Karnataka High Court
Sri B Dharamanna vs The State Of Karnataka on 21 April, 2026
Author: M.G.S. Kamal
Bench: M.G.S. Kamal
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF APRIL, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.G.S. KAMAL
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 95 OF 2013(C)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI B DHARAMANNA
S/O BEERANNA
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
VILLAGE ACCOUNTANT
HOLAVANAHALLI HOBLI
KORATAGERE TALUKD
R/A SIRA GATE
TUMKUR. SINCE DEAD BY LRS
1a) SMT. MANJULA S.D
W/O PURUSHOTHAM
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
R/AT EKANATHANAMMANA PALYA,
Digitally signed
by SUMA B N SIRA GATE, TUMKURU,
Location: HIGH KARNATAKA PIN CODE-572106.
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
1b) SMT. ROOPA S.D
W/O KANTHARAJU
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
R/AT MANJUNATH NILAYA
2ND CROSS, BASAVESHWARA LAYOUT
KYATHASANDRA, TUMKUR,
KARNATAKA PIN CODE-572 104.
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c) SMT. LATHA S.D
W/O DEEPAK T N
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS
R/AT LAKASHMINARASIMHASWAMY NILAYA,
NEW EXTENTION,
BEHIND ANJANEYA TEMPLE,
SRIRAMANAGARA TUMKUR,
KARNATAKA, PIN CODE-572101
1d) GAYATHRI S.D
W/O Y NAGANGOWD,
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
R/AT BEHIND RELIANCE TRENDS,
SIRAGATE, TUMKURU,
NORTHERN EXTENTION, KARNATAKA,
PIN CODE-572 106
2. SRI K SHANAKARANANDA
S/O K RAMANNA
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
HOLAVANAHALLI HOBLI
KORATAGERE TALUK
R/O SHIVA KRIPA
OPPOSITE CITY CLUB
SIRA GATE
TUMKUR
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. ARUN SHYAM M., SENIOR ADVOCATE A/W
SRI.SUYOG HERELE E., ADVOCATE)
AND:
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH LOKAYUKTHA POLICE, TUMKUR
REP BY SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BUILDING
BENGALURU - 560 001.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI.VENKATESH S. ARABATTI, SPL. COUNSEL)
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THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED U/S.374(2) CR.P.C
PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED:05.01.2013
PASSED BY THE II ADDL. DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
TUMKUR IN SPL.C.NO.18/2009 - CONVICTING THE
APPELANTS/ACCUSED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 7, 13(1)(d) &
13(2) OF PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988. AND THE
APPELLANTS/ACCUSED ARE SENTENCED TO UNDERGO R.I.
FOR 1 YEAR AND PAY FINE OF RS.5,000/- EACH IN DEFAULT
TO UNDERGO FURTHER IMPRISONMENT FOR 3 MONTHS EACH
FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 7 OF PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION
ACT, 1988. FURTHER APPELLANTS/ACCUSED ARE SENTENCED
TO UNDERGO RIGOROUS IMPRISONMENT FOR 3 YEARS AND
PAY FINE OF Rs.5,000/- IN DEFAULT TO UNDERGO FURTHER
IMPRISONMENT FOR 3 MONTHS EACH FOR THE OFFENCE U/S
13(1)(d) PUNISHABLE U/S 13(2) OF THE PREVENTION OF
CORRUPTION ACT, 1988.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR FURTHER HEARING, THIS
DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.G.S. KAMAL
ORAL JUDGMENT
This appeal is by accused Nos.1 and 2 being aggrieved by
the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed in
Special Case No.18/2009 on the file of II Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Tumkuru, by which the trial Court has passed
the following:
ORDER
A1 and 2 are convicted u/s 235(2) Cr.P.C for the offences
punishable u/s 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988.
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A1 and 2 are sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
1 year and pay fine of Rs.5,000/- each in default to undergo
further imprisonment for three months each for the offence
punishable u/s 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Further, A1 and 2 are sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for three years and pay fine of Rs.5,000/- in
default to undergo further imprisonment for three months each
for the offence u/s 13(1)(d) punishable u/s 13(2) of Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988.
Both sentences shall run concurrently.
The period of detention if any undergone by accused is to be
set off against the sentence of imprisonment.”
2. Case of the prosecution is that complainant namely
H.K.Ravikumar-PW5 had purchased 10 acres 18 guntas of land
in Sy.No.29 of Kurubarahalli from one Rangappa and others in
terms of deed of sale dated 02.11.2007 in the name of his
father D.Krishnaswamy-PW6. That a `J’ slip was sent from the
office of Sub-Registrar to the Office of Village Accountant,
Sompura through Tahsildar and Revenue Inspector. In this
regard, complainant-PW5 had met concerned Village
Accountant-accused No.1, who had protracted the matter.
Ultimately on 22.02.2008, accused No.1 had demanded a bribe
in a sum of Rs.10,000/- which after bargain was reduced to
Rs.7,500/-. Accused No.1 had assured that he would prepare
and forward the documents no sooner complainant-PW5 made
the payment of bribe amount.
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3. Complainant-PW5 not being ready to pay the bribe
amount had filed a complaint in this regard before the
lokayuktha police on 21.02.2008, pursuant to which a case in
Crime No.3/2008 was registered for the offences punishable
under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988. Further formalities of pre-trap mahazar
were conducted. Complainant-PW5 was instructed to go along
with shadow witness-PW3 to the office of the accused No.1 and
to pay the bribe amount only after demand made by the
accused No.1 and thereafter to give a signal. Accordingly on
21.02.2008 complainant-PW5, shadow witness-PW3 and the
father of the complainant-PW6 went to the office of accused
No.1. Accused No.1 after enquiring if the amount was brought
and on confirmation of the same, had directed the complainant-
PW5 to pay the same to the accused No.2 who in turn received
the bribe amount of Rs.7,500/- by directing the complainant-
PW5 to keep the same on the table. It is alleged thereafter
accused No.2 counted the amount and kept the same in his
shirt pocket. As such, accused Nos.1 and 2 have committed the
offences.
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4. After the investigation, charge sheet was filed. Since
accused denied the charges matter was set down for trial.
Prosecution examined eight witnesses as PW1 to PW8 and
exhibited 11 documents marked as Exhibits P1 to P11 and
marked 10 material objects as MOs.1 to 10. No evidence has
been led on behalf of the accused. After recording of the
statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C and on denial of the
incriminating evidence brought against the accused persons,
the trial Court framed the following points for its consideration:
“1) Whether valid sanction has been obtained to
prosecute the A1 and 2?
2) Whether prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt
that A1 & 2 being the public servants, at the relevant
point of time working respectively as village account &
revenue inspector at Holavanahalli circle, Koratagere
taluk and in order to change khata of land in Sy.No.29 of
Kurubarahalli to the name of complainant’s father, A1
demanded & received bribe of Rs.7,500/- through A2
and thereby A1 & 2 have committed the offence
punishable u/s 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act 1988?
