Jammu & Kashmir High Court – Srinagar Bench
Farooq Ahmad Mir (70 Years) vs Habib Ul-Llah Bhat on 6 May, 2026
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
CM(2562/2026)
In CM(M) 147/2026
CM(2563/2026)
Reserved on: 5th May, 2026.
Pronounced on: 6th May,2026
Uploaded on: 7th May,2026
Whether operative part or full
judgment has been pronounced: Full
Farooq Ahmad Mir (70 years) ...Petitioner(s)
S/o Late Rahim Mir
R/o Lalpora, District Kupwara.
Through: Mr. S M. Saleem, Advocate.
Vs.
1. Habib Ul-llah Bhat. ...Respondent(s)
2. Noor-u-Allh Bhat
S/o Saif-ul-llah Bhat
R/o: TehsIl Lalpora, Lolab
District: Kupwara
3. Mushtaq Ahmad Mir
S/o: Rahim Mir
R/o: Lalpora Lolab, District Kupwara.
Through:
CORAM:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Wasim Sadiq Nargal, Judge.
JUDGMENT
CM(M) 147/2026;
01. The petitioner, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, seeks setting
aside of order dated 28.02.2026 passed by the learned Principal
District Judge, Kupwara, whereby the appellate Court has
Page 1 of 8 CM(M) 147/2026
dismissed the miscellaneous appeal preferred by the petitioner and
upheld the order dated 30.05.2024 passed by the learned Munsiff,
Sogam, granting interim injunction in favour of the
plaintiffs/respondents, which is also impugned in the instant
petition.
02. The factual matrix of the case is that the respondents
herein had instituted a suit for permanent injunction before the
learned Trial Court, asserting possession over the suit property,
comprising land, building, and an access pathway. Along with the
suit, an application for interim relief was filed, which came to be
allowed initially by way of an ex-parte order dated 28.12.2023 and
subsequently confirmed vide order dated 30.05.2024 after hearing
both sides.
03. The petitioner herein/defendants, being aggrieved of the
said order, preferred miscellaneous appeal before the learned
Principal District Judge, Kupwara. The appellate Court, after
appreciating the record and considering the rival submissions,
dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the Learned Munsif
Sogam dated 30.05.2024, primarily on the ground that the plaintiffs
had succeeded in establishing a prima facie case of possession and
that the balance of convenience lay in maintaining status quo.
04. Heard and considered.
05. The principal contention raised by the petitioner before
this Court is that both the Courts below have erred in placing
reliance upon an unregistered and unstamped agreement to sell,
which, according to the petitioner, does not confer any right, title, or
interest in immovable property and is inadmissible in evidence. It is
further contended that the property in question is joint and
undivided, and therefore incapable of lawful alienation.
Page 2 of 8 CM(M) 147/2026
06. This Court is not inclined to accept the aforesaid
contention for more than one reason, as although an agreement to
sell does not confer title, it may nonetheless be relied upon for
collateral purposes, including for determining the nature of
possession. It is well settled that at the stage of consideration of an
application for temporary injunction, the Court is not required to
conclusively determine title. The enquiry is limited to the existence
of a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and likelihood of
irreparable injury.
07. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Zenit Mataplast (P) Ltd. v.
State of Maharashtra, reported as(2009) 10 SCC 388 has held as
under:
“Interim order is passed on the basis of prima facie findings,
which are tentative. Such order is passed as a temporary
arrangement to preserve the status quo till the matter is decided
finally, to ensure that the matter does not become either
infructuous or a fait accompli before the final hearing. The object
of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against
injury by violation of his right for which he could not be
adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if
the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial.”
08. A plain reading of judgment supra makes it clear that it is
evident that an interlocutory injunction rests on prima facie and
tentative findings and is intended only as a temporary measure to
preserve the status quo pending final adjudication. Its purpose is to
ensure that the proceedings do not become infructuous or render
the final relief illusory, while safeguarding the plaintiff from
irreparable injury that may not be adequately compensated by
damages if the matter is ultimately decided in his favour.
09. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P)
Ltd., reported as1990 Supp SCC 727 has held as under:
“The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise
of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellatePage 3 of 8 CM(M) 147/2026
court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court
of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where
the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily,
or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the
settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of
interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of
discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court
will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion
different from the one reached by the court below if the one
reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material.
The appellate court would normally not be justified in
interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on
the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it
would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has
been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial
manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a
different view may not justify interference with the trial court’s
exercise of discretion.”
10. Applying the aforesaid settled principles to the facts of the
present case, this Court finds no ground whatsoever warranting
interference with the discretionary order passed by the learned Trial
Court. The question as to whether the plaintiff had made out a
prima facie case, whether the balance of convenience lay in his
favour and whether irreparable loss would ensue in the event
interim protection was denied, already stands examined by the Trial
Court upon appreciation of the material placed before it. This Court,
while exercising supervisory/appellate jurisdiction, cannot reassess
the material on record as if sitting in appeal over the subjective
satisfaction arrived at by the court of first instance merely because
another view may also be possible.
11. The jurisdiction of this Court is confined only to examining
whether the discretion exercised by the Trial Court suffers from
patent arbitrariness, perversity, capriciousness or disregard of
settled principles governing grant or refusal of interlocutory
injunctions. No such infirmity has been demonstrated in the
impugned order. The view taken by the learned Trial Court is a
reasonably possible view borne out from the material available on
Page 4 of 8 CM(M) 147/2026
record and, therefore, this Court would refrain from substituting its
own discretion in place of that exercised by the Trial Court.
