Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Limited vs Alok Kotahwala S/O Haridas Kotahwala on 30 April, 2026
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 502/2023
In
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.10544/2012
Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Limited, Through Its Managing
Director, Third Floor, Khanij Bhawan, Tilak Marg, C-Scheme,
Jaipur.
----Appellant
Versus
1. Alok Kotahwala S/o Haridas Kotahwala, Aged About 59
Years, R/o Kotahwala Market, Tripolia Bazar, Jaipur.
2. M/s Central Orchid Private Ltd, Through Its Proprietor And
Director Alok Kotahwala, Kotahwala Market, Tripolia
Bazar, Jaipur.
3. M/s Subh Agro Farms And Properties Private Ltd.,
Through Its Promoter And Director Pramod Kotahwala,
Kotahwala Market, Tripolia Bazar, Jaipur.
4. Gyarsilal S/o Chotmal, R/o Village Sheopura, Tehsil
Sanganer, District Jaipur.
5. State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Department Of
Urban Development, Jaipur.
6. The Jaipur Development Authority, Through Its
Commissioner, J.L.N. Marg, Jaipur.
7. The Land Acquisition Officer, Jaipur Development
Authority, J.L.N. Marg, Jaipur.
8. The Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, Through Its
Commissioner, Behind Nehru Place, Lal Kothi, Tonk Road,
Jaipur-302015.
----Respondents
Connected With
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 739/2023
In
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.10544/2012
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Department Of
Urban Development, Jaipur.
2. The Jaipur Development Authority, Through Its
Commissioner, J.L.N.Marg, Jaipur.
3. The Land Acquisition Officer, Jaipur Development
Authority, J.L.N. Marg, Jaipur.
—-Appellants
Versus
1. Alok Kotahwala S/o Haridas Kotahwala, Aged About 59
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Years, R/o Kotahwala Market, Tripolia Bazar, Jaipur.
2. M/s Central Orchid Private Ltd., Through Its Proprietor
And Director Alok Kotahwala, Kotahwala Market, Tripolia
Bazar, Jaipur.
3. M/s Subh Agro Farms And Properties Private Ltd.,
Through Its Promoter And Director Pramod Kotahwala,
Kotahwala Market, Tripolia Bazar, Jaipur.
4. Gyarsilal S/o Chotmal, R/o Village Sheopura, Tehsil
Sanganer, District Jaipur.
5. Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Limited, Through Its
Managing Director, Third Floor, Khanij Bhawan, Tilak
Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur.
6. The Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, Through Its
Commissioner, Behind Nehru Place, Lal Kothi, Tonk Road,
Jaipur-302015.
—-Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Mr.Rajendra Prasad, Advocate General
with Mr. Sandeep Pathak, Adv.,
Ms. Jaya P. Pathak, Adv.,
Mr. Sheetanshu Sharma, Adv.,
Ms. Dhriti Laddha, Adv. &
Mr. Tanay Goyal, Adv.,
For Respondent(s) : Mr. A.K. Bhandari Sr. Adv. assisted by
Mr. Vaibhav Bhargava.
Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, Sr. Adv.
assisted by Ms. Alankrita Sharma.
Mr. Kamlesh Kumar Sahu (for
respondent No.6-JDA in SAW No.
502/2023)
HON’BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA
HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE SANGEETA SHARMA
Judgment
Date of conclusion of arguments : 19/02/2026
Date on which judgment was reserved : 19/02/2026
Whether the full judgment or only
the operative part is pronounced : Full judgment
Date of pronouncement : 30th/04/2026
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REPORTABLE
(Per Hon’ble The Acting Chief Justice)
1. The appellant had preferred the Special Appeals (Writ)
before this Court being aggrieved by the impugned judgment
dated 09.05.2023 passed by the Learned Single Judge whereby
the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
dated 26.05.2011, declaration under section 6 dated 05.07.2012
and notice dated 11.07.2012 have been quashed and the
appellants have been directed not to interfere in the land under
acquisition proceedings which have been quashed and the
respondents may not be deprived of their possession and rights.
