Gujarat High Court
Manhar Sukhlalbhai Patel vs Vijay Mohanbhai Shah (Chopra) on 5 May, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.RA/632/2010 JUDGMENT DATED: 05/05/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION (AGAINST CONVICTION -
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT ACT) NO. 632 of 2010
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HASMUKH D. SUTHAR
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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MANHAR SUKHLALBHAI PATEL
Versus
VIJAY MOHANBHAI SHAH (CHOPRA) & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR NK MAJMUDAR(430) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR.MANHAR S PATEL(6275) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR.MRUDUL M BAROT(3750) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
MR ROHAN RAVAL, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 2
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HASMUKH D. SUTHAR
Date : 05/05/2026
JUDGMENT
1) By way of present revision application under Section 397 read with
Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short
“Cr.P.C“), the applicant has prayed for quashing and setting aside
of the judgment and order dated 22.11.2010 passed by learned
City Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad, in Criminal Appeal No. 227/2009
and confirm the order of conviction and sentence passed by
learned Metropolitan Magistrate, NI Act, Court No.2, Ahmedabad,
in Criminal Case No.50/2008, whereby learned JMFC has been
pleased to hold the applicant guilty for the offence punishable
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under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and
sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment of one year and fine of
Rs.5,000/-.
2) Heard Mr. N.K.Majmudar, learned counsel for the applicant –
complainant, Mr. Mrudul Barot, learned counsel for respondent
No.1 and Mr. Rohan Raval, learned APP for the respondent State.
3) Brief facts of the case are that, the accused having financial need
for business, demanded a loan of Rs. 4,70,000/- from the
complainant in the month of September-2003 and the accused
gave a promise to return the said amount within six months. So,
the complainant gave Rs.4,70,000/- to the accused and in order to
build trust in return, the accused wrote a promissory note to the
complainant. Thereafter, as the accused did not return the said
amount to the complainant within time limit and upon demand by
the complainant, the accused stated that he did not have sufficient
fund in his personal account and therefore, he issued a cheque
dated 4/9/04 being cheque No. 409149 of Rs. 4,70,000/- from the
account of his proprietor firm Shri Bhavani Jewellers, Manekchowk
Co.O. Bank Ltd., Manek Chowk Branch and gave assurance that this
cheque would be honored. When the complainant deposited the
said cheque in the bank, due to insufficient balance in the
accused’s account, the said cheque was returned with a return
memo of “Today’s Opening Balance Insufficient” on 6/9/04 and the
complainant’s bank, Bank of Baroda, informed the complainant
about the same on 6/9/04. So the complainant through his lawyer
issued a notice to the accused on 20/9/04 by registered A.D. and
U.P.C., which notice was served on the accused. Pursuant to the
same, the accused gave a reply and did not return the money to
the complainant within the time limit. Therefore, the complainant
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filed a complaint against the accused under Section 138 of the Ni
Act, before learned Trial Court, in which learned Metropolitan
Magistrate has been pleased to hold the applicant guilty for the
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment
of one year and fine of Rs.5,000/-. The said order was assailed by
the accused before the learned Addl. Sessions Court, Ahmedabad
City by filing Criminal Appeal No. 2274/2009, in which learned
Addl. Sessions Judge has been pleased to set aside the order of
conviction and sentence and acquit the accused from the offence
under Section 138 of the NI Act vide order dated 22.11.2010.
