Allahabad High Court
Sheo Bux Singh vs State Of U.P. Secretary Revenue on 8 May, 2026
Author: Irshad Ali
Bench: Irshad Ali
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH A.F.R. Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-LKO:33441 Reserved on: 18.03.2026 Delivered on: 08.05.2026 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW WRIT - C No. - 3000056 of 2000 Sheo Bux Singh ..Petitioner(s) Versus State of U.P. Secretary Revenue ..Respondent(s) Counsel for Petitioner(s) : T.n.singh, Madan Gopal Tripathi Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C., Court No. - 4 HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.
1. Heard Sri Madan Gopal Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Jagdish Prasad Maurya, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent – State.
2. The present writ petition has been filed for issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the impugned order 18.02.1997 and 12.05.1997 passed by respondent No.4 contained as Annexure Nos.2 & 13 to the writ petition.
3. Factual matrix of the case is that the instant writ petition arises out of the illegal, arbitrary and capricious orders passed by the opposite party no. 2 affirming the order of the Prescribed Authority, District Balrampur dated 20.03.1999, whereby the land of the petitioner has been wrongly treated as irrigated at one stage and unirrigated at another, in clear violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 4-A of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
4. Initially a notice under Section 10(2) of the Act was issued to the petitioner on 14.10.1986, which was served on 22.12.1986, alleging that the petitioner was in possession of 22.76 acres of irrigated land situated in Village Kather, Navadeeh and Beb, out of which only 18.02 acres could be retained and 4.74 acres was proposed to be declared surplus. Subsequently, another notice dated 22.05.1987 was issued and served upon the petitioner on 02.06.1987.
5. The petitioner filed objections on 31.12.1987 before the Prescribed Authority, Balrampur, stating that he possessed only 10.96 acres of land in Village Kather and had no land in other villages as alleged in the notice. It was further submitted that the land situated in Village Beb had already been transferred by a registered sale deed dated 13.05.1974/14.05.1974 in favour of bona fide purchasers and possession had also been delivered, followed by mutation in the year 1975.
6. Due to certain unavoidable circumstances, the petitioner could not appear and an ex parte order was passed on 14.01.1992, which was subsequently set aside on a restoration application allowed on 23.04.1992. Thereafter, the Prescribed Authority, without properly considering the material on record and without following due procedure, passed an order dated 22.10.1993 declaring 4.74 acres of land as surplus.
7. Being aggrieved, the petitioner as well as the purchasers preferred appeals under Section 13 of the Act before the Additional Commissioner, Faizabad Division, which were decided by a common order dated 18.02.1997/08.02.1997, partly allowing the appeals and remanding the matter to the Prescribed Authority with certain directions.
8. In the remand proceedings, the Prescribed Authority misinterpreted the appellate order and, without application of mind, passed an order dated 05.11.1998 enhancing the surplus land from 4.74 acres to 5.54 acres by adopting an inconsistent and illegal approach in treating the land as irrigated and unirrigated for different purposes. The said order was challenged before the appellate authority, but the same was illegally affirmed by order dated 30.03.1999 without properly appreciating the facts and law involved.
9. It is pertinent to mention that while determining the ceiling limit, the entire land of the petitioner was treated as irrigated, thereby reducing the permissible holding, whereas for declaring surplus land, the same land was treated as unirrigated so as to increase the surplus area, which amounts to application of a double standard and is wholly illegal.
10. The Prescribed Authority failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 4-A of the Act, which require consideration of khasra entries of relevant years and spot inspection to determine whether land is irrigated or unirrigated. In fact, the land in Village Kather was unirrigated, as is evident from consolidation records (C.H. Form-41), but the same was wrongly treated as irrigated, thereby prejudicing the petitioners rights.
11. The total land allotted to the petitioner after consolidation was 10.58 acres, which clearly shows that there was no basis for increasing the surplus area as done by the authorities. The authorities have also erroneously treated sources like tank and Chora as valid sources of irrigation, which is legally impermissible.
12. That the petitioner continues to be in possession of the land in question and the impugned orders have not yet been implemented. The sale deed dated 13.05.1974/14.05.1974 in respect of land in Village Beb has already been held to be bona fide by the appellate authority, and therefore, the said land could not have been included in the petitioners holding for ceiling purposes.
13. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that by means of impugned orders, land of the petitioner has been treated inconsistently as at one stage as irrigated and at another as unirrigated, which is in clear violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 4-A of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960.
14. He next submitted that the impugned orders as well as the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and affirmed by the appellate authority are wholly unsustainable in law, inasmuch they suffer from manifest illegality, non-application of mind and violation of statutory provisions, particularly Section 4-A of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960.
15. He submitted that the entire proceedings stand vitiated on account of the fact that the authorities have adopted a self-contradictory and impermissible approach while determining the nature of land. The land of the petitioner has been treated as irrigated for the purpose of reducing the ceiling limit, whereas the same land has been treated as unirrigated for the purpose of increasing the surplus area, which is legally impermissible and arbitrary. Such inconsistent treatment of the same land amounts to application of a double standard and is hit by the doctrine of fairness and reasonableness, thereby rendering the impugned orders violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
16. He further submitted that the Prescribed Authority has failed to adhere to the mandatory provisions of Section 4-A of the Act, which require determination of the nature of land on the basis of khasra entries of the relevant years and spot inspection. No such proper exercise has been undertaken and the findings recorded are, thus, without any legal foundation.
17. He submitted that the authorities have completely ignored the material evidence on record, including consolidation records (C.H. Form-41), which clearly establish that the land situated in Village Kather was unirrigated. The non-consideration of relevant evidence vitiates the impugned orders.
18. He further submitted that the land situated in Village Beb had already been transferred by the petitioner through a registered sale deed dated 13.05.1974/14.05.1974 in favour of bona fide purchasers and possession had also been delivered followed by mutation in the year 1975. Once the said transaction has been accepted as bona fide, the said land could not have been included in the holding of the petitioner.
19. He submitted that the Prescribed Authority has acted illegally in enhancing the surplus land from 4.74 acres to 5.54 acres in the remand proceedings, without there being any justification or fresh material on record, which clearly demonstrates non-application of mind and arbitrary exercise of power.
20. He further submitted that the remand order passed by the appellate authority was misconstrued by the Prescribed Authority, which travelled beyond the scope of remand and passed an order detrimental to the petitioner, contrary to settled principles of law governing remand proceedings.
21. He submitted that the appellate authority, while affirming the order dated 05.11.1998 by its order dated 30.03.1999, has failed to consider the legal and factual infirmities in the order of the Prescribed Authority and has passed the impugned order in a mechanical manner without recording cogent reasons.
22. It is further submitted that the total land allotted to the petitioner after consolidation was only 10.58 acres, which itself demonstrates that there was no occasion to declare any additional land as surplus, much less to enhance the same. The authorities have further erred in treating sources such as tank and Chora as valid sources of irrigation, which is contrary to settled legal position and has resulted in wrongful classification of land to the prejudice of the petitioner.
