Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Syed Gouse Basha vs State Of Uttar on 22 April, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH : AMARAVATI
****
WRIT PETITION NO: 4684 OF 2026
Between:
1. SYED GOUSE BASHA, S/o. Syed Dastagir Basha, Aged about 55 years,
Occ Photo frame work Business,C/o. 11-1561 A.C. Bhavan, Muncipal
Complex, shop No.2, and 8,A.C Bomma Center, Near Vinayaka Hall Center
Nellore, S.P.S.R. Nellore District
...Petitioner
AND
1. THE STATE OF AP, Rep.by its Principal Secretary, Municipal
administration Urban Development Department, Secretariat Buildings at
Velagapudi, Amaravathi, Guntur District.
2. The Nellore Municipal Corporation, rep. by its Commissioner, Nellore,
S.P.S.R. Nellore District.
...Respondents
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 22.04.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G. RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers
may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes / No
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters / Journals? Yes / No
3. Whether His Lordship wish to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? Yes / No
______________________________________
GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD, J
2
* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA
PRASAD
+ WRIT PETITION NO: 4684 OF 2026
% 22.04.2026
Between:
1. SYED GOUSE BASHA, S/o. Syed Dastagir Basha, Aged about 55 years,
Occ Photo frame work Business,C/o. 11-1561 A.C. Bhavan, Muncipal
Complex, shop No.2, and 8,A.C Bomma Center, Near Vinayaka Hall Center
Nellore, S.P.S.R. Nellore District
...Petitioner
AND
1. THE STATE OF AP, Rep.by its Principal Secretary, Municipal
administration Urban Development Department, Secretariat Buildings at
Velagapudi, Amaravathi, Guntur District.
2. The Nellore Municipal Corporation, rep. by its Commissioner, Nellore,
S.P.S.R. Nellore District.
...Respondents
! Counsel for : Sri Sk. Iliyaz, learned Counsel for the Writ
Petitioner/s Petitioner
^ Counsel for : Sri S. Vijaya Kumar, learned Counsel appearing
Respondent/s on behalf of Sri A.S.C. Bose, learned Standing
Counsel for Municipal Corporations.
< Gist:
> Head Note:
4. ? Cases referred:
i. (2004) 10 SCC 665
ii. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1501
iii. (2006) 8 SCC 487
iv. (2010) 12 SCC 204
3
APHC010083442026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
WEDNESDAY,THE TWENTY SECOND DAY OF APRIL
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA
PRASAD
WRIT PETITION NO: 4684 OF 2026
Between:
1. SYED GOUSE BASHA, S/o. Syed Dastagir Basha, Aged about 55 years,
Occ Photo frame work Business,C/o. 11-1561 A.C. Bhavan, Muncipal
Complex, shop No.2, and 8,A.C Bomma Center, Near Vinayaka Hall Center
Nellore, S.P.S.R. Nellore District
...Petitioner
AND
1. THE STATE OF AP, Rep.by its Principal Secretary, Municipal
administration Urban Development Department, Secretariat Buildings at
Velagapudi, Amaravathi, Guntur District.
2. The Nellore Municipal Corporation, rep. by its Commissioner, Nellore,
S.P.S.R. Nellore District.
...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner: ILIYAZ SK
Counsel for the Respondents: GP MUNCIPAL ADMN AND URBAN DEV
AP
4
The Court made the following ORAL ORDER:
Heard Sri Sk. Iliyaz, learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner and Sri S.
Vijaya Kumar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri A.S.C. Bose,
learned Standing Counsel for Municipal Corporations.
2. Writ Petitioner has challenged the notice issued by the Respondent
Corporation dated 07.02.2026 (Ex.P.1). Learned Counsel for the Writ
Petitioner would also submit that Respondent No.2 has issued Trade Licence
dated 29.01.2026 (Ex.P.5) in favour of the Writ Petitioner and the Writ
Petitioner has been carrying on business in the present premises for the last
five years.
3. At the outset, Sri S. Vijaya Kumar, learned Counsel appearing on
behalf of Sri A.S.C. Bose, learned Standing Counsel for Municipal
Corporations has raised a preliminary objection that the Writ Petition is not
maintainable in the present form, inasmuch as the impugned notices are
issued to one Sri I. Vijaya Kumar and Sri M. Thirupathaiah, whereas the
present Writ Petitioner has nothing to do with the demand raised by the
Respondents against Sri I. Vijaya Kumar and Sri M. Thirupathaiah. He would
also contend that the Respondent No.2 has granted lease of Shops in favour
of Sri I. Vijaya Kumar and Sri M. Thirupathaiah but not the Writ Petitioner and
that the Respondent Corporation has raised a claim of Rs.7,30,430/- against
both the lessees but not the Writ Petitioner. He would also submit that the
Writ Petitioner has been illegally conducting the business from Shop No.2
(leased to Sri I. Vijaya Kumar) and Shop No.8 (leased to Sri M.
