Punjab-Haryana High Court
Divyanshu Budhiraja vs State Of Haryana on 20 April, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
254
CRM-M-21702-2024 (O&M)
Date of decision: 20.04.2026
Divyanshu Budhiraja ...Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
State of Haryana ...Respondent(s)
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD S. BHARDWAJ
Present :- Mr. Manav Sharma, Advocate for
Mr. Partap Singh, Advocate for the petitioner(s).
Dr. (Ms.) Malvika Singh, DAG Haryana.
*****
VINOD S. BHARDWAJ, J. (Oral)
1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking
quashing of FIR bearing No. 0002 dated 03.01.2024, under Section 174-A
IPC, registered at Police Station Sector 14, Panchkula as well as quashing of
order dated 15.12.2023 (Annexure P-14), passed by the Magistrate declaring
the petitioner as “proclaimed person” in case bearing FIR No. 16 dated
28.01.2018, under Section 3-A of Haryana Prevention of Defacement of
Property Act, 1989.
2. The following order was passed on 07.05.2024 by this court:
1. Through the instant petition, prayer is made for quashing
FIR No. 0002 dated 03.01.2024, under Section 174-A IPC,
registered at Police Station Sector 14, Panchkula, and further
prayer has been made for quashing of order dated 15.12.2023,
(Annexure P-14), passed by the learned Magistrate concerned
declaring the petitioner as “proclaimed person”.
2. It is not under dispute that prior to this petition, the
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254 CRM-M-21702-2024 (O&M)petitioner has approached this Court twice, firstly, when the
non- bailable warrants were issued by the learned trial court,
the petitioner maintained the petition under Section 482
Cr.P.C. through CRM-M-58771-2023. However, the same was
dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 22.11.2023,
(Annexure P/13), and thereupon, the petitioner again
approached this Court, once proclamation proceedings were
initiated against him, and that petition also met with the same
result, and the petition was ordered to be dismissed as
withdrawn vide order dated 10.1.2024. This is third round of
litigation where, now the petitioner, has approached this Court,
for seeking quashing of FIR 0002 dated 03.01.2024, under
Section 174-A IPC, registered at Police Station Sector 14,
Panchkula, on his being declared as “proclaimed person” vide
order dated 15.12.2023 (Annexure P-14), in case FIR No. 16
dated 28.1.2018, under Section 3-A of Prevention of
Defacement to Public Property Act, 1984, registered at Police
Station Sector-14, Panchkula, and also order dated 15.12.2023,
(Annexure P-14) declaring him as “proclaimed person”.
3. On the previous date of hearing i.e. 2.5.2024, when this
Court was not inclined to exercise its inherent powers
envisaged under Section 482 Cr.P .C., to quash the FIR in
question including order dated 15.12.2023, since the petitioner
was a “proclaimed person”, the learned counsel for the
petitioner seeks an adjournment to have instructions from the
petitioner as to whether, he is ready to surrender before the
learned trial court concerned, or not. The relevant extract of
the order is read as under:-
“1. After addressing arguments at length, the learned
counsel for the petitioner seeks some time to get
instructions from his client as to whether he is ready to
surrender or not before the learned trial Court
concerned, in pursuance of the order dated 15.12.2023,MANGAL SINGH
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254 CRM-M-21702-2024 (O&M)wherethrough, he has been declared a “Proclaimed
Person”, however, by reserving his right to challenge the
impugned FIR, which is the outcome of the order (supra).
2. Request allowed.
3. List on 07.05.2024.”
4. Today, the learned counsel for the petitioner at the very
outset submits that in deference to the directions issued by the
learned court, the petitioner has caused appearance before it,
and filed his regular bail application, and whereupon, he has
been released on regular bail vide order dated 3.5.2024. The
certified copy of that order, which is filed before this Court,
during the course of arguments, is taken on record as
Annexure-A. Furthermore, he submits that he does not now
press the prayer seeking quashing of PO order, and his
grievance only remains with regard to the registration of the
impugned FIR.
