 17,52,10,000/- as reflected
    in statement of the defendant no. 1 Ex. DW1/15. It is admitted that there is
    no operation in the defendant no.1’s company and there is nil transaction in
    the bank accounts, whereas the defendant no. 2 has not made any payment
    or adjustment of transactions held between the plaintiff and defendant no. 1
    in excess of ledger placed on record. It is further deposed that apart from
    debit note dt. 30.06.2017, he also issued two more debit notes on the
    plaintiff dated 22.04.2017 and 11.05.2017.

    10. I have heard the arguments and perused the record. My issue-wise
    findings are as under.

    ISSUE No. 1: – The onus to prove issue no.1 was put upon the plaintiff and
    to discharge the onus, the plaintiff has examined PW1 and has also cross
    examined DW1. However, before giving my findings on issues, it is
    necessary to ascertain, as to whether both the parties are being represented
    through their Authorized Representatives or not. Plaintiff has filed this suit

    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 Digitally signed
    by DEVENDRA
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. KUMAR 12/48
    DEVENDRA
    Date:

                                                                           KUMAR      2026.04.27
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    through AR, Mr. Sanjay Kumar Singh, who has been authorized to institute
    this suit through Board Resolution Ex.PW1/1. Ld. Counsel for defendants
    has argued that PW1 is not authorized representative of the plaintiff to
    institute this suit, as Board Resolution was passed way back on 11.02.2019,
    whereas this suit has been filed in the year 2024 which suggests that no
    board resolution was in favor of the plaintiff to institute this suit. It is
    further argued that suit filed without authority is liable to be dismissed.

    11. On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for plaintiff has opposed this
    submission and has argued that a board resolution was passed in favor of
    Mr. Sanjay Kumar Singh, who is PW1 and has proved said board resolution
    Ex.PW1/1. It is further argued that board resolution was duly passed in
    meeting of the board of directors and cannot be nullified merely because it
    was passed in the year 2019. It is further argued that the plaintiff has
    proved due institution of this suit, whereas the defendants are also
    corporate identities but they have not filed or proved any authority of AR to
    defend this case, due to written statements filed by them are liable to be
    rejected and suit may be decreed in favor of the plaintiff.

    12. Admittedly, both the parties are commercial entities due to their
    authorities are to be ascertained as under:

    Authority of AR to file / contest this Case

    Admittedly, both the parties are Private Limited Companies and they
    were supposed to institute / contest this suit only under authority by board
    of directors through board resolution. Plaintiff has instituted this suit

    Digitally
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 signed by
    DEVENDRA
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA KUMAR 13/48
    KUMAR Date:

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    through Mr. Sanjay Kumar Singh and PW1 has proved his authority Ex.
    PW1/1 through which he was authorized to institute this suit, whereas both
    the defendants have not filed or proved any board resolution / authority of
    AR to contest this case or to file written statements.

    13. Admittedly, a civil suit by a company / corporation has to be signed
    and verified by authorized representative in terms of Order XXIX Rule 1 of
    CPC
    , whereas appointment of authorized representative must be in terms of
    Order III Rule 2 of CPC. Order XXIX Rule 1 is as under:

    Order XXIX Rule 1. Subscription and verification of pleading.– In
    suit by or against a corporation, any pleading may be signed and
    verified on behalf of the corporation by the secretary or by any
    director or other principal officer of the corporation who is able to
    depose to the facts of the case.

    14. In view of Order XXIX Rule1 of CPC, authority mentioned in
    abovesaid provision must sign and verify pleadings like Secretary,
    Director, or any other Principal Officer of the company / corporation.
    Particular authority may sign and verify pleadings besides other
    authorized representatives appointed by the company / corporation on its
    behalf through board resolution. The authority of recognized agent has
    been prescribed under Order III Rule 1 & 2 of CPC as under:

    Rule 1. Appearances, etc., may be in person, by recognized agent or
    by pleader.–Any appearance, application or act in or to any Court,
    required or authorized by law to be made or done by a party in such
    Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law
    for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or
    by his recognized agent, or by a pleader [appearing, applying or
    acting, as the case may be, on his behalf :

    Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be
    made by the party in person.

    
    
                                                                                    Digitally
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024                                                           signed by
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd.            DEVENDRA 14/48
                                                                           DEVENDRA KUMAR
                                                                           KUMAR    Date:
                                                                                    2026.04.27
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    Rule 2. Recognised agents.–The recognised agents of parties by
    whom such appearances, applications and acts may be made or done
    are–

    (a) persons holding powers-of-attorney, authorising them to make and
    do such appearances, applications and acts on behalf of such parties;

    (b) persons carrying on trade or business for and in the names of
    parties not resident within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the
    Court within which limits the appearance, application or act is made
    or done, in matters connected with such trade or business only, where
    no other agent is expressly authorised to make and do such
    appearances, applications and acts.

    15. In view of abovesaid legal proposition, it stands proved that the
    recognized representative may be authorized by way of power of attorney /
    board resolution by board of directors in terms of Section 291 of the
    Companies Act, 1956 (Now corresponding Section 179 of the Companies
    Act, 2013). The authority of authorized representative under Order III Rule
    1 & 2 CPC viz-a-viz signing authority of authorized representative under
    Order XXIX Rule 1 & 2 of CPC has been defined in case titled Nibro Ltd.
    v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.
    , (1991) 70 Comp Cas 388 (Delhi) as under:

    Order 3, rule 1 provides that any appearance, application or act in or
    to any court required or authorise by law can be made or done by the
    party in person or by his recognized agent or by a pleader appearing,
    applying or acting, as the case may be, on his behalf. Provided of
    course, such an appearance, application or act in or to any court is
    required or authorised by law to be done or done by a party in such
    court. Where, however, there is an express provision of law, then that
    provision will prevail. Thus, if an authority is given to a pleader or a
    recognised agent as provided by law, the recognised agent or pleader
    can file an appearance or file a suit in court if the party himself is not
    in a position to file it. In my view, if a party is a company or a
    corporation, the recognised agent or a pleader has to be authorise by
    law to file such a plaint. Such an authority can be given to a pleader or
    an agent in the case of a company by a person specifically authorised
    in this behalf. In other words, a pleader or an agent can be authorised
    to file a suit on behalf of a company only by an authorised
    representative of the company. If a director or a secretary is authorised

    Digitally
    signed by
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    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA KUMAR 15/48
    KUMAR Date:

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    by law, then he can certainly give the authority to another person as
    provided under Order 3, rule 1.

    The authority of a principal offic”r of’a company in relation to suits
    filed on behalf of the limited company does not extend beyond what is
    laid down in Order 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That provision
    does not entitle the principal officer of a company to file a suit on its
    behalf and for that the authority has to be found either in the articles
    of association of the company or in the resolution of its board of
    directors. In the articles of association of several companies, provision
    is generally made authorizing their managing directors and other
    officers to file and defend suits on their behalf. Similarly, the board of
    directors of a company can authorize the institution of a suit on behalf
    of the company by a resolution. In the case of some companies the
    articles empower the managing director or directors to appoint general
    attorneys and general managers and given them authority to institute
    suits on behalf of the company. But in the absence of any proof in
    regard to any such power having been conferred on Shri Ram Lal
    Choudhary, it is not possible to accept his statement that he was
    authorised to file the suit as the principal officer of the plaintiff hotel.

    It is well-settled that under section 291 of the Companies Act except
    where express provision is made that the powers of a company in
    respect of a particular matter are to be exercised by the company in
    general meeting, in all other cases the board of directors are entitled to
    exercise all its powers. Individual directors have such powers only as
    are vested in them by the memorandum and articles. It is true that
    ordinarily the court will not unsuit a person on account of
    technicalities. However, the question of authority to institute a suit on
    behalf of a company is not a technical matter. It has far-reaching
    effects. It often affects the policy and finances of the company. Thus ,
    unless a power to institute a suit is specifically conferred on a
    particular director, he has no authority to institute a suit on behalf of
    the company. Needless to say such a power can be conferred by the
    board of directors only by passing a resolution in that regard.