2. The present case arises out of land acquisition proceedings
initiated by the State Government for the Jaipur Metro Rail
Project. Initially, the Jaipur Development Authority (JDA) proposed
construction of a terminal depot at Bambala Nala, which included
the land belonging to the respondents. Subsequently, the project
was taken forward in accordance with the requirements of the
Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation (JMRC), and the Metro route was
extended up to Sitapura. In this regard, a Detailed Project Report
(DPR) was prepared and the land of the respondents, situated in
Village Sheopura, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur, falling under
various khasra numbers, was identified as necessary for
construction and development of a Metro depot.
3. Pursuant thereto, the State Government initiated acquisition
proceedings by issuing a notification dated 26.05.2011 under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred
to as the “Act of 1894”), covering approximately 27 hectares of
land. The respondents filed objections under Section 5A of the Act
on 27.06.2011, to which a detailed reply was submitted by JMRC.
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A copy of the reply was furnished to the respondents on
09.03.2012, and an opportunity was granted to file a rejoinder.
However, no rejoinder was filed and no appearance was made on
09.04.2012. Consequently, the objections and replies were
considered, and a report under Section 5A was forwarded to the
Government on 18.05.2012.
4. Thereafter, administrative deliberations took place at various
levels, including consultation with JMRC and DMRC officials. It was
concluded that the entire land under acquisition was required for
depot purposes, considering the expansion of the Metro line and
project requirements. The competent authority found the
acquisition to be justified and reasonable. Accordingly, a
declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was issued on
05.07.2012, followed by a notice under Section 9 dated
11.07.2012 for taking possession.
5. Aggrieved thereby, the respondents filed a writ petition, S.B.
Civil Writ Petition No. 10544/2012, challenging the notification
dated 26.05.2011, the declaration dated 05.07.2012, and
subsequent proceedings. It was specifically averred that the
acquisition was being carried out for the benefit of JMRC, the
appellant herein, and that the mandatory procedure prescribed
under Sections 4, 5A, and 6 of the Act of 1894 had not been
properly followed, thereby vitiating the entire acquisition process.
6. During the pendency of the writ petition, interim orders were
passed, including a stay on acquisition proceedings, which was
later set aside by the Division Bench in D.B. S.A.W. 1294/2012.
The matter eventually reached the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 37292/2012, which directed
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maintenance of status quo and expeditious disposal of the writ
petition. Ultimately, the writ petition came to be decided on
09.05.2023.
7. Hence, this appeal.
8. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the
provisions of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were duly
complied with, and the notification dated 26.05.2011 was
published through all modes as prescribed under the Act. It was
contended that the declaration under Section 6 dated 05.07.2012
was preceded by a detailed enquiry conducted by the Land
Acquisition Officer (LAO) under Section 5A, wherein adequate
opportunity of hearing was afforded to all concerned persons. The
respondents, in fact, availed such opportunity and filed their
objections before the LAO.
9. It is further submitted that after filing objections, the
respondents, despite appearing through counsel, chose not to
participate further in the proceedings. Consequently, the LAO
proceeded to consider the material available on record along with
the reply submitted by the Appellant and prepared a report under
Section 5A of the Act. The LAO duly considered and adjudicated
upon the objections, including issues relating to title of land,
jurisdiction of the LAO, and the public purpose underlying the
acquisition. Upon such consideration, the LAO concurred with the
reply filed by the Appellant and concluded that the land in
question was required for a public purpose, namely, development
of a Metro Depot, and accordingly recommended issuance of
declaration under Section 6 to the State Government.
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10. The Learned Counsel further submits that the State
Government, upon receipt of the LAO’s report, independently
applied its mind and considered the overall circumstances
necessitating acquisition of the land. It was observed that the
acquisition was essential in view of the length of the Metro line,
the number of stations proposed in Phase-II vis-Ã -vis Phase-I, and
the provisions contained in the DPR. After due deliberation, the
Government found the acquisition to be reasonable and justified,
and accordingly issued the declaration under Section 6 of the Act
of 1894, which, it was argued, cannot be termed as illegal or
arbitrary.
