Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rccpl Private Limited vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 5 May, 2026
Author: Vivek Rusia
Bench: Vivek Rusia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:33936
1 RP-800-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK RUSIA
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PRADEEP MITTAL
REVIEW PETITION No. 800 of 2026
RCCPL PRIVATE LIMITED
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Kishore Shrivastava, Senior Advocate with Ms. Aditi
Shrivastava, Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Piyush Jain, G. A. for the State.
ORDER
Reserved on: 21.04.2026.
Pronounced on: 05.05.2026
Per: Justice Pradeep Mittal
This petition is filed seeking review of the order dated 09.04.2026
passed in W.P. No. 10517 of 2026.
2. The review petitioner submits that the judgment under review
suffers from errors of law and non-consideration of material submissions,
warranting reconsideration. It is undisputed that no minerals were extracted
or consumed; therefore, the demand for royalty is unsustainable, as royalty
under Section 9 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation)
Act, 1957 arises only upon actual removal or consumption of minerals. The
judgment erroneously equates dead rent with royalty without examining the
relevant statutory provisions.
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SINGH PARIHAR
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3. The petitioner had contended that performance of the contract
(MDPA) was contingent upon obtaining statutory approvals, including
environmental clearance (EC). In the absence of such approvals, mining
operations could not legally commence, and thus no breach could be
attributed to the petitioner. Reliance was placed on Sections 32 and 56 of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872 to establish that the contract was either contingent
or incapable of performance. These arguments, however, were not
considered.
4. It was further argued that contractual obligations are subordinate
to statutory law, and any interpretation contrary to law renders the contract
unenforceable. Additionally, the petitioner highlighted that the impugned
demand was issued without jurisdiction, as the authority to initiate
proceedings lies with the State Government, not the Collector, and that the
petitioner’s detailed reply to the show cause notice was ignored, rendering
the demand arbitrary.
5. The petitioner also relied on relevant contractual clauses requiring
compliance with applicable law and obtaining approvals before commencing
mining operations. Despite this, the Respondents failed to justify how
royalty could be levied without lawful mining activity.
6. Further, the judgment’s finding that one year was sufficient to
obtain approvals is unsupported by evidence. In reality, delays were
attributable to statutory authorities, and relevant case law supporting this
position was not considered, causing prejudice to the Petitioner.
7. The petitioner also contended that the contractual period for
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performance should commence only after entitlement to mine arises, and that
the initial period is meant for preparatory activities, not extraction. This was
overlooked, and incorrect assumptions were read into the agreement.
8. Finally, it is submitted that the writ petition was dismissed without
affording an opportunity for a full hearing or seeking a response from the
respondents. The petitioner expresses willingness to deposit the disputed
amount as an interim measure and seeks a fair reconsideration of the matter
after proper examination of all submissions and applicable law.
Heard the petitioner and the Government Advocate for the State.
9. Case of the petitioner is that the petitioner was granted the
prospecting licence on 03.3.20081 for limestone over an area of 1306.945
hectares situated in village Itoura, Chakbandi and other adjoining area of
Tahsil Raghurajnagar, District Satna. Thereafter, the petitioner applied for
grant of mining lease over an area measuring 795.942 hectares in the
aforesaid region. The respondent No.1granted an approval for mining lease
in favour of petitioner for a period of 50 years on 03.1.2018 under section
6(1)(c) of the MMDR Act subject to submission of mining plan. The
petitioner applied for environmental clearance before the Ministry of
Environment, Forest & Climate Change (MOEF) on 06.12.2018. The
petitioner was granted the mining lease by the State of Madhya Pradesh on
25.9.2020 subject to the condition that the petitioner shall obtain all consents,
approvals, permissions, licences under the applicable laws prior to
commencement of mining operations under the Mineral Concession Rules,
2016. In pursuant to the aforesaid grant of mining lease the petitioner
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submitted a performance security for Rs.9,62,55,597/- by way of the Bank
Guarantee. The Mining Lease deed was executed on 12.11.2020 and the
same was registered on 27.11.2020. The petitioner submitted an application
under Rule 20(3) of the Minerals (Other than Atomic & Hydro Carbons
Energy Minerals) Concession Rules, 2016 seeking extension of time for
commencement of production on the ground of obtaining environmental
clearance. Finally, the environmental clearance was granted on 30.6.2023.
Thereafter, the petitioner started the mining operations. In view of sub-clause
(i) of Clause 1.0 of Chapter-I of Mining Plan & Progressive Mine Closure
Plan of Itoura Limestone Deposit was approved by letter dated 27.11.2019, it
was anticipated that one to two years will be taken for obtaining
environmental clearance, CTO and permissions to enter upon the land.