    16. Further, in another landmark judgment titled United Bank of India v.
    Naresh Kumar
    , (1996) 6 SCC 660, it has held that;

    9. In cases like the present where suits are instituted or defended on
    behalf of a public corporation, public interest should not be permitted
    to be defeated on a mere technicality. Procedural defects which do not
    go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just
    cause. There is sufficient power in the courts, under the Code of Civil
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    Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a
    just case. As far as possible a substantive right should not be allowed
    to be defeated on account of a procedural irregularity which is
    curable.

    10. It cannot be disputed that a company like the appellant can sue
    and be sued in its own name. Under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of
    Civil Procedure
    a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its
    pleader, if any. As a company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some
    person has to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company. Order 29
    Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
    , therefore, provides that in a
    suit by or against a corporation the Secretary or any Director or other
    Principal Officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts
    of the case might sign and verify on behalf of the company. Reading
    Order 6 Rule 14 together with Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
    Procedure
    it would appear that even in the absence of any formal
    letter of authority or power of attorney having been executed a person
    referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which he
    holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the corporation. In
    addition thereto and dehors Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
    Procedure
    , as a company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise any
    person to sign the plaint or the written statement on its behalf and this
    would be regarded as sufficient compliance with the provisions of
    Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A person may be
    expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company,
    for example by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that
    effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour of any
    individual. In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been
    signed by one of its officers a corporation can ratify the said action of
    its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or
    implied. The court can, on the basis of the evidence on record, and
    after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to
    the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation
    had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer.

    13. The court had to be satisfied that Shri L.K. Rohatgi could sign the
    plaint on behalf of the appellant. The suit had been filed in the name
    of the appellant company; full amount of court fee had been paid by
    the appellant-Bank; documentary as well as oral evidence had been
    led on behalf of the appellant and the trial of the suit before the Sub-

    Judge, Ambala, had continued for about two years. It is difficult, in
    these circumstances, even to presume that the suit had been filed and
    tried without the appellant having authorised the institution of the
    same. The only reasonable conclusion which we can come to is that
    Shri L.K. Rohatgi must have been authorised to sign the plaint and, in

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    any case, it must be held that the appellant had ratified the action of
    Shri L.K. Rohatgi in signing the plaint and thereafter it continued with
    the suit.

    17. A combined reading of both judgments made it clear that the
    pleadings must be signed by any authority mentioned under Order XXIX
    Rule 1, or by any authorized agent / representative. The authorization of
    any authorized representative may be in terms of Order III Rule 2 of CPC,
    or by the company through resolution of board of directors in terms of
    Section 291 of the Companies Act, 1956 (corresponding Section 179 of the
    Companies Act, 2013). However, authority of any person/s mentioned
    under Order XXIX Rule 1 of CPC to sign the pleadings must be proved by
    Article of Association/ Resolution of Board of Directors, as held in case
    titled State Bank of Travancore v. Kingston Computers (I) (P) Ltd. , (2011)
    11 SCC 524 as under:

    14. In our view, the judgment under challenge is liable to be set aside
    because the respondent had not produced any evidence to prove that
    Shri Ashok K. Shukla was appointed as a Director of the Company
    and a resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of the
    Company to file a suit against the appellant and authorised Shri Ashok
    K. Shukla to do so. The letter of authority issued by Shri Raj K.
    Shukla, who described himself as the Chief Executive Officer of the
    Company, was nothing but a scrap of paper because no resolution was
    passed by the Board of Directors delegating its powers to Shri Raj K.
    Shukla to authorise another person to file a suit on behalf of the
    Company.

    13. The Division Bench of the High Court did take cognizance of the
    fact that the Company had not summoned any witness from the office
    of the Registrar of Companies to prove that Shri Ashok K. Shukla was
    a Director of the Company and that the minute book of the Company
    had not been produced to prove the appointment of Shri Ashok K.
    Shukla as a Director, but reversed the finding of the trial court on
    Issue 1 on the basis of the authority letter issued by Shri Raj K.
    Shukla and resolutions dated 14-2-2001 and 19-4-2001, by which the
    Board of Directors of the Company had authorised some persons to
    Digitally
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    operate the bank account.

    In view of abovesaid law, it stands proved that any company / corporation
    must be represented through Authorized Representative duly authorized by
    Board Resolution / Power of Attorney.

    18. In this case, PW1 has tendered his board resolution Ex.PW1/1 duly
    passed by board of directors of the plaintiff company. Defendants have just
    disputed this board resolution but no specific reason has been cited as to
    how board resolution is defective except stating that it was passed way
    back in the year 2019, whereas board resolution cannot be nullified /
    discarded merely because it was passed way back to grant general power to
    contest a case against the company. Plaintiff has pendency of various cases
    and if a person has been authorized through board resolution to contest
    other cases also, then such authorization cannot be disputed. As such, the
    plaintiff has duly authorized PW1 to represent the plaintiff before this court
    and authorization stands proved.

    19. However, the defendants are also companies and the defendant no. 1
    has filed written statement through one Mr. A. K. Prashant, Managing
    Director and the defendant No. 2 has filed WS through one Neha Dutta,
    whereas both the defendants have not relied upon or filed any board
    resolution or authority to contest this case. Admittedly, any company
    cannot contest any case through any individual director without board
    resolution or authorization and even pleading must be singed in terms of
    Order 29 Rule 1 CPC which prescribes that director, secretary or authorized
    representative of a company may institute / defend suit on behalf of the

    Digitally signed
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 by DEVENDRA
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. KUMAR 19/48
    DEVENDRA
    Date:

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    company but authority of said director must be proved through Article of
    association that the person signing plaint / WS was really a director to sign
    said pleadings. However, in this case, the defendant No. 1 has been
    represented through Managing Director but there is no board resolution/
    Article of association of the company to prove this authority. Managing
    Director of the defendant no.1 has examined himself as DW1 but he has
    not proved any document to prove his authority, due to WS filed by the
    defendant no.1 was without authority.

    20. Similarly, the defendant No. 2, M/s Patanjali Ayurved Ltd. is also a
    company and has filed WS through one Ms. Neha Dutta, whereas there is
    no board resolution / authority on record to prove that the defendant No. 2
    authorized her to contest this case on behalf of the company. As such, both
    the defendants have contested this suit without authority and have failed to
    comply with Order 29, Rule 1 CPC. If both the defendants have contested
    this suit without authority, then their written statements on record cannot be
    considered and shall be considered that they have no defense on merit.

    21. Now merit of the case has to be seen. The onus to prove issue no. 1
    was put upon the plaintiff and the plaintiff was supposed to prove that this
    suit has been filed within limitation. Ld. Counsel for plaintiff has argued
    that this suit is within limitation, as the plaintiff supplied the material and
    last invoice was raised on 31.05. 2017, whereas last payment was made by
    defendant no.1 in the year 2017. It is further argued that both the parties
    were at good terms, due to the plaintiff waited up to 2024 to institute this
    suit. It is further argued that the defendants never refused to make payment

    Digitally
    signed by
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    KUMAR Date:

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    and the plaintiff kept on sending them legal notice, which was duly replied
    and ultimately the defendant no.1 refused to make payment through reply
    to legal notice dated 01.05.2019 and only then this suit has been filed. It is
    further argued that limitation remained suspended during corona period and
    the plaintiff has filed this suit immediately after corona period, due to this
    suit is within limitation and same is liable to be decreed. It is further argued
    that plea of defective material was raised by the defendants in the year
    2018 and both the parties remained in contact through correspondence
    before filing of this suit and limitation shall started from final refusal by the
    defendant no.1. It is further argued that this suit is liable to be decreed.

    22. On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for defendants has opposed
    submissions and has submitted that suit is barred by limitation, as
    limitation to file this suit started in the year 2017 which kept on running up
    to 2020, whereas this suit has been filed in the year 2024, which is
    admittedly barred by limitation and same is liable to be dismissed.

    23. Admittedly, both the defendants have no defense on merit for the
    want of any authority for and on behalf of their companies to file written
    statement, whereas still they may dispute their liability on legal grounds.