3) Whether prosecution further proves beyond
reasonable doubt that on 21-02-2008 while working as
such public servants, A1 & 2 by corrupt or illegal means
and abusing their position as public servants received
illegal gratification of Rs.7,500/- from complainant and
thereby committed an offence of criminal misconduct
within the meaning of section 13(1)(d) punishable u/s
13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act 1988?
4) What order?”
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5. On appreciation of the evidence, the trial Court
answered point Nos.1 to 3 in the affirmative and consequently
passed the impugned order as noted above. Being aggrieved
the present appeal.
6. Sri.Arun Shyam M., learned Senior counsel appearing
for Sri.Suyog Herele, learned counsel for the
accused/appellants submits:
(a) that trial Court has grossly erred in passing the
impugned order without appreciating the serious lapses
and lacuna in the prosecution case, which if read in the
light of settled principles of law, should enure to the
benefit of the accused.
(b) that voice recorder which was sent by the
Investigating Officer through the complainant-PW5 has
not been seized and produced which amounts to
withholding of the material evidence and an adverse
inference to the case of the prosecution has to be
drawn.
(c) that according to the deposition of complainant-PW5,
the trap mahazar has been drawn in the police station
and not at the spot of the incident which vitiates the
entire case of the prosecution.
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(d) That there has been no demand either by accused
No.1 or accused No.2.
(e) Complainant-PW5 has deposed that he had kept the
money on the table of accused No.2 and he has not
spoken either about the demand or about accused No.2
keeping the money in his pocket.
(f) that it is only the shadow witness-PW3 who has
spoken about demand by accused No.1 and accused
No.2 which has not been corroborated.
(g) Trap witness-PW4 has spoken about he seeing the
money on the table of the accused No.2. He is also not
clear whether the mahazar was drawn at the police
station or at the spot.
(h) that the sanction order issued by PW7 cannot be
relied upon inasmuch as even according to PW7, he had
affixed the signature on the draft prepared by his clerk.
The said sanction order not only bears the signature of
PW7, but also signature of some other person, which
has not been proved and established by the prosecution.
(i) As per Ex.P7 the notice was received by the shadow
witness only on 22.02.2008. Whereas, his presence at
the spot is shown to be on 21.02.2008 instant.
(j) That the FIR was registered at 12.30 p.m. on
21.02.2008, which was sent to the Court at 13.00 hours
in a sealed cover which was received by the
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jurisdictional Court at 2.30 p.m. However, the pre-trap
panchanama indicate the process having commenced at
12.45 p.m. even before dispatching the FIR to the
jurisdictional Court.
(k) That the issue regarding validity or otherwise of the
sanction order could be raised even at the stage of
appeal.
(l) The irregularities in conducting the trap mahazar has
to be read in favour of the case of the accused persons.
(m) That PW4 in his deposition has deposed that he was
summoned to the police station at 11 a.m. on
21.02.2008 which is far ahead of even registering the
FIR. This gives rise to several questions with regard to
propriety of the very initiation of the proceedings.
Therefore, the manipulation, insertion and alteration of
the case of prosecution cannot be ruled out.
(n) He relies upon the following judgments in support of
his contentions:
1. NANJAPPA Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA- (2015)14 SCC 186.
2. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Vs. ASHOK KUMAR
AGGARWAL- (2014) 14 SCC 295
(1997) 7 SCC 622
4. AMEER JAN Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA-2000 SCC Online KAR
396
5. STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs AMEER JAN-(2007) 11 SCC 273
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6. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY LOKAYUKTHA POLICE TUMKUR Vs
S.I. AHAMED BASHA – 2012 SCC ONLINE KAR 5370
7. SRI. HANUMANTHAPPA Vs STATE OF KARNATAKA BY
LOKAYUKTHA POLICE MYSORE- 2012 SCC ONLINE KAR 5798
8. SURESH PRAKASH GAUTHAM Vs STATE OF UP IN CRIMINAL
MISC. BAIL APPLICATION NO.42264/2025 – ALLAHABAD HIGH
COURT
9. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. C. LASUMANAIK IN CRIMINAL
APPEL No. 100230/2015; DD: 22/06/2017
10. SRI GIRISHCHANDRA AND ANOTHER Vs. THE STATE BY
LOKYUKTHA POLICE, YADGIR, – ILR 2013 KAR 983.
11. BIJOY SINGH AND ANOTHER Vs. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA –
(2002) 9 SCC 147
12. ARJUN MARIK AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR – (1994)
SUPP (2)SCC 372
13. JITENDRA AND ANOTHER Vs. STATE OF M.P -(2004) 10 SCC
562.
14. ASHOK @ DANGRA JAISWAL Vs. STATE OF M.P – (2011) 5
SCC 123.
15. A. KARUNANITHI VS. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY
INSPECTOR OF POLICE- 2025 SCC Online SC 1677
16. SRI. CHANDRAKANTH REDDY CHATNALLI VS. THE STATE
OF KARNATAKA IN WPNO.200687/2025; DD DATE 23.09.2025
17. DILEEPBHAI NANUBHAI SANGHANI Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT
AND ANOTHER – 2025 SCC ONLINE SC 441.
and seeks for allowing of the appeal.
7. Sri.Venkatesh S. Arabatti, learned counsel appearing
for the prosecution submits:
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(a) that though the accused are entitled to raise the
issue with regard to validity of the sanction, they will
have to point out the requirement of “failure of justice”,
as contemplated under sub-Section (3) of Section 19.
Mere irregularity, errors and omissions cannot be
considered as “failure of justice”.
(b) Even if the sanction order contained a second
signature, the same is inconsequential as the accused
have failed to demonstrate any failure of justice having
caused to them.
(c) In terms of Section 461 of Cr.P.C, instances have
been listed which vitiates the proceedings in which
discrepancy as pointed out by learned counsel for the
accused with reference to depositions of PW3, PW4 and
PW5 of they assembling in the police station allegedly
prior to registration of the FIR is not a ground to vitiate
the proceedings.
(d) That the FIR has been registered at 12.30 p.m. the
same has been dispatched at 1.00 p.m. which is just
within 30 minutes of the registration. Witnesses have
been examined after expiry of over 4 years of
registration of FIR. Deposition indicating difference of
time of registration by 1 or 2 hours cannot be a ground
to accept the contention that the same vitiates the
proceedings.
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(e) That it is not the case of the accused that PW4 and
PW5 were never present at the spot of incident. Said
discrepancy if any cannot be the ground to grant any
favour to the accused. The discrepancy in Exhibit P7 in
mentioning the date as 22.02.2008 instead of
21.02.2008 cannot be a grave, it could be a human
error. Since the presence of PW4 at the spot is not being
disputed, error in mentioning the date would be of no
significance.
(f) Though PW5 complainant had only seen and spoken
about he keeping bribe amount on the table, the shadow
witness-PW3 has spoken about the next incident namely
accused No.2 taking the said amount, counting in his
hand and keeping the same in his pocket. Shadow
witness has spoken about both accused No.1 and
accused No.2 demanding the money.
(g) Though in the complaint allegation of demand was
attributed only to accused No.1, since demand by
accused No.2 has occurred at the time of payment of
amount, he has been arraigned as accused No.2, which
in the factual circumstances of the case is normal and
not uncommon and has to be read in a holistic manner
taking into consideration version of all the parties
involved during the trap mahazar and version of single
witness or person cannot be the criteria.
