Delhi High Court
Reena vs Union Of India & Anr on 7 May, 2026
Author: Navin Chawla
Bench: Navin Chawla
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 16.04.2026
Pronounced on: 07.05.2026
+ W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025
REENA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr.Akshay Bedi and Mr.Anand
Awasthi, Advocates.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr.Amit Tiwari, CGSC with
Ms.Ayushi Srivastava,
Mr.Ayush Tanwar, Mr.Arpan
Narwal and Mr.Kushagra
Malik, Advs. for UOI
Mr.Amol Sinha, ASC with
Mr.Kshitiz Garg, Mr.Ashvini
Kumar, Mr.Nitish Dhawan,
Mr.Manan Wadhwa and
Mr.Anshul Sharma, Advocates
with SI Karambir Singh, Anti
Narcotics Branch
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA
JUDGMENT
NAVIN CHAWLA, J.
1. This petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, challenging the Detention Order dated
13.05.2025, bearing no. U-11011/19/25-PITNDPS, passed by the
respondent no.1 through the Joint Secretary to the Government of
India, under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 1 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘PITNDPS Act‘), whereby the detention of the
petitioner has been directed and she has been ordered to be kept in
custody at the Tihar Jail, New Delhi, on the ground that such detention
is necessary in order to prevent her from engaging in illicit trafficking
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in the future.
2. The petitioner also challenges the order dated 08.08.2025
passed by the respondent no.1 through the Deputy Secretary to the
Government of India under Section 9(f) of the PITNDPS Act,
confirming the aforesaid Detention Order passed against the
petitioner.
3. The grounds on which the impugned Detention Order has been
passed allege that the petitioner is involved in four (04) FIRs under the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘NDPS Act‘), the details of which are detailed herein
under:
a. FIR No. 941/23 dated 21.10.2023, registered at P.S.
Bhalswa Dairy under Sections 21/25/29 of the NDPS Act,
involving alleged recovery of 300 grams of heroin, in which
the trial is pending and the petitioner has been released on bail
vide order dated 19.09.2024;
b. FIR No. 420/22 dated 04.06.2022, registered at P.S.
Prem Nagar under Section 21 of the NDPS Act, involving
alleged recovery of 30 grams of heroin, in which the trial is
pending at prosecution evidence stage and the petitioner has
been released on bail vide order dated 15.11.2022;
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 2 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
c. FIR No. 173/21 dated 28.03.2021, registered at P.S.
Prem Nagar under Section 21 of the NDPS Act, involving
alleged recovery of 16 grams of heroin, in which the petitioner
has been released on bail vide order dated 11.03.2022 and the
trial is pending at prosecution evidence stage; and,
d. FIR No. 164/25 dated 14.04.2025, registered at P.S.
Kanjhawala under Section 21 of the NDPS Act, involving
alleged recovery of 3.65 grams of heroin in which the
petitioner was arrested on 14.04.2025 itself and released on the
same day on furnishing bail bonds.
4. Apart from the above FIRs, in the grounds for detention the
petitioner has also been alleged to have been involved in other FIRs,
as under:
“1.5 Other Activities
a) Case FIR No. 27/2020, P.S. Prem Nagar,
seizure of 92 cans of 180 ml] each, Desi
Santra Sharab (for sale in Haryana only).
b) Case FIR No. 640/2019, P.S. Prem Nagar,
seizure of 84 cans of 180 ml Asli Santra
Masale Dar Desi Santra Sharab.
c) Case FIR No. 1015/2014, P.S. Kanjhawala,
seizure case of 11 cartons of country made
liquor each containing 50 quarter bottle of
180 ml.
d) Case FIR No. 80/2012, P.S. Nihal Vihar
Seizure of 6 cartoons of (Joshila Santra
Sharab) each containing 50 quarter bottles of
180 ml. and 40 quarter bottles 180 ml in a
separate open cartoon.”