23. He lastly submitted that the impugned orders are also liable to be set aside on the ground that they have been passed without proper appreciation of evidence, in violation of principles of natural justice and without assigning adequate reasons, thereby rendering them unsustainable in law. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance upon following judgments:
a) Beni Ram VS. State of U.P. and others; 1982 Allahabad LJ 974.
b) Km. Madhubala Vs. State of U.P.; 1978 Allahabad L.J. 1039.
c) Om Prakash Agarwal Vs. First Additional District and Sessions Judge, A.W.C. 1981 Page 775.
d) Ram Karan and 13 others Vs. State of U.P.; Ceiling No.111 of 2003 decided on 13.09.2012.
e) Pramod Kumar Vs. Additional Commissioner; 1999 (17) L.C.D. 379.
f) Municipality of Bhiwandi and Nizampur Vs. M/S Kailash Sizing Works; A.I.R. 1975 SC 529.
g) Dwarka Nath Vs. Income Tax Officer and another; 1966 AIR SC 81.
h) Rameshwar Vs. Jot Ram; (1976) 1 SCC 194.
i) Ramesh Kumar Vs. Kesho Ram; Supp. (2) SCC 623.
j) B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India; 1995 (6) SCC 623
k) Jodhey and others Vs. State through Ram Sahai; 1952 AIR Allahabad 788.
l) RBF Rig Corporation, Mumbai Vs. Commissioner of Customs (Imports), Mumbai; 2011 (3) SCC 573
m) Ramesh Chandra Sankla etc. Vs. Vikram Cement etc.; 2009 AIR Supreme Court 713
n) K.B. Ramchandra Raje Ors. (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. State of Karnataka and ors.; (2016) 3 SCC 422.
24. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel submitted that the instant writ petition is wholly misconceived, devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed with exemplary costs as the petitioner has approached this Honble Court by suppressing material facts and by making selective disclosure of the long-drawn ceiling proceedings under the provisions of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960.
25. He submitted that the present writ petition was instituted on 12.10.2000 challenging the appellate order dated 30.03.1999 as well as the consequential order dated 05.11.1998 passed by the Prescribed Authority. However, after lapse of more than two decades, the petitioner has sought to enlarge the scope of the writ petition by way of amendment seeking challenge to the orders dated 18.02.1997 and 12.05.1997, which were admittedly in existence on the date of filing of the writ petition. Such belated challenge, after about 25 years, is ex facie barred by delay and laches and is liable to be rejected on this ground alone.
26. He next submitted that the petitioner has deliberately concealed material proceedings and relevant documents pertaining to the ceiling case. The entire sequence of proceedings beginning from the original determination, restoration, remand orders and objections filed by the purchasers has not been candidly disclosed. The petitioner now seeks to fill lacunae in his case through repeated supplementary affidavits and amendment applications, which is legally impermissible.
27. He submitted that ceiling proceedings were initiated against the original tenure holder under Section 10(2) of the Act, wherein by order dated 14.01.1992 certain plots measuring 4.74 acres irrigated land situated in Village Kather were declared surplus. Thereafter, on restoration/recall moved by the tenure holder, the Prescribed Authority reconsidered the matter and passed a fresh order dated 22.10.1993 declaring different land as surplus. Against the order dated 22.10.1993, the original tenure holder preferred Appeal No.269, whereas the purchasers filed objections under Section 11(2) of the Act. The said objections were rejected on 31.05.1996, against which Appeal No.185 was preferred by the purchasers.
28. Both the aforesaid appeals were considered by the appellate authority. By common order dated 18.02.1997 and recall order dated 12.05.1997, the matter was remanded to the Prescribed Authority for reconsideration on specific and limited issues. The remand was thus a judicial order passed after due consideration of rival submissions and did not suffer from any illegality. Pursuant to the remand order, the Prescribed Authority reconsidered the matter in detail and framed specific issues for adjudication, namely: (i) determination of the nature of land of gata no.2345 as irrigated or unirrigated; and (ii) consideration of the tenure holders choice regarding retention of land in Village Baib vis–vis declaration of surplus land situated elsewhere.
29. After detailed appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the Prescribed Authority recorded categorical findings that the family of the tenure holder consisted of less than five members on the relevant cut-off date and, therefore, no additional ceiling benefit could be granted on account of alleged major sons. The Prescribed Authority further determined that the disputed land was to be treated as unirrigated, which itself reduced the proposed surplus area substantially. Ultimately, only land measuring 5.54 acres situated in Village Kather was declared surplus by order dated 05.11.1998. The said order dated 05.11.1998 was challenged by the petitioner in Appeal No.50 under Section 13 of the Act. The appellate authority, after considering the entire record, dismissed the appeal by reasoned order dated 30.03.1999 affirming the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority.
30. He submitted that it is significant to submit that the appellate authority considered all grounds raised by the petitioner, including the issue relating to classification of land, family composition and choice of retention. The petitioner failed to establish any factual or legal infirmity in the order of the Prescribed Authority.
31. The challenge raised by the petitioner to the remand orders dated 18.02.1997 and 12.05.1997 is wholly untenable. Firstly, no such challenge was made when the writ petition was instituted in the year 2000. Secondly, the petitioner accepted the remand proceedings, participated therein without protest and allowed fresh adjudication to culminate into order dated 05.11.1998. Having acquiesced to the remand proceedings, the petitioner is estopped from questioning the same after 25 years.
32. He submitted that the settled principle of law is that a litigant who participates in proceedings without demur cannot subsequently challenge the jurisdiction or procedural propriety of the same after suffering an adverse outcome.
33. He further submitted that repeated filing of supplementary affidavits in the years 2003, 2025 and 2025 again, along with amendment applications introducing new pleadings and annexures, clearly demonstrates an attempt to improve upon an otherwise weak case and to protract litigation. The petitioner has also sought to rely upon subsequent developments and documents which are wholly irrelevant for adjudication of the validity of orders passed in ceiling proceedings. Such documents cannot be permitted to alter the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution.
34. It is further submitted that the ceiling proceedings attained finality on several aspects much earlier, particularly in light of earlier appellate orders passed in the years 1976 and subsequent proceedings determining the nature and extent of holdings. The petitioner cannot be permitted to reopen issues which have long attained finality. The findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority and affirmed by the appellate authority are pure findings of fact based upon appreciation of revenue records, documentary evidence and statutory forms.
35. This Honble Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, would not ordinarily interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless shown to be perverse or based on no evidence. In the present case, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any perversity, jurisdictional error or violation of principles of natural justice. The impugned orders are reasoned, lawful and passed strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
36. He lastly submitted that the writ petition also suffers from gross delay and laches. The petitioner has approached this Honble Court against concluded proceedings and thereafter remained indolent for decades while intermittently attempting to revive stale issues through supplementary pleadings. Equity does not favour a litigant who sleeps over his rights and thereafter seeks discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, his submission is that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the grounds of suppression of material facts, delay and laches, acquiescence, estoppel, and absence of any legal infirmity in the impugned orders.
