What would be effect of lawful revocation of the original gift deed under Senior Citizen Act?

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    Insofar as the Petitioner’s contention that he has subsequently

    transferred the subject property in favour of his wife is concerned, it

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    is evident that any such transfer is purely derivative of the petitioner’s title. Upon lawful revocation of the original gift deed under the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, the very basis of the petitioner’s title stands divested, and consequently, any transfer effected by him would not, prima facie, create an indefeasible or superior right in favour of the transferee. At the same time, since the petitioner’s wife is not a party to the present proceedings, this Court refrains from rendering any conclusive adjudication upon her rights, if any, and leaves it open for her to avail such remedies as may be permissible in law. {Para 26}

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

    CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    WRIT PETITION NO. 12120 OF 2025

    Shri. Sambhaji Balkrishna Zambre, Vs  Smt. Chhaya Balkrishna Zambre,

    CORAM : SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.

    DATE : 6th MAY 2026.

    Citation: 2026:BHC-KOL:3563

    1. Heard. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent of

    the parties. Petition is decided finally at admission stage.

    2. The Petitioner assails the order dated 23/09/2025 rendered

    by the Appellate Officer, Senior Citizens Welfare Tribunal and

    District Magistrate Sangli in Appeal bearing No. Jeshtha Nagrik

    Appeal/SR-01/2025 dismissing the appeal presented by the

    Petitioner and endorsing the order passed by presiding Officer,

    Senior Citizen Welfare Tribunal in Application bearing No.

    MAG/J.Na./SR/20/2022.

    3. The litigating parties are deeply interconnected yet stand as

    two opposing sides. The Respondent is the aged mother of the

    Petitioner, and the dispute pertains to the estate left behind by the

    Petitioner’s father who passed away on 02-06-2007. The subject

    matter involves several properties, including Revision Survey No.

    159 situated in Kupwad and various City Survey numbers in Sangli,

    which the Petitioner claims to be a combination of ancestral and

    self-acquired assets. Following the demise of the father, the

    Petitioner’s two sisters executed a registered relinquishment deed in

    2013, which was followed by the Respondent-mother executing the

    registered relinquishment deeds in favour of the Petitioner

    respectively in the year 2015 and 2018.

    4. Subsequently, the Petitioner transferred a portion of the suit

    property in favour of his wife, purportedly in compliance with a

    maintenance decree passed by the Family Court, Sangli, in 2020.

    During this period, the Respondent initiated Special Civil Suit No.

    1056/2020 before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sangli, seeking

    the cancellation of the relinquishment deeds on the grounds of

    fraud. Simultaneously, the Respondent filed an application under

    the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act,

    2007, before the Welfare Tribunal seeking maintenance and the

    setting aside of the subject deeds.

    5. The Welfare Tribunal allowed the Respondent’s application,

    resulting in the cancellation of the registered relinquishment deeds

    and a direction to the Petitioner to pay a monthly maintenance of

    10,000. The Petitioner challenged this ₹ decision before the

    Appellate Officer and District Magistrate, Sangli, after hearing

    litigating sides, dismissed the appeal and upheld the findings of the

    lower Tribunal. As such, the Petitioner is before this Court.

    6. Learned counsel for the Petitioner Mr. Bhavake, submits that

    the impugned orders are legally unsustainable as the Senior Citizens

    Welfare Tribunal in absence of the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon

    the validity of the relinquishment deeds while Special Civil Suit No.

    1056 of 2020 was already pending before a competent Civil Court

    for the same relief. He contends that the relinquishment deeds of

    2015 and 2018 were executed voluntarily without any express

    stipulation/condition of maintenance, and therefore, the summary

    powers under Section 23 of the 2007 Act could not have been

    invoked to void registered instruments. Furthermore, it is argued

    that the Tribunal failed to consider that a portion of the property

    had already been transferred to a third party, the Petitioner’s wife,

    under a Family Court decree, and gloss cannot be created on such

    rights in a summary proceeding. Counsel further asserts that the

    Petitioner has consistently cared for the Respondent and that the

    direction to pay monthly maintenance of ₹10,000/- is arbitrary,

    excessive, and was passed without a proper inquiry into the

    Petitioner’s financial means or the Respondent’s actual requirements.

    7. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submits that in

    absence of specific conditions in the gift deed for providing

    maintenance to the mother-transferor, the deed could not have been

    revoked. To buttress the same, has placed reliance upon the Sudesh

    Chhikara Vs. Ramti Devi and Anr1 and Veena Singh Vs. District

    Registrar/Additional Collector and anr2.