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(h) Read holistically, no error which could throw away
the case of prosecution is made out. The statement of
the accused recorded soon after the trap proceedings
indicate that no defence of thrusting of money is raised.
The money was recovered from the pocket of accused
No.2 and not from the table. That the instances of
accused No.1 demanding the money and directing the
complainant to hand over the same to accused No.2 and
accused No.2 thereafter confirming the amount having
been brought and receiving the money complies with the
requirement of proof of demand and receipt.
(i) Recovery of money from the pocket of accused No.2,
counting and keeping of which is spoken to by shadow
witness-PW3 satisfy the requirement of receipt of the
amount. Conjoint reading of these two factors fulfils the
elementary requirement of demand and proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
(j) The further circumstance in the nature of
Phenolphthalein solution test on accused No.2 turning
positive completes the chain of events. That the
documentary evidence indicate pendency of the work at
the end of accused Nos.1 and 2 which has neither been
disputed nor controverted. Thus the prosecution has
completed all chains of link in proving the guilt of the
accused.
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(k) The minor discrepancies, if any, shall not take away
the core of the prosecution.
(l) He relies upon the following judgments in support of
his contentions:
1.VINOD KUMAR Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB- (2015) 3 SCC 220
(1998) 4 SCC 517
3. H.N. RISHBUD AND ANR Vs. STATE OF DELHI- AIR 1955 SC
196 -(1954) 2 SCC 934
4. SYED AHMED Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA- (2012) 8 SCC 527 .
5. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH VS. VIRENDER KUMAR
TRIPATHI- (2009) 15 SCC 533
6. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS VS. RAJMANGAL RAM – (2014)
11 SCC 388
7.ASHOK TSHERING BHUTIA Vs. STATE OF SIKKIM- (2011) 4
SCC 402.
8.SONELAL TIWARI Vs. STATE OF M.P.,-(1998) 2 SCC 431
9.HAZARI LAL Vs. STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION)- (1980) 2
SCC 390.
10. M. NARSING RAO Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH -(2001)
1 SCC 691
11. P. SARANGAPANI (DEAD) THROUGH LR PAKA SAROJA V.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH IN CRL.A.NO. 2173/2011 DATED
21.09.2023
12. NEERAJ DUTTA V. STATE (GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI) -(2023)
4 SCC 731
13. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA VS. MAHESH G. JAIN -(2013) 8
SCC 119
14. STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE Vs. S.
SUBBEGOWDA-(2023) 17 SCC 699
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15. STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. T. NANJAPPA – AIR 2015 SC 3060
16. STATE BY POLICE INSPECTOR Vs. T. VENKATESH MURTHY-
AIR 2004 SC 5117
17. SITA SOREN Vs. UNION OF INDIA -(2024) 5 SCC 629
18. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY LOKAYUKTA Vs. C. CHAND SAHEB
– ILR 2007 KAR 1106
19. PRAKASH CHAND Vs. STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION) –
(1979) 3 SCC 90
and seeks for dismissal of the appeal.
8. Heard and perused the records.
9. Points that arise for consideration are:
“(1) Whether the prosecution has proved commission of
offence by accused Nos.1 and 2 by demanding and
accepting the bribe amount of Rs.7,500/- on 21.02.2008
at the office of revenue inspector of Holavanahalli?
(2) Whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the
accused notwithstanding the defence raised with regard
to validity or otherwise of the sanction order?”
DISSCUSION AND ANALYSIS:
10. According to the complainant-PW5, he had purchased
land in Sy.No.29 of Kurubarahalli in terms of deed of sale dated
02.11.2007 in the name of his father and a `J’ slip in this
regard was raised and forwarded from the office of Sub-
Registrar to the office of Village Accountant, Sompura. Accused
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No.1 was the Village Accountant at the relevant point in time.
There is no denial by the accused with regard to `J’ slip being
forwarded from the office of the Sub-Registrar to the office of
the accused. The line of questions/suggestions put forth on
behalf of the accused to PW7, the sanctioning authority,
indicate that a `J’ slip was indeed raised and forwarded to the
office of the accused, which was received on 21.01.2008.
Paragraph 5 of the cross-examination of PW7 is as under:
“5. ¤¦-4 ¦gÁ墣À°è ‘eÉ’ ¹è¥ï gÉ«£ÀÆå E£ïì¥ÉPÀÖgïgÀªÀgÀ ªÀÄÄAzÉ
vÁB21.01.2008 PÉÌ §A¢zÉ JAzÀÄ £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹zÁÝgÉ JAzÀgÉ ¸Àj.
¸ÁQë ‘eÉ’ ¹è¥ï vÁB07.01.2008 PÉÌ ¨sÀÆ«ÄPÉÃAzÀæPÉÌ §A¢zÀÄÝ
vÁB21.01.2008 gÀAzÀÄ ªÀÄÄåmÉõÀ£ï jf¸ÀÖgï£À°è £ÀªÀÄÆzÁVzÉ
JAzÀÄ £ÀÄrAiÀÄÄvÁÛgÉ. JA.M-7 gÀ ¥ÀÄl ¸ÀASÉå-1 gÀ°è F §UÉÎ
£ÀªÀÄÆzÀÄ EzÉ. vÁB21.01.2008 gÀAzÀÄ DPÉëÃ¥ÀuÉUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß PÉÆÃj
£ÉÆnøÀ£ÀÄß PÉÆnÖzÁÝgÉ. 22.02.2008 gÀ ªÀgÉUÉ vÀPÀgÁgÀÄ ¸À°è¸À®Ä
F §UÉÎ PÁ¯ÁªÀPÁ±À EvÀÄÛ JAzÀgÉ ¸Àj. AiÀiÁgÀÆ vÀPÀgÁgÀÄ ¸À°è¸ÀzÉÃ
EzÀÝ°è ªÀÄÄA¢£À £ÀqÀªÀ½PÉ DUÀÄvÀÛzÉ JAzÀgÉ ¸Àj.”
11. The aforesaid line of cross examination indicate
admission on the part of the accused of pendency of the work
at their end at the relevant point in time and the date as
alleged in the complaint.