4) Learned counsel for the applicant-complainant has submitted that
the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned lower
Appellate Court are illegal, perverse, and contrary to law. It is
contended that the findings recorded by the lower Appellate
Court are contrary to the oral as well as documentary evidence
produced on record before the learned Trial Court. It is further
submitted that the lower Appellate Court has exceeded its
jurisdiction by taking into consideration facts which were not
germane to the issues involved in the proceedings and by relying
upon extraneous considerations, which are impermissible while
adjudicating proceedings under the provisions of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881. Learned counsel has further argued that
the statutory notice was duly served at the correct address of the
accused and, therefore, the presumption of service under Section
27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 squarely applies. However, the
learned Sessions Judge failed to appreciate the said legal position
and erroneously concluded that there was no legally enforceable
debt. It is submitted that the learned Appellate Court committed a
grave error in disregarding the promissory note produced on
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record and in holding that, in the absence of corroborative
evidence, the legally enforceable debt was not proved. It is also
contended that the learned Appellate Court accepted the
submissions advanced on behalf of the accused regarding the
financial capacity of the complainant without properly
appreciating the evidence available on record. Once the execution
of the cheque and the signature thereon are admitted or not
specifically denied, the statutory presumptions under Sections 118
and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are required to be
drawn in favour of the complainant. In the present case, the
accused not only failed to deny the signature on the cheque but
also examined witnesses in defence. Furthermore, the Talati
examined before the Trial Court supported the case of the
complainant by deposing that the complainant possessed
agricultural land situated at village Nanasara, thereby
substantiating the financial capacity of the complainant to advance
the amount in question. It is submitted that merely because the
said amount was not reflected in the income-tax returns of the
complainant, the same could not have been made the sole ground
for reversing the well-reasoned findings recorded by the learned
Trial Court. According to the applicant, the reasons assigned by the
learned Addl. Sessions Judge are contrary to the settled principles
governing proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act and,
therefore, the impugned judgment and order deserve to be
quashed and set aside.
5) Learned counsel for respondent No.1 – accused has opposed the
present revision application and submitted that the learned Addl.
Sessions Judge has not committed any error in acquitting the
accused, as the complainant failed to establish the existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability. It is contended that the
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burden initially lies upon the complainant to prove the
foundational facts of the transaction. It is further submitted that
the statutory notice was not duly served upon the accused and,
despite the same, the learned Trial Court erroneously convicted
the accused without proper appreciation of the oral and
documentary evidence available on record. According to the
respondent, the learned Addl. Sessions Court has rightly re-
appreciated the evidence and validly reversed the order of
conviction passed by the Trial Court. Learned counsel has also
pointed out that no corresponding entry regarding the alleged
loan transaction was reflected in the income-tax returns of the
complainant. It is submitted that the complainant himself
admitted that his annual income for the financial year 2003-2004
was approximately Rs.1,42,500/- and for the financial year 2004-
2005 was approximately Rs.1,35,500/-. In support of the said
contention, an officer from the Income Tax Department, namely
Mukesh, was examined before the Court. It is further argued that
the cheque in question was not issued towards discharge of any
legally enforceable debt, but was handed over to the complainant
for a limited purpose when the wife of the accused intended to
travel to London and required proof of financial balance.
According to the respondent, the said cheque was subsequently
misused by the complainant. It is also contended that the
handwriting appearing on the promissory note is not that of the
accused. Learned counsel has therefore submitted that the
learned Sessions Court has properly appreciated the evidence on
record and has rightly accepted the probable defence raised by the
accused on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. In
view of the aforesaid submissions, it is prayed that the present
revision application being devoid of merits deserves to be
dismissed.
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6) Mr. Barot, learned counsel for the accused has relied on the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahabir &
Ors. Vs. The State of Haryana, reported in 2025 INSC 120 and
argued that this Court has not power to convert acquittal into
conviction and requested to remit back the matter to decide
afresh.
7) Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and
perusing the material placed on record, it is worth to mention that
here in the case on hand, learned Trial Court has convicted the
accused and the same was assailed before the learned Addl.
Sessions Court, wherein, learned Addl. Sessions Court has
overturned the findings of learned trial Court and set aside the
conviction. It is duty of the lower appellate Court while deciding
the appeal, reasons assigned by the learned trial Court is required
to be considered based on the evidence before the Court and
credibility of the witnesses has to be adjudicated by the appellate
Court in drawing inference from the proved and admitted facts.
Reference is required to be made on the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Padam Singh Vs. State of U.P,
reported in AIR 2000 SC 361. Herein in the case on hand, learned
Sessions Court has not examined the reasons assigned by the
learned Trial Court as to whether the same are consonance with
the evidence produced on record or not and simply accepted the
arguments canvassed by learned counsel for the accused.