37. I have considered the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record as well as law reports cited by learned counsel for the petitioner.
38. To resolve the controversy involved in the matter, relevant portion of the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner are being quoted below:
“4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record I have no hesitation in saying that the order passed by the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority both betray a lack of proper approach and consideration of the provisions of the Act. It is imperative for an authority exercising power under the Act to consider whether a tenure-holder has land in excess of the ceiling limit, to apply the provisions of law as applicable to the tenure-holder carefully and consider the evidence on record meticulously. In a statute like that of the present Act a tenure-holder is liable to lose agricultural land in case it is found to be beyond his ceiling limit. The ceiling limit under the Act is measured under the terms of irrigated land. It, therefore, becomes necessary for the authorities under the Act to consider and decide whether the petitioner’s land is an irrigated land within the meaning of S. 4A of the Act. The provisions of the said Act are to be applied strictly. In a legislation which seeks to take away land it is imperative that the provisions of the law are applied correctly taking care of all the requirements under the law.
9. Interpretation of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act has to be done keeping an eye on the object of this Act. It must be noticed that this Act has been enacted for the public good. The provisions of the Act cannot be construed in a manner so as to defeat the very object of the Act. While construing the provisions of the Act care also be taken to see that there is a strict compliance with the requirements of law. It has been noticed that this Act is in the nature of an expropriatory legislation. Therefore, before a tenure-holder is deprived of his land, it must be clearly found that he has surplus land and in arriving at that finding it is the duty of the authorities under the Act to see that the provisions of the Act are duly and properly construed.”
b) Km. Madhubala Vs. State of U.P. (Supra):
13. In this case I propose to deal with only the last submission made on behalf of the petitioner. Sec. 5(6) provides that in determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure-holder, any transfer of land made after the twenty-fourth day of Jan., 1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared surplus land under this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into account: Sub-sec. (6) has a proviso (b) which says that if a transfer is proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument, not for the immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holders or other members of his family, the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply to that transfer.
16. All sale deeds executed after 8-6-1973 cannot be ignored under the provisions of S. 5(6) in view of the provisos to that sub-section. The Additional District Judge did not examine the question as to whether the transfer was in good faith and for adequate consideration and the other requirements of proviso (b) to sub-sec. (6) of S. 5.
19. 18. The learned Standing Counsel Sri Upadhya sought to justify the order of the Appellate Authority on a new ground which is not to be found in the judgment of the Appellate Authority. He submitted that in view of the provisions of S. 5(8) of the Ceiling Act, the order of the Appellate Authority is perfectly in accordance with law. Sec. 5(8) was introduced into the statute by U.P. Act No. XX of 1976 namely the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1976. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 2 of the Amending Act declared that it shall come into force on Oct. 10, 1975. Sec. 5 was substantially amended by S. 6 of the aforesaid Amending Act. Sub-cl. (8) was added to S. 5 by this Act, which is reproduced below:
Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-secs. (6) and (7) no tenure-holder shall transfer any land held by him during the continuance of proceedings for determination of surplus land in relation to such tenure-holder and every transfer made in contravention of this sub-section shall be void.
Explanation: For the purposes of this sub-section, proceedings for determination of surplus land shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of publication of notice under sub-sec. (2) of S. 9 and shall be deemed to have concluded on the date when an order in relation to such tenure-holder is passed under sub-sec. (1) of S. 11 or under sub-sec. (1) of S. 12, or as the case may be, under Section 13.
21. 20. It is well settled that a law is not deemed to be retrospective unless it is made expressly retrospective or is found by the court to be retrospective by necessary intendment. Nothing has been shown to indicate to the court’s satisfaction that by necessary intendment the law was made retrospective, when sub-section (8) was added to the statute. The learned Standing Counsel also submits that by virtue of the Explanation to Section 5(8) the proceedings for determination of surplus land shall be deemed to commence on the date of the publication of notice under sub-sec. (2) of S. 9.
23. Sec. 5(8) is clearly prospective on the explanation of the Supreme Court reported in (1977) 1 SCC 340 : (AIR 1976 SC 1654) State of Haryana v. Chaman Mal. In that case in para. 37 it was observed that the Supreme Court could permit arguments to be addressed when certain changes had taken place in the Central Act in question. That case is no authority for the proposition that is sought to be advanced by the learned Standing Counsel Courts of law do take into account changes in the law when it is necessary to do so in pending matters. The language of S. 5(8) is not such as would justify the upholding of an order of the Additional District Judge on the ground that he was only applying the law as it existed on the date on which he decided the appeal.
24. The rights of the parties had to be decided on the date of the notice under S. 10 of the Act and not on any subsequent date. The transfers which were valid under the proviso (b) to Section 5(6) have not been invalidated by the provisions of S. 5(8) of the Act.”
c) Om Prakash Agarwal Vs. First Additional District and Sessions Judge (Supra):
13. INTERPRETATION13. The U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1972 was enforced with effect from 8-6-1973. Therefore in view of the provision contained in sub-section (1), on and from 8-6-1973 a person who is a tenure-holder cannot hold land in excess of his ceiling area. In view of Explana-tion I to sub-section (1) all the land held by the tenure-holder has to be taken into account while determining his ceiling and surplus areas, irrespective of the fact whether the land is held by the tenure-holder in his own name or in the name of someone else fictitiously. While considering the question whether a land held ostensibly in the name of another person actually belongs to the tenure-holder, the rule of evidence prescribed in Explanation II to sub-section (1) has to be followed. This rule of evidence applies to the case where on or before 24-1-1971 a land was held by the tenure-holder but after this date it came to be recorded in the name of someone else although the tenure-holder continued to be in its possession by cultivating the same. This rule will apply also to the situation where the name of the tenure-holder is not completely obliterated from the records and alongwith his name the name of someone else too comes to be recorded. In both the situations the Prescribed Authoritity is required under this Explanation to presume that the land continues to be held by the tenure-holder who held it prior to 24-1-1971. This presumption is, however, rebuttable as is evident from the use of the words unless the contrary is proved to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority. Sub-section (6) contains extension of the principle contained in Explanation I. It provides for ignoring the sale deeds executed after 24-1-1971. However all sale deeds executed after this date are not to be ignored. Sale deeds which are not sham or fictitious have to be taken into account and the land conveyed by such deeds has to be excluded from the holding of the tenure-holder. This is so because of the provision contained in proviso (b) to sub-section (6). In view of the proviso the command contained in sub-section (6) for ignoring transfer effected after 24-1-1971 will not apply if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. The transfer is made in good faith;