Thirupathaiah).
4. Sri S. Vijaya Kumar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri
A.S.C. Bose, learned Standing Counsel for Municipal Corporations would
submit that Sri I. Vijaya Kumar and Sri M. Thirupathaiah have illegally sub-
leased the Shop Nos.2 & 8 to the Writ Petitioner and that the Writ Petitioner
has no right to file the present Writ Petition.
5
5. Having considered these aspects, prima-facie, it appears that the
Writ Petitioner does not have any right to file the present Writ Petition against
the Official Respondent No.2, inasmuch as the Shop Nos.2 & 8 have been
leased in favour of Sri I.Vijaya Kumar and Sri M. Thirupathaiah respectively.
6. Admittedly, the Shop Nos.2 & 8 were leased-out by the Respondent
Corporation to Sri I. Vijaya Kumar and Sri M. Thirupathaiah respectively and
the Writ Petitioner has established the Glass and Photo frame works in both
the Shops jointly, probably under unauthorized and illegal sub-lease. In any
case, the impugned notices itself would indicate that they were issued to Sri I.
Vijaya Kumar and Sri M. Thirupathaiah. Therefore, this Court opines that the
lessees namely Sri I. Vijaya Kumar and Sri M. Thirupathaiah would be the
necessary parties, who cannot be left-out in the present Writ Petition. Despite
the fact that the lessees are invariably the necessary parties, the Writ
Petitioner has not chosen to array them in the Cause Title. Therefore, this
Writ Petition suffers from the vice of non-joinder of necessary parties. This
apart, the projection of Trade Licence in favour of the Writ Petitioner is of no
avail for seeking the present relief. Although the Writ Petitioner had not
placed any material on record to show whether the Writ Petitioner had been
paying any rents to the original lessees or not, nevertheless, it can be safely
assumed that the Writ Petitioner had been paying the rents/lease amounts to
the original lessees and that the said original lessees must have been
enjoying such rental proceeds without paying even the minimum lease amount
to the Corporation.
Non-joinder of Necessary Parties:
7. It is also settled law that non-joinder of necessary parties even in a
Writ Petition can lead to dismissal of the Writ Petition, inasmuch as the
litigants cannot be permitted to obtain Orders from the Writ Court with sinister
motives to execute such Orders against non-parties in the litigation by
projecting that the Order passed by the Writ Court is an Order in rem and not
an Order in personam. The view of this Court is fortified by the dictum of
6
Hon’ble Apex Court in Dattatreya and Others v. Mahaveer and Others : (2004)
10 SCC 665, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Para No.10 held as under :
“10. In the meantime, in the year 1985 an application in Form
I was given by the appellants for registration of occupancy
under the provisions of the Karnataka Certain Inams
Abolition Act, 1977. Since it remained pending and was not
decided, another writ petition was filed, namely, Writ Petition
No. 5495 of 1992 but the respondents were not impleaded
as parties to the said petition. It is true a direction was sought
for the Tribunal to dispose of the application moved by the
appellants in the year 1985 and the learned Single Judge
being uninformed about the earlier order passed by the
Tribunal in 1979 in respect of the same land on an
application in which both parties were represented, passed
the order for disposal of the application on merits. We,
however, feel that the learned Single Judge went wrong one-
sidedly in saying that it was incumbent upon the respondents
to have got the order reviewed or modified. By not
impleading the present respondents as parties in Writ
Petition No. 5495 of 1992 the appellants deprived the
respondents of an opportunity to challenge that order;
rather they were kept in the dark about the whole
proceeding. Any order to consider the application of the
appellants moved in 1985 was likely to affect the order
dated 3-7-1979 passed in favour of the respondents. The
appellants knew it, being parties in the earlier proceedings of
1974. The fact thus remains that the material facts were not
brought to the notice of the Court and the persons who were
ultimately to be affected were avoided to be impleaded as
parties. It was merely not a question of non-impleadment
of necessary parties technically and strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure rather was very much a question of proper
parties being there before the court particularly in
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The
argument tried to be raised otherwise is not tenable.
