Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Gopal Lal vs J D A And Ors on 2 May, 2026
[2026:RJ-JP:17817]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2127/2008
Gopal Lal S/o Shri Kedar Lal, aged about 37 years, R/o B-10,
Tulsi Dasji Ki Bagichi, Janata Colony, Jaipur.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Jaipur Development Authority, Indra Circle, Jawahar Lal
Nehru Marg, Jaipur Through Its Secretary.
2. A.M.B. Hotels Private Limited, B-179, Ist Floor, Greater
Kailash Part-1, New Delhi.
----Respondents
3. JDA Appellate Tribunal, Indra Circle, Jawahar Lal Nehru
Marg, Jaipur.
----Proforma-Respondent
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sarthak Rastogi with
Mr. Tushar Kumar and Ms. Mansvi
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Arpit Srivastava for respondent
No.1
Mr. R.S. Mehta for respondent No.2
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE GANESH RAM MEENA
Order
Arguments concluded on :: 27/03/2026
Order reserved on :: 27/03/2026
Pronounced on :: 02/05/2026
1. The present writ petition has been filed by the
petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the
order dated 20.12.2007 passed by the respondent No. 3 – the
learned Jaipur Development Authority Appellate Tribunal (for short
“JDA Tribunal”) whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner against
auctioning of his land by respondent No. 1-Jaipur Development
Authority was dismissed.
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2. The facts borne out of the pleadings are that the
petitioner has filed an appeal before the JDA Tribunal alleging
therein that his land bearing Khasra No.128 of Revenue Village
Chainpura, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur was part of old bearing
Khasra No. 48/171 measuring 11 biswa, which was entered in the
name of late Brijmohan and was lateron recorded in the name of
Brijmohan’s son, namely, Roop Narayan. The aforesaid land of
Khasra No. 48/271 was proposed for acquisition by the erstwhile
UIT Jaipur, however, allegedly, the scheme could not be
implemented and was challenged on the ground of the land being
earmarked for extension of the Sanganer Airport.
The petitioner alleged in the appeal that the land
bearing Khasra No. 128 measuring 0.04 hectare was recorded in
the khatedari of the petitioner vide order dated 06.11.1985
passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Sanganer under the
provisions of Section 125 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act,
1956 (for short “the Act of 1956”) and the same remained under
his possession. However, allegedly, the respondent No. 1-Jaipur
Development Authority came and demolished the boundary wall
and issued an advertisement dated 06.04.2007 in the newspaper
for auctioning of the land which included the petitioner’s land and
the same was auctioned on 16.04.2007.
The petitioner filed an application before JDA Tribunal
annexing the map drawn by an approved architect superimposing
the petitioner’s land on the Khasra plan and also, filed an
application on 16.10.2007 before respondent No. 1-Jaipur
Development Authority claiming that even if it was presumed that
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the land was acquired, the same was liable to be regularized as
per the State Government’s Circular dated 26.05.2000 with
regularization charges @25% of residential reserve price.
Further, an application seeking direction to the revenue
authorities for measuring the petitioner’s land bearing Khasra No.
128 and the land auctioned by respondent No. 1-Jaipur
Development Authority was filed by the petitioner, however, no
action was taken on the said application.
The appeal filed by the petitioner finally came to be
dismissed by the JDA Tribunal vide its impugned order dated
20.12.2007.
3. In the backdrop of these facts, the learned counsel for
the petitioner submitted that the JDA Tribunal had no jurisdiction
to test the validity of the order passed by the Assistant Settlement
Officer as the same was not challenged by the respondent No. 1-
Jaipur Development Authority and thus, attained finality.
Learned counsel further submitted that no notice was
given to the petitioner by the respondent No. 1 before demolishing
the boundary wall of his land and the State Government had no
power to acquire the said land.
It is further contended by learned counsel that the JDA
Tribunal had committed an error by entitling respondent No. 2 –
A.M.B. Hotels Pvt. Ltd. for interest on the amount of Rs. 8 crores
deposited by it before the respondent No. 1-Jaipur Development
Authority.