2. It is made for adequate consideration;
3. It is made through an irrevocable instrument; that is, there should be a written document
4. The transaction of transfer is not Benami;
5. The transfer is not made for the immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other members of his family.
17. 18. In view of the above the following conditions should exist before the benefit of proviso (b) may be allowed to a tenure-holder in respect of sale effected by him:
1. The transfer is not effected to circumvent or avoid the provisions of the Act:
2. The transfer is effected through a written document;
3. The transfer is not gartuitous but is for consideration;
4. The consideration is adequate and not low;
5. After effecting the transfer the transferor completely divests himself of his interest in the land, including cultivatory possession;
6. The transfer is not designed in such a manner that the actual or substantial beneficiary thereunder is the transferor himself or the members of his family, whether immediately or at a future date;
7. The transfer is not effected solely for the purpose of converting land into cash.
20. The next question that requires consideration is whether the benefit of proviso (b) can be extended also to the transfers effected after 8-6-1973. Sri Umesh Chandra, learned Chief Standing Counsel submitted that since in view of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 5 the ceiling area is to be determined with reference to the date 8-6-1973, all transfers effected after this date will have to be treated as void. According to the learned counsel the title in the land becomes frozen crystallised on 8-6-1973 and on and from this date there can be no variation or change in the title and since the effect of transfer is change or variation in title, transfer itself becomes completely prohibited on and from 8-6-1973. In our opinion in view of the provision contained in sub-sec. (1) of section 5, the ceiling area is to be determined with reference to the person who is tenure-holder on 8-6-1973 which means that if the tenure-holder dies after 8-6-1973 leaving several heirs, the entire land held by such tenure-holder will be taken as the unit for determining the ceiling and surplus areas and not the individual shares inherited by the heirs. In other words, the succession will be ignored and for the purposes of the ceiling proceedings, the deceased tenure-holder will be treated as alive, although his heirs will be substituted and brought on record. But for the provision contained in Section 5(1), each heir could have claimed that the share inherited by him may be considered separately and out of this share land equivalent to his ceiling area may be left with him. The Act does not specifically provide for treating all tranfers effected after 8-6-1973 as void. If we accept the argument of the learned counsel we will have to read in the Act an implied provision for treating all transfers effected on and after 8-6-1973 as void. Such an implied provision cannot be read when the Act itself contains a specific date from which all the transfers are to be treated as void. This date is specified in sub-section (8) of Section 5. Under this sub-section no tenure-holder is entitled to transfer land during the continuance of proceedings for determination of surplus land. In the Explanation appended to the sub-section it has been explanied that proceedings for determination of surplus land shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of publication of notice under sub-section (2) of Section 9. This under sub-section (8) read with the Explanation the right to transfer land is taken away as soon as notice under Section 9(2) is published. In other words the right to transfer continues subject of course to the provisions contained in sub-section (6) upto the stage of publication of notice unde; Section 9(2). The consequences of a transfer made after the publication of the notice is also provided in sub-section (8) itself which says that such a transfer shall be void. In case we accept the argument of the learned Chief Standing Counsel there would be two dates from which the transfer of land will be prohibited, one specified date and the other implied date. When the Legislature itself has fixed a date for depriving a tenure-holder of his right to transfer land it is not possible for the courts to fix another date in addition to or in substitution of the said date. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the benefit of proviso (b) is available also to transfers effected between 8-6-1973 and the date on which notice under Section 9(2) is published. The view that we have taken herein was taken by B.N. Sapru, J. also in Km. Madhubala v. State af U.P., 1978 ALJ 1039. Contrary view were expressed by M.P. Mehrotra, J. in Jairam Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1978 AWC 624 and by Mufti, J. in Smt. Runwar Rani Sushila Devi v. State, 1978 ALJ 1099. For the reasons recorded hereinbefore we respectfully agree with the view expressed by brother Sapru, J. and regret our inability to agree with the view taken by our learned brethren Mehrotra and Mufti, JJ.
23. 24. From the above provision it is obvious that in determining ceiling area the family is treated as the unit and, therefore, all the land possessed by the members of the family as defined in the Act will have to be aggregated or clubbed together. The term family has been defined in clause (7) of Section 3 as follows:
family in relation to a tenure-holder, means himself or herself and his wife or her husband, as the case may be (other than a judicially sparated wife or hus-band), minor sons and minor daughters other than married daughters.
25. Under the above definition minor son, minor unmarried daughter, the tenure-holder and his or her spouse constitute tenure-holder’s family. As such the land held by the minor sons, minor unmarried daughters and the spouse is to be clubbed with the land of the tenure-holder for the purpose of determining the ceiling area of the tenure-holder. Thus in proceedings for determination of ceiling area a woman whose husband is a tenure-holder has no independent status as a tenure-holder. Her land is, therefore, clubbed with the land of her husband. The same is the position of a minor son and minor unmarried daughter whose father or mother is a tenure-holder. Therefore, where a husband and wife both are holders of a holding they together constitute one unit of tenure-holder. In this context the prohibition contained in sub-section (8) of Section 5 will apply also to a sale effected by a woman whose husband is also a tenure-holder. If the woman whose husband was a tenure-holder had not been excluded from the definition of tenure-holder under clause (17) of Section 3 the consequence would have been that under sub-section (3) of Section 5 her land could not have been clubbed with the land of her husband and being an independent tenure-holder her own land would also have been subjected to determination of ceiling and surplus areas. It is to avoid this situation that a woman whose husband is a tenure-holder has been excluded from the definition of the term tenure-holder given in the Act. We accordingly do not accept the contention of Sri S.P. Gupta that sub-section (8) of Section 5 does not apply to a sale effected by a woman. The learned counsel further contended that sub-seciion (8) was added to Section 5 of the Act through U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act 1976 (U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976) with effect from 10-10-1975 and therefore its provisions could not be invoked for invalidating the transfers effected prior thereto. Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Amending Act says that the Act shall be deemed to have come into force on October 10, 1975. Sub-section (8) was added through clause (d) of Section 6 of the Amending Act which is as follows:
(d) After sub-section (7), the following sub-section shall be inserted,:
(g)
From the above provisions it is apparent that the retroactivity given to sub-section (8) does not go beyond 10-10-1975. Another amendment was made through clause (a) of Section 6. With regard to this amendment it has been specifically provided by clause (a) that the same shall be deemed to have been substituted from [January 17, 1975. However no date earlier than 10th October 1975 has been provided in the Act for the addition of sub-section (8). Sri Gupta is therefore justified in saying that the transfers effected prior to 10-10-1975 will not be hit by sub-section (8) of Section 5.”