5. The Detaining Authority, on the basis of above allegations,
recorded its satisfaction to pass the impugned Detention Order, as
under:
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 3 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
“1.6 I am of the view that, despite being
granted bail, your conduct has consistently
reflected a pattern of illegal activity. You have
been found to operate a narcotic distribution
network through both known and unknown
associates, making use of local juveniles and
communication devices to facilitate the
delivery of narcotic substances. Even while on
bail, you have continued to pose a significant
threat to public health and order. By engaging
in the distribution of smaller quantities at
different intervals, you have been able to
secure bail repeatedly, only to re-engage in
the same unlawful activities thereafter.
2. After going through the facts and
circumstances in all above-mentioned cases, it
is clearly established that you i.e. Reena W/O
Ramesh @ Babban, are actively involved in
trafficking of Narcotics Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances and you are a
habitual offender. Your presence in the society
is a threat to innocent person of the
locality/State/Nation and your activities are
prejudicial to society.
3. I am aware that at present you i.e. Reena
W/O Ramesh @ Babban are on bail. However,
considering your conscious involvement in
illegal trafficking of drugs and psychotropic
substances in a repeated manner to the
detriment of the society, you have a high
propensity to be involved in the prejudicial
activities in future.
4. In view of the facts mentioned above, I have
no hesitation in arriving at the conclusicn that
you i.e. Reena W/O Ramesh @ Babban
through your above acts engaged yourself in
prejudicial activities of illicit traffic of
narcotics and psychotropic substances, which
poses serious threat to the health and welfare
not only to the citizens of this country but to
every citizen in the world, besides deleterious
effect on the national economy. The offencesSignature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 4 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
committed by you i.e. Reena W/O Ramesh @
Babban are so interlinked and continuous in
character and are of such nature that these
affect security and health of the nation. The
grievous nature and gravity of offences
committed by you i.e. Reena W/O Ramesh @
Babban in a well-planned manner clearly
establishes your continued propensity and
inclination to engage in such acts of
prejudicial activities.
Considering the facts of the present case
mentioned in foregoing paras, I have no
hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that
there is ample opportunity for Reena W/O
Ramesh @ Babban i.e. you to repeat the above
serious prejudicial acts. Hence, I am satisfied
that in the meantime you i.e. Reena W/O
Ramesh @ Babban should be immobilized and
there is a need to prevent you i.e. Reena W/O
Ramesh @ Babban from engaging in such
illicit traffic of narcotic drug and psychotropic
substances in future by detention under section
3(1) of vy Prevention of Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
(PITNDPS) 24/ Act, 1988.
5. In view of the overwhelming evidences
discussed in foregoing paras, detailing how
you i.e. Reena W/O Ramesh @ Babban have
indulged in organizing the illicit trafficking of
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic substances
as well as have a high propensity to engage in
this illicit activity, it is conclusively felt that if
you are not detained under section 3(1) of the
PITNDPS Act, 1988, you i.e. Reena W/O
Ramesh @ Babban would continue to so
engage yourself in possessing, purchase, sale,
transportation, storage, use of narcotics and
psychotropic substances illegally and handling
the above activities, organizing directly in the
above activities and conspiring in furtherance
of above activities which amount to illicit
trafficking of psychotropic substances under
section 2(e) of the Prevention of Illicit TrafficSignature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 5 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (PITNDPS) Act, 1988 in future
also. I am, therefore, satisfied that there is full
justification to detain you i.e. Reena W/O
Ramesh @ Babban under section 3(1) of the
Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 with a
view to preventing you i.e. Reena W/O Ramesh
@ Babban from engaging in above illicit
traffic of narcotics and psychotropic
substances specified under schedule to the
NDPS Act, 1985.”
6. The Confirming Authority, vide its order dated 08.08.2025,
confirmed the Detention Order passed against the petitioner, and
recorded as under:
“AND WHEREAS the matter of Reena W/o
Ramesh@Babban was placed before the
Central Advisory Board which is of the
opinion that there exist sufficient grounds for
detention of the detenu Reena W/o Ramesh
@Babban.