11. It is also submitted that the land in question is indispensable
for the development of a Metro Depot, which requires a large
contiguous parcel of land for construction of essential
infrastructure, including depot buildings, storm water drains,
sewer lines, electrical and signaling trenches, circulating roads,
metro lines, stations, and other ancillary structures. It was
emphasized that Phase-II of the Metro project, extending
approximately 23.099 kilometers as compared to 12.067 kms in
Phase-I, necessitated a suitably located and sufficiently large
depot, and technical experts had identified the subject land as
most appropriate.
12. The Learned Counsel further submitted that detailed replies
were furnished to each objection raised by the respondents,
including their suggestion to acquire alternate land. It was
contended that the determination of the site for a Metro Depot is a
matter within the domain of the competent authorities and is
based on technical considerations such as route alignment and
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operational requirements. Therefore, the respondents cannot
insist on acquisition of alternate land or challenge such decisions
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
13. Additionally, it was argued that the impugned order of the
learned Single Judge suffers from a fundamental error in treating
proceedings under Sections 5A and 6 as judicial or quasi-judicial in
nature, whereas in law, such proceedings are administrative. It
was contended that administrative decisions are not required to be
supported by detailed reasons unless expressly mandated by
statute, and the absence of elaborate reasoning does not vitiate
such decisions.
14. The Learned Counsel also relied upon settled legal principles
to contend that a declaration under Section 6(1) is conclusive
evidence of the satisfaction of the Government regarding the
existence of a public purpose, and the scope of judicial review in
this regard is limited. It was further submitted that the report of
the LAO is merely recommendatory in nature and is not required
to be communicated to landowners, nor is there any requirement
of affording a second hearing by the Government at the stage of
Section 6. It was contended that while the LAO is required to
apply its mind while preparing the report, it is not obligatory to
deal with each objection in elaborate detail, and the report
prepared in the present case satisfies the requirements of law.
15. Learned counsel relies on Province of Bombay v
Khushaldas S. Advani AIR 1950 SC 222; Patel Gandalal
Somnath and others v. State of Gujarat & Ors. AIR 1963
Gujarat 50 DB; Jayantilal Amrat Lal Shodhan vs. F.N. Rana
and others AIR 1964 SC 648 to submit that where there is only
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one party, the action would be administrative unless there is a
duty to act judicially and where the language of the statute
indicates with sufficient clearness that the function be regarded as
administrative function.
16. Learned Counsel also submits that in the case of Aircraft
Employees Housing Cooperative Society Ltd. Vs. Secretary,
Rural Development & Panchayat Raj. Govt. of Karnataka,
Bangalore & Ors. (1996) 11 SCC 475, the Hon’ble Apex Court
held that when the petitioner himself was absent on the scheduled
date of hearing, it cannot be assumed that the petitioner has not
been given an opportunity of hearing.
17. Further, he submits that in Abdul Hussain Tayabali etc.
vs. State of Gujarat AIR 1968 SC 432, it was held that Section
5A is only of recommendatory value and not binding upon the
Government. There is no provision for giving the second
opportunity before issuance of notification under section 6.
18. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents have
supported the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge and
submitted that the writ petitioners-respondents were not granted
fair opportunity of hearing as required under Section 5-A of the
Land Acquisition Act. It is submitted that merely because the writ
petitioners-respondents’ counsel was not present on the day fixed
for filing of the rejoinder, the LAO could not have concluded the
proceedings and sent the report to the State Government
subsequently on the next date, i.e. 18.05.2012.
19. He submits that the date 18.05.2012 was not notified to the
parties and their valuable land has been wrongfully acquired
without following the necessary requirement of hearing objections
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under Section 5A of the Act of 1894. He relies on the judgments
passed in the case of Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. vs. State of West
Bengal: (2012) 2 SCC 25.