d) Ram Karan and 13 others Vs. State of U.P. (Supra):
“29. Next argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners while challenging the judgment and order dated 16.9.2002 (Annexure No. 1) passed by the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling)/additional Collector, Sitapur/opposite party no. 3 that admittedly Shri Vishwa Nath Singh the original tenure holder of the land in question (Plot nos. 377 and 382) executed the registered sale deed on 12.8.1959 in favour of Smt. Kamla Shukla, Smt. Ram Devi and on 18.8.1959 in favour of Smt. Prem Kumari, Smt. Karori Banerji, Sri Prakash Banerji and Smt. Sushma Kochar. Thereafter, the said land has been recorded in their favour as per litigations held under the provisions as provided U.P. Z.A. & L. R. Act, 1901, thus, they become tenure holder of the land in question i.e. plot nos. 382 and 377. Subsequently, the said persons sold the land by registered sale deeds executed on 27.11.1975 and 20.2.1981 respectively, so the finding given by the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling)/additional Collector, Sitapur/opposite party no. 3 that the said sale deeds are hit by the provisions of Section 5(6) of the Act, is incorrect because after the sale deeds executed by Shri Vishwa Nath Singh in the year 1959, he is not the tenure holder, so there is no justification or reason to issue the notice under Section 10(2) of the Act to him, so the action on the part of the respondent no. 3 to proceed and pass the judgment on the ground that the sale deed executed in favour of the petitioners between 1975 to 1981 by some other person to whom the land has been transferred by the registered sale deed and recorded in their favour is an action, contrary to the provisions of Section 5(6) of the Act, rather perverse in nature, contrary to the facts of the case when the said sale deeds are on record. In order to support his argument, Shri Brijesh Kumar Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the judgment given by Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (Dead) through L.Rs. (2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases 370, so liable to be set aside.
31. In order to decide the said argument, I feel appropriate to go through the relevant provisions as provided under sub-section 17 of Section 3 as well as Sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act, reproduced herein below:-
 tenure-holder means a person who is the holder of a holding but except in Chapter III does not include-
(a) a woman whose husband is a tenrue-holder;
(b) a minor child whose father or mother is a tenure holder;
Section 5(6)- in determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure-holder, any transfer of land made after the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared surplus land under this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into account.
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to-
(a) a transfer in favour of any person (including Government) referred to in sub-section (2):
(b) a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument not being a benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other members of his family.
Explanation I.- For the purposes of this sub-section, the expression transfer to land made after the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971, includes-
[(a) a declaration of a person as a co-tenure-holder made after the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971 in a suit or proceeding irrespective of whether such suit or proceeding was pending on or was instituted after the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971].
Explanation II-The burden of proving that a case falls within Clause (b) of the proviso shall rest with the party claiming its benefit.
32. The U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1972 was enforced with effect from 8-6-1973. Therefore, in view of the provision contained in sub-section 91), on and from 8-6-1973 a person who is a tenure holder cannot hold land in excess of his ceiling area. In view of Explanation I to sub-section (1) all the land held by the tenure-holder has to be taken into account while determining his ceiling and surplus areas, irrespective of the fact whether the land is held by the tenure-holder in his own name or in the name of someone else fictitiously. While considering the question whether a land held ostensibly in the name of another person actually belongs to the tenure-holder, the rule of evidence prescribed in Explanation II to sub-section (1) has to be followed. This rule of evidence applies to the case where on or before 24.1.1971 a land was held by the tenure-holder but after this date it came to be recorded in the name of someone else although the tenure-holder continued to be in its possession by cultivating the same. This rule will apply also to the situation where the name of the tenure-holder is not completely obliterated from the records and along with his name the name of someone else too comes to be recorded. In both the situations the Prescribed Authority is required under this Explanation to presume that the land continues to be held by the tenure-holder who held it prior to 24.1.1971. This presumption is, however, rebuttable as is evident from the use of the wrods unless the contrary is proved to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority. Sub-section (6) contains extension of the principle contained in Explanation I. It provides executed after this date are not to be ignored. Sale deeds which are not sham or fictitious have to be taken into account and the land conveyed by such deeds has to be excluded from the holding of the tenure-holder. This is so because of the provision contained in proviso (b) to sub-section (6), command for ignoring transfer effected after 21.1.1971 will not apply if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. The transfer is made in good faith;
2. It is made for adequate consideration;
3. It is made through an irrevocable instrument; that is, there should be a written document;
4. The transaction of transfer is not Benami;
36. Thus, it is mandatory on the part of the Prescribed Authority in the present case to determine that at the time of issuing a notice under Section 10(2) of the Act whether Shri Vishwa Nath Singh was the tenure holder in respect to land in question or Smt. Prem Kumari, Smt. Karori Banerji, Sri Prakash Banerji and Smt. Sushma Kochar and Smt. Kamla Shukla and Smt. Ram Devi were the tenure holders by virtue of the sale deed executed in their favour on 18.8.1959 and 12.8.1959. But admittedly the Prescribed Authority failed to discharge the said mandatory duty casted upon it, even the notice under Section 10(2) of the Act have not been issued to them. (See Ibrahim v. State of U.P. 1986 RR 138, Thakur Das v. State of U.P. 1987 RD 127 and Viresh Pratap Shah v. A.D.J., Basti, 2005 (98) RD 419), so the argument advanced by learned State Counsel with the aid of the provisions as provided under Sub-section 1 of Section 5 of the Act that the impugned order passed by the Prescribed Authority while adjudicating and deciding the dispute involved in the instant case after taking into consideration that the land belongs to Sri Vishwa Nath Singh and passing the impugned order is a correct exercise, has got no force, moreover, the Prescribed Authority also failed to consider while passing the impugned order that whether as per the definition as provided Subsection 17 of Section 3 of the Act Smt. Prem Kumari, Smt. Karori Banerji, Sri Prakash Banerji, Smt. Sushma Kochar, Smt. Kamla Shukla and Smt. Ram Devi are tenure holder of the land in question whose names are recorded in the revenue record as per the registered sale deed executed by Shri Vishwa Nath Singh in the year 1959 and as per the litigation taken place in the proceeding under Section 176 and Section 209 of the U.P. Z. A. & L. R. Act. So, it is necessary to issue notice under Section 10(2) of the Act to them.
37. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Om Prakash Agarwal v. First Addl. District and Sessions Judge 1981 AWC 775 after placing the reliance on the judgment given by Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Brijendra Singh v. State of U.P., 1981 AWC 125 in paragraph 16 and 17 held as under:-
Para 16 Once it is established by the transferring tenure holder that the transfer in question effected in the course of ordinary management of his affairs, was made for adequate consideration and he has genuinely absolutely and irrevocably divested himself of all right, tiltle and interest (including cultivatory possession) in the land in favour of the transferee the onus under Explanation II, in the absence of any circumstances, suggestive of collusion, or an intention or design to defraud or circumvesnt the Ceiling Act, on the tenure holder to show that the transfer was effected in good faith, will stand discharged, and it will not be necessary for the tenure-holder to prove further that the transfer was made for an impelling need or to raise money for meeting a pressing legal necessity. Although proof of the fact that a transfer was made for a valid pressing necessity, may highlight or strength the inference in favour of the genuineness of the transfer, it is not an indispensable constituent of good faith; nor is the proof of legal necessity requisite, as a matter of law, to enable a tenure-holder to avail of the benefit of clause (b) of proviso
Para 17 – In view of the above following conditions should exist before the benefit of proviso (b) may be allowed to a tenure-holder in respect of sale effected by him:-
1. The transfer is not effected to circumvent or avoid the provisions of the Act;
2. The transfer is effected through a written document;
3. The transfer is not gartuitous but is for consideration;
4. The consideration is adequate and not low;
5. After effecting the transfer the transferor completely divests himself of his interest in the land, including cultivatory possession.”
e) Pramod Kumar Vs. Additional Commissioner (Supra):
“9. The sale deeds executed after 24.1.1971 are to be ignored unless they are saved under clause (b) of sub-section (6) of Section 5. A reference in this regard may be made to the decision rendered in the case of Raghuvir Singh v. State of U.P., [1996 AWC 1380.] and Raghuvir Singh v. State of U.P.. [1979 ALJ Page 767.]