4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent No.
1, in the reply to the writ petition, refutes the above-mentioned
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contentions and submitted that the case of the petitioner cannot
be based on his rejoinder and also, no registered sale deed has
been presented by him to prove his title.
Learned counsel further contended that the petitioner
was a rank trespasser, claiming title of a portion of the land vested
in the State and Section 83(8) of the Jaipur Development Act,
1982 (for short “the Act of 1982”) does not apply upon rank
trespassers.
It is the stand of the respondent No.2 that the land in
dispute was acquired by the respondent No. 1 on 03.06.1981 and
the possession of the same was taken on 06.07.1982, which was
much prior to the auction held on 16.04.2007 and the said
possession cannot be challenged by the petitioner, as he being a
subsequent transferee.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 in the reply
to the writ petition submitted that the respondent No. 2
participated as the highest bidder in the auction held on
16.04.2007 and his bid was accepted by the respondent No. 1-
Jaipur Development Authority vide its letter dated 23.04.2007.
Learned counsel further submitted that the respondent
No. 2 has been unnecessarily dragged into the dispute between
the petitioner and the respondent No. 1 and immense loss
suffered by it as a result of the said dispute.
6. Considered the submissions made by counsel for the
respective parties and also perused the material made available
on record.
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7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Shalini Shyam
Shetty and Anr. Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in
(2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 329 has laid down
principles to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Apex Court in para 49 has
observed as under:-
“49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of
this Court, the following principles on the
exercise of High Court’s jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution may be formulated:
(a) A petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is different from a petition under
Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by
High Court under these two Articles is also
different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227
cannot be called a writ petition. The history of
the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High
Courts is substantially different from the history
of conferment of the power of Superintendence
on the High Courts under Article 227 and have
been discussed above.
(c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in
exercise of its power of superintendence under
Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the
orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor
can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of
appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal
subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative
statutory mode of redressal has been provided,
that would also operate as a restrain on the
exercise of this power by the High Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High
Courts in exercise of its power of
superintendence have been repeatedly laid down
by this Court. In this regard the High Court must
be guided by the principles laid down by the
Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam
Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam
Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by
subsequent Constitution Benches and various
other decisions of this Court.
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(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh
(supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High
Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of
superintendence can interfere in order only to
keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it,
“within the bounds of their authority”.
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by
such tribunals and Courts by exercising
jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not
declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is
vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and
(f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its
power of superintendence when there has been a
patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and
Courts subordinate to it or where there has been
a gross and manifest failure of justice or the
basic principles of natural justice have been
flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence
High Court cannot interfere to correct mere
errors of law or fact or just because another view
than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts
subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other
words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly
exercised.
(i) High Court’s power of superintendence under
Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It
has been declared a part of the basic structure of
the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this
Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union
of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261
and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional
amendment is also very doubtful.
(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of
a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of
the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure
Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and
cannot cut down the ambit of High Court’s power
under Article 227. At the same time, it must be
remembered that such statutory amendment
does not correspondingly expand the High
Court’s jurisdiction of superintendence under
Article 227.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to be
exercised on equitable principle. In an
appropriate case, the power can be exercised
suo motu.
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(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and
unfettered power of the High Court under Article
227, it transpires that the main object of this
Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial
control by the High Court on the administration
of justice within its territory.
(m) The object of superintendence, both
administrative and judicial, is to maintain
efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the
entire machinery of justice in such a way as it
does not bring it into any disrepute. The power
of interference under this Article is to be kept to
the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice
does not come to a halt and the fountain of
justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to
maintain public confidence in the functioning of
the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High
Court.
(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial
intervention is not to be exercised just for grant
of relief in individual cases but should be
directed for promotion of public confidence in the
administration of justice in the larger public
interest whereas Article 226 is meant for
protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the
power under Article 227 may be unfettered but
its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial
discipline pointed out above.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this
power will be counter-productive and will divest
this extraordinary power of its strength and
vitality.”