8) This Court has carefully perused and scrutinized the evidence
produced on record and has also examined the reasons assigned
by the learned Sessions Court while overturning the findings
recorded by the learned Trial Court. This Court has further re-
appreciated the evidence and the findings arrived at by the
learned Trial Court while convicting the accused. In the present
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case, proceedings came to be initiated under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. According to the complainant,
the accused was in need of financial assistance and, therefore, in
September 2003, the complainant advanced an amount of
Rs.4,70,000/- in cash to the accused. It is the case of the
complainant that the accused assured repayment of the said
amount and, towards discharge of the said liability, issued cheque
No.409149 dated 04.09.2004 for an amount of Rs.4,70,000/- drawn
on Bhagyoday Co-operative Bank in his capacity as proprietor of
“Bhavani Jewellers.” The said cheque, when presented for
encashment on 06.09.2004, came to be dishonoured with the
endorsement “Insufficient Funds.” Thereafter, the complainant
issued a statutory notice dated 20.09.2004 through Registered
Post A.D. demanding payment of the cheque amount. Despite
service of notice, the accused failed to make payment within the
stipulated period and, therefore, the complainant instituted a
complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on
04.11.2004. Upon verification of the complaint, process came to be
issued against the accused.
9) The accused appeared before the Court and pleaded not guilty,
and therefore, the trial proceeded. In support of the complaint,
the complainant produced documentary as well as oral evidence,
including the complaint at Exhibit-3, the promissory note at
Exhibit-7, the cheque at Exhibit-8, the bank return memo at
Exhibit-9, copy of the statutory notice at Exhibit-10, postal receipt
at Exhibit-11, and correspondence with the postal authorities at
Exhibit-12. Thereafter, the statement of the accused under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded, wherein the
accused, by way of defence, stated that he had not executed the
promissory note and that the cheque in question had been handed
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over only for the purpose of showing bank balance, as the wife of
the complainant intended to travel to London, and that the said
cheque had subsequently been misused by the complainant. In
defence, the accused examined Income Tax Officer Mr. Mukesh
Solanki at Exhibit-16 and produced copies of income-tax returns at
Exhibit-17. The defence also examined the Talati of Nanasara
village at Exhibit-18 and produced revenue record Forms at
Exhibits 19 to 21. After appreciation of the aforesaid oral and
documentary evidence, the learned Trial Court held the accused
guilty for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act and sentenced him to undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of
Rs.5,000/-. It appears that no separate order awarding
compensation under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure came to be passed by the learned Trial Court.
10) Further, as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Prem Chand Vijay Kumar Vs. Yashpal Singh,
reportred in 2005 (4) SCC 417, the following facts are required to
be proved to successfully prosecute the drawer for an offence
under Section 138 of the Act:
(a) that the cheque was drawn for payment of an amount of money for
discharge of a debt/liability and the cheque was dishonoured;
(b) that the cheque was presented within the prescribed period;
(c) that the payee made a demand for payment of the money by giving a
notice in writing to the drawer within the stipulated period; and
(d) that the drawer failed to make the payment within 15 days of the
receipt of the notice.
11) At the outset, it is a settled position of law that once the execution
of a cheque is proved or admitted, a statutory presumption arises
under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,Page 8 of 16
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1881, that the cheque was issued towards discharge of a legally
enforceable debt or liability, unless the contrary is proved by the
accused. Therefore, the burden shifts upon the accused to rebut
the said presumption by raising a probable defence. In the present
case, the learned Trial Court, upon appreciation and analysis of the
oral as well as documentary evidence on record, arrived at the
conclusion that the accused had issued a cheque for an amount of
Rs.4,70,000/- in favour of the complainant and that the said
cheque was presented before the bank within the statutory period
of limitation. The cheque came to be dishonoured and thereafter
the statutory notice was duly issued and produced on record. As
discussed hereinabove, upon careful examination of the evidence
led before the learned Trial Court, it clearly emerges that the
accused has admitted his signature on the cheque in question,
though he has disputed the handwriting appearing in the body of
the cheque as well as the handwriting on the promissory note.