5. Since the petitioner has caused appearance before the
learned trial court after being declared as “proclaimed
person”, and has been released on regular bail, therefore, this
Court proceed to consider the legality of the registration of the
impugned FIR against the petitioner.
6. In asking for the second relief (supra), he submits that in
fact the petitioner is facing the trial under Section 3-A of
Prevention of Defacement to Public Property Act, 1984, which
is compoundable offence, and he has moved an application for
compounding the said offence, in which notice has been served
upon the Municipal Corporation concerned. For that, he draws
attention of this Court to the observations of the learned trial
court concerned while granting the relief of regular bail to the
petitioner vide order dated 3.5.2024. The relevant extract is
read as under:-
“Further, an application for compounding the said FIR
in lieu of Section 4 of the Haryana Prevention ofMANGAL SINGH
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254 CRM-M-21702-2024 (O&M)Defacement of Property Act, 1989, P.S. Sector- 14,
Panchkula also moved on behalf of the
applicant/accused. Let, notice of the said application in
pursuance of Section 4(2) read with Section 3 of the said
Act be issued to Executive Officer or Secretary of the
Municipal Corporation, Panchkula for 06.07.2024, the
date already fixed. Papers be tagged with the main file.
File be sent back to the concerned Court immediately.”
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner in addition submits
that in view of the judgments passed by this Court in Pardeep
Kumar vs State of Punjab and another, Law Finder Doc Id#
2325731 and Darshan Singh vs State of Punjab and others,
Law Finder Doc Id # 2529290, the impugned FIR is not
maintainable.
8. Notice of motion for 22.8.2024.
9. Mr. Bhupender Singh, DAG, Haryana waives service on
behalf of the State.
10. In the meanwhile, further proceedings arising out of the
instant FIR are ordered to be stayed.”
3. Perusal of the above orders shows that, in compliance of the
aforesaid order, the petitioner appeared and was granted bail by the trial
court.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits
that at the time of registration of FIR No. 16 dated 28.01.2018, the petitioner
was the President of Haryana Youth Congress and had also been associated
with the National Students’ Union of India (NSUI). It is contended that the
petitioner had raised certain issues concerning unemployment and on
account thereof, he has been falsely implicated in the aforesaid FIR. It is
further submitted that in the said FIR, the petitioner was granted bail by the
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254 CRM-M-21702-2024 (O&M)
learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panchkula, vide order dated
28.12.2021. Learned counsel submits that on 30.07.2022, an application
seeking exemption from personal appearance was moved on behalf of the
petitioner; however, the same came to be dismissed and on the very same
date, warrants of arrest were issued against him. It is contended that the said
warrants, as well as the subsequent warrants issued thereafter, were never
served upon the petitioner. In this regard, reliance is placed on the report
called for by the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panchkula,
which indicates that the petitioner was not residing at the address mentioned
in the Court record. Despite the same, the petitioner came to be declared a
proclaimed person, resulting in the registration of FIR No. 0002 dated
03.01.2024 under Section 174-A IPC at Police Station Sector 14, Panchkula.
5. Learned counsel further submits that in the original case arising
out of FIR No. 16 dated 28.01.2018 under Section 3-A of the Haryana
Prevention of Defacement of Property Act, 1989, the petitioner has since
been acquitted by the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Panchkula, vide judgment dated 15.04.2025. He thus submits that once the
proceedings in the main case stand terminated on account of acquittal of the
petitioner herein, no purpose would be served by keeping the present
proceedings alive, more-so when there are circumstances showing no service
of the petitioner as well.
6. Referring to the status report filed by way of an affidavit of
Rakesh Kumar, HPS, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Panchkula, on
behalf of the State of Haryana, learned State counsel has advanced
submissions in tandem with the stand taken in the said status report and has
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254 CRM-M-21702-2024 (O&M)
opposed the present petition and has prayed for its dismissal.