    Defendants have taken a defense of limitation and Section 3 of Limitation
    Act cast a duty upon the court to ascertain limitation in every case even
    without citing limitation as defense by opposite party. Section 3 of
    Limitation Act is as under:

    Section-3. Bar of limitation.–(1) Subject to the provisions contained
    in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred,
    and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed

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    although limitation has not been set up as a defence.

    (2) For the purposes of this Act,–

    (a) a suit is instituted,–

    (i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to
    the proper officer;

    (ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for
    leave to sue as a pauper is made; and

    (iii) in the case of a claim against a company which is
    being wound up by the court, when the claimant first
    sends in his claim to the official liquidator;

    (b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter-claim, shall be treated as
    a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been instituted–

    (i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit in
    which the set-off is pleaded;

    (ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date on which the
    counter claim is made in court;

    (c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made when
    the application is presented to the proper officer of that court.

    24. Section 3 came into interpretation before Hon’ble Apex Court in case
    titled Noharlal Verma v. Distt. Coop. Central Bank Ltd., (2008) 14 SCC
    445 and relevant observations are as under:

    33. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as
    under:

    “3. Bar of limitation.–(1) Subject to the provisions contained in
    Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred,
    and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed
    although limitation has not been set up as a defence.”

    (emphasis
    supplied)

    Bare reading of the aforesaid provision leaves no room for doubt that
    if a suit is instituted, appeal is preferred or application is made after
    the prescribed period, it has to be dismissed even though no such plea

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    has been raised or defence has been set up. In other words, even in
    absence of such plea by the defendant, respondent or opponent, the
    court or authority must dismiss such suit, appeal or application, if it is
    satisfied that the suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation.

    25. Further, in case titled V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. v. Board of Trustees
    of Port of Mormugao, (2005) 4 SCC 613, it has held that;

    20. The mandate of Section 3 of the Limitation Act is that it is the
    duty of the court to dismiss any suit instituted after the prescribed
    period of limitation irrespective of the fact that limitation has not been
    set up as a defence. If a suit is ex facie barred by the law of limitation,
    a court has no choice but to dismiss the same even if the defendant
    intentionally has not raised the plea of limitation.

    21. This Court in Manindra Land & Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath
    Banerjee
    [(1964) 3 SCR 495;

    Section 3 of the Limitation Act enjoins a court to dismiss any suit
    instituted, appeal preferred and application made, after the period of
    limitation prescribed therefor by Schedule I irrespective of the fact
    whether the opponent had set up the plea of limitation or not. It is the
    duty of the court not to proceed with the application if it is made
    beyond the period of limitation prescribed. The Court had no choice
    and if in construing the necessary provision of the Limitation Act or in
    determining which provision of the Limitation Act applies, the
    subordinate court comes to an erroneous decision, it is open to the
    court in revision to interfere with that conclusion as that conclusion
    led the court to assume or not to assume the jurisdiction to proceed
    with the determination of that matter.”

    After going through the abovesaid cases, it stands proved that the limitation
    is material to determine a lis and litigation barred by limitation shall be
    dismissed without any exception and it shall also be duty of the court to
    dismiss such litigation.

    26. To prove limitation, it is necessary to go through documents of the
    parties. Defendant no.1 has relied upon purchase order dated 01.06. 2017
    (Ex. PW1/2) which was followed by various invoices Ex. PW1/3 (Colly.)

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    The last invoice was dated 31.05.2017. However, this case is not based
    upon individual invoice and rather based upon statement of accounts
    Ex.PW1/4, due to the limitation has to be considered on the basis of entries
    of statement of accounts. As per statement of accounts, the transactions
    between the parties started w.e.f. 28.02.2017 and last supply was made on
    31.05.2017 of Rs. 20,87,284/-, whereas the last payment of Rs. 6,66,311/-

    was made through RTGS on 20.12.2017. In fact, limitation to file this suit
    started from last payment in terms of Section 19 of Limitation Act.

    27. However, Ld. counsel for plaintiff has argued that the limitation shall
    start from the date of refusal of payment by the defendants which was
    through reply dated 01.05.2019 (Ex.PW1/7), whereas Ld. Counsel for
    plaintiff has not cited any provision under Limitation Act to support this
    contention. Even, Ld. Counsel has argued that reply to legal notice
    Ex.PW1/7 was acknowledgment of debt by the defendants in terms of
    Section 18 of Limitation Act, due to limitation stands extended. On the
    other hand, Ld. Counsel for defendants has argued that once limitation
    started shall continue till expiry and limitation in this case started when last
    payment was made and not from the date of denial of the payment, due to
    this suit is barred by limitation. It is further argued that reply to legal notice
    cannot be considered acknowledgment, especially when the defendants
    have denied their liability to pay any amount and this suit is liable to be
    dismissed.

    28. Admittedly, this suit is not based upon individual invoice and is
    based upon ledger accounts maintained regarding supply of goods and

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    record of payment/s. There are two articles in Limitation Act to deal with
    such cases i.e. Article 14 and 113 of Schedule under Limitation Act. Both
    the articles are as under:

    PERIOD OF LIMITATION
    [See Sections 2(j) and 3]
    FIRST DIVISION–SUITS
    Part I–Suits Relating To Accounts
    Description of suit Period of Time from which period
    limitation begins to run
    Part II–Suits Relating To Contracts

    14. For the price of goods sold and Three The date of the
    delivered where no fixed period of credit is years delivery of the
    agreed upon. goods.

    Part X–Suits for which there is no prescribed period

    113. Any suit for which no period of Three When the right to
    limitation is provided elsewhere in this years sue accrues
    Schedule.

    In view of abovesaid Articles, it is clear that both the Articles deal with
    different limitations, as per Article 14, the limitation starts from the date of
    delivery of the goods, whereas as per Article 113, it starts when right to sue
    accrues.

    29. Ld. Counsel for plaintiff has argued that there was no fixed time to
    pay amount, due to limitation would start from the date of reply of legal
    notice in terms of Article 113 of Schedule of Limitation Act, though PW1

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    has deposed that credit line was of 2 months agreed between the parties.
    However, to determine application of any specific Article, it is necessary to
    ascertain criteria of application of both the Articles, which depends upon
    the cause of action set out in the pleadings. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of
    India has held in case titled B & T AG v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 358
    that:

    65. Cause of action becomes important for the purposes of calculating
    the limitation period for bringing an action. It is imperative that a
    party realises when a cause of action arises. If a party simply delays
    sending a notice seeking reference under the 1996 Act because they
    are unclear of when the cause of action arose, the claim can become
    time-barred even before the party realises the same.

    64. “Cause of action” means the whole bundle of material facts, which
    it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to
    succeed in the suit. In delivering the judgment of the Board in Chand
    Kour v. Partab Singh [Chand Kour
    v. Partab Singh, 1888 SCC OnLine
    PC 14 : ILR (1889) 16 Cal 98] , Lord Watson observed : (SCC OnLine
    PC)
    “… Now the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence
    which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the
    character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to
    the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other
    words, to the [Ed. : The matter between two asterisks has been
    emphasised in original.] media [Ed. : The matter between two
    asterisks has been emphasised in original.] upon which the plaintiff
    asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    68. Whether any particular facts constitute a cause of action has to be
    determined with reference to the facts of each case and with reference
    to, the substance, rather than the form of the action. If an infringement
    of a right happens at a particular time, the whole cause of action will
    be said to have arisen then and there. In such a case, it is not open to a
    party to sit tight and not to file an application for settlement of dispute
    of his right, which had been infringed, within the time provided by the
    Limitation Act, and, allow his right to be extinguished by lapse of
    time, and thereafter, to wait for another cause of action and then file
    an application under Section 11 of the 1996 Act for establishment of
    his right which was not then alive, and, which had been long
    extinguished because, in such a case, such an application would mean

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    an application for revival of a right, which had long been extinguished
    under the 1963 Act and is, therefore, dead for all purposes. Such
    proceedings would not be maintainable and would obviously be met
    by the plea of limitation under Article 137 of the 1963 Act.