Therefore, the petitioner was aware well in advance that one- or two-years
relaxation period will be granted to it to obtain the clearance etc. before
starting the mining activities.
10. The petitioner was served with a demand notice dated 04.10.2024
by the Collector, District Satna stating that as per MDPA agreement and
Mining Schemes the petitioner has not deposited total royalty amounting to
Rs.3,65,31,040/-, therefore, why the performance security amount be not
forfeited. It was alleged that petitioner has failed to achieve the production of
30% of the Mining Scheme in the financial year 2022-23. The petitioner has
neither achieved the 40% production for the financial year 2023-24 nor
deposited the royalty amount. On the ground of breach of MPDA the
petitioner was called upon to deposit the alleged royalty amount
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ofRs.1,09,31,040/- for financial year 2022-23 and Rs.2,56,00,000/- for
financial year 2023-24 within seven days, due to failure to achieve minimum
production requirement prescribed under the mining Plan. As per notice there
was no demand for years 2020-21 and 2021-22. When the petitioner
deposited aforesaid amount, another notice dated 24.2.2026 was issued to
show-cause as to why performance security be not confiscated in favour of
Government of Madhya Pradesh under clauses 4.3.3 and 8.3 of the MPDA
for not discharging the liability of paying Rs.5,30,41,305/-. The petitioner
submitted a reply challenging the jurisdiction of the respondent No.2.
11. The contention of Shri Shrivastava learned senior counsel is
liable to be accepted that the petitioner could not perform the mining
operations for want of environmental clearance and mining activities. For
obtaining such clearance and completing other formalities, the petitioner was
already granted two years relaxation in achieving the minimum target. As
per Schedule-D which pertains to Minimum Production Requirement the
petitioner was required to make minimum production.
12. This Court while dismissing the W.P. No. 10517 of 2026, has
observed that the issue had previously arisen in cases concerning the levy of
dead rent due to the non-commencement of mining activities. In that batch of
cases, a similar plea was raised, namely that production could not commence
due to delays in obtaining environmental clearance and permission to enter
the mining areas. However, this plea was rejected by this Court in M.P.
Bricks Company vs. State of M.P. & Others (W.P. No. 3601/2021, decided
on 28.01.2026) and in other similar matters. Therefore, in our view, the
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respondents were justified in issuing the demand notice to the petitioner,
failing which the Bank Guarantee/Performance Guarantee is liable to be
encashed.
13. The petitioner places heavy reliance on the judgment reported as
2025 Supreme (Chh) 376: 2025: CGHC:50601-DB, JSW Steel Limited v.
Union of India and others, specifically paragraphs 29 to 31, which are
reproduced herein below.
” 29. A careful perusal of clause 5.18 of the mining lease deed
would reveal that the petitioner/lessee would not carry mining
operations till such time it gets the EC, as required under the
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and that will be incorporated
in the supplementary agreement. As such, clause 5.18 has also
prohibited the petitioner from commencing mining operations
without obtaining requisite EC. Thus, from the aforesaid
discussion, it is quite apparent that,
1. There was a legislative/statutory injunction under Section 4(1)
of the MMDR Act to commence mining operations and the terms
and conditions of the mining lease deed also prohibited the
petitioner from commencing mining operations, as any violation
of such a legislative/ statutory injunction would entail criminal
proceedings under Section 21(1) and civil consequences under
Section 21(5) of the MMDR Act. In this regard, the decision of
the Supreme Court in the matter of MD, Army Welfare Housing
Organisation v. Sumangal Services (P) Ltd., (2004) 9 SCC 619
may be noticed herein in which their Lordships have held that no
party would be held responsible for failing to meet its contractual
obligation when it was faced with a statutory/ legislative
injunction, and observed as under:-
“110. Impossibility to fulfil the contractual obligation may arise in
different fact situations.
111. Statutory injunction by a statutory authority may be one of
such causes. A building bye-law must be scrupulously followed.
Violation of Section 204 of the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993
attracts penal provisions contained in Section 440. It is, therefore,
mandatory in nature. The correspondences between AWHO and
the Municipality clearly show that even infrastructural works were
not permitted to be carried out. Sumangal, therefore, cannot be
said to have committed any illegality in complying with the stop-
work notice. To what extent it committed breach of the terms of
the contract, assuming that it could have carried out some job as
pointed out by AWHO would depend upon the commercial
viability as a large number of workmen were to be engaged
although it cannot carry out the major construction work, whichSignature Not Verified
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was a relevant factor for determining the quantum of damages.
Sumangal might have been partially liable but it cannot be faulted
when it refused to carry out any constructional work in violation
of the stop-work notice which would attract the penal provisions
of Section 440 of the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993.”
2. Clause 5.18 of the mining lease deed (Annexure P-2)
unequivocally restrains the petitioner from starting mining
operations without obtaining environmental clearance.