AND WHEREAS, the Central Government has
considered the opinion of the Central Advisory
Board.
NOW THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers
conferred by Section 9(f) of the Prevention of
Illicit Traffic in narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988, the
Central Government hereby confirms the
aforesaid Detention Order dated 13.05.2025
and further directs under Section 11 of the
said Act that Reena W/0 Ramesh @Babban be
detained for a period of one year from the date
of her detention i.e. 26.05.2025.”
7. Aggrieved by the Detention Order dated 13.05.2025 and the
Confirmation Order dated 08.08.2025, the petitioner has filed the
present Writ petition.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 6 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE
PETITIONER
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
impugned Detention Order dated 13.05.2025 as well as the
Confirmation Order dated 08.08.2025 are liable to be quashed as they
suffer from serious infirmities and disclose a break in the live and
proximate link between the alleged activities and the purpose of
detention, thereby rendering the detention to be punitive in nature
rather than being preventive.
9. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the
record shows that the certified copies of the bail orders and other
judicial records relating to the earlier FIRs, were obtained by the
respondent authorities in the month of November 2024. Despite the
availability of the entire material, the proposal for preventive
detention was forwarded only on 10.02.2025 and the Detention Order
was thereafter passed on 13.05.2025, which demonstrates absence of
immediacy and vitiates the subjective satisfaction.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the
petitioner was enlarged on bail on 19.09.2024 in FIR No. 941/23, inter
alia, on the ground of non-compliance with the mandate of Section 50
of the NDPS Act, as well as on the ground of parity, inasmuch as the
co-accused, had been granted bail by this Court on 09.07.2024.
However, the Detaining Authority, while referring to the grant of bail
in the impugned Detention Order, has referred only to the ground of
parity and has omitted to mention the crucial ground of non-
compliance of Section 50, thereby reflecting non-application of mind.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 7 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the
proposal dated 10.02.2025 refers only to three FIRs pertaining to the
years 2021, 2022 and 2023. The fourth FIR dated 14.04.2025,
involving an alleged recovery of only 3.65 grams of heroin, has been
subsequently used as a trigger to justify the impugned Detention
Order, despite the fact that the petitioner was released on bail on the
very same day in the said case. This indicates that the detention is
based on a trivial incident, thereby breaking the live and proximate
link. He submits that till date, the chargesheet has not been filed in the
said case, showing the frivolous nature of the same and that it had
been concocted to generate a live link for justifying the impugned
Detention Order.
12. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in the bail
order dated 19.09.2024 passed in FIR No. 941/2023, the learned Trial
Court after considering the material on record, granted bail to the
petitioner despite the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, thereby
recording that the conditions under Section 37 stood satisfied. This
clearly indicates that the Court did not find sufficient grounds to deny
liberty to the petitioner. Instead of challenging the same or seeking
cancellation of bail, the impugned Detention Order was passed to
nullify the effect thereof.
13. He submits that when a detenue has been granted bail, the State
ought to have first sought cancellation of bail under ordinary criminal
law instead of resorting to preventive detention, which is an
extraordinary measure. In support, he places reliance on Ameena
Begum v State of Telangana, 2023 9 SCC 587; and Dhanyam v State
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 8 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
of Kerela & Ors. AIR 2025 SC 2868. He further submits that none of
the orders granting bail to the petitioner were challenged, which
shows that petitioner was not considered a threat to warrant preventive
detention.
14. By placing reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench of
Calcutta High Court titled, Jahanara Bibi v. Union of India and Ors.
2025 SCC Online Cal 7003, the learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that in cases where an accused has been granted bail and has
complied with the bail conditions, the conduct alleged in such case
cannot, by itself, be construed as posing threat to the public at large
and the detaining authority must demonstrate compelling reasons to
justify preventive detention.