7. I have heard the counsel appearing for the parties and have gone
through the documents appended with the present petition.
8. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Daljit Singh v. State of
Haryana & Others reported as 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1 has held that
Section 174A IPC constitutes an independent and substantive offence which
is attracted the moment a person fails to appear in response to a
proclamation issued under Section 82 Cr.P.C. The offence is complete upon
such non-appearance and can be prosecuted independently, even if the
proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. subsequently ceases to exist.
However, the Court has also clarified that though proceedings under Section
174A IPC may continue as a stand-alone offence, the Court can, in
appropriate cases, take into account subsequent developments, such as
acquittal in the main case, and may close such proceedings if the
circumstances so warrant. The relevant extract thereof are as under:
“7.2. Section 174A IPC, inserted by the 2005 Amendment to
the Penal Code, 1860 inserts a substantive offence, prescribing
punishment of three years or fine or both when such
proclamation is issued under Section 82(1) Cr. P.C. and, seven
years and fine if the said proclamation is under Subsection (4)
thereof. The object and purpose of this Section is to ensure
penal consequences for defiance of a Court order requiring a
person’s presence.
7.3. Now, what happens if the status under Section 82 Cr.
P.C. is nullified i.e., the person subjected to such proclamation,
by virtue of subsequent developments is no longer required to
be presented before a Court of law. Then, can the prosecution
still proceed against such a person for having not appearedMANGAL SINGH
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254 CRM-M-21702-2024 (O&M)before a Court during the time that the process was in effect.
The answer is in the affirmative. We say so for the following
reasons:–
(i) The language of Section 174A, IPC says “whoever fails
to appear at the specified place and the specified time as
required by proclamation…”. This implies that the very
instance at which a person is directed to appear, and he
does not do so, this Section comes into play;
(ii) What further flows from the language employed is that
the instance of non-appearance becomes an infraction of
the Section, and therefore, prosecution therefor would be
independent of Section 82, Cr. P.C. being in effect;
(iii) So, while proceedings under Section 174A IPC cannot be
initiated independent of Section 82, Cr. P.C., i.e., can
only be started post the issuance of proclamation, they
can continue if the said proclamation is no longer in
effect.
(iv) We find that the Delhi High Court has taken this view,
i.e., that Section 174A, IPC is a stand-alone offence in
Mukesh Bhatia v. State (NCT of Delhi); Divya Verma v.
State; Sameena v. State GNCT of Delhi. For the reasons
afore-stated, we agree with the findings made in these
judgments/orders. At the same time, it stands clarified
that we have not commented on the merits of the cases.
(v) Granted that the offence prescribed in Section 174A IPC
is indeed stand-alone, given that it arises out of an
original offence in connection with which proceedings
under Section 82 Cr. P.C. is initiated and in the said
offence the accused stands, subsequently, acquitted, it
would be permissible in law for the Court seized of the
trial under such offence, to take note of such a
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254 CRM-M-21702-2024 (O&M)
development and treat the same as a ground to draw the
proceedings to a close, should such a prayer be made
and the circumstances of the case so warrant.
8. In conclusion, we hold that Section 174A IPC is an
independent, substantive offence, that can continue even if the
proclamation under Section 82, Cr. P.C. is extinguished. It is a
stand-alone offence. That being the position of law, let us now
turn to the present facts. As we have already noted supra, the
Appellant stands acquitted of the main offence.
9. The record speaks to the fact that an FIR under Section 174A
IPC was registered against the Appellant, in connection with
which, he was released on bail by the Judicial Magistrate, First
Class, Bhiwani, vide order dated 19th December, 2022. It
reads:–
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
10. None has disputed the above or brought to the attention of
this Court such a fact that the said arrangement has not been
complied with.
11. The Appellant has been acquitted which means that there is
no case for which his presence is required to be secured.