8. The learned JDA Tribunal after examining the complete
record has held that the petitioner could not establish his
possession and title over the land-in-question. The learned JDA
Tribunal has observed that the petitioner has raised a dispute on
the basis of some entry in the record made pursuant to the order
dated 06.11.1985 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer,
Jaipur, Sanganer under the provisions of Section 125 of the Act of
1956 existing on that date, which lateron stands repealed.
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9. As per the facts on record, when the acquisition
proceedings were initiated and notification under Section 4 of the
Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (for short “the Act of 1953”)
was issued on 21.08.1969, the land was recorded in the name of
Brijmohan. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1953 was
made on 28.02.1973 and the award was passed on 03.06.1981 for
6 biswa of the land for the reason that 5 biswa of the land was
already acquired by the PWD for construction of the road and
therefore, the award was passed as regards the remaining land
measuring 6 biswa as is evident from para 7 of the award dated
03.06.1981 (Annexure-3). The possession of the land is also said
to be taken by the Land Acquisition Officer on 06.07.1982 and the
said acquisition proceedings were never said to have been
challenged either by the erstwhile owner Brijmohan and his
successor or by the present petitioner and the acquisition
proceedings became absolute and the Jaipur Development
Authority become the owner.
10. The petitioner is claiming the land on the basis of order
dated 06.11.1985 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer
under Section 125 (now stands repealed) of the Act of 1956.
11. The then existing Section 125 of the Act of 1956 relates
to the settlement of the dispute as to the entries in the record of
the rights. Since there was an acquisition of the land-in-question
and the award has already been passed in the year 1981 and the
Jaipur Development Authority has become absolute owner of the
land-in-question, any settlement of the dispute regarding land-in-
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question by the petitioner or Brijmohan has no bearing on the land
acquisition and the possession being taken by the Jaipur
Development Authority for the reason that at the relevant time the
Jaipur Development Authority was in possession over the land-in-
question, therefore, the order dated 06.11.1985 (Annexure-1) is
contrary to the record and passed in the back of the Jaipur
Development Authority and therefore, the same cannot be made
effective and enforceable against the Jaipur Development
Authority. As per the facts stated in the order dated 06.11.1985
(Annexure-1), the land-in-question was initially recorded in the
name of Roop Narayan- the successor of Brijmohan and when the
acquisition proceedings were drawn for the land-in-question, no
objection was made by Brijmohan or his successor and the award
was passed accordingly. Once the award has been passed by the
Land Acquisition Officer over the land-in-question and the
possession has already been taken by the Jaipur Development
Authority, any order as regards change in the entries of the
revenue record would be in the present facts and circumstances of
the case a misrepresentation. The provisions of Section 125 of the
Act of 1956 do not seem to be applicable in the light of the facts
of the present case.
12. The petitioner has referred a judgment passed by Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in case of Nebhan Das Versus
Banshi Lal & Ors. reported in 1979 Supreme(Raj) 131,
wherein, the Court in para No.4 has observed as under:-
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[2026:RJ-JP:17817] (10 of 18) [CW-2127/2008]“It may be pointed out that the petitioners made
an application under Section 125 of the Land
Revenue Act, which reads as under,-
“125. Settlement of disputes as to entries in
record of rights. – All other disputes regarding
entries in the record of rights shall be decided on
the basis of possession.
(2) If in the course of enquiry in to a dispute
under this section the Land Records Officer is
unable to satisfy himself as to which party is in
possession, and shall decide the dispute
accordingly.
(3) No order as to possession passed under this
section shall debar any person from establishing
his right to the property in any civil or revenue
court having jurisidiction.”