12. Complainant -H.K.Ravikumar who is examined as
PW5 at paragraph 2 of his deposition has stated as under:
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“2. ನಂತರ ಾ ಗಳ , ಇ ೆಕ ಮತು ಾನು ೕ ೕ ಾ ಯ 1 ೆ
ಆ ೋ”ಯ ಆ#ೕ ಹ&ರ’ೆ( )ೋ*, ಅ ಂದ ಅ ಾಂತ, ನನ- ತಂ.ೆ ಮತು ಾನು
ಆ#ೕ ಒಳಗ0ೆ )ೋ.ಾಗ, 1 ೆ ಆ ೋ” ಇದು1, ಾನು ಲಂಚ ‘ೊಡಲು )ೋ.ಾಗ
ಅದನು- ಪಕ(ದ ರೂ6ನ ದ1 2 ೆ ಆ ೋ” ೆ ‘ೊಡ7ೇ’ೆಂದು )ೇ8ದ19ಂದ ಾನು
ಅ:ೌಂಟನು- ಅವರ >ೇಬ@ Aೕ ಟು Bಗ-@ ‘ೊ>ೆ ನು. ಅಷ ರ ಇ ೆಕ ಮತು
ಜನ ಬಂದರು. 2 ೆ ಆ ೋ” ೆ ಾನು ದುಡEನು- ‘ೊ>ೆ ೆಂದು )ೇ8.ಾಗ, ಇ ೆಕ
ತಮF ಪ9ಚಯ :ಾ ‘ೊಂಡು ‘ೆ6ಕ@ನ 2 ೆ ಆ ೋ”ಯ ‘ೈಯನು- HೊIೆ.ಾಗ
ಅದ’ೆ( “ಂJ ಕಲ ಬಂತು. ಅದನು- 7ಾಟ ೆ )ಾK Bೕ@ :ಾ ದರು. ಮು.:ಾ.3
9ಂದ 5 ಅವರ ‘ೈ HೊIೆಸುವMದ’ೆ( ಮುಂNೆ ಇದ1 ‘ೆ6ಕ@ ಮತು ಅವರ ಬಲ ೈ ಮತು
ಎಡ ೈ HೊIೆBದ ‘ೆ6ಕ@ ಅಷ ರ ಜನ PಾBQಾದ19ಂದ ಅ ಂದ ಾRೆSಾ
‘ೊರಟ ೆ ೆ ೆ ೕಷ ೆ )ೋ.ೆವM. ಅ ಎSಾ >ೈT :ಾ B ನನ- ಸU
Hೆ ೆದು’ೊಂಡರು”.
13. Though the said witness has spoken about he having
seen and he keeping the money on the table of accused No.2,
the fact of accused No.1 demanding the amount and upon the
instruction of accused No.1 he keeping the money on the table
of the accused No.2 has been reiterated in his cross-
examination and nothing has been elicited to discredit his
version to this extent.
14. Manjunath-PW3 is the shadow witness who had
accompanied the complainant-PW5, in his chief examination at
paragraph 2 has deposed as under:
“2. ಮXಾYಹ- ಸು:ಾರು 2 ಗಂ>ೆ ೆ .ೋ. ಾ 1ರ ‘ಾ9ನ ಇತರರು ಮತು ಾನು
)ೊಳವನಹ8Zಯ ಕಂ.ಾಯ ಕ[ೇ9 ಪಕ(ದ PÁgÀÄ ¤°è¹ .ೋ. ಾ 1, 5 ಮತು
– 18 –
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ನನ-ನು- ಒಳ ೆ ಕ8Bದರು . zÀÄqÀÄÝ vÀA¢¢ÝÃgÀ JAzÀÄ 1£Éà DgÉÆæ .ೋ ಾgÀನು-
‘ೇಳSಾ* ತಂ\.ೆ1ೕ ೆ ಎಂದು ಅವರು )ೇ8ದರು. ಆಗ ಅ:ೌಂಟನು- 2£Éà ಆ ೋ” ೆ
‘ೊಡ7ೇ’ೆಂದು 1£Éà ಆ ೋ” )ೇ8 ಕ8Bದರು. ಅ:ೌಂ] ತಂ\\1ೕರ ಎಂದು 2 ೆ
ಆ ೋ” ‘ೇ8ದ19ಂದ .ೋ. ಾ 1 Hೆ ೆದು’ೊಂಡು )ೋ*ದ1 ಹಣವನು- >ೇಬ@ AೕSೆ
ಇಡSಾ* 2£Éà ಅ ೋ” ಅದನು- Hೆ ೆದು’ೊಂಡು ಎ_B ತಮF Pೇ`ನ
ಇಟು ‘ೊಂಡರು. ನಂತರ ಆNೆ ಬಂದು .ೋ. ಾ 1 ತSೆ ‘ೆ ೆದು’ೊಂಡು ಸ ೆ-
:ಾಡSಾ* ಆ#ೕಸgïì ಒಳಗ0ೆ ಬಂದು ಪ9ಚಯ :ಾ ‘ೊಂಡು .ಾaವಣವನು-
ತQಾರು :ಾ B ಅದರ 2£Éà ಆ ೋ”ಯ ‘ೈಗಳನು- HೊIೆB.ಾ* ಅದ’ೆ( “ಂJ
ಕಲ ಬಂತು . ಅದನು- Bೕ ೆ ೆ )ಾK Bೕ@ :ಾ ದರು ಮು:ಾ `3 9ಂದ 5 ಅವರ ‘ೆ(
HೊIೆಸುವMದ’ೆ( ಮುಂNೆ ಇದ1 .ಾaವಣ ಮತು ಅವರ ಬಲ ೈ ಮತು ಎಡ’ೆ( HೊIೆBದ
.ಾaವಣ “.
15. Perusal of the aforesaid portion of deposition indicate
that even accused No.2 had demanded the bribe amount and
the same was kept on the table of accused No.2 who had
counted and kept in his pocket.
16. Narasimha Murthy-PW4 is the mahazar witness. He
has spoken about taking the money out of the pocket of the
accused No.2 and conducting of the further proceeding of the
trap mahazar. The said witness in the cross examination
though initially had stated that he had seen the bribe money on
the table of accused No.2, has thereafter voluntarily stated that
the bribe money was found in the pocket of accused No.2.
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17. The phenolphthalein test was conducted on accused
No.2. The test report indicate the bribe money having been
handled by the accused. To this extent prosecution has made
out its case.
18. However, the relevant submission of the learned
Senior counsel for the accused as noted above is with regard
to non seizure of voice recorder which according to him has
been deliberately withheld as if it had been produced would
have given the different version in favour of the accused.
Investigation Officer who has been examined in this regard in
his examination-in-chief has stated that in the mahazar
produced at Ex.P3 following is mentioned with regard to non-
seizure of voice recorder.
” ಾabೕ*ಕ ಪಂಚ ಾA ‘ಾಲದ ತcdಾe’ಾ9ಗಳ ¦gÁå¢UÉ ‘ೊf ದ1 Rಾg
ೇ’ಾಡhರನು- ಆ :ಾ ‘ೇಳSಾ* ಆ ೋ”ತರ ಮತು ¦gÁå¢ ನಡುRೆ >ಾaT
ಸಮಯದ ನ0ೆದ ಸಂ7ಾಷiೆ ಅಸjಷ Rಾ* ೆ’ಾkh ಆ*ರುವMದನು- ತcdಾe’ಾ9ಗಳ
ಎಲರ ಸಮlಮ )ಾK ‘ೇಳSಾ*, Hಾಂ&aಕ Hೊಂದ ೆmಂದSೊ ಮತು ¦gÁåದು.ಾರರು
ೆ’ಾkhರನು- ಆ :ಾ ದ ನಂತರ ಸು:ಾರು 20c6ಷ ತಮF ಬ8ಯ nೕ
ಇ9B’ೊಂ ದ19ಂದ )ೊರಗ0ೆ ಓ0ಾಡುವ Rಾಹನ ಶಬ1ಗಳ ಇತ ೆ ಜನಗಳ
:ಾತ ಾ ರುವMದು ಸ)ಾ .ಾಖSಾ*ರುತ.ೆ ಮತು ಆ ೋ”ತರ ಕ[ೇ9ಯ ಬಹಳ ಜನ
ಇದು1 ಅವರ ಗSಾ>ೆಯ ಅಸjಷ Rಾ* ೆ’ಾkh ಆ*ದ19ಂದ ಅದನು- ತcdಾe’ಾ9ಗಳ
ಅ:ಾನತುಪ B ‘ೊಂ ರುವM\ಲ.”