    73. Negotiations may continue even for a period of ten years or
    twenty years after the cause of action had arisen. Mere negotiations
    will not postpone the “cause of action” for the purpose of limitation.

    The Legislature has prescribed a limit of three years for the
    enforcement of a claim and this statutory time period cannot be
    defeated on the ground that the parties were negotiating.

    In view of abovesaid case law, it stands proved that the cause of action is
    not a single fact but a bundle of facts which gives a cause to file a case.
    However, when infringement of any right happens at a particular time, the
    whole cause of action starts immediately to file a case and mere
    negotiations cannot postpone “cause of action” for the purpose of
    limitation.

    30. In the present case also, the different paragraphs of the plaint have
    proved that initially, cause of action started way back in the years 2017
    when the purchase order was placed and goods were supplied and it
    continued till the last payment was made on 20.12.2017. Further, the
    plaintiff served a legal notice dated 12.02.2019 which was replied by the
    defendants on 01.05.2019 by which they denied their liability. However,
    the limitation cannot be extended in whimsical manner. The plaintiff got a
    cause of action to file this suit soon after last payment and subsequent
    development was just sequence of events and could not extend the
    limitation. In fact, the limitation once starts shall continue till the period of
    limitation extinguish.

    
    
                                                                                    Digitally
                                                                                    signed by
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024                                                           DEVENDRA
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    31. However, the main issue in this case is by which article of limitation
    this suit shall govern. Ld. Counsel for plaintiff has cited Article 113,
    whereas Ld. Counsel for defendants has claimed Article 14. The Hon’ble
    High Court of Delhi has held in case titled Bharath Skins Corporation v.
    Taneja Skins Company Pvt. Ltd.
    , 2011 SCC OnLine Del 5523 that:

    23. The upshot of the above discussion is that Article 14 of the
    Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to suits for
    recovery of money due on a running and current but a non-mutual
    account between the buyer and seller i.e. an account of the kind with
    which we are dealing.

    24. There being no Article in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963
    dealing with suits for recovery of money due on running and current
    but non-mutual accounts, in such circumstances, the residual article
    viz. Article 113 applies to such suits.

    25. Under Article 113, the period for limitation for filing a suit is three
    years and the same begins to run when the right to sue would accrue
    when claim was denied in response to the legal notice dated
    26.06.1985 on 13.07.1985 but since Rs. 7,000/- was paid on
    13.07.1985 and 24.07.1985 (Rs. 2,000/- on the former date and Rs.
    5,000/- on the latter date), limitation would commence from
    24.07.1985. The suit being filed on 02.09.1985, governed for purposes
    of limitation by Article 113 the suit would be within limitation.

    32. Contrary to it, it has held in case titled XS Infosol Pvt. Ltd. v. GLS
    Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
    , 2018 SCC OnLine Del 6601 as under:

    6. The subject suit is a suit for services provided by the
    appellant/plaintiff and with respect to which the Bill dated 7.11.2012
    was raised and last payment under which was made on 13.2.2013. If
    the suit was a suit for recovery of price of goods not paid for then the
    suit would have been governed by Article 14 of the Limitation Act,
    1963
    and which provides limitation to be three years from the date of
    delivery of goods. The present suit would be governed by Article 113
    of the Limitation Act and because there is no Article provided for sale
    of services, however, when we have to apply Article 113 of the
    Limitation Act in the facts of the present case the same will have to be
    on the same principles contained in Article 14 of the Limitation Act
    with respect to providing for sale of goods because sale of goods and
    services more or less stand on the same footing.

    Digitally
    signed by
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 DEVENDRA
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. 28/48
    DEVENDRA KUMAR
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
    16:13:02
    +0530

    33. In view of comparison of both judgments, it is clear that case titled
    XS Infosol Pvt. Ltd. (Supra) is more applicable on the facts of this case,
    which has laid down a clear criteria to apply Article 113 according to the
    parameters of Article 14 of Schedule of Limitation Act, 1963. The cause of
    action in cases of supply of the goods and services shall start from the date
    of supply of the goods in terms of Article 14 and Article 113 of the
    Limitation Act shall be read in reference of Article 14 and the limitation
    shall start from the date of supply of the goods / services. Article 14
    provides the limitation of 3 years to recover amount from the date of supply
    of the goods, which was during the period from 2017 to 2020. Plaintiff has
    served a legal notice dated 12.02.2019 (Ex.PW1/5), which was definitely
    after a lot of delay and reply to legal notice by the defendants was
    thereafter, due to cause of action cannot be from the date of reply to legal
    notice and rather from the date of last payment by the defendants.

    34. Ld. Counsel for defendants has argued that this case is based upon
    ledger, due to limitation shall start from last payment. It is not disputed if
    ledger account has been maintained in regular course of business, then the
    limitation shall start from the last payment. Defendants have not pointed
    out any deficiency in statement of accounts of the plaintiff and even they
    have not taken any such defense, due to it may be considered that statement
    of accounts of the plaintiff had been maintained in regular course of
    business and the limitation to file this suit shall start from the last payment.

    35. Ld. Counsel for plaintiff has further argued that reply to legal notice
    Ex.PW1/7 was also acknowledgments of debt in terms of Section 18 of the

    Digitally signed
    by DEVENDRA
    KUMAR
    DEVENDRA
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 Date:

    KUMAR
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. 2026.04.27 29/48
    16:13:07
    +0530
    Limitation Act. Law to determine nature of written acknowledgement/ part
    payment has been provided under Sections 18 & 19 of Limitation Act,
    1963, which are as under:

    Section – 18. Effect of acknowledgment in writing.–(1) Where,
    before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application
    in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in
    respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by
    the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any
    person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of
    limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment
    was so signed.

    (2) Where the writing containing the acknowledgment is undated, oral
    evidence may be given of the time when it was signed; but subject to
    the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), oral
    evidence of its contents shall not be received.

    Explanation.–For the purposes of this section–

    (a) an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify
    the exact nature of the property or right, or avers that the time for
    payment, delivery, performance or enjoyment has not yet come or is
    accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy,
    or is coupled with a claim to set off, or is addressed to a person other
    than a person entitled to the property or right,

    (b) the word “signed” means signed either personally or by an agent
    duly authorised in this behalf, and

    (c) an application for the execution of a decree or order shall not be
    deemed to be an application in respect of any property or right.”

    &

    Section-19. Effect of payment on account of debt or of interest on
    legacy.–Where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a
    legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the
    person liable to pay the debt or legacy or by his agent duly authorised
    in this behalf, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the
    time when the payment was made:

    Provided that, save in the case of payment of interest made before the
    1st day of January, 1928, an acknowledgment of the payment appears

    Digitally
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 signed by
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA 30/48
    DEVENDRA KUMAR
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
    16:13:13
    +0530
    in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the
    payment.

    Explanation.–For the purposes of this section–

    (a) where mortgaged land is in the possession of the mortgagee, the
    receipt of the rent or produce of such land shall be deemed to be a
    payment;

    (b) “debt” does not include money payable under a decree or order of
    a court.”

    In view of abovesaid sections, it is clear that written acknowledgment of
    debt under section 18 must be in writing and part payment u/s 19 must be
    within the period of limitation to extend period of limitation.

    36. Section 18 of Limitation Act came into interpretation before Hon’ble
    Apex Court in case titled Tilak Ram v. Nathu, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 99
    and relevant observations are as under:

    8. The section requires (i) an admission or acknowledgment (ii) that
    such acknowledgment must be in respect of a liability in respect of a
    property or right, (iii) that it must be made before the expiry of the
    period of limitation and (iv) that it should be in writing and signed by
    the party against whom such property or right is claimed. Under the
    Explanation such an acknowledgment need not specify the exact
    nature of the property or the right claimed. It is manifest that the
    statement relied on must amount to an admission or acknowledgment
    and that acknowledgment must be in respect of the property or right
    claimed by the party relying on such a statement.