On a bare regarding of section 125, extracted
above, it is amply clear that dispute regarding
entries in the record of rights have to be decide
on the basis of possession, and the Land Records
Officer is not required to go into the question of
title. It is further clear that if any party is
aggrieved by the order passed under Section 125
of the Land Revenue Act, it shall not be debarred
from establishing its right to the property in civil
or revenue court having jurisdiction. The
Revenue Appellate Authority has no doubt
observed regarding possession of the land in
dispute as follows,-
“There is no dispute regarding possession. The
respondents have not taken objection that they
are in possession of the disputed land. Before
transfer, thereat of this land was deposited by
the transfer and after transfer the transferees
deposited the rent. Therefore, as regards
possession, there appears to be no dispute.”
However, attention may be drawn to the finding
arrived at by the learned Collector on the
question of possession. He has observed that the
land in question (land in the bed of the tank)
was not under cultivation and therefore, it was
not assessed at the aforesaid rate and further
that Singharas and lotus flowers are grown in
the land and it is used by general public for both
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bathing and washing and thus, the land in the
bed of the tank is used by the public in which no
“khatedari” rights can accrue. It appears that the
attention of the Revenue Appellate Authority was
not drawn to these findings of the Collector and
as already observed above, so far as the
Revenue Board is concerned, both the judgments
of the Board are a silent on the question. We
may point out, even at the risk of repetition, that
under section 125 of the Land Revenue Act,
under which the proceedings in question had
taken place, it was the duty of the Land Records
Officer as well as the appellate and revisional
authorities to determine the quetion of
possession. It is provided in the section itself
that the Land Records Officer is to satisfy himself
by summary inquiry as to who is the person best
entitled to possession and shall decide the
dispute accordingly. If any party is aggrieved by
an order passed under sec. 125, he has the
remedy to establish his right to the land in any
civil or revenue court. Since the Board of
Revenue for Rajasthan has not decided the
dispute on the basis of possession, we have no
alternative but to quash the impugned orders of
the Board.”
13. As per the facts on record, since the acquisition
proceedings for the land-in-question were initiated on 21.08.1969
by issuing notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1953 and
thereafter, declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1953 on
28.02.1973 and the award was passed by the Land Acquisition
Officer on 03.06.1981 and the possession of the 6 biswa of the
land was acquired by the Jaipur Development Authority in the year
1982, the aforementioned case would have no bearing on the
present case because the acquisition proceedings were completed
much prior to the order passed under Section 125 of the Act of
1956 and the possession was also taken long back.
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14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Meera Sahni
versus Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors. reported in 2008 (9) SCC
177 has observed as under:-
“23. We have also given our consideration to the
contention of learned senior counsel Dr. A.M.
Singhvi that it is a case of remand to the High
Court so as to enable the High Court to enquire
into factual aspect as to whether or not there
was a proper application and that whether or
not, permission as required, was granted by the
competent authority. The facts delineated
hereinabove clearly and explicitly prove and
establish that the same did not happen and all
the statutory requirements were totally ignored
and overlooked by the appellants and also by the
registering authority. Therefore, it cannot be a
case for remand under any circumstances. The
responsibility, if any, was on the appellants to
prove and establish that necessary
permission/NOC was granted by the competent
authority. They have also failed to prove that the
certificate, which is annexed and signed on
behalf of the Additional Magistrate/Tehsildar,
could be considered as a permission/NOC, as
envisaged under the Act. There was no valid
transfer in favour of the appellants and,
therefore, there is no question of issuing any
direction to the respondents to allot any
alternative land to the appellants. So far as the
prayer for granting liberty to the appellants to
make an application under Sections 4 and 5 of
the Delhi Lands Act is concerned, we do not
make any observation thereto except for saying
that if a statutory remedy is provided for to a
person, he is always entitled to take recourse to
such remedy in accordance with law.”