15. He further submits that in the present case, none of the cases
alleged against the petitioner have yet culminated in conviction and,
therefore, the presumption of innocence applies and mere pendency of
criminal cases cannot justify the invocation of preventive detention.
16. The learned counsel for the petitioner further relies upon the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Pramod Singla v Union of India,
2023 SCC Online SC 895, wherein the Court has observed that
preventive detention laws are a colonial legacy and possess immense
potential for misuse, and therefore, such laws must be invoked only in
the rarest of rare circumstances.
17. By placing reliance on judgment of this Court in Validad Khan
@Mullah v Union of India and Ors, 2026: DHC:2054:DB, the
learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the delay in executing a
detention order has to be justified. In the present case, the same has to
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 9 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
be counted from the day the petitioner was enlarged on bail, that is, on
19.09.2024. The proposal was sent only on 10.02.2025, and the
Detention Order was passed on 13.05.2025. The petitioner was
detained on 26.05.2025. He submits that therefore, there was
considerable delay not only in passing of the impugned Detention
Order, but also in its execution.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL
FOR THE RESPONDENT
18. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that
the impugned Detention Order dated 13.05.2025 as well as the
Confirmation Order dated 08.08.2025 have been passed after due
application of mind and upon a proper appreciation of the material
placed before the Detaining Authority. He submits that the authority
was fully satisfied that the activities of the petitioner posed a real, live
and proximate threat of the petitioner engaging in illicit trafficking of
narcotic drugs in the future, prevention of which is the very object of
passing a preventive Detention Order under the PITNDPS Act.
19. The learned counsel for the respondent further submits that the
proposal for the detention was duly initiated on 10.02.2025, wherein
details of the multiple FIRs involving the petitioner were specifically
placed before the Detaining Authority.
20. The learned counsel for the respondent contends that in FIR
No. 941/2023, the petitioner was granted bail on 19.09.2024 primarily
on the ground of parity with the co-accused. It is contended that the
non-filing of an application for cancellation of bail by the respondent
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 10 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
authorities is not fatal, as the Detaining Authority is only required to
be aware of the fact of grant of bail and to assess the likelihood of the
detenue continuing the prejudicial activities. The same has been duly
considered and recorded in the impugned Detention Order.
21. The learned counsel for the respondent further submits that the
conduct of the petitioner reflects a continuous and unbroken chain of
prejudicial activities from the year 2021 till 2025, without any
cessation. He further states that it is the repeated involvement of the
petitioner, coupled with her continued engagement even after being
granted bail, which clearly establishes a pattern and propensity to
indulge in illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs. The petitioner is a
habitual offender whose activities have initially started from
bootlegging and thereafter, shifted to dealing in narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances.
22. The learned counsel for the respondent contends that the
Detaining Authority has also taken note of the evolving nature of the
petitioner’s activities, wherein she has allegedly shifted to dealing in
smaller quantities so as to remain outside the rigours of stricter
provisions, thereby continuing her illegal trade in a calculated manner.
He submits that as all the cases against the petitioner are pending trial,
the prevention is necessary.
23. The learned counsel for the respondent further submits that the
object of the detention is preventive and not punitive. The authorities,
upon collection of relevant material, including certified copies of
documents, processed the proposal and passed the detention order
within a reasonable time. It is contended that the time taken in
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 11 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
obtaining certified copies and processing the proposal cannot be said
to be inordinate or unexplained.
24. It is submitted that the detention order is based on relevant,
cogent, and proximate material, and does not suffer from any illegality
or infirmity warranting interference by this Court.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
25. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsels for
the parties and have perused the record.
26. The impugned Detention Order has been passed against the
petitioner in the exercise of powers vested in the Competent Authority
under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act, which reads as under:
“3. Power to make orders detaining certain
persons.-
(I) The Central Government or a State
Government, or any officer of the Central
Government, not below the rank of a Joint
Secretary to that Government, specially
empowered for the purposes of this section by
that Government, or any officer of a State
Government, not below the rank of a Secretary
to that Government, specially empowered for
the purposes of this section by that
Government, may, if satisfied, with respect to
any person (including a foreigner) that, with a
view to preventing him from engaging in illicit
traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances, it is necessary so to do, make an
order directing that such person be detained.”