Once the signature on the cheque is admitted, the execution of
the cheque stands proved and the statutory presumption under
the Negotiable Instruments Act comes into operation. Merely
because the contents or body of the cheque were filled in by the
complainant would not, by itself, invalidate the cheque or lead to
an inference that there was no legally enforceable debt or liability.
In the absence of cogent evidence rebutting the statutory
presumption, such contention alone cannot be accepted as
sufficient to disbelieve the case of the complainant.
12) In the case on hand, once the signature is admitted by the accused,
as per the law laid down in the case of Kalamani Tex and Anr. Vs.
P. Balasubramanian, reported in (2021) 5 SCC 283, the Court
shall have to presume about legally enforceable debt under
Section 139 of the Act. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Rajesh
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Jain Vs. Ajay Singh reported in (2023) 10 SCC 148, held that as
per Section 139 of the Act, the word “until the contrary is proved”,
do not mean that the accused must necessarily prove the negative
that the instrument is not issued in discharge of any debt/liability,
rather the accused has the option to ask the court to consider the
non-existence of debt so probable that a prudent man ought
under the circumstances of the case, to act upon the supposition
that debt did not exist. Accused has voluntary signed the cheque.
Once voluntarily signed blank cheque leaf is handed over to the
complainant, there is presumption that the same was handed over
towards legally enforceable debt.
13) So far as dispute qua promissory note is concerned, learned trial
Court has compared handwriting also based on the admitted
signature on VP filed by the accused and other proceedings and
come to the conclusion that defense is not acceptable,
handwriting are same under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act
and the same is compared by learned trial Court as assigned
proper and valid reasons.
14) Further, in view of the Hitenbhai Parekh Vs. State of Gujarat,
Junagadh Power Project, reported in 2012 (2) GLR 1394, the
accused failed to rebut the statutory presumption and ld. Trial
Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the complainant is
succeeding in proving that the accused failed to prove that the
cheque is not issued towards legally enforceable debt. Hence,
merely denial the fact that he has not filled up the body of the
cheque is not a ground once admission of signature which proves
the execution. In this regard, reference is required to be made in
the case of Bir Singh Vs. Mukesh Kumar, reported in 2019 (4)
SCC 197, more particular paras 37 to 41.
15) If we consider the record, no such defence has been raised by the
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accused or no statutory reply to the notice has been given by the
accused. Hence, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant
reported in (2022) 6 SCC 735 and Kalamani Tex v. P.
Balasubramanian, reported in (2021) 5 SCC 283, the effect of
admission regarding the signature on the cheque is explained.
Once the signature is admitted, it is required to be presumed that
the cheque was issued towards consideration for a legally
enforceable debt. Further once, signature is accepted then cheque
was issued towards the security and it was signed. As per
explanation of legal position on how to rebut the presumption
under Section 139 of the NI Act and to raise the presumption
under Section 139 of the NI Act, the Hon’ble Apex court has clearly
explained in the case of Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh reported in
(2023) 10 SCC 148. Considering the aforesaid fact, presumption
under Section 118 of the NI Act, even if for the sake of argument it
is accepted that cheque was issued towards security, even then it
is not a piece of paper and is a valuable security and under Sections
87 and 20 of the NI Act gives the power to holder of the cheque to
complete inchoate instrument. Moreover, Sections 20 and 87 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act authorize the giver of the check to
fill the check. Therefore, the learned trial Court has not committed
any error. However, the ld. Sessions Judge has reached the
conclusion that the complainant could not prove his financial
capacity, which is contrary to the record. There is testimony from
the Income Tax Officer and the Income Tax return on record.
Additionally, the accused also has 10 acres of agricultural land. It is
not mandatory to show agricultural income in Income Tax, and
even if it is not shown, it cannot be said that there is no legally
debt.