15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Sunil Kumar Jain
versus Kishan & Others reported in (1995) 4 SCC 147 has
observed as under:-
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[2026:RJ-JP:17817] (13 of 18) [CW-2127/2008]“2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
contended that under the agreement of sale
dated 05-12-1981 the respondents had received
consideration and kept the petitioner in
possession of the land and that, therefore, by
operation of Section 53-A of the Transfer of
Property Act, the petitioner is entitled to the
compensation. We are unable to agree with the
learned counsel. In a reference, the dispute is to
the title to receive the compensation. It is settled
law that the agreement of sale does not confer
title and therefore, the agreement-holder, even
assuming that the agreement is valid, does not
acquire any title to the property. It is seen that
the agreement is subsequent to the notification
under Section 4(1). The Government is not
bound by such an agreement. The inter se
dispute is only with respect ot the undoubted
owner of the property as per Section 4
notification and that, therefore, the
compensation was directed to be paid to the
respondent since he is one of the members. We
cannot find any illegality in the order passed by
the courts. However, if the petitioner has got any
claim under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition
Act, it is open to him to take such action as is
open to him under law.”
16. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in case of The
State of Rajasthan & Ors. Versus Late Shri Triloki Nath
Sahani & Ors. (S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal
No.413/1991) decided on 17.10.2023 has observed as under:-
“15. Likewise, an agreement to sale does not
create any title in favour of applicant over the
land and the agreement of the applicant would
be best make the applicant entitled for refund of
consideration money because agreement was
entered into subsequent to the acquisition
proceedings. Further, applicant was not a party
to the land acquisition proceedings at any stage,
therefore, this Court is of the view that the(Uploaded on 02/05/2026 at 10:30:40 AM)
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[2026:RJ-JP:17817] (14 of 18) [CW-2127/2008]applicant cannot be impleaded as a respondent
in this appeal”
17. The petitioner is claiming right over the land-in-
question on the basis of transfer of his name in the land records
by virtue of order dated 06.11.1985 passed by the Assistant
Settlement Officer under the provisions of Section 125 of the Act
of 1956.
The land is said to be acquired by issuing notification
under Section 4 of the Act of 1953 on 21.08.1969 and the
declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1953 on 28.02.1973 and
thereafter, award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on
03.06.1981 and the possession being taken by the Land
Acquisition Officer on 06.07.1982, the petitioner cannot claim his
rights on such transfer in view of the restriction given under
Section 3 of the Rajasthan Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act,
1976 (for short “the Act of 1976”). Section 3 of the Act of 1976
reads as under:-
“3. Prohibition on transfer of lands acquired by
State Government. – No person shall purport to
transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise
any land or part thereof situated in the State of
Rajasthan, which has been acquired by the
Government under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition
Act, 1953, or under any other law providing for
acquisition of land for a public purpose.”
18. Since the land was acquired, award was passed and the
possession was taken in the year 1982, the transfer of the land in
the name of the petitioner by order dated 06.11.1985 i.e.
subsequent to the award and possession taken by the Jaipur
Development Authority, is hit by Section 3 of the Act of 1976 and
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therefore, the order dated 06.11.1985 passed by the Assistant
Settlement Officer in opinion of this Court does not benefits him.
19. It was also argued by counsel for the respondent No.2
that as per the affidavit filed with this writ petition, the age of the
petitioner at the time of filing of the writ petition in the year 2008
was 37 years meaning thereby, in the year 1985 he was 15 years
of age and therefore, at that time he was minor. The Assistant
Settlement Officer vide its order dated 06.11.1985 has ordered to
record the name of the petitioner in the revenue record on the
basis of his possession over the land-in-question and the consent
given by the recorded khatedar Brijmohan or his successor.
Looking to the age of the petitioner at the relevant time seems
that the fact of possession shown of the petitioner in the year
1985 is wholly misconceived. A young boy of 15 years age cannot
be said to be the possession over the land-in-question and the
order of the Assistant Settlement Officer seems to be just fiscal
proceedings of papers which has no bearing in actual. After
making scrutiny of the order passed by the JDA Tribunal, the Court
finds that the findings of the JDA Tribunal are just and proper in
the facts and circumstances of the present case and does not
suffers any illegality or perversity and the findings have been
given by the Tribunal after due examination of the record and
application of mind which does not call any interference. In view
of the discussion made above, the Court finds no merit in this writ
petition and the same deserves to be dismissed.