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19. Learned counsel for the accused relied upon the
judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of
State of Karnataka Vs C.Lasumanaik in Criminal Appeal
No.100230/2015 dated 22.06.2017 wherein the Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court at paragraph 15 has held that “the
defence of the accused that he never demanded the bribe
amount and it was forcibly thrusted into his hand by the
complainant himself and during the course of the proceeding it
has come on record that the accused insisted the Investigation
Officer to seize/produce the tape recorder, which will go to
prove his defence. It is his consistent case that had the
prosecution produced the tape recorder before the Court, it
would have been established that he never demanded the bribe
amount and therefore non production of the tape recorder also
taken away the opportunity of the defence to prove his
defence.” Referring to this observation of Co-ordinate Bench
of this Court and learned Senior counsel vehemently submitted,
even the instant case, had the prosecution produced the tape
recorder, it would have revealed the actual conversation that
had taken place between the complainant and the accused
persons. Perhaps to hide or shield this evidence, the
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prosecution has not produced the same which shall in any
event benefit the accused persons.
20. The aforesaid submission cannot be accepted for
the reason that in the case relied upon as noted above, a
specific defence had been set up by the accused persons that
they had insisted the Investigation Officer to seize and produce
a tape recorder which is not the case at hand. Further in the
said case they also had setup a defence of accused therein
forcibly thrusting the money into their hands which is absent in
the instant case. The statement of the accused persons
recorded at the time of trap mahazar in the instant case
indicate that no such defence has been raised by the accused
persons. In any event the prosecution in the mahazar at Ex.P3
provided the explanation for non-seizing of the tape recorder as
noted herein above. Therefore, non production of the tape
recorder in the instant case cannot be considered as a serious
consequence or withholding of the evidence by the prosecution.
21. The other ground raised is with regard to grant of
sanction. Learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the
Apex Court in the cases of Nanjappa Vs State of Karnataka,
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CBI Vs Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, Mansukhlal, Vithaldas
Chauhan Vs State of Gujarat, Ameer Jan Vs State of
Karnataka supra. The principles laid down in the said
judgments regarding accused being entitled to raise the issue
with regard to validity of the sanction even at the stage of
appeal cannot be disputed. The further principle laid down in
the said judgments with regard to requirement of application of
mind by the sanctioning authority also cannot be disputed. The
argument of learned Senior counsel for accused in the instant
case with reference to the sanction order is with reference to
the deposition of the PW7 found at paragraph 6 which read as
under:
“6. ಇನೂ- 30 \ನಗಳ ಅವe ಕIೆ\ಲRಾದರೂ ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟ , .ಾಖSಾ&ಗಳನು- ಪ9sೕ ಸ.ೆ
Qಾಂ&aಕRಾ* ಅtbೕಜ ಾ ಮಂಜೂ ಾ& ಆ.ೇಶ cೕ .ೆ1ೕ ೆ ಎಂದ ೆ ಸ9ಯಲ,
ಮಂಜೂ ಾ& ಆ.ೇಶ’ೆ( ಸU :ಾ ದ \ನದ Hಾ9ೕಖನು- ನಮೂ\B.ೆ1ೕ ೆ. ನಮF Bಬuಂ\
ತQಾ9Bದ ಕರಡನು- ಪ9sೕ B ಏ ಾದರೂ &ದು1ಪ ಇದ1 :ಾ B ಆ.ೇಶವನು-
)ೊರ ಸುHೇ ೆ. c”ನು- 5£ÀÄß vÁjÃRÄ 2-2-09 ಸU :ಾ zÉÝä ಎಂದ ೆ ¸Àj. EzÀPÉÌ £ÀªÀÄä
¹§âA¢ ¢£ÁAPÀ 3-2-09 ಸU :ಾ zÉÝä ಎಂದ ೆ ಾ ಅದು Qಾರ ಸU ಎಂದು ನನ ೆ ೊ&ಲ
ಎಂದು ನು ಯುHಾ ೆ. c”-5’ೆ( ಾನು 2-2-09 ‘ೆ( ಸU :ಾ ಲ ಎಂದ ೆ ಸ9ಯಲ, ಸದ9
ಆ.ೇಶ 3-2-09 ‘ೆ( ತQಾ ಾ*.ೆ ಎಂದ ೆ ಸ9ಯಲ, ಆದ ‘ಾರಣ ನಮF Bಬuಂ\ ನಮF ಸUಯ
ನಂತರ 3-2-09 ಎಂದು Hಾ9ೕಖನು- ನಮೂ\B.ಾ1 ೆ ಎಂದ ೆ ನನ ೆ ೊ&ಲ”.
22. Referring to the aforesaid deposition of PW7, learned
Senior counsel for the accused insisted that the witness himself
has admitted that he carried out the correction to the draft
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prepared by his staff member. He also pointed out the
ignorance pleaded by PW7 sanctioning authority with regard to
the second signature and the date 03.02.2009 would also
indicate that the said document could have been prepared by
someone other than the PW7. Reiterating the principles of law,
enunciated in the judgments relied upon by him, he submits
that the sanction order not meeting the requirement of law,
vitiate the entire proceedings. Anything done thereafter cannot
be countenanced.
23. Sri.Venkatesh Arabatti learned counsel for
respondent in response relied upon the judgment of the Apex
Court in the case of State of MP Vs Virendra Kumar Tripathi
reported in (2009) 15 SCC 533 and State of Bihar and
others Vs Rajmangal Ram reported in (2014)11 SCC 388.
Referring to paragraphs 8 to 12 in the case of Virendra Kumar
Tripathi, he submits unless the accused makes out a case of
“failure of justice” and in the absence of raising a specific
defence in this regard, any error as contemplated under
subsection (3) of Section 19 cannot result in reversal or altering
of the order of the trial Court.
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24. He also referred to judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of State of Maharashtra through CBI Vs Mahesh G.
Jain, reported in (2013) 8 SCC 119 wherein at paragraph 14,
the Apex Court referring to its earlier judgments has culled out
the principles governing the process of issuing the sanction
which is as under:
“14. From the aforesaid authorities the following principles
can be culled out:-
14.1 It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the
valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning authority
after being satisfied that a case for sanction has been made
out.
14.2 The sanction order may expressly show that the
sanctioning authority has perused the material placed before
him and, after consideration of the circumstances, has
granted sanction for prosecution.
14.3 The prosecution may prove by adducing the evidence
that the material was placed before the sanctioning authority
and his satisfaction was arrived at upon perusal of the
material placed before him.
14.4 Grant of sanction is only an administrative function and
the sanctioning authority is required to prima facie reach the
satisfaction that relevant facts would constitute the offence.