Resultantly, the appeal is allowed. In the attending facts and
circumstances of the case, i.e. that the original offence pertains
to the year 2010; the money subject matter of dispute stands
paid, the judgment of the High Court with the particulars as
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this judgment, stands quashed and
set aside. All criminal proceedings, inclusive of the FIR under
Section 174A IPC, shall stand closed. The Appellant’s status, as
a ‘proclaimed person’ stands quashed.
9. Further, while examining the analogous provisions of Section
174A and Section 229A of the Indian Penal Code, both being designed to
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254 CRM-M-21702-2024 (O&M)
penalize conduct whereby an individual evades or defies the process of law,
a Co-ordinate Bench of this court vide order dated 01.09.2025 passed in
CRM-M-15467 of 2025 titled as Paramjit Singh @ Kaka Vs State of
Punjab, has held that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS,
2023 / Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 is primarily intended to prevent abuse of
the process of law and to secure the ends of justice and that once the main
trial culminates in acquittal, any ancillary proceedings arising therefrom
cannot be permitted to continue independently, as their continuation would
amount to abuse of the judicial process.The relevant extract thereof read as
under:
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
The above principle(s) of law; though held in the realm of
dealing with an FIR under Section 174A of IPC arising out of
criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1880; would apply with same vigour to an FIR
under Section 229A of IPC arising out of a FIR under Section
NDPS Act.
8. It is for the High Court, while exercising its innate
plenary powers under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023/428 of
Cr.P.C., 1973, to ratiocinate that it should not apply the law in
an austere, academic and exacting technical manner, without
considering its practical implications. The law is not merely a
set of programmed, nailed-to-the-ground rules, to be applied
without context. It must be enforced, while bearing in mind, that
its purpose is to ensure substantive justice between the parties.
The statutory provision of Section 229A of IPC, when perused
in the light of ratio decidendi of the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Daljit Singh (supra) and of this Court in the
case of Sanjeet (supra) unequivocally shows that an FIR under
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254 CRM-M-21702-2024 (O&M)
Section 229A of the IPC does not proprio vigore become liable
to be quashed, in case the main trial has been decided on merits
and culminated in acquittal. However, at the same time, the
factum of acquittal and the said judgment having attained
finality, is indubitably, a relevant factor to be considered while
dealing with a plea for quashing of an FIR (as also proceedings
emanating therefrom) under Section 229A of IPC. This fact
assumes greater significance considering that once the main
trial has been decided on merits and culminated in acquittal,
the ancillary proceedings which have no independent existence,
cannot be permitted to continue, as the same would amount to
abuse of the process of law. Such litigation, especially in the
backdrop of main trial having been decided and result in
acquittal, will have an adverse impact on the overburdened
Court-dockets. Allowing such prosecution, when the main trial
has resulted in acquittal would undermine the legislative intent;
thereby contravening the principles of fairness, proportionality,
and justice in criminal proceedings. A literal interpretation may
sometimes lead to unjust outcomes that also contradict the
law’s underlying purpose. Therefore, the High Court under its
inherent jurisdiction must balance the letter of Law with its
spirit, ensuring fair and equitable results. This approach
underscores Law’s role as an apparatus for fostering societal
harmony and addressing the real-world complexities,
efficaciously as also effectively, rather than mere
literal/technical compliance.
9. The inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS,
2023/Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 is primarily aimed at
preventing abuse of judicial process and securing the ends of
justice. Thus, it is a settled canon of criminal jurisprudence that
once the main trial has culminated in acquittal, the ancillary
proceedings which derive their foundation therefrom cannot
independently subsist and their continuance would only amount
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254 CRM-M-21702-2024 (O&M)
to an abuse of the process of law. The inherent powers of a
High Court are powers which are incidental replete powers,
which if did not so exist, the Court would be obliged to sit still
and helplessly see the process of law and Courts being abused
for the purposes of injustice. In other words; such power(s) is
intrinsic to a High Court, it is its very life-blood, its very
essence, its immanent attribute. Without such power(s), a High
Court would have form but lack the substance. These powers of
a High Court hence deserve to be construed with the widest
possible amplitude. These inherent powers are in consonance
with the nature of a High Court which ought to be, and has in
fact been, invested with power(s) to maintain its authority to
prevent the process of law/Courts being obstructed or abused.