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16) It appears that learned trial Court has properly appreciated the
evidence and exercised the jurisdiction as the cheque was
presented before the Bank and same came to be dishonored with
endorsement “funds insufficient”. Within the prescribed time limit,
the notice of demand was issued which was not properly replied to
by the accused pursuant to which the complaint was filed within
limitation.
17) If we peruse the record, it appears that the accused has produced
income tax returns and having 10 acres of agricultural land, which
is evident from Exhs:19 to 21. The learned trial Court has
considered the said fact and came to the conclusion that
approximately 10 acres of land owned by the accused which is in
joint ownership of family and there is no such mandatory law to
show the income of agricultural land is required to be shown in
income tax returns. For the sake of argument, it is accepted that
such income is not mentioned in the income tax, it does mean that
there does not exist any legally enforceable debt and there is
breach of provisions of Income Tax Act.
18) The accused has failed to rebut the presumption and to show that
the complainant does not have financial capacity. After giving the
check, a promissory note was also written. The defense of the
accused that the check was given for the wife to go to London is
not acceptable. If the check was given for that purpose, it would
not happen that the check is deposited in the complainant’s
account. Therefore, the defense of the accused is not acceptable.
If there is a violation of any Income Tax law, there is a separate law
for that in view of the judgment of Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.
Boarcar & Anr. and therefore, arguments canvassed by learned
counsel for the accused is not acceptable.
19) The learned Sessions Judge has recorded a finding that the
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statutory notice was not served upon the accused and, therefore,
no opportunity was afforded to him to make payment of the
cheque amount. However, this Court finds that the learned Trial
Court had properly appreciated the evidence on record and rightly
concluded that the address mentioned in the statutory notice was
the correct address of the accused. Significantly, the very same
address was furnished by the accused before the Court during the
proceedings. In such circumstances, the presumption of due
service under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would
clearly come into picture. It is well settled that when a notice is
dispatched to the correct address by registered post, service
thereof is presumed unless rebutted by cogent evidence. In this
regard, reliance may be placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed,
wherein it has been held that once a notice is sent to the correct
address, the presumption of service would arise and it would be
deemed to have been served upon the addressee. Despite the
aforesaid settled legal position, the learned Sessions Court
proceeded on the premise that the notice was not served and that
no opportunity had been given to the accused. This Court is of the
considered opinion that once the statutory notice was sent to the
correct address and the accused failed to respond to the same, the
presumption regarding service remained unrebutted. Further, the
accused also failed to probabilise his defence that the complainant
lacked the financial capacity to advance the amount in question.
Mere suggestions or bald assertions in that regard, without cogent
rebuttal evidence, would not be sufficient to dislodge the
statutory presumptions available in favour of the complainant
under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
20) In this regard, reference is required to be made on the decision of
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the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tedhi Singh (supra),
wherein in paras 9 and 10, it has been held as under:-
“9. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have noted that in
the case under Section 138 of the N. I. Act the complainant need not show
in the first instance that he had the capacity. The proceedings under
Section 138 of the N. I. Act is not a civil suit. At the time, when the
complainant gives his evidence, unless a case is set up in the reply notice to
the statutory notice sent, that the complainant did not have the
wherewithal, it cannot be expected of the complainant to initially lead
evidence to show that he had the financial capacity. To that extent the
Courts in our view were right in holding on those lines. However, the
accused has the right to demonstrate that the complainant in a particular
case did not have the capacity and therefore, the case of the accused is
acceptable which he can do by producing independent materials, namely,
by examining his witnesses and producing documents. It is also open to
him to establish the very same aspect by pointing to the materials
produced by the complainant himself. He can further, more importantly,
achieve this result through the cross examination of the witnesses of the
complainant. Ultimately, it becomes the duty of the Courts to consider
carefully and appreciate the totality of the evidence and then come to a
conclusion whether in the given case, the accused has shown that the case
of the complainant is in peril for the reason that the accused has
established a probable defence.”