    8. Per contra, Mr. Chavan, learned counsel for the senior citizen

    has vehemently opposed the petition submitting that failure and

    1 2022 SCC Online SC 1684

    2 (2022) 7 SCC 1

    neglect on the part of the Petitioner to maintain his own natural

    mother, a senior citizen would dis-entitle the Petitioner to claim any

    relief much less the reliefs claimed in the present petition. It is

    further submitted that the fact finding authorities have rendered a

    positive finding in relation to neglect and incoherence with the

    object of the provisions of the Act of 2007, especially Section 23,

    therefore prayed for a dismissal of the petition.

    9. Upon hearing the respective counsel for the litigating sides

    and perusing the material on record, it is necessary to record that

    there is no dispute regarding the fundamental facts governing the

    relationship. It is admitted that the Respondent is the widowed

    mother of the Petitioner and that, following the demise of the

    patriarch Balkrishna Zambre, the parties continued to reside

    together as a joint family unit. This familial proximity is a crucial

    factor, as it provided the Petitioner with the position of trust and

    influence necessary to facilitate the execution of the relinquishment

    deeds in his favour. The record clearly establishes that the

    Respondent, in her twilight years, was entirely dependent on the

    Petitioner for her emotional and physical well-being.

    10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of S. Vanitha v. Deputy

    Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District and Ors3 has observed as

    under:

    “Traditional norms and values of the Indian society laid stress on

    providing care for the elderly. However, due to withering of the

    joint family system, a large number of elderly are not being

    looked after by their family. Consequently, many older persons,

    particularly widowed women are now forced to spend their

    twilight years all alone and are exposed to emotional neglect

    and to lack of physical and financial support. This clearly reveals

    that ageing has become a major social challenge and there is a

    need to give more attention to the care and protection for the

    older persons. Though the parents can claim maintenance under

    the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the procedure is both

    time- consuming as well as expensive. Hence, there is a need to

    have simple, inexpensive and speedy provisions to claim

    maintenance for parents.”

    11. Thus, the statute recognizes the right of parents and senior

    citizens for maintenance. The Tribunal can pass an order of

    maintenance under Section 9, whereas Section 23 which is primarily

    aimed to empower the Tribunal to declare the transfer made by

    senior citizen upon fulfillment of certain conditions. Section reads as

    under.

    “23. Transfer of property to be void in certain

    circumstances

    1. Where any senior citizen who, after the

    3 (2021) 15 SCC 730

    commencement of this Act, has by way of gift or

    otherwise, his property, subject to the condition that

    the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and

    basic physical needs to the transferor and such

    transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities

    and physical needs, the said transfer of property shall

    be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or

    under undue influence and shall at the option of the

    transferor be declared void by the Tribunal.

    2. Where any senior citizen has a right to receive

    maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part,

    thereof is transferred, the right to receive maintenance

    may be enforced against the transferee if the transferee

    has notice of the right, or if the transfer is gratuitous;

    but not against the transferee for consideration and

    without notice of right.

    3. If any senior citizen is incapable of enforcing the

    rights under sub-sections (1) and (2), action may be

    taken on his behalf by any of the organisation referred

    to in Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 5.”

    12. A reading of Section 23(1) of the Act of 2007 establishes that

    when a property is transferred by a senior citizen, whether by gift or

    otherwise, it is both implicitly vis-a-vis explicitly subject to the

    condition that the transferee shall provide the transferor with basic

    amenities and physical needs. The statute incorporates a legal

    fiction that if the transferee, after obtaining the benefit of the

    transfer, fails to fulfill these essential obligations, the transfer is

    deemed to have been vitiated by fraud, coercion, or undue

    influence. This deeming fiction operates upon the breach while not

    providing maintenance. Consequently, in cases of such noncompliance

    by the transferee, the Tribunal is statutorily empowered

    to declare the transfer void at the option of the senior citizen,

    ensuring that property rights do not supersede the fundamental

    right to survival and dignity.

    13. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the

    Petitioner, suggesting that the senior citizen has disputed the very

    execution of the relinquishment deeds. However, this submission is

    premised upon misleading and misconstruction of the pleadings.