It is a trite posit of jurisprudence that though laws attempt to
deal with all cases that may arise, the infinite variety of
circumstances which shape events and the imperfections of
language make it impossible to lay down provisions capable of
governing every case, which in fact arises. A High Court which
exists for the furtherance of justice in an indefatigable manner,
should therefore, have unfettered power(s) to deal with
situations which, though not expressly provided for by the law,
need to be dealt with, to prevent injustice or the abuse of the
process of law and Courts. The juridical basis of these plenary
power(s) is the authority; in fact the seminal duty and
responsibility of a High Court; to uphold, to protect and to
fulfill the judicial function of administering justice, in
accordance with law, in a regular, orderly and effective
manner. In other words; Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 reflects
peerless powers, which a High Court may draw upon as
necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so, in
particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law,
to prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice nay substantial
justice between the parties and to secure the ends of justice.
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254 CRM-M-21702-2024 (O&M)
10. Keeping in view the entirety of the attending facts and
circumstances of the case in hand; especially the petitioner
(herein) having been acquitted of the offence under Section the
NDPS Act, the original offence alleged to have been committed
in the year 2014 and no useful purpose seeming to be arising by
continuation of the proceedings qua the impugned FIR; this
Court deems it appropriate that the impugned FIR as also all
proceedings emanating therefrom deserve to be quashed.
10. It is thus evident that this Court has taken a consistent view and
have quashed the proceedings arising as a result of order declaring as a
proclaimed person and the consequent registration of the FIR under Section
174-A IPC not advancing any interest of the justice and to be a mere
protraction of an agony of criminal trial upon an accused when the main
dispute has already been finalized.
11. The object underlying the declaration of a person as a
proclaimed offender/person is to secure the presence of an accused before a
Court of law and to ensure that the judicial process is not thwarted by
deliberate evasion. Such a declaration is not intended to be punitive in itself,
but is a coercive mechanism devised to compel appearance and facilitate the
effective adjudication and finalisation of the proceedings pending against the
accused. In essence, the purpose is to prevent the frustration of the trial
process and to uphold the authority of the Court by ensuring that an accused
does not defeat the course of justice by remaining absent. Once the presence
of the accused is secured or the main proceedings themselves stand
concluded, the very rationale behind such a declaration loses its significance.
12. It is evident from the facts and circumstances of the present case
that the petitioner has already been acquitted in the main case arising out of
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254 CRM-M-21702-2024 (O&M)
FIR No. 16 dated 28.01.2018, registered under Section 3-A of Haryana
Prevention of Defacement of Public Property Act, 1984 at Police Station
Sector-14, Panchkula, by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panchkula
vide judgment dated 15.04.2025, thereby eroding the very substratum of the
proceedings arising out of FIR bearing No. 0002 dated 03.01.2024, under
Section 174-A IPC, registered at Police Station Sector 14, Panchkula. The
record further reflects that the warrants of arrest were not duly served upon
the petitioner and that his declaration as a proclaimed person suffers from
procedural infirmities. Additionally, the petitioner had been granted bail
earlier and had participated in the proceedings. In such circumstances, the
continuation of the present FIR would serve no useful purpose and would
amount to nothing but an abuse of the process of law.
13. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and FIR bearing No. 0002
dated 03.01.2024, under Section 174-A IPC, registered at Police Station
Sector 14, Panchkula as well as the summoning order dated 15.12.2023,
along with all subsequent proceedings emanating therefrom, are quashed qua
the petitioner herein.
(VINOD S. BHARDWAJ)
20.04.2026 JUDGE
Mangal Singh
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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