27. In Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration and Ors., (1982) 2
SCC 403, the Supreme Court explained the object of preventive
detention as one devised to afford protection to the society and not to
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 12 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
punish a man for having done something, but to intercept before he
does it and to prevent him from doing.
28. In Ameena Begum (supra), the Supreme Court, on a detailed
examination of the law governing judicial review of an order of
Preventive Detention, summarized the principles applicable thereto as
under:
“28. In the circumstances of a given case, a
constitutional court when called upon to test
the legality of orders of preventive detention
would be entitled to examine whether:
28.1. The order is based on the requisite
satisfaction, albeit subjective, of the detaining
authority, for, the absence of such satisfaction
as to the existence of a matter of fact or law,
upon which validity of the exercise of the
power is predicated, would be the sine qua
non for the exercise of the power not being
satisfied;
28.2. In reaching such requisite satisfaction,
the detaining authority has applied its mind to
all relevant circumstances and the same is not
based on material extraneous to the scope and
purpose of the statute;
28.3. Power has been exercised for achieving
the purpose for which it has been conferred, or
exercised for an improper purpose, not
authorised by the statute, and is therefore ultra
vires;
28.4. The detaining authority has acted
independently or under the dictation of
another body;
28.5. The detaining authority, by reason of
self-created rules of policy or in any other
manner not authorised by the governing
statute, has disabled itself from applying its
mind to the facts of each individual case;
28.6. The satisfaction of the detaining
authority rests on materials which are of
rationally probative value, and the detainingSignature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 13 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
authority has given due regard to the matters
as per the statutory mandate;
28.7. The satisfaction has been arrived at
bearing in mind existence of a live and
proximate link between the past conduct of a
person and the imperative need to detain him
or is based on material which is stale;
28.8. The ground(s) for reaching the requisite
satisfaction is/are such which an individual,
with some degree of rationality and prudence,
would consider as connected with the fact and
relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry in
respect whereof the satisfaction is to be
reached;
28.9. The grounds on which the order of
preventive detention rests are not vague but
are precise, pertinent and relevant which, with
sufficient clarity, inform the detenu the
satisfaction for the detention, giving him the
opportunity to make a suitable representation;
and
28.10. The timelines, as provided under the
law, have been strictly adhered to.”
“29. Should the Court find the exercise of
power to be bad and/or to be vitiated applying
any of the tests noted above, rendering the
detention order vulnerable, detention which
undoubtedly visits the person detained with
drastic consequences would call for being
interdicted for righting the wrong.”
29. In Sushanta Kumar Banik (supra), the Supreme Court while
considering the above principles and the object of preventive
detention, held as under:
“14. In view of the above object of the
preventive detention, it becomes very
imperative on the part of the detaining
authority as well as the executing authorities
to remain vigilant and keep their eyes skinned
but not to turn a blind eye in passing the
detention order at the earliest from the date ofSignature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 14 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
the proposal and executing the detention order
because any indifferent attitude on the part of
the detaining authority or executing authority
would defeat the very purpose of the
preventive action and turn the detention order
as a dead letter and frustrate the entire
proceedings.