    14. A careful perusal of the Respondent’s application

    unequivocally establishes that applicant has narrated the specific

    circumstances, under which the deeds were executed, rather than

    issuing an express denial of her signatures or the act of execution

    itself. Since the challenge is rooted in the circumstances of the

    transfer and the subsequent failure to provide maintenance, the

    “deeming fiction” under Section 23 is attracted. Consequently, the

    Petitioner’s reliance on the Veena Singh (Supra) judgment is

    misplaced, as the facts of the present case do not pertain to a

    dispute over the factum of execution, but rather in relation to the

    failure of Petitioner to maintain a senior citizen.

    15. The submission of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that

    the filing of a substantive civil suit precludes the senior citizen from

    taking recourse to the provisions of Section 23 is similarly devoid of

    merit. The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens

    Act, 2007, was enacted to give effect to the guarantees of social

    security and dignity for the elderly through a simplified,

    inexpensive, and expeditious mechanism. Its provisions are

    supplemental and operate in a distinct field, primarily the

    immediate protection of a senior citizen’s life and property. The

    mere pendency of a protracted civil litigation cannot be used as a

    weapon/tool to deny a senior citizen the summary and remedial

    reliefs provided under this special statute, as doing so would

    frustrate the very objective of providing urgent relief to those in

    their twilight years.

    16. At this juncture, it is imperative to refer to the verdict of the

    Hon’ble Apex Court in Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit and Ors4.,

    wherein the Court, after considering the principles laid down in

    Sudesh Chikara, delved into the nuances of Section 23 of the Act.

    The Apex Court reiterated that beneficial legislations, such as the

    Act of 2007, must receive a liberal and purpose-oriented

    construction in consonance with social objectives. A literal

    interpretation that defeats the legislative intent must be avoided;

    instead, the Court’s duty is to discern the underlying “mischief” the

    statute seeks to remedy, in this case, the abandonment and financial

    exploitation of the elderly and adopt a construction that suppresses

    the problem while advancing the remedy.

    17. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bharat Singh v. New

    Delhi Tuberculosis Centre5 and Indian Performing Right Society Ltd.

    v. Sanjay Dalia6, once the legislative intent is clear, the statute must

    receive a functional interpretation. This principle ensures that

    exemption clauses or technicalities do not provide a “deceptive

    ground” for evading statutory obligations. In the context of the

    Consumer Protection Act, as seen in Kozyflex Mattresses (P) Ltd. v.

    4 (2025) 2 SCC 787

    5 (1986) 2 SCC 614

    6 (2015) 10 SCC 161

    SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd 7 , and the Medical Termination of

    Pregnancy Act in X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi)8, the judiciary has

    consistently held that where two views are possible, the one that

    favours the beneficiary of the social welfare legislation must prevail.

    Consequently, the provisions of the Act of 2007 cannot be

    interpreted in a narrow, pedantic manner that leaves a senior citizen

    remediless.

    18. In the backdrop of the legislative history discussed, I am of the

    considered view that the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the

    Act, which defines the protective purpose of the enactment, has

    been restated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in S. Vanitha (Supra). The

    preamble of the Act unequivocally declares its intent to provide a

    more effective and robust framework for the maintenance and

    welfare of parents and senior citizens, rights that are both

    guaranteed and recognised under the Constitution. As a beneficial

    piece of legislation, the Act is specifically designed to secure the

    dignity of senior citizens against the unique vulnerabilities and

    abandonment they often face in the twilight of their lives.

    19. Consequently, the submission of the learned counsel for the

    7 2024 INSC 234

    8 (2023) 9 SCC 433

    Petitioner, that the authorities below should have stayed their hands

    due to the pendency of a civil suit, cannot be accepted. To hold

    otherwise would be to allow procedural technicalities to defeat the

    very “fast-track” social security net that the legislature has

    introduced, created and conferred upon senior citizens like the

    Respondent.

    20. Adopting the same view, the verdict of the Hon’ble Apex Court

    in Urmila Dixit (Supra), lends significant support to the findings of

    the authorities below. Consequently, the Petitioner’s plea that the

    absence of a specific “maintenance clause” incorporated in the text

    of the relinquishment deeds or the lack of pleadings regarding the

    breach of such an obligation should defeat the Respondent’s claim,

    cannot be accepted.

    21. In a beneficial piece of legislation such as the Act of 2007, the

    focus is on the substantive reality of the senior citizen’s

    abandonment rather than the formalistic perfection of the

    pleadings. This Court must ensure to fulfill the primary aim and

    object of the statute, which is to ensure the immediate protection

    and subsistence of the senior citizen. To allow the Petitioner to rely

    on the silence of the deeds to evade his natural and statutory duty

    would be to frustrate the very “deeming fiction” that the legislature

    has incorporated to prevent the exploitation of parents.