20. Learned counsel for the respondents have further submitted
that the LAO has failed to apply his mind to the contentions raised
by the objectors and has merely recorded the reason for rejecting
the objections that the land was required for public purpose.
21. Learned counsel has also submitted that the entire record
was not examined by the State Government before issuing notice
under Section 6 of the Act of 1894. The mandatory provisions of
Section 5A of the Act of 1894 have been cursorily ignored. He
insists that the proceedings under Section 5A cannot be said to be
merely administrative in nature, but are quasi judicial in nature as
held in State of Mysore Vs. V.K. Kangan: (1976) 2 SCC 895,
Shyam Nandan Prasad Vs. State of Bihar: (1993) 4 SCC 255
and Kranti Associates Vs. Masood Ahmed: (2010) 9 SCC
496.
22. It is his further submission that the State Government also
did not apply its mind to the report of the LAO without examining
whether there is any need of the land for the purpose of
acquisition.
23. It is also submitted that a large number of trees have grown
there, and the Metro Rail project has already been completed.
Therefore, even if the land was earlier required, it now deserves to
be de-acquired, as it will no longer be put to use since the metro
rail has already been set up.
24. Section 5A of the Act of 1894, reads as under:
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[2026:RJ-JP:16521-DB] (10 of 18) [SAW-502/2023]“5A. Hearing of objections. – (1) Any person
interested in any land which has been notified
under section 4, sub-section (1), as being needed
or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for
a Company may, [within thirty days from the
date of the publication of the notification], object
to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the
locality, as the case may be.
(2) Every objection under sub-section (1) shall
be made to the Collector in writing, and the
Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of
being heard [in person or by any person
authorized by him in this behalf] or by pleader
and shall, after hearing all such objections and
after making such further inquiry, if any, as he
thinks necessary, [either make a report in
respect of the land which has been notified under
section 4, sub-section (1), or make different
reports in respect of different parcels of such
land, to the appropriate Government, containing
his recommendations on the objections, together
with the record of the proceedings held by him,
for the decision of that Government]. The
decision of the [appropriate Government] on the
objections shall be final.
(3) For the purpose of this section, a person shall
be deemed to be interested in land who would be
entitled to claim an interest in compensation if
the land were acquired under this Act.]”
25. From a perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is apparent that
where an acquisition is not required to be done for emergent
purposes, the Collector shall receive objections, and the objectors
shall be afforded an opportunity of being heard, whereafter the
Collector/LAO shall submit a report.
26. The learned Single Judge has noted that the LAO issued
appropriate notice to the objectors to raise their objections to the
proposed acquisition. Not only did the writ petitioners submit their
objections, but the JMRC also filed its response thereto. After
considering all relevant aspects, the LAO proceeded to submit his
report and rejected the objections.
27. However, we find that the learned Single Judge proceeded to
examine the report of the LAO as if sitting in appeal. It is well
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settled that, while exercising jurisdiction in a writ petition, the
Court is concerned only with the decision-making process and not
with the actual decision itself.
28. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v.
Gopi Nath & Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312 has discussed the
scope of Judicial review. The relevant observation is as follows:-
“8. But here what was assailed was the
correctness of findings as if before an appellate
forum. Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed
against the decision but is confined to the decision
making process. Judicial review cannot extend to the
examination of the correctness or reasonableness of
a decision as a matter of fact. The purpose of
judicial review is to ensure that the individual
receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the
authority after according fair treatment reaches, on
a matter which it is authorised by law to decide, a
conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court.
Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a
review of the manner in which the decision is made.
It will be erroneous to think that the Court sits in
judgment not only on the correctness of the decision
making process but also on the correctness of the
decision itself”
29. Further in the case of State of A.P. v. Sree Rama Rao,
1963 SCC OnLine SC 6; Union of India v. Dwarka Prasad
Tiwari, (2006) 10 SCC 388; Sushil Kumar v. State of
Haryana, (2022) 3 SCC 203, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held
that the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in
decision-making process and not the actual decision.
30. Learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition on the
ground of non-compliance of Section 5A of the Act of 1894. In
Kalumiya Karimmiya v. State of Gujarat, (1977) 1 SCC
715, the Apex Court held as under:
“6. Mr Dave confines his submissions before us only
to the following points; which we will deal with
seriatim.
7. First, that in spite of the appellant’s request for
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[2026:RJ-JP:16521-DB] (12 of 18) [SAW-502/2023]Collector did not grant him a copy. He further
complains that there was no proper and adequate
hearing under Section 5A(2) of the Act. According to
the learned counsel a proper hearing would include
furnishing of a copy of the report under Section 5A.
We are unable to accept this submission. Although,
ordinarily, there should be no difficulty in furnishing
a copy of the report under Section 5-A to an
objector, when he asks for the same, it is not a
correct proposition that hearing under Section 5-A is
invalid because of failure to furnish a copy of the
report at the conclusion of the hearing under the said
section. Unless there are weighty reasons, a report in
a public enquiry like this, should be available to the
persons who take part in the enquiry. But failure to
furnish a copy of the report of such an enquiry
cannot vitiate the enquiry if it is otherwise not open
to any valid objection. Apart from this solitary
ground, our attention has not been drawn to any
infirmity in the hearing under Section 5A. We are
therefore, unable to hold that the said enquiry under
Section 5-A was invalid.
8. The matter would have been different if a second
enquiry were essential under the law at the stage
when the State Government was considering the
report under Section 5-A for issuing its declaration
under SSction 6 of the Act. We are, however, clearly
of opinion that there is no reason to hold that a
second hearing by the State Government at the
stage is necessary under Section 6 of the Act. (See
Abdul Husein Tayabali v. State of Gujarat [AIR 1968
SC 432 : (1968) 1 SCR 597 : (1968) 2 SCJ 425] .)
Since that is the position in law, failure to furnish a
copy of the report under Section 5-A is innocuous.
The matter, again, may be different if there is a
proper allegation of mala fide against the Collector or
the State Government. There is no such allegation in
this case. The first submission of the learned counsel
is, therefore, devoid of substance.
9. The learned counsel next contends that there was
considerable delay between the notification under
Section 4 which was issued on June 7, 1966, and the
declaration under Section 6 made on January 13,
1969. Since numerous dags of land belonging to a
number of persons were the subject-matter of
acquisition and individual objections had to be heard,
we do not think that there has been any inordinate
delay in making the notification. Even, the appellant
has not submitted, before the High Court a copy of
his written objection nor is the same produced before
us to indicate when his objections were actually filed
and whether he was not also responsible for some
delay in the conclusion of the enquiry. The delay in
this case is only about 2½ years and, as we have
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learned counsel is also of no avail.”
31. In Sam Hiring Co. v. A.R. Bhujbal, (1996) 8 SCC 18, the
question was whether the land appurtenant to the land being used
for construction was required to be acquired. It was held as under:
“5. The question then is: Whether the appellant is
entitled to the further hearing? After the report was
submitted by the Executive Engineer with regard to
the objections raised by the appellant, the Division
Bench of the High Court has pointed out that the
Land Acquisition Officer had considered the
objections after hearing him and with a view to
satisfy himself whether the objections raised by the
appellant were tenable, he required factual material
and so he called for the report from the Executive
Engineer. The Executive Engineer’s report was
submitted clearing the position and the finding is not
adverse to the appellant but beneficial to him.
Therefore, the need to give further opportunity does
not arise nor is there any need to call the Executive
Engineer for cross-examination. Accordingly, the
principle of natural justice has not been violated.”
32. In almost a similar case from Karnataka reported in Aircraft
Employees’ Housing Coop. Society Ltd. v. Secy., Rural
Development and Panchayat Raj, Govt. of Karnataka,
(1996) 11 SCC 475 , where on the date, the landowner failed to
appear and the LAO submitted his report, the Apex Court held as
under:
“5. The next question is whether the view taken by the
High Court that the enquiry under Section 5-A is
vitiated in law, is correct? In our view, the High Court
has not correctly interpreted the legal position. It is
seen that the respondent was given opportunity thrice
to file his objections. At his instance the case was
posted for hearing on 30-11-1981 on which date
neither the respondent nor his counsel was present.