14.5 The adequacy of material placed before the sanctioning
authority cannot be gone into by the court as it does not sit
in appeal over the sanction order.
14.6 If the sanctioning authority has perused all the
materials placed before him and some of them have not
been proved that would not vitiate the order of sanction.
14.7 The order of sanction is a pre-requisite as it is intended
to provide a safeguard to public servant against frivolous and
vexatious litigants, but simultaneously an order of sanction
should not be construed in a pedantic manner and there
should not be a hyper-technical approach to test its validity.
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25. In the case of State of Bihar and others Vs
Rajmangal Ram, at paragraph 9 and 10, the Apex Court has
held as under:
“9. In the instant cases the High Court had interdicted the
criminal proceedings on the ground that the Law Department
was not the competent authority to accord sanction for the
prosecution of the respondents. Even assuming that the Law
Department was not competent, it was still necessary for the
High Court to reach the conclusion that a failure of justice has
been occasioned. Such a finding is conspicuously absent
rendering it difficult to sustain the impugned orders of the High
Court.
10. The High Court in both the cases had also come to the
conclusion that the sanction orders in question were passed
mechanically and without consideration of the relevant facts
and records. This was treated as an additional ground for
interference with the criminal proceedings registered against
the respondents. Having perused the relevant part of the
orders under challenge we do not think that the High Court
was justified in coming to the said findings at the stage when
the same were recorded. A more appropriate stage for
reaching the said conclusion would have been only after
evidence in the cases had been led on the issue in question.”
26. Thus from the aforesaid enunciation of law by the
Apex Court, it becomes clear that not every error or
discrepancy would make the sanction order nonest, but only
those which result in failure of justice. This also requires a
specific plea of defence to be raised by the accused before the
trial Court as found in the case of Virender Kumar supra.
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27. In the instant case, except paragraph 6 of the cross
examination extracted herein above, nothing is brought on
record to indicate that the error so pointed out has resulted in
any failure of justice to the accused persons. Heavy reliance
placed on the deposition of PW7 regarding he correcting the
draft, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the
respondent is misreading inasmuch as the said answer perhaps
was to a general question and not specifically to the sanction
order in the instant case. Therefore, the contention urged
regarding sanction order not being valid cannot be accepted.
28. As regards delay in registering the FIR and initiation
of the pre-trap mahazar proceedings even before dispatching of
the FIR to the jurisdictional Magistrate, learned Senior counsel
for accused relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of
this Court in the case of Girish Chandra and Another Vs The
State by Lokayuktha Police, Yadgir reported in ILR 2013
Kar 983, wherein the Division Bench of this Court at paragraph
9, 10 and 11 has held as under:
“9. Therefore, in all trap cases, it is just and necessary that
recording of complaint and submission of FIR to the
jurisdictional Court before embarking upon the protocol of raid
is mandatory. If this type of investigation by surprise raid in
trap cases is permitted, it would demoralize the public
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administration and the SHOs of Lokayuktha police stations
would tend to misuse the powers of investigation. It is therefore
necessary that the Director General of Police shall properly
educate all SHOs of Lokayuktha Police Stations in the State
about the legal requirements of investigation to be complied in
trap cases. Besides, written guidelines be laid down to be
followed in the protocol of investigation in a trap case. Non-
adherence to protocol of investigation by the investigating
officer should necessarily result in disciplinary action.
10. With regard to the question whether registration of FIR
should precede the investigation or that FIR could be registered
under the midst of the process of investigation would always
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In a
situation where an offence is committed right in the presence of
a police officer, it would be imprudent to insist that he should
rush to the police station to record the FIR. The police officer
should immediately act, like apprehending the accused, sending
the victim to medical treatment etc., and thereafter registration
of FIR would be an ideal investigation procedure. Otherwise, in
all other type of cases, registration of FIR is mandatory since an
FIR is to be sent to the Court at the earliest stage, so that no
manipulating and tampering of facts would be possible. If the
FIR is sent to the Court, all further investigation should
necessary be consistent with the FIR.
11. In the context of facts of the case on hand, the conduct of
investigation by surprise raid in the absence of FIR is untenable.
Accordingly, the substantial question of law formulated for
consideration is answered in the affirmative.”
29. The consequence of delay in filing the FIR has also
been dealt with by the Apex Court in the case of Arjun Marik
and others Vs State of Bihar reported in 1994 Supp (2)
SCC 372 wherein at paragraph 24 it has been held as under:
“24.The matter does not stop here. There is yet another
serious infirmity which further deepens the suspicion and casts
cloud on the credibility of the entire prosecution story and
which has also been lost sight of by the trial court as well as
the High Court and it is with regard to the sending of
occurrence report (FIR) to the Magistrate concerned on 22-7-
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1985 i.e. on the 3rd day of the occurrence. Section 157 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure mandates that if, from information
received or otherwise, an officer in charge of police station has
reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is
empowered under Section 156 to investigate, he shall
forthwith send a report of the same to the Magistrate
empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police
report. Section 157, CrPC thus in other words directs the
sending of the report forthwith i.e. without any delay and
immediately. Further, Section 159 CrPC envisages that on
receiving such report, the Magistrate may direct an
investigation or, if he thinks fit, to proceed at once or depute
any other Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to hold a
preliminary inquiry into the case in the manner provided in the
Code of Criminal Procedure. The forwarding of the occurrence
report is indispensable and absolute and it has to be forwarded
with earliest despatch which intention is implicit with the use
of the word “forthwith” occurring in Section 157, which means
promptly and without any undue delay. The purpose and
object is so obvious which is spelt out from the combined
reading of Sections 157 and 159 CrPC. It has the dual
purpose, firstly to avoid the possibility of improvement in the
prosecution story and introduction of any distorted version by
deliberations and consultation and secondly to enable the
Magistrate concerned to have a watch on the progress of the
investigation.”
30. The facts involved in the case of Girish Chandra
supra as seen at paragraph 11 extracted above was with regard
to the investigation by a surprise raid, in the absence of FIR,
which is not the case at hand. In the case of Bijoy Singh
supra, the incident had taken place on 25.08.1991 while the
FIR was registered and report received by the Magistrate on
27.08.1991.
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31. In the case of Arjun Marik, FIR had been registered
3 days after the incident.
32. It is under these circumstances, Division bench of
this Court and the Apex Court respectively in the said
judgments have held that delay in filing the FIR has to be
construed strictly and with caution.
33. FIR in the instant case produced at Exhibit P6
indicate that the same was registered at 12.30 p.m. on
21.02.2008 and was dispatched at 13 hours (1.00 p.m.) in a
sealed cover which has been received by the jurisdictional
Magistrate at 2.30 p.m. In other words, within 30 minutes from
the time of registration of FIR, the same has been dispatched.
This under no circumstance can be construed as deliberate and
inordinate delay, giving rise to any attempt of manipulation,
insertion, deletion, addition, as contended by the learned
Senior counsel for accused.