…………………………… The appellants cannot be allowed
to claim any bona fides in not impleading the respondents as
parties in that writ petition or about non-disclosure of the
earlier order dated 3-7-1979 in respect of the same land and
within their knowledge on the ground that it was not
necessary to disclose it. As observed earlier, they knew
well that if any order is passed in their favour the
respondents would be the affected persons. The
respondents were deprived from raising this point
before the learned Single Judge regarding a pre-existing
order relating to the same land and non-disclosure of
the same. The conduct of the appellants had been far
7from being fair if not fraudulent. It was a deliberate
suppression of material fact which caused prejudice to
the respondents. Fair play is the basic rule to seek relief
under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
8. In Avtar Singh Hit v. Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management
Committee and others (2006) 8 SCC 487, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Para
Nos.31 & 32 held as under :
“31. In our view no relief could have been granted to the writ
petitioners on account of the fact that the newly elected
office-bearers of the Executive Board, who would have been
affected by the decision of the writ petitions, were not
impleaded as party to the writ petitions. In Udit Narain Singh
Malpaharia v. Addl. Member, Board of Revenue [1963 Supp
(1) SCR 676 : AIR 1963 SC 786] it was observed that where
in a petition for a writ of certiorari made to the High Court,
only the tribunal whose order was sought to be quashed was
made a party but the persons who were parties before the
lower tribunal and in whose favour the impugned order was
passed were not joined as parties; the writ petition was
incompetent and had been rightly rejected by the High Court.
In Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P. [(1984) 4 SCC 251 : 1984
SCC (L&S) 704 : AIR 1985 SC 167] it was held: (SCC p.
256)
“A High Court ought not to hear and dispose of a
writ petition under Article 226 without the persons
who would be vitally affected by its judgment being
before it as respondents or at least some of them
being before it as respondents in a representative
capacity if their number is too large to join them as
respondents individually, and, if the petitioners
refuse to so join them, the High Court ought to
dismiss the petition for non-joinder of necessary
parties.”
32. In Ishwar Singh v. Kuldip Singh [1995 Supp (1)
SCC 179 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 373 : (1995) 29 ATC 144] it was
held that a writ petition challenging selection and
appointment to some posts without impleading the selected
candidates was not maintainable. This view has been
reiterated in Arun Tewari v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak
Sangh [(1998) 2 SCC 332 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 541 : AIR 1998
SC 331] .”
8
9. In Para No.9 of the Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Uttaranchal Public Service Commission v. Mamta Bisht : (2010) 12 SCC
204, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:
“9. In case Respondent 1 wanted her selection against the
reserved category vacancy, the last selected candidate in
that category was a necessary party and without impleading
her, the writ petition could not have been entertained by the
High Court in view of the law laid down by nearly a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Udit Narain Singh
Malpaharia v. Board of Revenue [AIR 1963 SC 786] ,
wherein the Court has explained the distinction between
necessary party, proper party and pro forma party and
further held that if a person who is likely to suffer from the
order of the court and has not been impleaded as a party has
a right to ignore the said order as it has been passed in
violation of the principles of natural justice. More so, proviso
to Order 1, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter called “CPC“) provides that non-joinder of
necessary party be fatal. Undoubtedly, provisions of CPC are
not applicable in writ jurisdiction by virtue of the provision of
Section 141 CPC but the principles enshrined therein are
applicable. (Vide Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of
Gujarat [AIR 1965 SC 1153] , Babubhai Muljibhai
Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot [(1974) 2 SCC 706 : AIR
1974 SC 2105] and Sarguja Transport
Service v. STAT [(1987) 1 SCC 5 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 19 : AIR
1987 SC 88] .)”
10. In Vishnu Vardhan alias Vishnu Pradhan vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1501, the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Para Nos. 43 to 46, 48 to 50 held as under :
“43. Although the provisions of the CPC do not apply to writ
proceedings ex proprio vigore, the principles flowing
therefrom, as far as practicable, can be made applicable.
Order I Rule 9, CPC, as originally enacted, ordained that a
suit shall not be defeated by reason of misjoinder or
nonjoinder of parties; however, after its amendment in 1976
introducing the proviso, the implication is that non-joinder of
a party could, in a given case, prove fatal for the right to relief
claimed by the plaintiff, more so when a necessary party is
not impleaded, and defeat the suit. Although Order I Rule 10
does empower a court to implead at any stage of the
proceedings a party who should have been joined as a
defendant, either upon or without the application of either
9party, a decree passed by the court in the absence of a
necessary or proper party to the suit and affecting his
interest could be avoided by such party; however, if the
decree is such that it acknowledges and declares the right of
the decree-holder to the subject matter of the suit and
entitles him to its benefits, such a decree has to be carried
either in appeal or review by the affected non-party to divest
the decree-holder of whatever the decree entitles him to.