    37. Further, in case titled Food Corpn. of India v. Assam State Coop.
    Marketing & Consumer Federation Ltd.
    , (2004) 12 SCC 360, it has held
    that;

    14. According to Section 18 of the Limitation Act, an
    acknowledgement of liability made in writing in respect of any right
    claimed by the opposite party and signed by the party against whom
    such right is claimed made before the expiration of the prescribed
    period for a suit in respect of such right has the effect of commencing
    Digitally
    signed by
    DEVENDRA
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024
    DEVENDRA KUMAR
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. 31/48
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
    16:13:17
    +0530
    a fresh period of limitation from the date on which the
    acknowledgement was so signed. It is well settled that to amount to an
    acknowledgement of liability within the meaning of Section 18 of the
    Limitation Act, it need not be accompanied by a promise to pay either
    expressly or even by implication.

    15. The statement providing foundation for a plea of
    acknowledgement must relate to a present subsisting liability, though
    the exact nature or the specific character of the said liability may not
    be indicated in words. The words used in the acknowledgement must
    indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties such as
    that of debtor and creditor. The intention to attempt such jural
    relationship must be apparent. However, such intention can be
    inferred by implication from the nature of the admission and need not
    be expressed in words. A clear statement containing acknowledgement
    of liability can imply the intention to admit jural relationship of debtor
    and creditor. Though oral evidence in lieu of or making a departure
    from the statement sought to be relied on as acknowledgement is
    excluded but surrounding circumstances can always be considered.
    Courts generally lean in favour of a liberal construction of such
    statements though an acknowledgement shall not be inferred where
    there is no admission so as to fasten liability on the maker of the
    statement by an involved or far-fetched process of reasoning.
    (See Shapoor Freedom Mazda v. Durga Prosad Chamaria [AIR 1961
    SC 1236] and Lakshmirattan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Aluminium
    Corpn. of India Ltd.
    [(1971) 1 SCC 67 : (1971) 2 SCR 623] ) So long
    as the statement amounts to an admission, acknowledging the jural
    relationship and existence of liability, it is immaterial that the
    admission is accompanied by an assertion that nothing would be
    found due from the person making the admission or that on an
    account being taken something may be found due and payable to the
    person making the acknowledgement by the person to whom the
    statement is made.

    38. Further, in case titled New Mangalore Port Trust v. Clifford D’Souza,
    (2025) 5 SCC 577, it has observed that

    25. Section 18 of the Limitation Act is very clear that where liability
    is acknowledged in respect of any property or right, a fresh limitation
    may be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so
    signed. Clause (a) of the Explanation to Section 18 declares that an
    acknowledgment would be sufficient for various reasons to be stated
    therein, which includes the time for payment has not yet come as one
    of the reasons. In the present case this reason squarely applies.

    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024                                                             Digitally signed
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd.              by DEVENDRA        32/48
                                                                                      KUMAR
                                                                           DEVENDRA
                                                                                      Date:
                                                                           KUMAR      2026.04.27
                                                                                      16:13:23
                                                                                      +0530
    

    39. Section 19 was also dealt with by Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled
    Shapoor Freedom Mazda v. Durga Prasad Chamaria , 1961 SCC OnLine SC
    147 and relevant observations are as under:

    6. It is thus clear that acknowledgment as prescribed by Section 19
    merely renews debt; it does not create a new right of action. It is a
    mere acknowledgment of the liability in respect of the right in
    question; it need not be accompanied by a promise to pay either
    expressly or even by implication. The statement on which a plea of
    acknowledgment is based must relate to a present subsisting liability
    though the exact nature or the specific character of the said liability
    may not be indicated in words. Words used in the acknowledgment
    must, however, indicate the existence of jural relationship between the
    parties such as that of debtor and creditor, and it must appear that the
    statement is made with the intention to admit such jural relationship.

    Such intention can be inferred by implication from the nature of the
    admission, and need not be expressed in words. If the statement is
    fairly clear then the intention to admit jural relationship may be
    implied from it. The admission in question need not be express but
    must be made in circumstances and in words from which the court can
    reasonably infer that the person making the admission intended to
    refer to a subsisting liability as at the date of the statement. In
    construing words used in the statements made in writing on which a
    plea of acknowledgment rests oral evidence has been expressly
    excluded but surrounding circumstances can always be considered.
    Stated generally courts lean in favour of a liberal construction of such
    statements though it does not mean that where no admission is made
    one should be inferred, or where a statement was made clearly
    without intending to admit the existence of jural relationship such
    intention could be fastened on the maker of the statement by an
    involved or far-fetched process of reasoning. Broadly stated that is the
    effect of the relevant provisions contained in Section 19, and there is
    really no substantial difference between the parties as to the true legal
    position in this matter.

    40. In another case titled Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. v. Assam SEB ,
    (2020) 2 SCC 677, it has further observed that:

    16. We may notice the judgment of this Court dealing with Section 20
    of the Limitation Act, 1908, which was akin to present Section 19 of
    the Limitation Act, 1963. In Sant Lal Mahton v. Kamla Prasad , 1951
    Digitally
    signed by
    DEVENDRA
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024
    DEVENDRA KUMAR
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. KUMAR 33/48
    Date:

    2026.04.27
    16:13:28
    +0530
    SCC 1008, this Court held that for applicability of Section 20 of the
    Limitation Act, 1908, two conditions were essential that the payment
    must be made within the prescribed period of limitation and it must be
    acknowledged by some form of writing either in the handwriting of
    the payer himself or signed by him. This Court further held that for
    claiming benefit of exemption under Section 20, there has to be
    pleading and proof. In paras 9 and 10, the following has been laid
    down :

    “9. It would be clear, we think, from the language of Section 20,
    Limitation Act, that to attract its operations two conditions are
    essential: first, the payment must be made within the prescribed period
    of limitation and secondly, it must be acknowledged by some form of
    writing either in the handwriting of the payer himself or signed by
    him. We agree with the Subordinate Judge that it is the payment which
    really extends the period of limitation under Section 20, Limitation
    Act; but the payment has got to be proved in a particular way and for
    reason of policy the legislature insists on a written or signed
    acknowledgment as the only proof of payment and excludes oral
    testimony. Unless, therefore, there is acknowledgment in the required
    form, the payment by itself is of no avail. The Subordinate Judge,
    however, is right in holding that while the section requires that the
    payment should be made within the period of limitation, it does not
    require that the acknowledgment should also be made within that
    period. To interpret the proviso in that way would be to import into it
    certain words which do not occur there. This is the view taken by
    almost all the High Courts in India and to us it seems to be a proper
    view to take.

    10. … If the plaintiff’s right of action is apparently barred under the
    statute of limitation, Order 7 Rule 6, Civil Procedure Code makes it
    his duty to state specifically in the plaint the grounds of exemption
    allowed by the Limitation Act, upon which he relies to exclude its
    operation; and if the plaintiff has got to allege in his plaint the facts
    which entitle him to exemption, obviously these facts must be in
    existence at or before the time when the plaint is filed; facts which
    come into existence after the filing of the plaint cannot be called in aid
    to revive a right of action which was dead at the date of the suit. To
    claim exemption under Section 20, Limitation Act the plaintiff must
    be in a position to allege and prove not only that there was payment of
    interest on a debt or part-payment of the principal, but that such
    payment had been acknowledged in writing in the manner
    contemplated by that section.”

    Digitally signed

    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024                                                             by DEVENDRA
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd.              KUMAR              34/48
                                                                           DEVENDRA
                                                                                      Date:
                                                                           KUMAR      2026.04.27
                                                                                      16:13:33
                                                                                      +0530
    

    41. After going through abovesaid case law, it stands proved that a
    written acknowledgment / or part payment must be within the existing
    period of limitation and must be a clear acknowledgment of outstanding
    debt. In view of abovesaid legal proposition, the contents of reply to legal
    notice Ex.PW1/7 would show that the defendants have nowhere
    acknowledged their liability to pay outstanding amount. Rather they have
    denied any liability to pay amount under the pretext of supply of defective
    material. Even e-mails Ex.DW1/10 (colly) have also not proved any such
    acknowledgment of debt and have proved supply of material. As such,
    there was no written acknowledgment of debt to increase the period of
    limitation by reply to legal notice and plea taken by the plaintiff has no
    force.