3. Similarly, proviso to clause 2 of the Order of 2017 also
prohibited the petitioner from commencing mining operations
stating that no mining activity shall commence unless and until the
applicant/petitioner obtains environmental clearance as laid down
under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and the rules made
thereunder.
30. A conjoint reading of Sections 4(1), 4A(4), 21(1) and 21(5)
of the MMDR Act along with the proviso appended to clause 2 of
the Order of 2017 and clause 5.18 of the mining lease deed
(Annexure P- 2) would clearly demonstrate that though the
petitioner was granted mining lease by the respondent herein, but
immediate commencement of mining operation was not
contemplated unless and until it obtains environmental clearance
as laid down under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and
the rules made thereunder. Therefore, the statutory period of two
years has not begun to run and the fundamental pre-conditions for
invoking Section 4A(4) of the MMDR Act are wholly absent/
missing, as the petitioner has expressly been injuncted by Section
4A(4), clause 5.18 of the mining lease deed and proviso to clause
2 of the Order of 2017 to carry out mining operations unless and
until it obtains environmental clearance as laid down under the
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and the rules made
thereunder. In other words, the statutory prohibition under the
Order of 2017 dated 4-1-2017 as well as the explicit terms of the
lease deed prevented the petitioner from carrying out mining
operations until the EC is obtained and in the event the petitioner
had commenced mining operations without obtaining EC, it would
have been in direct violation of the Order of 2017 as well as
clause 5.18 of the mining lease deed as also the statutory bar under
Section 4(1) of the MMDR Act and such a violation would have
subjected the petitioner to both criminal prosecution under Section
21(1) and civil liabilities under Section 21(5) of the MMDR Act.
31. Section 4A(4) of the MMDR Act would be applicable only
in cases where a lessee, despite being legally permitted to do so,
fails to commence mining operations within two years of the grant
of the lease. In the present case, as held in the earlier paragraphs,
the petitioner was expressly prohibited from carrying out mining
operations until EC is obtained. Since the statutory condition
precedent for exercise of power under Section 4A(4) of the
MMDR Act is a mining lease which permits commencement of
mining operations and in absence of which the proceeding under
Section 4A(4) of the MMDR Act could not have been initiated
against the petitioner.”
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14. The petitioner places reliance on the judgment in M.M. Thomas
v. State of Kerala, (2000) 1 SCC 666 , particularly paragraph 14, which is
reproduced below.
“14. The High Court as a court of record, as envisaged in Article
215 of the Constitution, must have inherent powers to correct the
records. A court of record envelops all such powers whose acts
and proceedings are to be enrolled in a perpetual memorial and
testimony. A court of record is undoubtedly a superior court which
is itself competent to determine the scope of its jurisdiction. The
High Court, as a court of record, has a duty to itself to keep all its
records correctly and in accordance with law. Hence, if any
apparent error is noticed by the High Court in respect of any
orders passed by it the High Court has not only power, but a duty
to correct it. The High Court’s power in that regard is plenary. In
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1967 SC 1
: (1966) 3 SCR 744] a nine-Judge Bench of this Court has
recognised the aforesaid superior status of the High Court as a
court of plenary jurisdiction being a court of record. “
15. Petitioner places reliance on the judgement in the case of Ashok
Kumar Pattanaik v. State of Orissa, (1998) 6 SCC 176 , particularly para no.
4 which is reproduced below:-
“4. Having given our anxious consideration to these rival
contentions we find that the decision rendered in Sisir [(1996) 7
SCC 120 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 754 had not noticed the relevant rules
to which our attention was invited by the learned Senior Counsel
for the review petitioners. Unfortunately these rules do not seem
to have been pointed out to the Court while it passed the said
order. Whether these rules had any bearing on the ultimate
decision or not is not a question for our consideration at this stage.
However, we do find that all relevant aspects of the matter which
had a direct bearing on the result of the civil appeal were not
placed for consideration of the Court when it decided the aforesaid
civil appeal. On this short ground and without expressing any
opinion on the merits of the controversy between the parties, we
deem it fit to recall the order of this Court in Sisir 1996) 7 SCC
120 and restore the civil appeal to the file of this Court for a freshSignature Not Verified
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decision on the limited question.”