Under these circumstances, the respondent having
failed to present himself either in person or through
counsel on 30-11-1981, the omission to give a right of
hearing to him does not vitiate enquiry under Section
5-A. On the other hand, the respondent denied himself
of the opportunity of being heard. Therefore, enquiry
under Section 5-A is not vitiated by the error of law.
Consequently, the declaration under Section 6 is not
vitiated by any error of law. Shri Juneja equally is not
correct in contending that even under the unamended
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[2026:RJ-JP:16521-DB] (14 of 18) [SAW-502/2023]and therefore, the notification under Section 4(1)
stood elapsed. Admittedly, the notification under
Section 4(1) was published on 24-11-1981. The writ
petition was filed in 1982 sometime after October
1982. Therefore, the stay was granted. In the
interregnum, the Government was disabled to take
further steps and, therefore, it cannot be said that
though the stay was granted the notification under
Section 4(1) stood elapsed for non-publication of the
declaration under Section 6 within three years up to
23-9-1994. We place on record our deep appreciation
for the valuable assistance rendered by Shri Juneja.”
33. Thus, Section 6 notification cannot be said to be vitiated
solely because the LAO did not wait for the objectors to appear
again, despite their having been informed of the dates.
34. Once the LAO submitted his report stating that the
objections were rejected on the ground that the land was being
acquired for a public purpose, the same must be treated as a
sufficient decision on his part. He was not required to deal with
each and every objection individually, particularly in the absence
of any representation on behalf of the writ petitioners when the
matter was taken up on the date fixed by the LAO for filing a
rejoinder.
35. It is apparent that the LAO heard the submissions of the
representative of the Jaipur Metro and thereafter fixed the matter
for 18.05.2012 for submission of the report. If the writ petitioners
had been diligent in pursuing their objections, they would have
made inquiries with the office of the LAO and filed appropriate
applications. However, it appears that the writ petitioners
approached the Court only after the report had been submitted
and the notification under Section 6 had been issued.
36. Persons who sleep over their rights or allow proceedings to
continue without any demur cannot subsequently be permitted to
turn around and challenge the consequential actions. Once Section
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6 notice has been issued, the proceedings under Section 5A of the
Act of 1894 stand terminated and the learned Single Judge, with
great respect, has failed to address these aspects and therefore,
the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be
sustained.
37. In the case of Haryana Urban Development Authority v.
Abhishek Gupta, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2991, the Hon’ble Apex
Court while dealing with this issue held as under:
“17. The choice of different terminologies for the role
of the Collector and the role of the Government
makes it evident that the Legislature intended
different roles for each of them. The Collector has no
power to “decide” the case and can only give
“recommendations” to the Government. It is the
Government which is the ultimate arbiter for
determining whether the land is to be released or
not. No other authority can dictate the outcome of
Section 5A proceedings–neither the Collector nor the
landowner.5 While the Collector’s report can form
the “basis” of such decision, the Government is free
to independently evaluate and take a final decision,
of course, based on relevant and lawful
considerations.”
38. At the same time, while we uphold the acquisition, we cannot
lose sight of the fact that several trees are growing on the
concerned land, which also require due protection. Modern
techniques have now been developed for transplanting large trees
from one place to another. Such trees can be relocated along with
their roots and successfully regrown at another site.
39. We have a considerable amount of land available in and
around Jaipur where trees can be grown, including areas such as
Jhalana Wildlife Sanctuary as well as in and around Chandlai Lake.
Trees can also be regrown along the sides of highways. Therefore,
appropriate steps must be taken for the relocation and regrowth
of the trees existing on the concerned land.