    22. Similarly, the submission that the mere payment of

    maintenance, whether under a Family Court decree or the Tribunal’s

    order, would absolve the Petitioner from the applicability of Section

    23 is entirely without merit, as such, does not warrant

    consideration. The statutory obligation to provide maintenance is a

    distinct and continuous duty that runs parallel to the consequences

    of property transfers contemplated under the Act.

    23. Section 23 is a statutory safeguard designed to restore the

    property to a senior citizen when a transfer has been misused to

    leave them destitute or vulnerable. Therefore, the subsequent

    payment of a monthly sum does not “cure” or negate the underlying

    breach of the condition of care that initially triggered the Tribunal’s

    power to declare the relinquishment deeds void. To accept the

    Petitioner’s argument would allow a transferee to strip a parent of

    their life’s assets and then seek to “buy off” the statutory protection

    of the parent’s property rights.

    24. Regarding the challenge to the Appellate Authority’s order on

    the grounds that it is merely a concurring view lacking independent

    reasoning, a perusal of the record makes it apparent that the

    Appellate Authority specifically considered the execution of the

    relinquishment deeds and the subsequent departure on the part of

    the Petitioner from his duty to provide basic amenities and physical

    needs to his natural mother.

    25. In any event, the legal position regarding concurring orders is

    no longer res integra. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex

    Court in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India (AIR 1990 SC 1984) has settled that an appellate or revisional authority, while affirming an order, is not required to record elaborate or separate reasons if it finds itself in agreement with the reasoning contained in the order under challenge. The requirement for detailed recording of reasons is

    paramount at the original stage to ensure transparency; since the

    Senior Citizens Welfare Tribunal’s original order was exhaustive and

    well-reasoned, the Appellate Authority’s endorsement of those

    findings does not suffer from any legal infirmity or lack of

    jurisdiction. Consequently, the Petitioner’s grievance that the

    impugned order is “non-speaking” is flawed and legally unsustainable.

    26. Insofar as the Petitioner’s contention that he has subsequently

    transferred the subject property in favour of his wife is concerned, it

    is evident that any such transfer is purely derivative of the

    petitioner’s title. Upon lawful revocation of the original gift deed

    under the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, the very basis of the petitioner’s title stands divested, and consequently, any transfer effected by him would not, prima facie, create an indefeasible or superior right in favour of the transferee. At the same time, since the petitioner’s wife is not a party to the present proceedings, this Court refrains from rendering any conclusive adjudication upon her rights, if any, and leaves it open for her to avail such remedies as may be permissible in law.

    27. Resultantly, taking into account the totality of the

    circumstances narrated hereinabove, and specifically the conduct of

    the Petitioner in abdicating his fundamental obligation to provide

    basic amenities and physical needs to the Respondent-mother, as

    such, no case for interference is made out. The record demonstrates

    that the Petitioner, rather than fulfilling his natural and statutory

    duties, as such, has chosen to drag an aged/mother, a senior citizen

    through protracted and multi-layered litigation, effectively depleting

    her resources and peace of mind in her twilight years. Such conduct

    further disentitles the Petitioner from seeking any relief, much less

    the equitable and discretionary relief under Article 227 of the

    Constitution of India.

    28. The petition, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed. Rule is

    discharged.

    29. Considering that the Petitioner has left no stone unturned in

    harassing the Respondent, age old mother and depleting her meager

    resources through persistent litigation in her twilight years, I am of

    the considered view that this is a fit case to impose exemplary costs

    to discourage such challenges against welfare orders. The

    Petitioner’s attempt of layering litigation while the Respondent

    struggles for basic maintenance is a clear abuse of the legal process.

    Accordingly, the Petitioner is directed to pay costs quantified at

    ₹50,000/- to the Respondent. This amount shall be deposited with

    the Tribunal or paid directly to the Respondent within four weeks

    from today, failing which the same shall be recovered as arrears of

    land revenue.

    [SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.]

    30. At this stage, the learned counsel for the Petitioner prays for

    the stay of this judgment and the continuation of the interim relief

    previously granted. However, considering the findings recorded

    hereinabove regarding the Petitioner’s persistent failure to fulfill his

    statutory obligations and the urgent, non-negotiable need of the

    senior citizen for both maintenance and the restoration of her

    property rights, I am of the opinion that further stay would only

    serve to prolong the Respondent’s hardship.

    31. The request for continuation of interim relief, therefore, does

    not warrant consideration and is accordingly rejected.

    [SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.]

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