16. Petitioner places reliance on the judgement in the case of Surjit Singh
v. Union of India, (1997) 10 SCC 592 particularly para no. 7 which is
reproduced below:-
“7. In the light of these directions, it is obvious that the
Government of India had prepared the seniority list. The
contention of the promotes which was found acceptable to the
Tribunal that preceding the date of amendment the Government
was devoid of power to carry forward all unfilled vacancies to the
direct recruits and that all these vacancies are meant to be thrown
open to the promotes, is clearly a misinterpretation of the rules and
on that basis the directions came to be issued by the Tribunal. This
Court had suggested on earlier occasion that vacancies meant for
the direct recruits may be carried forward for two years after the
recruitment year and thereafter the unfilled vacancies would be
thrown open to the respective cadres. Under these circumstances,
the view of the Tribunal is clearly illegal; unfortunately, the
Tribunal has wrongly stated that if they commit mistake, it is for
this Court to correct the same. That view of the Tribunal is not
conducive to the proper functioning of judicial service. When a
patent error is brought to the notice of the Tribunal, the Tribunal is
duty-bound to correct, with grace, its mistake of law by way of
review of its order/directions.”
17. There is no dispute pertaining to the power of review of the High
Court. It is true that if any error is found in the record of the High Court, the
High Court has the power to correct the record and recall its previous order.
The power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
is limited; however, the High Court has wide inherent powers to correct its
record. Secondly, in the impugned order, no incorrect facts have been
recorded. The citation of JSW Steel Limited of the Chhattisgarh High Court,
relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is not applicable to the
present case as the facts are entirely different. The present case relates to the
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minimum guarantee of royalties as per the terms of the agreement, whereas
the cited case pertains to cancellation of lease due to non-operation of the
lease.
18. It is true that the lease was not in operation as the No Objection
Certificate could not be obtained or granted by the concerned department. As
far as dead rent is concerned, if the lease is not in operation, the lessee is
bound to pay dead rent. Royalty is a consideration based on the minimum
quantity of minerals extracted from the quarry lease. If the minerals extracted
are less than the prescribed dead rent, the lessee is still bound to pay the
minimum dead rent, regardless of the reason for failure to extract the
minimum quantity of minerals. It is argued by the learned counsel for the
petitioner that his case does not fall within the purview of dead rent.
However, we are not satisfied with this submission. The lessee and lessor had
agreed that for the first and second years there would be no minimum
guarantee of royalty, but for the third, fourth, and fifth years onwards, the
minimum guarantee was fixed at 30%, 40%, and 50% respectively. This
clearly shows that the dead rent/guaranteed royalty was enhanced by mutual
agreement between the parties. Therefore, the lessee is bound to pay royalty
as per the terms of the agreement, even in case of non-operation of the lease
due to non-obtaining of the No Objection Certificate.
19. Guarantee of minimum royalty is another type of dead rent. If the
lessee cannot succeed in obtaining all clearances to begin the lease, he ought
to surrender the lease. However, if he continues to hold it until all clearances
are obtained from the department, then he must pay the minimum guaranteed
royalty as per the terms of the contract.
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SINGH PARIHAR
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20. The conditions of the lease deed/contract prevail over Section 56 of
the Indian Contract Act. If the lease could not be operated due to non-grant
of permission by the concerned department, Section 56 of the Contract Act
does not apply, as the lease deed specifically provides that the lessee is
required to pay the minimum royalty. This implies that, irrespective of the
reason for the lessee’s inability to excavate minerals, the lessee remains
obligated to pay the minimum royalty. The condition of minimum royalty is
in the nature of “dead rent,” which is imposed by agreement, and dead rent is
also recognized under statutory provisions. Therefore, there is no merit in the
submission of the learned senior counsel that royalty is not similar to dead
rent and that the lessee is not bound to pay until actual excavation begins.
The petitioner was prevented from commencing the lease operations due to
non-grant of permission by the concerned department; hence, Section 56 of
the Contract Act is not attracted in the present case.
21. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at length, this court
is of the considered opinion that it is a well-established legal principle that
the power of review is extremely limited unless there is an error apparent on
the face of the record. Nowadays review petition is being filed with the
purpose of rehearing the entire matter, which is not the scope of review. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that review proceedings cannot be
treated as an appeal in disguise, nor can they be used for rehearing the matter
or for applying subsequent developments in law. In Northern India Caterers
(India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1980) 2 SCC 167 , it was held that a
review is not permissible merely for rehearing the case on merits or because
another view is possible. Similarly, in Parsoni Devi v. State of Bihar, (2004)
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1 SCC 632, the Court reiterated that review is maintainable only in cases of
an error apparent on the face of the record, a patent mistake, or a manifest
injustice, and not merely on account of a subsequent change in law. Learned
counsel has failed to point out any error on the face of the record. This
review petition is nothing but repetition of facts and grounds which have
already been considered while deciding the main case.
22. In view of the above, there is no error apparent on the face of the
record. The review petition is dismissed.
(VIVEK RUSIA) (PRADEEP MITTAL)
JUDGE JUDGE
MSP
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Signed by: MANVENDRA
SINGH PARIHAR
Signing time: 05-05-2026
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