10. We have gone through the nature of the evidence in this case. We
also bear in mind the fact that three Courts have held in favour of the
respondent. In this regard we bear in mind that though it is true that reply
notice was sent by the appellant, therein he admits the case of the
respondent that the parties were having a cordial relationship. In the reply
notice the appellant has not set up any case that the respondent did not
have the financial capacity to advance the loan. In fact even we notice
that there is no reference to the loss of the cheque book or signed cheque
leaf. No complaint was given of the loss of the cheque book or the signed
cheque leaf either to the police or to the bank. In the evidence of DW5, the
son of the appellant, the version given is that on 5.10.2011, PW5 had left
home with the cheque book of the appellant which had a cheque signed by
the appellant for withdrawing money, if needed in the absence of the
appellant. He set up the version that he drove away an unowned cow. in
the field. Thereafter, while sitting in the bus he saw the cheque book was
not with him. He further deposed that since his father was not at home he
could not tell him about the incident and got engrossed in his study
and forgot the incident. In his statement under Section 313 Cr.PC given on
10.01.2013, appellant has taken the stand that he informed the Bank. It is
relevant to notice that DW5 has further deposed that when the appellant
received the notice he asked him about the cheque book and then he told
him about the incident of the loss of cheque book. Still, at the time when
the reply notice was sent, the case is not set up about the loss of cheque
book and about the cheque relied upon by the respondent being one which
is brought into existence using the lost signed cheque leaf. We have
already noticed that there is no evidence to establish that the appellant
had informed the Bank about the loss of the cheque book containing blank
cheque. In fact, In the statement under Section 313 Cr.PC. appellant had
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stated that this cheque book containing a blank cheque was lost.
Appellant has no case that the signature on the cheque in question was
not put by him.”
In view of the above, notice is served, and no reply has been
given, then it required to be presumed that the cheque was issued
towards legally enforceable debt.
21) Perusing the reasons assigned by learned Session Court, ignoring
statutory presumption under Section 118 and 139 of the Act, in
absence of probable defense merely based on the arguments
canvassed by learned counsel that without verifying or re-
appreciating the evidence straightway accepted oral submissions
of the accused is not permissible under the Act and merely amount
was not mentioned in the Income Tax return as discussed in earlier
part does not mean that no legally enforceable debt does exist.
22) One more aspect which deserves consideration is that the offence
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is
compoundable in nature. During the course of hearing, this Court
granted sufficient opportunity to the parties to explore the
possibility of amicable settlement, particularly at the request of
the accused. However, despite ample opportunity having been
granted, the dispute could not be resolved as the parties were not
willing to arrive at any settlement. Therefore, in light of the object
under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and
having regard to the principles laid down in Sanjabij Tari v.
Kishore S. Boarcar & Anr., this Court is constrained to examine the
matter on merits.
23) Learned counsel appearing for the accused has contended that
this Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Sections
397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ought not to
interfere with an order of acquittal by re-appreciating the
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NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.RA/632/2010 JUDGMENT DATED: 05/05/2026
undefined
evidence. However, this Court is of the considered view that the
revisional jurisdiction can be exercised the findings recorded by
the lower appellate Court are found to be perverse, contrary to
the evidence on record, or based on an erroneous application of
settled principles of law. Here in the case on hand, the applicant is
able to demonstrate the manifest error in the perversity in the
findings and reasoning assigned by the learned Sessions Court. In
view of the same, there is no bar to allow revision application and
inference in revisional jurisdiction is required in the present case.
24) Since in the present case, the learned Sessions Court has not
properly appreciated the evidence and applied the settled legal
principles governing by presumption under Sections 118 and 139
of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
25) This Court is of the opinion that the impugned judgment and order
passed by the learned Sessions Court is perverse and warrants
interference.
26) For the foregoing reasons and observations, the present revision
application is partly allowed. The impugned judgment and order
dated 22.11.2010 passed by the learned City Sessions Judge,
Ahmedabad, in Criminal Appeal No.227 of 2009 is hereby quashed
and set aside. The matter is remanded to the concerned learned
Addl. Sessions Judge, who shall pass appropriate order in the
pending Criminal Appeal, in accordance with law, within a period of
two weeks from the date of receipt of this order.
(HASMUKH D. SUTHAR,J)
SUCHIT
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