10. Sub-section 8 of Section 6 has been added in the statute by U.P. Imposition of Ceiling (Amendment) Act 1976 (Act No. XX of 1976) which came into force with effect from 10.10.1975. Thus all sale deeds relied upon by the petitioners i.e., dated 13.4.1973, 5.11.1974, 20.9.1975 were executed before the enactment and enforcement of sub-section (8) of Section 5. Therefore the said sale deeds cannot be said to be void in terms of sub-section (8) of Section 5. View taken to the contrary by the authorities below is thus manifestly erroneous, illegal. A reference in this regard may be made to the decision rendered by a Division Bench in the case of Om Prakash Agarwal v. A.D.J.. [1981 AWC 775.] It was thus obligatory upon the authority below to look into the validity or otherwise of the sale deeds in question before discarding the same. The authorities below committed an error which is apparent on the face of record in holding that the aforesaid sale deeds were void and were hit by sub-section (8) of Section 5.”
f) Municipality of Bhiwandi and Nizampur Vs. M/S Kailash Sizing Works (Supra):
“11. Section 167 of the Bombay District Municipal Act confers protection on the Municipality in respect of anything in good faith done or intended to be done. The expression done in good faith has been defined in the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 and in the General Clauses Act, to mean, done honestly, whether done negligently or not. The question therefore is, whether the Municipality, in the present case, can be said to have acted honestly.
12. In Jones v. Gordon [ 2 App Cas 616] Lord Blackburn pointed out the distinction between the case of a person who was honestly blundering and careless, and the case of a person who has acted not honestly. An authority is not acting honestly where an authority has a suspicion that there is something wrong and does not make further enquiries. Being aware of possible harm to others, and acting in spite thereof, is acting with reckless disregard of consequences. It is worse than negligence, for negligent action is that, the consequences of which, the law presumes to be present in the mind of the negligent person, whether actually it was there or not. This legal presumption is drawn through the well known hypothetical reasonable man. Reckless disregard of consequences and mala fides stand equal, where the actual state of mind of the actor is relevant. This is so in the eye of law, even if there might be variations in the degree of moral reproach deserved by recklessness and mala fides.
13. The Bombay, as also, the Central, General Clauses Acts, help only insofar as they lay down that negligence does not necessarily mean mala fides. Something more than negligence is necessary. But these Acts say honestly and so, for the interpretation of that word, we have explained the legal meanings above.”
g) Dwarka Nath Vs. Income Tax Officer and another (Supra):
“4. We shall first take the preliminary objection, for if we maintain it, no other question will arise for consideration. Article 226 of the Constitution reads:
every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
This article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression nature, for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with that of the English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the article itself. To say this is not to say that the High Courts can function arbitrarily under this Article. Some limitations are implicit in the article and others may be evolved to direct the article through defined channels. This interpretation has been accepted by this Court in Basappa v. Nagappa [(1962) 2 SCR 169] and Irani v. State of Madras [(1955) 1 SCR 250] .”
h) Rameshwar Vs. Jot Ram (Supra):
“8. In P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders [(1975) 1 SCC 770, 772 : AIR 1975 SC 1409, 1410] this Court dealt with the adjectival activism relating to post-institution circumstances. Two propositions were laid down. Firstly, it was held that [SCC p. 772, para 4]
it is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding.
This is an emphatic statement that the right of a party is determined by the facts as they exist on the date the action is instituted. Granting the presence of such facts, then he is entitled to its enforcement. Later developments cannot defeat his right because, as explained earlier, had the court found his facts to be true the day he sued he would have got his decree. The Court’s procedural delays cannot deprive him of legal justice or right crystallised in the initial cause of action. This position finds support in Bhajan Lal v. State of Punjab [(1971) 1 SCC 34] .”
i) Ramesh Kumar Vs. Kesho Ram (Supra):
“4. 6. The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a cautious cognizance of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief. In Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri [AIR 1941 FC 5 : 73 CLJ 51 : 53 MLW 373] Chief Justice Sir Maurice Gwyer observed: (AIR p. 6)
But, with regard to the question whether the court is entitled to take into account legislative changes since the decision under appeal was given, I desire to point out that the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States is the same as that which I think commends itself to all three members of this Court. In Patterson v. State of Alabama [(1934) 294 US 600] , Hughes C.J. said:
We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered.
And in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders [(1975) 1 SCC 770 : (1975) 3 SCR 958] Justice Krishna Iyer said : (SCC p. 772, para 4)
We feel the submissions devoid of substance. First about the jurisdiction and propriety vis-a-vis circumstances which come into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad.
These principles have since been reiterated and reaffirmed in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad [(1981) 3 SCC 103 : (1981) 3 SCR 605] .”
j) B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India (Supra):
“3. It deserves to be pointed out that the mere fact that there is no provision parallel to Article 142 relating to the High Courts, can be no ground to think that they have not to do complete justice, and if moulding of relief would do complete justice between the parties, the same cannot be ordered. Absence of provision like Article 142 is not material, according to me. This may be illustrated by pointing out that despite there being no provision in the Constitution parallel to Article 137 conferring power of review on the High Court, this Court held as early as 1961 in Shivdeo Singh case [Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909] that the High Courts too can exercise power of review, which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction. I would say that power to do complete justice also inheres in every court, not to speak of a court of plenary jurisdiction like a High Court. Of course, this power is not as wide as which this Court has under Article 142. That, however, is a different matter.