34. Learned Senior counsel for accused emphatically
submitted as against the registration of the FIR at 12.30 p.m.
witness-PW4 in his deposition has stated that he was
summoned and was present in the police station at 11 a.m. on
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21.02.2008. Whereas PW4 has stated that he was present at
the police station at about 12.45 p.m. He also referred to the
pre-trap panchanama at Ex.P2 wherein the proceedings stated
to have commenced at 12.45 p.m. Referring to these timings,
he submits that even before registration of FIR, PW4 was
summoned and even before dispatch of the FIR, proceedings
were initiated. However, he is unable to point out any
provisions of law which would adversely affect the credibility of
the prosecution even if the proceedings of pre-trap mahazar
were initiated after registration of the FIR and before the same
being received by the Magistrate. The precedents relied upon
by him would only indicate inordinate and unexplained delay in
the registration of FIR, which is not the case at hand as already
noted.
35. As regard the deposition of the witnesses of they
being present before the Investigating Officer between 11.00
a.m to 12.45 p.m., as pointed out by learned counsel for the
respondent, the said witnesses have spoken after 4 years of
the incident and human memory lapse cannot be ruled out. In
any event, the difference of the time is only of about 1 hour to
2 hours from the records and the oral evidence.
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36. As regards the wrong mentioning of the date in
Ex.P7, wherein the date of endorsement is shown as
22.02.2008.
37. Perusal of the said document Ex.P7 indicate that the
same was the communication issued by the Investigation
Officer to the Deputy Director, Department of Public
Instruction, Tumkur seeking to depute his staff having put in 10
years of service. The endorsement on the said document
indicate that one Manjunath, SDA was deputed as requested.
The said endorsement is dated 22.02.2008. The witness who
was deputed is one Manjunath who is the shadow witness
examined as PW3. There is no dispute of the fact that said
Manjunath was indeed working in the Department of Public
Instruction during the relevant point in time. It is also not in
dispute that said Manjunath was present during the entire trap
mahazar process. The said witness has supported the case of
the prosecution. Mere wrong mentioning of the date on the said
document, cannot have the effect of the very presence,
nonexistence of the said witness at the time of mahazar.
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38. In the case of Syed Ahmed Vs State of Karnataka
reported in (2012) 8 SCC 527, at paragraph 34, Apex Court
has answered the question, “what is a minor discrepancy”.
Paragraph 34 reads as under:
34. In our opinion, the discrepancy with regard to the attire of
Syed Ahmed, the Rs 10 currency note and the forensic
examination of the wallet are rather minor matters. What is a
minor discrepancy? This has been the subject-matter of
discussion in Abdul Nawaz v. State of W.B. and Jugendra Singh
After referring to a few earlier decisions of this Court, it was
held that a discrepancy would be minor if it did not affect the
substratum of the prosecution case or impact on the core issue.
In such an event, the minor discrepancy could be ignored.”
39. The points of discrepancy raised by learned counsel
for the accused in the process of registration of FIR and
conducting of the mahazar as noted above cannot but be
termed as a minor discrepancy not taking away the core and
substratum of the case of the prosecution. This in the light of
prosecution having proved and established demand of bribe by
accused No.1 and payment of the bribe amount by the
complainant-PW5 to the accused No.2.
40. This brings to the aspect of demand by accused No.2.
41. Learned counsel for the accused relied upon the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of A Karunanithi Vs
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The State represented by Inspector of Police reported in
2025 SCC online SC 1677 arising out of SLP (Crl.)No.9964 of
2019, which involved facts in the nature of demand by a Village
Administrator officer accused No.1 and a Village Assistant
accused No.2 and complainant approaching accused No.1 who
allegedly demanding Rs.500/- as a bribe and during the trap
accused No.1 instructing accused No.2 to collect the money.
And complainant handing over marked notes to accused No.2
who had counted and kept the same as directed by accused
No.1. The Apex Court at paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 18 of the
said judgment has held as under:
14. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Neeraj Datta v. State
(NCT of Delhi)2 has held that for recording a conviction under
Section 7 and Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, the
prosecution has to prove the demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification either by direct evidence which can be in the nature
of oral evidence or documentary evidence or circumstantial
evidence. In other words, to convict a person under the
aforesaid provision demand and acceptance of illegal gratification
is a sine qua non.
15. We first take up the case of A-2. It is no one’s case that A-2
ever demanded any illegal gratification. He undoubtedly
accepted the money on the directions of A-1 and kept the same
with him. So, there was no demand of illegal gratification on his
part. The demand made by A-1 cannot be attributed to A-2 as no
evidence was adduced which could establish that A-2 was a
habitual offender working in aid with A-1 or was facilitating A-1
in demanding and receiving illegal gratification. Accordingly, in
the absence of any allegation or evidence that A-2 demanded
bribe from the complainant or he was acting in connivence with
A-1, he cannot be prosecuted for the commission of the crime of
demanding and receiving illegal gratification.
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16. Admittedly, A-2 was not charged with the abetment of the
aforesaid crime. He had accepted the money on the direction of
A-1 only. He could have received the money innocently on the
direction of A-1 or he may have received it knowingly. Both the
views are possible. However, as no evidence was adduced to
prove that both of them have connived to demand and accept
the bribe, even if a fair trial may have been given to the A-2, it
cannot be said with any certainty that he was an accomplice to
the crime. Accordingly, in the absence of charge of abetment
and the proof of connivance between A-1 and A-2, we are of the
opinion that A-2 could not have been convicted.
18. Now, coming to the conviction of A-1. The evidence on
record amply proves that he demanded bribe from the
complainant not only once but twice, and thereafter when the
trap was laid. The bribe on his behalf was accepted by A-2. The
evidence proves that A-2 accepted the money on the dictates of
A-1. Therefore, both the ingredients of demand and receipt
stand duly proved against A-1. The evidence in this regard of
PW-1 and PW-2, despite some minor contradictions stand
unshaken. Therefore, in our opinion, his conviction as held by
the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is not liable to be
interfered with.”
42. The facts emanating in the present case are almost
identical to the facts involved in the said case. According to the
complaint in the instant case, the demand for bribe was made
by accused No.1. Complaint was filed specifically alleging the
demand being made by accused No.1. Trap was laid keeping in
mind the demand made by the accused No.1. Instruction was
given to pay the money only when the demand is made by
accused No.1. It so happens during the process accused No.1
on clarification about complainant-PW5 having brought the
bribe amount had instructed that the amount to be paid to the
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accused No.2 who was in the other room. Complainant-PW5 as
noted above has not spoken about demand being made by
accused No.2. He has also not seen accused No.2 counting and
keeping the money in his pocket. It is only PW3-shadow
witness has spoken about demand being made by accused No.2
and he picking up the money from the table, counting and
keeping the same in his pocket. Except PW3 shadow witness
speaking about the so called demand made by accused No.2,
there is no material evidence brought on record. In the cross
examination, the allegation of demand made by accused No.2
has been denied. Though the prosecution has brought on
record the material with regard to the demand made by the
accused No.1, who eventually directed the complainant-PW5 to
pay the amount to accused No.2, may satisfy the requirement
of proof of demand and acceptance against accused No.1, in
the considered view of this Court, the same would not meet the
requirement of demand and acceptance by accused No.2. At
the most, accused No.2 has received the money and there is no
demand. The factual and fundamental requirement of proof of
demand, more particularly by accused No.2 is absent in the
instant case, which is sine qua non for the purpose of
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establishing the guilt against the accused No.2 as held by the
Apex Court in the case of Neeraj Dutta Vs State (Govt. of
N.C.T of Delhi) reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 280.