15. The adverse effect of delay in arresting a
detenu has been examined by this Court in a
series of decisions and this Court has laid
down the rule in clear terms that an
unreasonable and unexplained delay in
securing a detenu and detaining him vitiates
the detention order. In the decisions we shall
refer hereinafter, there was a delay in
arresting the detenu after the date of passing
of the order of detention. However, the same
principles would apply even in the case of
delay in passing the order of detention from
the date of the proposal. The common
underlying principle in both situations would
be the “live & proximate link” between the
grounds of detention & the avowed purpose of
detention.
xxx
21. It is manifestly clear from a conspectus of
the above decisions of this Court, that the
underlying principle is that if there is
unreasonable delay between the date of the
order of detention & actual arrest of the
detenu and in the same manner from the date
of the proposal and passing of the order of
detention, such delay unless satisfactorily
explained throws a considerable doubt on the
genuineness of the requisite subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority in
passing the detention order and consequently
render the detention order bad and invalid
because the “live and proximate link” between
the grounds of detention and the purpose of
detention is snapped in arresting the detenu. A
question whether the delay is unreasonableSignature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 15 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
and stands unexplained depends on the facts
and circumstances of each case.
xxx
24. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision
would indicate that the accused arrested under
the NDPS Act, 1985 can be ordered to be
released on bail only if the Court is satisfied
that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty of such
offence and that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail. If the appellant herein
was ordered to be released on bail despite the
rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985,
then the same is suggestive that the Court
concerned might not have found any prima
facie case against him. Had this fact been
brought to the notice of the detaining
authority, then it would have influenced the
mind of the detaining authority one way or the
other on the question whether or not to make
an order of detention. The State never thought
to even challenge the bail orders passed by the
special court releasing the appellant on bail.
xxx
27. From the above decisions, it emerges that
the requisite subjective satisfaction, the
formation of which is a condition precedent to
passing of a detention order will get vitiated if
material or vital facts which would have
bearing on the issue and weighed the
satisfaction of the detaining authority one way
or the other and influence his mind are either
withheld or suppressed by the sponsoring
authority or ignored and not considered by the
detaining authority before issuing the
detention order.
xxx
29. The preventive detention is a serious
invasion of personal liberty and the normal
methods open to a person charged with
commission of any offence to disprove the
charge or to prove his innocence at the trialSignature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 16 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
are not available to the person preventively
detained and, therefore, in prevention
detention jurisprudence whatever little
safeguards the Constitution and the
enactments authorizing such detention provide
assume utmost importance and must be strictly
adhered to.”
30. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case,
the grounds of detention first refer to four FIRs wherein the petitioner
is an accused under the NDPS Act. It further refers to four other FIRs
wherein the petitioner is named as an accused with reference to
offences involving the illicit liquor trade. The grounds also take note
of the fact that the petitioner has been released on bail in these FIRs,
the most recent being on 14.04.2025.
31. In the present case, the proposal for passing of the Detention
Order was sent by the Sponsoring Authority on 10.02.2025. At that
time, the petitioner had been named in three out of the aforesaid four
FIRs under the NDPS Act and had been granted bail in all three, the
last of such orders being the bail order dated 19.09.2024 passed by the
learned Special Judge. The Detaining Authority while referring the
said order observed as under:
” G. A bail Application was filed by you i.e.
Reena in the Court of ASJ (Special Judge-
NDPS ACT), Rohini Courts, which was
conditionally allowed vide Hon’ble Court
order dated 19.09.2024 since your co-accused
got bail in this instance by Hon’ble High
Court.”
32. The learned counsel for the petitioner has rightly drawn our
attention to the order dated 19.09.2024 passed by the learned Special
Judge to contend that the petitioner had been released on bail not only
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 17 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
on the ground that his co-accused had been granted bail by this Court,
but also because the learned Trial Court had found a prima facie case
of violation of the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. We
quote from the order dated 19.09.2024 as under:
“3.1 Applying the ratio of above discussed
cases to the present case, the notice served
upon the accused in the present case is exactly
similar as it was in Ikram’s case (discussed
supra). IO has not mentioned in the notice
about the second option that accused may be
taken to the nearest Magistrate or Gazetted
Officer for the purpose of her search and by
doing so, in my view, IO has failed to comply
the twin conditions laid down in section 50
NDPS Act and which has been specifically
enumerated by higher courts in the above
stated cases. The bar of section 37 NDPS Act
has become inoperative due to the failure of
the IO to serve the notice under section 50
NDPS by following the twin conditions.”