4. What has been stated above may be buttressed by putting the matter a little differently. The same is that in a case of a dismissal, Article 21 gets attracted, and, in view of the interdependence of fundamental rights, which concept was first accepted in the case commonly known as Bank Nationalisation case [Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248 : (1970) 3 SCR 530] , which thinking was extended to cases attracting Article 21 in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597] , the punishment/penalty awarded has to be reasonable; and if it be unreasonable, Article 14 would be violated. That Article 14 gets attracted in a case of disproportionate punishment was the view of this Court in Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P. [(1983) 2 SCC 442 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 342 : AIR 1983 SC 454] also. Now if Article 14 were to be violated, it cannot be doubted that a High Court can take care of the same by substituting, in appropriate cases, a punishment deemed reasonable by it.”
k) Jodhey and others Vs. State through Ram Sahai (Supra):
“10. To emphasise and to clarify the plenary nature of power of superintendence vested in the High Court the provision of law relating to it has been split up into four clauses. The first clause enunciates the general power of supervision given to High Court over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in rerelation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It is couched in a language which would vest the High Court with a power that is not fettered with any restriction and must embrace all aspects of the functions exercised by every Court and tribunal. On a proper interpretation of this clause it is difficult to my mind to hold that the powers of superintendence are confined only to administrative matters. There are no limits, fetters or restrictions placed on this power of superintendence in this Clause and the purpose of this Article seems to be to make the High Court the custodian of all justice within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction and to arm it with a weapon that could be wielded for the purpose of seeing that justice is meted out fairly and properly by the bodies mentioned therein. To fulfil this function it seems to me that the power of superintendence of the High Court over judicial matters is as necessary as over administrative matters. As a matter of fact judicial function of a Court is not less important than its administrative function. In fact it is more necessary to rectify lapses in judicial matters than defects in administrative matters. A judicial error might affect the rights, liberty and freedom of the subject whereas an administrative error might not do so. To my mind superintendence over judicial functions is a necessary complement of superintendence over administrative functions and it is sometimes very difficult to say where the one ends and the other begins. If the High Court is to perform this function efficiently and effectively, it must act on both sides, otherwise the very power of superintendence will be crippled and what has been achieved on the administrative side might be lost on the judicial side.”
l) RBF Rig Corporation, Mumbai Vs. Commissioner of Customs (Imports) (Supra):
“16. 21. In Dwarka Nath v. ITO [AIR 1966 SC 81] this Court pointed out that Article 226 is designedly couched in a wide language in order not to confine the power conferred by it only to the power to issue prerogative writs as understood in England, such wide language being used to enable the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found and to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country.
17. 22. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. I, para 89, it is stated that the purpose of an order of mandamus
89.Nature of mandamus. is to remedy defects of justice; and accordingly it will issue, to the end that justice may be done, in all cases where there is a specific legal right and no specific legal remedy for enforcing that right; and it may issue in cases where, although there is an alternative legal remedy, yet that mode of redress is less convenient, beneficial and effectual.
18. The High Court, in the present case, has moulded the relief in such a manner to meet out justice to an aggrieved person. It is not open to the subordinate Tribunal to examine whether a direction issued by the High Court under its writ powers was correct and refuse to carry it out as such amounts to denial of justice and destroys the principle of hierarchy of courts in the administration of justice. 24. This Court in Bishnu Ram Borah v. Parag Saikia [(1984) 2 SCC 488] has held: (SCC pp. 496-97, para 11)
11. It is regrettable that the Board of Revenue failed to realise that like any other subordinate tribunal, it was subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Just as the judgments and orders of the Supreme Court have to be faithfully obeyed and carried out throughout the territory of India under Article 142 of the Constitution, so should be the judgments and orders of the High Court by all inferior courts and tribunals subject to their supervisory jurisdiction within the State under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. We cannot but deprecate the action of the Board of Revenue in refusing to carry out the directions of the High Court. In Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. ITO [AIR 1961 SC 182 : (1961) 1 SCR 474] the Income Tax Officer had virtually refused to carry out the clear and unambiguous directions which a superior tribunal like the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal had given to him by its final order in exercise of its appellate powers in respect of an order of assessment made by him. The Court held that such refusal was in effect a denial of justice and is furthermore destructive of one of the basic principles in the administration of justice based as it is in this country on the hierarchy of courts. The facts of the present case are more or less similar and we would have allowed the matter to rest at that but unfortunately the judgment of the High Court directing the issue of a writ of mandamus for the grant of a liquor licence to Respondents 1 and 2 cannot be sustained.
”
m) Ramesh Chandra Sankla etc. Vs. Vikram Cement etc. (Supra):
“80. Now, it is well settled that jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 is discretionary and equitable. Before more than half a century, the High Court of Allahabad in the leading case of Jodhey v. State [AIR 1952 All 788] observed: (AIR p. 792, para 10)
10. There are no limits, fetters or restrictions placed on this power of superintendence in this clause and the purpose of this article seems to be to make the High Court the custodian of all justice within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction and to arm it with a weapon that could be wielded for the purpose of seeing that justice is meted out fairly and properly by the bodies mentioned therein.
(emphasis supplied)
82. 92. In Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal [(2002) 1 SCC 100 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 97] , dealing with an order passed by the High Court setting aside an order of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, this Court stated: (SCC p. 106, para 12)
12. Time and again this Court has reminded that the power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is to advance justice and not to thwart it (vide State of U.P.v. District Judge, Unnao [(1984) 2 SCC 673 : AIR 1984 SC 1401] ). The very purpose of such constitutional powers being conferred on the High Courts is that no man should be subjected to injustice by violating the law. The lookout of the High Court is, therefore, not merely to pick out any error of law through an academic angle but to see whether injustice has resulted on account of any erroneous interpretation of law. If justice became the by-product of an erroneous view of law the High Court is not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting the error of law.
n) K.B. Ramchandra Raje Ors. (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. State of Karnataka and ors. (Supra):
“24. The acquisition under the 1903 Act and the allotment of 55 acres of land to Respondent 28 having been found to be contrary to law consequential orders of handing over of possession of the entire land should normally follow. However, in granting relief at the end of a protracted litigation, as in the present case, the Court cannot be unmindful of facts and events that may have occurred during the pendency of the litigation. It may, at times, become necessary to balance the equities having regard to the fact situation and accordingly mould the relief(s). How the relief is to be moulded, in the light of all the relevant facts, essentially lies in the realm of the discretion of the courts whose ultimate duty is to uphold and further the mandate of law. If the issue is viewed from the aforesaid perspective the several decisions cited on behalf of the respondents in this regard, particularly by Respondent 28 i.e. Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory [Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory, (2005) 13 SCC 477] , U.G. Hospitals (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana [U.G. Hospitals (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2011) 14 SCC 354 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 959] , Gaiv Dinshaw Irani v. Tehmtan Irani [Gaiv Dinshaw Irani v. Tehmtan Irani, (2014) 8 SCC 294 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 318] and Bhimandas Ambwani v. Delhi Power Co. Ltd. [Bhimandas Ambwani v. Delhi Power Co. Ltd., (2013) 14 SCC 195 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 448] can at best indicate the manner of exercise of the judicial discretion in the facts surrounding the particular cases in question.”
39. From the pleadings exchanged between the parties, the material brought on record and the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, the principal question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to whether the Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate authority have determined the ceiling area of the petitioner in accordance with the mandatory provisions of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, particularly Section 4-A thereof, and whether the impugned orders suffer from perversity, inconsistency of reasoning, non-consideration of material evidence and manifest illegality warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
40. This Court finds that the entire controversy centres around the classification of the land in question as irrigated or unirrigated and the consequent determination of ceiling surplus area. The record unmistakably demonstrates that while computing the permissible ceiling area of the petitioner, the authorities have treated the land as irrigated so as to reduce the ceiling entitlement available to the petitioner, whereas while identifying the land to be declared surplus, the same holding has been treated as unirrigated so as to enlarge the surplus area. Such a self-contradictory approach strikes at the very root of fairness in quasi-judicial adjudication and renders the impugned determination arbitrary.