43. Though learned counsel for the respondent insisted
that the recovery of the amount from the person of accused
No.2 and he not explaining the same may have to be read in
the light of Section 20, the same would be of no avail inasmuch
as statutory presumption under Section 20 can be drawn only
when the fundamental ingredients of demand and acceptance
are proved. As noted above, the prosecution in the considered
view of this Court has failed to establish the factum of demand
and proof of acceptance by accused No.2. Therefore calling
upon the accused No.2 to discharge the statutory burden is of
no avail. The Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs
Chandrasha reported in 2024 SCC online SC 3469 and
paragraph 21 has held as under:
“21. It is settled law that the two basic facts viz., ‘demand’
and ‘acceptance’ of gratification have been proved, the
presumption under Section 20 can be invoked to the effect that
the gratification was demanded and accepted as a motive or
reward as contemplated under Section 7 of the Act. However,
such presumption is rebuttable. Even on the basis of the
preponderance of probability, the accused can rebut the same.
In the present case, the prosecution proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt, in respect of the ‘demand’ and ‘acceptance’
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of the bribe amount from the complainant and recovery of
tainted currency notes from the possession of the respondent.
The said operation is preceded by recording of the demand in
the tape recorder. In such circumstances, the respondent has to
rebut the presumption by disproving the case of the prosecution
either in the cross-examination of the prosecution side
witnesses or by adducing material evidence that the receipt of
Rs. 2,000/- was not a bribe amount, but a legal fee or
repayment of loan. However, he failed to do so and on the
contrary, we find the prosecution to have proved the case
beyond any doubt.”
44. Further there is no specific charge framed as against
accused No.2 of he demanding any money. The charge framed
reads as under:
.ೋwಾ ೋಪiೆ
“`. 7ಾಲಕೃಷy, `.ಎ¹ì, ಎ@.ಎ@.`॰, 2 ೇ ಅeಕ zSಾ ಮತು ಸತa
ಾYQಾeೕಶರು, ತುಮಕೂರು, ಆದ ಾನು cಮF AೕSೆ ಈ ‘ೆಳಕಂಡಂHೆ
.ೋwಾ ೋ”ಸುHೇ ೆ:
1. `.ಧಮhಣY ` `ೕರ|ಯ, 55 ವಷh, ಾaಮSೆK(ಗರು, ೊಂಪMರ ವೃತ,
)ೊಳವನಹ8Z ºÉÆç½, ‘ೊರಟ ೆ ೆ Hಾಲೂಕು Rಾ¸À: s ಾ ೇ ತುಮಕೂರು,
2. ‘ೆ. ಶಂಕ ಾನಂದ ` , PÉ. ಾಮಣY, 55 ವಷh, ಾಜಸ}c9ೕlಕರು,
)ೊಳವನಹ8Z )ೋಬ8, ‘ೊರಟ ೆ ೆ Hಾಲೂಕು. Rಾಸಃ sವಕೃಪ (Bf ಕ• ಎದುರು)
s ಾ ೇ], ತುಮಕೂರು,cಮF ೈK 1 ೆಯವರು ಾaಮSೆK( ೆ ಮತು 2 ೆಯವರು
ಾಜಸc9ೕlಕ ಾ* ಾವhಜcಕ ೇವಕ ಾ*ದು1, \£ÁAPÀ 21-02-08 ರಂದು
ಮXಾYಹ- ಸು:ಾರು 2.20 ಗಂ>ೆಯ ತುಮಕೂರು zSೆಯ ‘ೊರಟ ೆ ೆ HಾಲೂKನ
)ೊಳವನಹ8Z )ೋಬ8ಯ ೋಂಪMರದ cಮF ೈK 2 ೆಯವರ ಕ[ೇ9ಯ
.ೋ.¸Á.1 )ೆ€.’ೆ.ರ•ಕು:ಾ £À )ೆಸ9 ೆ dಾHೆ ಬದSಾವiೆ :ಾ ‘ೊಡಲು
cವhUಸ7ೇ’ಾ*ದ1 ಪ\ೕಯ ‘ಾಯh’ೆ( ¥Á9HೋಷಕRಾ* ಅವ9ಂದ cಮF ೈK
1 ೆಯವರ c.ೇhಶನದಂHೆ 2 ೆಯವರು ಅವ9ಂದ ರೂ 7,500/- ಲಂಚವನು-
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ಪ0ೆ\ದ19ಂದ cೕವM ಭawಾ Nಾರ ತqÉ ಅecಯಮ 1988 ರ ಕಲಂ ರ ಯ sƒಾಹh
ಅಪ ಾಧವನು- ಎಸ*\9 ಮತು ಇದು ನನ- ¸ÀAYÉÕÃAiÀÄ’ೊ(ಳಪf .ೆ.
ಎರಡ ೆಯ.ಾ*, ಅ.ೆ \ನ, ಆ.ೆ ಸಮಯ ಮತು ಅ.ೆ ಸ„ಳದ cೕವM
ಾವhಜcಕ ೇವಕ ಾ*ದು1, .ೋ. ಾ 1 9ಂದ ‘ಾನೂನು7ಾUರRಾ* ಲಂಚವನು-
ಪ0ೆದು ಅಪ ಾeಕ ದುನhಡHೆಯನು- ಎಸ*ದ19ಂದ ಭawಾ Nಾರ ತ0ೆ ಅecಯಮ
1988 ರ ಕಲಂ 13(2) ರ ಯ sƒಾಹh ಅಪ ಾಧವನು- ಎಸ*\9 ಮತು ಇದು ನನ-
¸ÀAYÉÕÃAiÀÄ’ೊ(ಳಪf .ೆ.
Aೕಲ(ಂಡ .ೋwಾ ೋಪiೆ ೆ ನc-ಂದ cಮF ಅe•Nಾರiೆ ಆಗತಕ(.ೆಂದು ಈ ಮೂಲಕ c.ೇhsಸುHೇ ೆ”.
45. The trial Court in the considered view of this Court
has erred in convicting the accused No.2.
46. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the view
that the judgment of conviction as against the accused No.1 is
required to be sustained and against accused No.2 required to
be set aside.
47. As regards the sentencing is concerned, the trial
Court has imposed imprisonment for a period of one year with
fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo
imprisonment for a period of 3 months for the offence
punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act
and imprisonment for a period of three years with fine of
Rs.5,000/- and in default to undergo imprisonment for period of
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3 months for the offences punishable under Section 13(1)(d)
and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
48. Accused No.1 is stated to have passed away during
the pendency of proceedings and his legal heirs have been
brought on record. Therefore, as regard the punishment is
concerned, the matter stands abated. However, the Judgment
of conviction is sustained.
49. Accused No.2 is acquitted of the offences punishable
under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act.
Appeal is thus partly allowed.
Sd/-
(M.G.S. KAMAL)
JUDGE
SBN
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 1