12. Furthermore, from a bare perusal of the orders passed by
the Courts below i.e, learned Principal District Judge, Kupwara, and
the learned Munsiff, Sogam, demonstrates that the primary
consideration which weighed with both the Courts was the factum
of peaceful use and possession of the suit property by the plaintiffs
therein. In a suit for simpliciter injunction, possession assumes
paramount importance. Even a person without perfect title, if found
in settled possession, is entitled to protection against unlawful
interference except in accordance with law.
13. The argument relating to inadmissibility of the agreement
to sell, though legally sound in the context of title, cannot be
stretched to negate the limited use of such document for collateral
purposes, particularly for assessing the nature and character of
possession. Both the Courts below have relied upon the said
document only to the extent of prima facie possession, which cannot
be said to be impermissible.
14. Hon’ble Supreme Court in S. Kaladevi v. V.R.
Somasundaram, reported as (2010) 5 SCC 401 has held that an
unregistered document affecting immovable property, though
required to be registered under the Registration Act, 1908 or the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882, may nevertheless be admitted in
evidence for a limited purpose, namely as evidence of a contract in a
suit for specific performance or as proof of any collateral transaction
which is not required to be effected by a registered instrument. The
relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under:
“The main provision in Section 49 provides that any
document which is required to be registered, if not registered, shall
not affect any immovable property comprised therein nor such
document shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting
such property. The proviso, however, would show that anPage 5 of 8 CM(M) 147/2026
unregistered document affecting immovable property and required
by the 1908 Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be
registered may be received as an evidence to the contract in a suit
for specific performance or as evidence of any collateral
transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument.
By virtue of the proviso, therefore, an unregistered sale deed of an
immovable property of the value of Rs 100 and more could be
admitted in evidence as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific
performance of the contract. Such an unregistered sale deed can
also be admitted in evidence as an evidence of any collateral
transaction not required to be effected by registered document.
When an unregistered sale deed is tendered in evidence, not as
evidence of a completed sale, but as proof of an oral agreement of
sale, the deed can be received in evidence making an endorsement
that it is received only as evidence of an oral agreement of sale
under the proviso to Section 49 of the 1908 Act. ”
15. A plain reading of the aforesaid judgment makes it clear
that reliance on an unregistered agreement is permissible to the
limited extent of assessing the nature and character of possession,
being a collateral purpose in law.
16. This Court has no hesitation in holding that the Courts
below have committed no error in taking such material into
consideration at the prima facie stage.
17. The plea that the property is joint and undivided raises
disputed questions of fact, which cannot be adjudicated in
proceedings of this nature, much less at the interlocutory stage.
Such issues necessarily require appreciation of evidence and are to
be decided during trial.
18. It is trite that this Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 227, does not re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own
view merely because another view is possible. This Court does not
sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the Courts below and
interference is warranted only where there is patent perversity,
gross illegality, or failure of justice resulting from jurisdictional
error.
Page 6 of 8 CM(M) 147/2026
19. Hon’ble Supreme Court recently P.Suresh Vs.
D.Kalaivani & Ors. reported as 2026 SCC OnLine SC 143 has
held as under:
“The scope, ambit, amplitude and nature of the powers of a
High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution are discussed
and delineated by this Court in catena of decisions. Article 227
is perceived to be a custodian of justice, which is in the nature
of extraordinary supervisory powers, discretionary in nature.
In Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, this
Court cautioned that an improper and frequent exercise of this
power will be counterproductive and would divest this
extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. It was
observed that this discretionary power has to be exercised very
sparingly.”
20. In similar facts and circumstances Hon’ble the Supreme
Court in Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ram
Tahel Ramnand, reported as (1972) 1 SCC 898 held as
under:
“Article 227 of the Constitution no doubt does not confer on
the High Court power similar to that of an ordinary Court of
appeal. The material part of this article substantially
reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of
India Act, 1915 except that the power of superintendence has
been extended by this article to Tribunals as well. Section 107
according to preponderance of judicial opinion clothed the
High Courts with a power of judicial superintendence apart
from and independently of the provisions of the other laws
conferring on them revisional jurisdiction. The power under
Article 227 of the Constitution is intended to be used
sparingly and only in appropriate cases, for the purpose of
keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the
bounds of their authority and, not for correcting mere errors.”
21. Furthermore, Hon’ble Apex Court in Koyilerian Janaki
v. Rent Controller (Munsiff), Cannanore, reported as (2000) 9
SCC 406 observed as under:
“The power under Article 227 is exercisable where it is found
by the High Court that due to a certain grave error an
injustice has been caused to a party.”
Page 7 of 8 CM(M) 147/2026
22. The petitioner has failed to point out any patent illegality,
jurisdictional error, or perversity in the concurrent findings
recorded by the Courts below.
23. Viewed thus, the impugned order dated 28.02.2026 passed
by the learned Principal District Judge, Kupwara, and also order
dated 30.05.2024 passed by Learned Munsiff Sogam do not suffer
from any infirmity warranting interference. The same reflect proper
application of mind and are in consonance with settled principles
governing grant of temporary injunction.
24. Consequently, the present petition, being devoid of merit,
is accordingly dismissed along with all connected applications. The
orders passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Kupwara, and
the learned Munsiff, Sogam Court are upheld.
25. It is, however, clarified that any observation made herein is
only for the purpose of adjudication of the present petition and shall
not be construed as an expression on the merits of the case. The
Trial Court shall decide the suit independently on the basis of
evidence led by the parties.
(Wasim Sadiq Nargal)
Judge
SRINAGAR:
06.05.2026
“HAMID”
Whether Judgment is Speaking? Yes
Whether Judgment is Reportable? Yes.
Page 8 of 8 CM(M) 147/2026
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