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[2026:RJ-JP:16521-DB] (16 of 18) [SAW-502/2023]
40. One of the contentions raised by the respondents, namely
that the project is already over, is found to be wholly
misconceived. Metro rail has expanded significantly, and we have
already witnessed two phases of the metro system being
developed in the Pink City of Jaipur. We cannot lose sight of the
fact that a city evolves over years and centuries. There is a
constant increase in population, which must be catered to by
appropriate means of transportation, and metro rail systems
provide an effective solution. Recently, when the case was
reserved, we have noticed that a third phase of metro railway has
also been announced by the State Government.
41. It is noteworthy to mention that conservation of environment
and developmental activities go hand in hand.
42. Moreover, the Court has to weigh public interest vis-a-vis the
private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In the case of Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 1236, the Hon’ble Apex Court has
highlighted the same as under-
“10. Before parting with this case, we think it
necessary to make a few observations relevant to
land acquisition proceedings. Our country is now
launched upon an ambitious programme of all-round
economic advancement to make our economy
competitive in the world market. We are anxious to
attract foreign direct investment to the maximum
extent. We propose to compete with China
economically. We wish to attain the pace of progress
achieved by some of the Asian countries, referred to
as “Asian tigers”, e.g., South Korea, Taiwan and
Singapore. It is, however, recognised on all hands
that the infrastructure necessary for sustaining such
a pace of progress is woefully lacking in our country.
The means of transportation, power and
communications are in dire need of substantial
improvement, expansion and modernisation. These
things very often call for acquisition of land and that
too without any delay. It is, however, natural that in
most of these cases, the persons affected challenge(Uploaded on 01/05/2026 at 01:12:02 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JP:16521-DB] (17 of 18) [SAW-502/2023]the acquisition proceedings in courts. These
challenges are generally in the shape of writ petitions
filed in High Courts. Invariably, stay of acquisition is
asked for and in some cases, orders by way of stay
or injunction are also made. Whatever may have
been the practices in the past, a time has come
where the courts should keep the larger public
interest in mind while exercising their power of
granting stay/injunction. The power under Article
226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in
furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on
the making out of a legal point. And in the matter of
land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of
justice and the public interest coalesce. They are
very often one and the same. Even in a civil suit,
granting of injunction or other similar orders, more
particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally
discretionary. The courts have to weigh the public
interest vis-Ã -vis the private interest while exercising
the power under Article 226 — indeed any of their
discretionary powers. It may even be open to the
High Court to direct, in case it finds finally that the
acquisition was vitiated on account of non-
compliance with some legal requirement that the
persons interested shall also be entitled to a
particular amount of damages to be awarded as a
lump sum or calculated at a certain percentage of
compensation payable. There are many ways of
affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong;
quashing the acquisition proceedings is not the only
mode of redress. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of
balancing the competing interests. Beyond this, it is
neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and
trust that these considerations will be duly borne in
mind by the courts while dealing with challenges to
acquisition proceedings.”
43. We, therefore, cannot, while exercising jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, presume that land which
has been acquired would not be required for future projects
concerning the metro railway. The contention of the respondents
in this regard is, therefore, rejected.
44. However, adequate compensation has to be determined and
released to the entitled parties in accordance with the provisions
of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 as held in
the case of Indore Development Authority (LAPSE-5 J.) v.
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[2026:RJ-JP:16521-DB] (18 of 18) [SAW-502/2023]
Manoharlal, (2020) 8 SCC 129. As per the provisions of Section
24(1)(a), in case the award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date
of commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of
proceedings.
45. In view of above, we allow the appeals and set aside the
judgment dated 09.05.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge,
and direct the Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation to take possession of
the land in question.
46. However, the trees shall be transplanted and regrown at
appropriate sites to be earmarked by the Jaipur Development
Authority and the Forest Department. At the same time, the JMRC
shall also undertake additional plantation by growing twice the
number of trees being relocated from the concerned land, in areas
designated for forests in and around Jaipur, as well as near water
bodies and wetlands.
47. A report in this regard shall be filed before this Court and the
case will be listed only for that purpose in the month of August
2026.
48. All pending applications also stand disposed of.
(SANGEETA SHARMA),J (SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA),ACTING CJ
Govind/Gaurav
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