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20. It is well settled principle of law that in writ jurisdiction
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the findings given
by the Court below or Tribunal after assessment of the evidence
available on record does not deserve interference by reassessing
or waiving the evidence.
21. Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Vinay
Raghunath Deshmukh Vs. Natwarlal Shamji Gada & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No.——-of 2026) (@SLP (C) No.8991 of
2025) decided on 24.04.2026 in para No.16 has observed as
under:-
“16. Yet another aspect that goes to the root of
the matter is that the tenants challenged the
order passed by the Appellate Bench permitting
the amendment by filing a writ petition under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is well
settled that in exercise of such jurisdiction, it
would not be open for the High Court to review
or reassess the material that was taken into
consideration by the Court while passing the
impugned order. In this regard we may usefully
refer to the decision in Raj Kumar Bhatia v.
Subhash Chander Bhatia, wherein a three
Judge Bench of this Court held as under:
“11 ……The High Court has in the exercise of
its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution entered upon the merits of the
case which was sought to be set up by the
appellant in the amendment. This is
impermissible. Whether an amendment
should be allowed is not dependent on
whether the case which is proposed to be set
up will eventually succeed at the trial. In
enquiring into merits, the High Court
transgressed the limitations on its jurisdiction
under Article 227. In Sadhna Lodh v.
National Insurance Company, this Court
has held that the supervisory jurisdiction
conferred on the High Court under Article 227
is confined only to see whether an inferior
court or tribunal has proceeded within the
parameters of its jurisdiction. In the exercise
of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High(Uploaded on 02/05/2026 at 10:30:40 AM)
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[2026:RJ-JP:17817] (17 of 18) [CW-2127/2008]Court does not act as an appellate court or
tribunal and it is not open to it to review or
reassess the evidence upon which the inferior
court or tribunal has passed an order. The
Trial Court had in the considered exercise of
its jurisdiction allowed the amendment of the
written statement under Order 6 Rule 17 of
the CPC. There was no reason for the High
Court to interfere under Article 227.”
Thus, the discretion exercised by the Appellate
Bench while allowing the amendment was not
liable to be interfered with in exercise of the
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, especially
when there was no error of jurisdiction nor a
statutory bar for permitting the plaint to be
amended based on subsequent events.”
22. The land-in-question was auctioned by the Jaipur
Development Authority and the respondent No.2 was the highest
bidder who has already deposited Rs.8,20,05,000/-, out of which,
Rs.4,90,00,000/- was refunded by the Jaipur Development
Authority on account of pendency of litigation in the JDA Tribunal
and the remaining amount of Rs.3,30,05,000/- lying with the
Jaipur Development Authority. On filing of the writ petition against
the order passed by the JDA Tribunal, the Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court vide order dated 04.03.2008 had passed an interim
order directing the parties to maintain status-quo as it exists on
that day. Because of interim order passed by the Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court, the respondent No.2 who is highest bidder in
the auction could not get possession of the land auctioned to him
till date. The land-in-question was auctioned for commercial
purposes and because of pendency of the litigation, the highest
bidder had certainly suffered a loss.
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[2026:RJ-JP:17817] (18 of 18) [CW-2127/2008]
23. Accordingly, the present writ petition being devoid of
merit, is hereby, dismissed.
24. In view of the order passed in the main petition, the
pending applications as well as stay application also stands
dismissed.
25. Since this writ petition is now dismissed, the
respondent No.1-Jaipur Development Authority is directed to
proceed further to finalize the transfer of the land to the highest
bidder. The respondent No.1- Jaipur Development Authority is
directed to issue a fresh demand notice within a period of fifteen
days from today to the respondent No.2 for depositing the balance
amount of the bid in a reasonable period. On depositing of the
amount by the respondent No.2, the Jaipur Development Authority
shall handover the possession of the land-in-question to the
respondent No.2 without any delay and preferably within a period
of fifteen days from the date of depositing the amount by the
respondent No.2 as per fresh demand notice.
(GANESH RAM MEENA),J
Ashish Kumar/
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