    42. Now limitation of this suit has to be seen. Article 14 of the
    Limitation Act provides the limitation for 3 years from the date of cause of
    action. In this case, this suit is based upon statement of account / ledger Ex.

    PWPW1/4, as per which, last payment was made on 20.12.2017 and the
    limitation started w.e.f. from 21.12.2017, which continued up to
    15.03.2020, when the courts stopped functioning during COVID-19
    outbreak and the limitation remained suspended during the period from
    15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 under the direction of Hon’ble Apex Court. As
    such, it is necessary to go through judgment dealing with exclusion of
    corona period from limitation titled Cognizance for Extension of
    Limitation, In re, (2022) 3 SCC 117 as under:

    5. Taking into consideration the arguments advanced by the learned
    counsel and the impact of the surge of the virus on public health and
    adversities faced by litigants in the prevailing conditions, we deem it

    Digitally
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 signed by
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA 35/48
    DEVENDRA KUMAR
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
    16:13:37
    +0530
    appropriate to dispose of MA No. 21 of 2022 with the following
    directions:

    5.1. The order dated 23-3-2020 [Cognizance for Extension of
    Limitation, In re, (2020) 19 SCC 10 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 801] is
    restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 8-3-2021
    [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, (2021) 5 SCC 452 :

    (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 40 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 615 : (2021) 2 SCC
    (L&S) 50] , 27-4-2021 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re,
    (2021) 17 SCC 231 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 373] and 23-9-2021
    [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, 2021 SCC OnLine SC
    947] , it is directed that the period from 15-3-2020 till 28-2-2022 shall
    stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed
    under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-

    judicial proceedings.

    5.2. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 3-
    10-2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 1-3-2022.

    5.3. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the
    period between 15-3-2020 till 28-2-2022, notwithstanding the actual
    balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a
    limitation period of 90 days from 1-3-2022. In the event the actual
    balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 1-3-2022 is
    greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.

    5.4. It is further clarified that the period from 15-3-2020 till 28-2-
    2022 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed
    under Sections 23(4) and 29-A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
    1996, Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos

    (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
    and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for
    instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or
    tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings.

    43. In view of abovesaid judgment, it is clear that the limitation to file all
    suits / proceedings was halted during corona period and if the period of
    limitation was going to expire during corona period, then a balance period
    of 90 days was granted to file a litigation. In this case also, the period of
    limitation started on 21.12.2017 and was going to expired on 21.12.2020

    Digitally
    signed by
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 DEVENDRA
    DEVENDRA KUMAR
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. 36/48
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
    16:13:42
    +0530
    thereby meaning a balance period of 8 months 6 days left after corona
    period till 28.02.2022. The limitation upto 01.11.2022 was available to the
    plaintiff, whereas this suit has been filed on 01.03.2024, which is definitely
    barred by limitation. As such, the plaintiff has failed to discharge the onus
    to prove this issue and issue no.1 is decided in favor of the defendants and
    against the plaintiff.

    44. Issue No. 2: The onus to prove issue no.2 was fixed upon the
    plaintiff. To discharge the onus, the plaintiff has examined PW1 and has
    also cross examined DW1. Though the defendants have no defense on
    merit for the want of authority of ARs to contest this case, yet the
    defendants may rebut admitted case of the plaintiff to dispute territorial
    jurisdiction of this court. Plaintiff has made averments regarding territorial
    jurisdiction of this court in Paragraph 33 of the plaint as under.

    33. That the subject matter of the recovery of debt due falls within the
    jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court. This Hon’ble Court has the
    territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try this suit as the plaintiff
    company has its registered office at C-53, Shashi Garden Mayur Vihar
    Phase-1, Delhi which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of this
    Hon’ble Court. Also all the business meetings between the plaintiff
    and defendants were held at plaintiff’s registered office and the
    payment of the outstanding dues were also received in the Mayur
    Vihar branch bank account of the plaintiff. Furthermore, all the
    invoices which were raised to the defendant’s company contain a
    clause wherein it has been mentioned that “any dispute is subject to
    Delhi Jurisdiction only”. The cause of action within the territorial
    jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court. Hence, this Hon’ble Court has
    jurisdiction to try and entertain this present case.

    45. In view of abovesaid paragraph, it stands proved that the plaintiff
    invoked territorial jurisdiction of this court on the basis of its registered
    office. However, PW1 has admitted that the corporate office of the plaintiff
    Digitally
    signed by
    DEVENDRA
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 DEVENDRA KUMAR
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. KUMAR Date: 37/48
    2026.04.27
    16:13:46
    +0530
    company is at Noida, UP, wherefrom all marketing operations are also
    conducted, and its manufacturing plants are at Noida, Madhya Pradesh,
    Uttarakhand and J& K. Plaintiff has local office at Haridwar, Uttarakhand
    as mentioned in invoice Ex.PW1/3 (colly). It is also not disputed that the
    purchase order Ex.PW1/2 was placed at Noida from address of the
    defendant no.1 at Bangalore, Karnataka, whereas the material was supplied
    from Haridwar, Uttarakhand to Bangalore, Karnataka through transporter
    and transport receipts as well as invoices have duly corroborated it. As
    such, no part of cause of action arose at Mayur Vihar, Delhi.

    46. However, Ld. counsel for plaintiff has argued that this court has
    territorial jurisdiction to entertain this case, as the company has its
    registered office at Mayur Vihar, Delhi. The territorial jurisdiction of the
    courts on the basis of Registered Office has been dealt with in case titled
    Patel Roadways Ltd. v. Prasad Trading Co., (1991) 4 SCC 270 and relevant
    observations are as under:

    9. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20 inter alia refer to a court within
    the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant inter alia “carries
    on business”. Clause (c) on the other hand refers to a court within the
    local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly or in part
    arises. It has not been urged before us on behalf of the appellant that
    the cause of action wholly or in part arose in Bombay. Consequently
    clause (c) is not attracted to the facts of these cases. What has been
    urged with the aid of the Explanation to Section 20 of the Code is that
    since the appellant has its principal office in Bombay it shall be
    deemed to carry on business at Bombay and consequently the courts
    at Bombay will also have jurisdiction. On a plain reading of the
    Explanation to Section 20 of the Code we find an apparent fallacy in
    the aforesaid argument. The Explanation is in two parts, one before
    the word “or” occurring between the words “office in India” and the
    word “in respect of” and the other thereafter. The Explanation applies
    to a defendant which is a corporation, which term, as seen above,
    would include even a company such as the appellant in the instant

    Digitally
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 signed by
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA38/48
    DEVENDRA KUMAR
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
    16:13:52
    +0530
    case. The first part of the Explanation applies only to such a
    corporation which has its sole or principal office at a particular place.
    In that event the courts within whose jurisdiction the sole or principal
    office of the defendant is situate will also have jurisdiction inasmuch
    as even if the defendant may not be actually carrying on business at
    that place, it will “be deemed to carry on business” at that place
    because of the fiction created by the Explanation. The latter part of the
    Explanation takes care of a case where the defendant does not have a
    sole office but has a principal office at one place and has also a
    subordinate office at another place. The words “at such place”
    occurring at the end of the Explanation and the word “or” referred to
    above which is disjunctive clearly suggest that if the case falls within
    the latter part of the Explanation it is not the court within whose
    jurisdiction the principal office of the defendant is situate but the court
    within whose jurisdiction it has a subordinate office which alone shall
    have jurisdiction “in respect of any cause of action arising at any
    place where it has also a subordinate office”.

    10. Here we may point out that the view which we take finds support
    from a circumstance which, in our opinion, is relevant. Section 20 of
    the Code before its amendment by the Code of Civil Procedure
    (Amendment) Act, 1976 had two Explanations being Explanations I
    and II. By the Amendment Act Explanation I was omitted and
    Explanation II was renumbered as the present Explanation.