41. Section 4-A of the Act lays down a specific statutory mechanism for determination of irrigated land. The provision obligates the authority to examine khasra entries of the relevant faslis and undertake due verification including spot inspection so as to record a categorical finding regarding the source and availability of assured irrigation. The requirement is mandatory and not directory, inasmuch as classification of land directly affects the proprietary rights of a tenure holder and any deprivation of land under an expropriatory legislation must strictly conform to statutory safeguards.
42. In the case of Beni Ram Vs. State of U.P. (Supra), this Court categorically held that since the Ceiling Act is in the nature of expropriatory legislation, strict compliance with statutory requirements is imperative and the authorities must meticulously determine whether land is irrigated within the meaning of Section 4-A before declaring any area surplus. The ratio of the aforesaid judgment squarely applies to the facts of the present case. A perusal of the impugned orders reveals no meaningful discussion of the khasra entries, no proper appreciation of the consolidation records and no reasoned finding based upon statutory parameters.
43. The petitioner has specifically relied upon C.H. Form-41 and other consolidation records demonstrating that the land situated in Village Kather was recorded as unirrigated. The authorities have brushed aside this documentary evidence without assigning cogent reasons. It is settled law that omission to consider material evidence amounts to perversity in decision-making. A quasi-judicial order affecting substantive rights cannot be sustained when relevant evidence is ignored and conclusions are founded upon conjectures.
44. Equally unsustainable is the finding of the Prescribed Authority treating tank and Chora as valid and assured sources of irrigation. No material has been brought on record to establish that these sources fulfilled the statutory requirement contemplated under Section 4-A. The classification of land cannot rest upon assumptions or casual inferences. The burden lay upon the State authorities to establish with clarity that the land answered the statutory description of irrigated land. That burden has not been discharged.
45. The contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner regarding the bona fide transfer of land situated in Village Beb also merits acceptance. The sale deed dated 13.05.1974/14.05.1974 is a registered instrument and the material on record demonstrates that possession was delivered and mutation was effected in favour of the purchasers in the year 1975 itself. The appellate authority itself accepted the transaction to be bona fide.
46. In the case of Km. Madhubala Vs. State of U.P. (Supra), Om Prakash Agarwal Vs. First Additional District and Sessions Judge (Supra) and Pramod Kumar Vs. Additional Commissioner (Supra), it has been consistently held that transfers made after 24.01.1971 cannot automatically be ignored unless the authority records a finding that such transfer does not satisfy the conditions contemplated under proviso (b) to Section 5(6) of the Act. Once a transfer is shown to be genuine, for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument, the transferred land is liable to be excluded from the holding of the tenure holder.
47. In the present case, there is no finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority dislodging the genuineness of the transfer. On the contrary, the transaction having been accepted as bona fide, the inclusion of the said land in the petitioners holding was wholly impermissible. The authorities thus committed a manifest error of law apparent on the face of record.
48. The enhancement of declared surplus land from 4.74 acres to 5.54 acres in remand proceedings is another aspect which exposes the illegality of the proceedings. The appellate remand was confined to specific issues requiring reconsideration. The Prescribed Authority could not have travelled beyond the scope of remand so as to place the petitioner in a worse position in absence of any fresh material justifying such enhancement.
49. It is a settled principle that an authority acting pursuant to a remand order must strictly confine itself to the terms of remand. Any adjudication beyond the remitted issues is jurisdictionally unsustainable. The Prescribed Authority clearly misconstrued the remand directions and exercised jurisdiction not vested in it.
50. The appellate authority while affirming the order dated 05.11.1998 failed to independently examine these glaring legal infirmities. The order dated 30.03.1999 is conspicuously silent on the petitioners specific objections relating to inconsistent classification of land, non-compliance of Section 4-A and wrongful inclusion of transferred land. The appellate order, thus, suffers from non-application of mind and mechanical affirmance.
51. The submission of learned Standing Counsel regarding delay and laches does not persuade this Court. The writ petition was instituted challenging the consequential orders and during pendency of proceedings the petitioner sought amendment to challenge foundational remand orders as well. The challenge essentially pertains to a continuing illegality affecting the petitioners proprietary rights. Since the impugned orders are found to be ex facie contrary to statutory provisions, this Court cannot decline relief solely on technical considerations.
52. The law laid down in the case of Dwarka Nath Vs. Income Tax Officer (Supra), Jodhey Vs. State (Supra), RBF Rig Corporation Vs. Commissioner of Customs (Supra) and Ramesh Chandra Sankla Vs. Vikram Cement (Supra) unequivocally recognizes the plenary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 to reach injustice wherever found and to mould relief so as to advance substantial justice. Technical objections cannot override the constitutional obligation of this Court to correct patent illegality.
53. The objection of acquiescence raised by learned Standing Counsel is equally untenable. Participation in proceedings pursuant to a remand order cannot estop a litigant from questioning the legality of orders when the very proceedings culminate in an order passed in excess of jurisdiction and in violation of statutory mandate.
54. This Court is also mindful of the principle enunciated in the case of Rameshwar Vs. Jot Ram (Supra) and Ramesh Kumar Vs. Kesho Ram (Supra) that rights of parties are ordinarily to be adjudged as on the date of institution of proceedings, though relief may be moulded to meet the ends of justice. In the present case, subsequent developments do not dilute the petitioners accrued right to challenge orders vitiated by patent illegality.
55. Upon cumulative consideration of the entire material on record, this Court is satisfied that the Prescribed Authority failed to undertake the mandatory statutory exercise under Section 4-A; ignored relevant documentary evidence; adopted mutually destructive findings regarding nature of land; wrongly included land already transferred through a bona fide sale deed; and illegally enhanced the surplus area beyond the scope of remand. The appellate authority compounded these errors by mechanically affirming the illegal order.
56. The impugned orders, therefore, cannot be sustained in law. They suffer from arbitrariness, perversity, non-application of mind and violation of statutory provisions, thereby offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
57. Consequently, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed.
58. The impugned orders dated 18.02.1997/12.05.1997, the consequential order dated 05.11.1998 passed by the Prescribed Authority and the appellate order dated 30.03.1999 are hereby quashed.
59. The matter is remitted to the Prescribed Authority concerned for fresh determination strictly in accordance with law after affording adequate opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties and after specifically determining:
(i) the nature of land strictly in terms of Section 4-A of the Act on the basis of relevant khasra entries and spot verification;
(ii) the effect of the registered sale deed dated 13.05.1974/14.05.1974 in light of Section 5(6)(b) of the Act;
(iii) the petitioners permissible ceiling area after due consideration of all admissible documentary evidence.
60. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before the competent authority.
61. Till fresh decision is taken, status quo with regard to possession over the land in question shall be maintained.
62. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Irshad Ali,J.)
May 8, 2026
Adarsh K Singh
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