44. Insofar as writ proceedings are concerned, it is no
longer res integra that any order made on a writ petition
affecting the interest of a party who has not been
arrayed as a respondent could be invalidated on the
ground of breach of natural justice.
45. We may profitably refer to the decision in Poonam v.
State of U.P.39 . Although the decision was rendered in
connection with a selection process for allotment of a fair
price shop, this Court after analysing various previous
decisions emphasised:
“21. We have referred to the aforesaid
passages as they state the basic principle
behind the doctrine of natural justice, that is,
no order should be passed behind the back of
a person who is to be adversely affected by
the order. The principle behind the proviso to
Order 1 Rule 9 that the Code of Civil
Procedure enjoins it and the said principle is
also applicable to the writs. An unsuccessful
candidate challenging the selection as far as
the service jurisprudence is concerned is
bound to make the selected candidates
parties.”
46. A reference may further be made to the decision in Ajay
Ishwar Ghute v. Meher K. Patel40 wherein a Bench of
twoJudges [of which one of us (Ujjal Bhuyan, J.) was a
member] in an appeal against an order made under Article
226 of the Constitution, held thus:
“21. In the facts of the case, the senior
district-level officials of the State had stated
on oath that the construction of the
compound wall, in respect of which relief
was sought in the Writ Petition, would affect
the rights of several third parties. However,
the Court completely ignored the same. Even
in clause 6(iii) of the “Minutes of Order”,
there was enough indication that the
compound wall, if not appropriately
10constructed, would affect the rights of
owners of the other lands. Therefore, it was
the duty of the Court to have called upon the
1st and 2nd respondents to implead the
persons who were likely to be affected. The
1st and 2nd respondents could not have
pleaded ignorance about the names of the
concerned parties as they have referred to
the owners of the other lands in the “Minutes
of Order”. However, the Division Bench of
the High Court has failed to make even an
elementary enquiry whether third parties will
be affected by the construction of the
compound wall under police protection.
Hence, the order dated 16th March 2022
passed in the Writ Petition in terms of the
“Minutes of Order” is entirely illegal and
must be set aside. The Writ Petition will have
to be remanded to the High Court to decide
the same in accordance with the law.”
47. xxx
48. However, it is clarified that we do not seek to make any
opprobrious remarks against the High Court as it was
incumbent upon Reddy to implead Vishnu and Sudhakar as
respondents in his writ petition and the High Court could not
have been expected to know the long-standing disputes or
the fact that Reddy had procured change in the revenue
records on the basis of the compromise decree whereupon
further proceedings between Vishnu and Reddy in the shape
of a suit were pending unless the same was brought to its
notice.
49. In any event, having regard to the events preceding
presentation of the writ petition by Reddy, out of which the
present proceedings have arisen, we have no hesitation to
hold that Reddy tailored a situation to suit his convenience
by not impleading Vishnu as a party with the sole intention of
obtaining an order in respect of not only the quantum of
compensation payable for acquisition of the subject land but
also a declaration as to his entitlement thereto – all, behind
Vishnu’s back. An attempt by Reddy to steal a march over
Vishnu is clearly discernible which, without reference to
anything more, does border on fraud.
50. Moving ahead, it is equally well settled that suppression
of even a single material fact can be fatal before writ courts.
In this context, one may usefully refer to the decision of this
Court in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of
Bihar42 where the law has succinctly been stated as follows:
11
“13. As a general rule, suppression of a material
fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from
obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved
out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant
from abusing the process of court by deceiving
it. But the suppressed fact must be a material
one in the sense that had it not been suppressed
it would have had an effect on the merits of the
case. It must be a matter which was material for
the consideration of the court, whatever view the
court may have taken ….”
(Emphasis Supplied)
11. In the aforesaid premise, the present Writ Petition is not
maintainable only at the behest of the Writ Petitioner, inasmuch as the Shop
Nos.2 & 8 were leased-out to Sri I. Vijaya Kumar and Sri M. Thirupathaiah but
not the Writ Petitioner herein. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is dismissed as
not maintainable in view of non-joinder of necessary parties. No Order as to
Costs.
12. Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand closed in terms of this order.
______________________________________
GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD, J
Dt: 22.04.2026
L.R Copy to be marked.
B/O : JKS
12
98
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD
WRIT PETITION No. 4684 OF 2026
22.04.2026
Note: L.R. Copy to be marked.
B/O : JKS