    Explanation I so omitted read as hereunder:

    “Explanation I.– Where a person has a permanent dwelling at one
    place and also temporary residence at another place, he shall be
    deemed to reside at both places in respect of any cause of action
    arising at the place where he has such temporary residence.”

    11. This Explanation dealt with the case of place of residence of the
    defendant and provided with regard to a person having a permanent
    dwelling at one place and also temporary at another place that such
    person shall be deemed to reside at both places in respect of any cause
    of action arising at the place where he has such temporary residence.
    The language used in Explanation II on the other hand which is the
    present Explanation was entirely different. Had the intention been that
    if a corporation had its principal office at one place and a subordinate
    office at another place and the cause of action arose at the place where
    it had its subordinate office it shall be deemed to be carrying on
    business at both places the language used in Explanation II would
    have been identical to that of Explanation I which was dealing with a
    case of a person having a permanent dwelling at one place and also
    temporary residence at another place. The marked difference in the
    language of the two Explanations clearly supports the view which we

    Digitally
    signed by
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 DEVENDRA
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA KUMAR 39/48
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
    16:14:02
    +0530
    have taken with regard to the interpretation of the present Explanation
    to Section 20 of the Code which was Explanation II earlier as
    indicated above.

    12. We would also like to add that the interpretation sought to be
    placed by the appellant on the provision in question renders the
    Explanation totally redundant. If the intention of the legislature was,
    as is said on their behalf, that a suit against a corporation could be
    instituted either at the place of its sole or principal office (whether or
    not the corporation carries on business at that place) or at any other
    place where the cause of action arises, the provisions of clauses (a),

    (b) and (c) together with the first part of the Explanation would have
    completely achieved the purpose. Indeed the effect would have been
    wider. The suit could have been instituted at the place of the principal
    office because of the situation of such office (whether or not any
    actual business was carried on there). Alternatively, a suit could have
    been instituted at the place where the cause of action arose under
    clause (c) (irrespective of whether the corporation had a subordinate
    office in such place or not). This was, therefore, not the purpose of the
    Explanation. The Explanation is really an Explanation to clause (a). It
    is in the nature of a clarification on the scope of clause (a) viz. as to
    where the corporation can be said to carry on business. This, it is
    clarified, will be the place where the principal office is situated
    (whether or not any business actually is carried on there) or the place
    where a business is carried on giving rise to a cause of action (even
    though the principal office of the corporation is not located there) so
    long as there is a subordinate office of the corporation situated at such
    place. The linking together of the place where the cause of action
    arises with the place where a subordinate office is located clearly
    shows that the intention of the legislature was that, in the case of a
    corporation, for the purposes of clause (a), the location of the
    subordinate office, within the local limits of which a cause of action
    arises, is to be the relevant place for the filing of a suit and not the
    principal place of business. If the intention was that the location of the
    sole or principal office as well as the location of the subordinate office
    (within the limits of which a cause of action arises) are to be deemed
    to be places where the corporation is deemed to be carrying on
    business, the disjunctive “or” will not be there. Instead, the second
    part of the Explanation would have read “and, in respect of any cause
    of action arising at any place where it has a subordinate office, also at
    such place”.

    13. As far as we can see the interpretation which we have placed on
    this section does not create any practical or undue difficulties or
    disadvantage either to the plaintiff or a defendant corporation. It is

    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 Digitally
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. signed by 40/48
    DEVENDRA
    DEVENDRA KUMAR
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
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    true that, normally, under clauses (a) to (c), the plaintiff has a choice
    of forum and cannot be compelled to go to the place of residence or
    business of the corporation and can file a suit at a place where the
    cause of action arises. If a corporation desires to be protected from
    being dragged into litigation at some place merely because a cause of
    action arises there it can save itself from such a situation by an
    exclusion clause as has been done in the present case. The clear
    intendment of the Explanation, however, is that, where the corporation
    has a subordinate office in the place where the cause of action arises,
    it cannot be heard to say that it cannot be sued there because it does
    not carry on business at that place. It would be a great hardship if, in
    spite of the corporation having a subordinate office at the place where
    the cause of action arises (with which in all probability the plaintiff
    has had dealings), such plaintiff is to be compelled to travel to the
    place where the corporation has its principal place. That place should
    be convenient to the plaintiff; and since the corporation has an office
    at such place, it will also be under no disadvantage. Thus the
    Explanation provides an alternative locus for the corporation’s place
    of business, not an additional one.

    14. There may be only one extraordinary situation in which this
    interpretation may cause an apparent anomaly. This is where the
    plaintiff has also his/its place of business at the same place as the
    corporation but the cause of action has arisen at some other place. The
    above interpretation would preclude him from filing a suit in that
    place of business common to both parties and compel him to go to a
    court having jurisdiction over the place where the cause of action has
    arisen. But this is not really a hardship because such plaintiff must
    have had some nexus or connection with the place since some part of
    the cause of action had arisen there; if he can have dealings with the
    corporation at such a place giving rise to the cause of action, there is
    no reason why he should find it disadvantageous or difficult to file a
    suit at such place. Equally, the corporation, having a subordinate
    office at the place, will suffer no disadvantage.

    In view of abovesaid judgment, it stands proved that the territorial
    jurisdiction of the court cannot be considered on the basis of Registered
    Office, until and unless some part of cause of action also arose there in
    terms of section 20 of CPC. However, in this case, no other part of cause of
    action arose at Delhi, due to this court has no territorial jurisdiction on the

    Digitally
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 signed by
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA41/48
    DEVENDRA KUMAR
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
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    basis of registered office of the plaintiff.

    47. Next plea taken by the plaintiff is that all business meetings between
    the parties took place at registered office of the plaintiff, due to a partly
    cause of action arose at Delhi. However, Hon’ble High Court of Delhi has
    held in case titled Jain Irrigation Systems Vs. Pragyawan Technolgies Pvt.

    Ltd, 2024 SCC online 6514 that pre-contract negotiations cannot form part
    of cause of action and no jurisdiction may be conferred upon the court,
    until and unless those negotiations were part of contract, which is not in
    this case. (Para 33). Accordingly, on the basis of such averments, this court
    has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this case. It is pertinent to mention
    here that PW1 has deposed that the material supplied to the defendants was
    manufactured at Haridwar, Uttarakhand and all marketing operations were
    being carried out at Noida, UP, then there was no cause of action at Delhi.
    Even transport receipts by which the material was supplied have also
    corroborated that the material was supplied from Uttarakhand to Bangalore,
    Karnataka.

    48. Next argument led by Ld. Counsel for plaintiff is that this court has
    territorial jurisdiction as payment was received by the plaintiff in its bank
    account at Mayur Vihar, Delhi. Even all invoices were raised from the same
    address. Admittedly, the purchase order Ex.PW1/2 has proved that it was
    placed on the plaintiff at Noida, UP, whereas invoices were issued from
    Haridwar, Uttarakhand to Bangalore, Karnataka. As such, none of the
    invoices has proved that invoices were raised from Delhi.

    
    
                                                                                    Digitally
                                                                                    signed by
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024                                                           DEVENDRA
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd.   DEVENDRA KUMAR      42/48
                                                                           KUMAR    Date:
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    49. So far as part payment to the plaintiff by the defendants is concerned,
    no place of payment was agreed by the parties in purchase order Ex.PW1/2
    or invoices Ex.PW1/3 (colly). The place of payment may create a partly
    cause of action if place of payment is agreed by the parties at a particular
    place as held in Auto Movers V/s. Luminous Power Technologies Private
    Limited, 2021 SCC Online Del 4387, as per which, the court may have
    jurisdiction where payment was agreed between the parties. However, there
    was no agreed place of payment in this case and merely mentioning that
    payments by A/c Payee Cheques / DD in favor of Montage Enterprises
    Private Ltd. in invoices cannot be agreed place of payments. As such, this
    court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this case.

    50. Further, Ld. Counsel for plaintiff has argued that both the parties
    agreed for territorial jurisdiction of Delhi Courts, due to this court has
    territorial jurisdiction to entertain this suit and suit is liable to be decreed.
    On the other hand, Ld. Counsel of defendants has opposed the submission
    and has argued that parties cannot confer territorial jurisdiction upon a
    court through agreement, if no part of cause of action arose there, due to
    this court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this case and this suit is
    liable to be dismissed for the want of territorial jurisdiction.