33. In our view, therefore, the Detaining Authority has failed to
apply its mind on the very relevant consideration which is the ground
on which the petitioner had been granted bail by the Competent
Court.
34. We have already reproduced hereinabove the exposition of law
by the Supreme Court in Sushanta Kumar Banik (supra), wherein it
was held that in cases under the NDPS Act, a plain reading of
Section 37 of the NDPS Act would show that the accused can be
released on bail only if the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence
and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. In such
cases, if the accused has been ordered to be released on bail despite
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 18 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, then the same is
suggestive that the Court concerned might not have found any prima
facie case against him.
35. In the present case, had the Detaining Authority noticed that
apart from the fact that the co-accused has been granted bail, the
learned Trial Court had also found a prima facie violation of Section
50 of the NDPS Act, it may have influenced the mind of the Detaining
Authority in one way or the other on the question of whether or not to
pass the Detention Order against the petitioner.
36. It is also important to note here that, the State also never
challenged the bail order in spite of the allegations that the petitioner
was even thereafter alleged to have been found dealing in heroin albeit
of a small quantity.
37. Therefore, the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority
is vitiated by the non-consideration of relevant factors.
38. What is of further significance in the present case is that,
though the petitioner had been released on bail in FIR No.941/2023
vide order dated 19.09.2024 of the learned Trial Court, the certified
copies of the relevant papers were obtained by the Sponsoring
Authority only on 16.11.2024 and 27.11.2024, and that the proposal
was still not moved till 10.02.2025. There is no satisfactory
explanation given by the respondent authorities for this delay.
39. Further, the next FIR against the petitioner was registered on
14.04.2025, which, as we have already noticed hereinabove, was for a
small quantity and the petitioner was released on bail on the very same
day on her personal bond. There is no explanation for the period
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 19 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
between 10.02.2025 to 14.04.2025, that is the registration of this FIR,
and thereafter between 14.04.2025 till the passing of the impugned
Detention Order, which came to be passed only on 13.05.2025.
40. As far as FIR No.164/2025 is concerned, not only the quantity
alleged to be involved was small, but the petitioner was released on
bail on personal bond. Further, the learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that till date, the Charge-Sheet has not been filed in the said
FIR. It has been more than one year since the registration of the same.
41. In view of the above facts, we are not satisfied that the case in
FIR No. 164/2025 is sufficient to wish away and explain the earlier
delay in passing of the Detention Order.
42. As noted hereinabove, the respondent has also not explained the
delay between 19.09.2024, when bail was granted to the petitioner in
FIR No. 941/2023, and 10.02.2025, when the proposal was sent and
thereafter till 14.04.2025, when the petitioner was again alleged to be
involved in an offence under the NDPS Act.
43. As explained by the Supreme Court in Sushanta Kumar Banik
(supra), the delay in passing of the Detention Order itself shows the
absence of a live and proximate link between the grounds of detention
and the purpose sought to be achieved. If the Detaining Authority had
been really and genuinely satisfied after proper application of mind to
the material placed before it, that it was necessary to detain the
petitioner with a view to prevent her from indulging in such illegal
activities, the Detaining Authority would have acted with greater
promptitude in securing the arrest of the petitioner forthwith, rather
than waiting for her to commit another offence.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 20 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
44. In view of the above, we are unable to sustain the impugned
Detention Order. The same is accordingly set aside. In case the
petitioner is not detained in any other case, she should be released
forthwith.
45. We, however, clarify that any observations made by us
hereinabove is only for the purpose of adjudicating the validity of the
Detention Order and should not influence any of the pending cases
against the petitioner, including the FIR No.164/2025.
46. The petition is allowed in the above terms. There is no order as
to costs.
NAVIN CHAWLA, J.
RAVINDER DUDEJA, J.
MAY 7, 2026/Arya/Pb
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2901/2025 Page 21 of 21
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:07.05.2026
17:02:05