    51. Admittedly, it is settled proposition of law that both the parties
    cannot confer territorial jurisdiction upon a particular court which
    otherwise has no jurisdiction. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held in case
    titled A.B.C Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs. A.P. Agencies, Salem (1989) 2
    SCC 163 that if both the parties have two different jurisdictions of two

    Digitally
    signed by
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 DEVENDRA
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA KUMAR 43/48
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
    16:14:20
    +0530
    different courts, then they may choose a particular place of jurisdiction by
    agreement but they cannot choose any exclusive jurisdiction of a place to
    adjudicate their disputes. In view of this judgment, both the parties are not
    free to select territorial jurisdiction by any court so jurisdiction cannot be
    determined on the basis of exclusive clause of jurisdiction in agreement /
    invoices/ purchase order. As such, no part of cause of action arose at Delhi
    and the plaintiff has failed to discharge the onus to prove issue no.2 and
    this issue is decided in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff.

    52. Issues No. 3 and 4: The onus to prove both the issues was put upon
    the plaintiff and to discharge the onus, the plaintiff has examined PW1 and
    has also cross examined DW1. PW1 has deposed that the plaintiff is
    engaged in the production of flexible packaging material and the defendant
    no.1 placed purchase order Ex.PW1/1 and material was supplied against
    invoices Ex.PW1/3 (colly). It is further deposed that the plaintiff
    maintained running ledger accounts of the defendant and all payments were
    entered into said accounts Ex. PW1/4. It is further deposed that the material
    was supplied to the defendant no.1 as per design and description approved
    by the defendant no. 2. It is further proved that the defendant no. 1 failed to
    pay amount of material and when the plaintiff raised issue of payment, the
    defendant no.1 raised a debit note thereby stating that the material was
    defective and still lying in its godown. DW1 has proved statement of
    accounts Ex.DW1/9 to counter the case of the plaintiff. As such, the
    defendants have pleaded that the material supplied by the plaintiff was
    defective and was also declined earlier by the defendant no.2 for
    misprinting but still the plaintiff supplied citing space crunch and later on
    Digitally
    signed by
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 DEVENDRA
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd.DEVENDRA KUMAR 44/48
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
    16:14:26
    +0530
    claimed its amount.

    53. Ld. Counsel for defendants have argued that the plaintiff is not
    entitled for any recovery, as the material supplied by the plaintiff was
    defective and was lying in the godown of the defendant no.1 and was not
    lifted despite specific communication to left. However, it is not disputed
    that the material was not returned to the plaintiff and stated to be lying in
    godown, whereas subsequently godown and assets of the defendant no.1
    were taken over by Canara Bank under SARFAESI, Act thereby meaning
    that the material was considered as assets of the defendant no.1 and was
    part of valuation of assets of Rs. 17,52,10,000/- as reflected in statement
    Ex.DW1/15.

    54. Admittedly, the material was supplied by the plaintiff and was duly
    received by the defendant no.1 despite delay of 32 days in supply of
    material without any objection but no payment made. Since the material
    was accepted by the defendant no.1 despite delay on 02.07.2017,
    accordingly the defendant no.1 cannot object supply or payment on this
    ground of delay. Even there is no evidence on record that the material was
    defective and merely communication between the defendants could not
    prove it. No doubt the defendants communicated the plaintiff about lifting
    of material from the spot but still they did not bother to return it and merely
    raised debit note. If the material was not returned and merely debit note
    was issued, then the defendants cannot escape of their liability to pay due
    amount. So far as issuance of debit note is concerned, DW1 has admitted
    that debit note was dispatched through post but no proof of delivery of such
    Digitally
    signed by
    DEVENDRA
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024
    DEVENDRA KUMAR
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. KUMAR 45/48
    Date:

    2026.04.27
    16:14:30
    +0530
    debit note has been proved on record. In fact, issuance of debit note is
    routine process in commercial field but it must be proved coupled with
    genuine purpose, which is not proved in this case. As such, the defendants
    shall be liable to pay amount of the supply of material.

    55. So for as privity of contract between the defendant no.2 and plaintiff
    is concerned, the defendant no.2 has pleaded that there was no privity of
    contract between the parties. Admittedly, purchase order Ex.PW1/1 was
    placed by the defendant no.1, though for and on behalf of the defendant
    no.2 and under its approval, yet merely approval of the product by the
    defendant no.2 does not make the defendant no.2 liable to pay amount of
    the plaintiff. In fact, there were direct business relations between the
    defendant no.1 and the plaintiff and the material was supplied by the
    plaintiff to the defendant no.1 and there was no privity of contract between
    the plaintiff and the defendant no.2 to pay outstanding amount. Ld. Counsel
    for plaintiff has argued that the defendant no.2 also paid amount to the
    plaintiff directly as reflected in ledger of the plaintiff, but merely making
    payment directly to the plaintiff by the defendant no.2 without placing any
    work order shall be considered to be made on behalf of the defendant no.1
    only. As such, the defendant no.1 and the plaintiff had not privity of
    contract to make the defendant no.2 liable to pay this amount.

    56. In fact, the plaintiff supplied the material to the defendant no.1 and
    the defendant no.1 communicated to the plaintiff repeatedly that the
    material was defective but still the defendant no.1 failed to return defective
    material and merely issuing of debit not could not save from liability to pay

    Digitally
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 signed by
    DEVENDRA
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. 46/48
    DEVENDRA KUMAR
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
    16:14:34
    +0530
    the amount, especially when the material has been taken over by the bank
    and considered assets of the defendant no.1. As such, the plaintiff has
    proved that it is entitled for recovery of suit amount.

    57. So far as interest against outstanding amount is concerned, the
    transaction between the parties was commercial in nature and commercial
    transactions definitely carry interest against outstanding amount. Purchase
    order Ex.PW1/2 and invoices Ex.PW1/3 (colly) have no interest clause due
    to there was no contract for agreed rate of interest, due to the plaintiff shall
    be entitled for normal interest against outstanding amount. As such, the
    plaintiff has discharged the onus to prove both the issues and both issues
    no.3 & 4 are decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants.

    58. Relief : Plaintiff has discharged the onus to prove issues no. 3 & 4
    but has failed to discharge the onus to prove issues no. 1 & 2. I have
    already observed that the claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation and
    even this court also has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this suit.
    Normally, if the court comes to conclusion that the court has no territorial
    jurisdiction to entertain a suit, the plaint has to be returned under Order 7
    Rule 10 of CPC
    to present the same before the court of appropriate
    territorial jurisdiction. However, in this case, this suit is also barred by
    limitation and Section 3 of Limitation Act cast a duty upon the court to
    dismiss such suit. The purpose of return of a plaint is to enable the plaintiff
    to present the suit again to seek similar remedy before the court of
    appropriate territorial jurisdiction, whereas if suit is barred by limitation,
    then such remedy also extinguish and no purpose shall serve by return of
    Digitally
    signed by
    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024 DEVENDRA
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. DEVENDRA KUMAR 47/48
    KUMAR Date:

    2026.04.27
    16:14:40
    +0530
    the suit. Accordingly, the suit shall be dismissed. As such, the plaintiff has
    failed to prove that it is entitled for relief, hence suit is hereby dismissed.
    No such order of cost. Decree sheet be prepared.

    Digitally signed
    by DEVENDRA

    59. File be consigned to Record Room. KUMAR
    DEVENDRA
    Date:

                                                                           KUMAR      2026.04.27
                                                                                      16:14:45
                                                                                      +0530
    ANNOUNCED IN OPEN COURT       (DEVENDER KUMAR)
         th
    

    ON 27 day of April, 2026 District Judge (Commercial Court-01)
    East District
    Karkardooma Courts, Delhi

    CS (Comm) No. 75/2024
    Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Anjaneya Agro Tech Pvt. Ltd. 48/48



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