Anuj Tyagi And 3 Others vs State Of U.P. And Another on 1 May, 2026

Allahabad High Court

Anuj Tyagi And 3 Others vs State Of U.P. And Another on 1 May, 2026

Author: Vivek Kumar Singh

Bench: Vivek Kumar Singh

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC:99275
 
Reserved on 28.03.2026  Delivered on 01.05.2026 
 
   
 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 
 
APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 12283 of 2026   
 
   Anuj Tyagi And 3 Others    
 
  .....Applicant(s)   
 
 Versus  
 
   State of U.P. and Another    
 
  .....Opposite Party(s)       
 
   
 
  
 
Counsel for Applicant(s)   
 
:   
 
Jyoti Singh, Vijit Saxena   
 
  
 
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)   
 
:   
 
G.A.   
 
     
 
 Court No. - 80
 
   
 
 HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR SINGH, J.      

1. Heard Shri Vijit Saxena, learned counsel for the applicants and Shri Prashant Kumar, learned AGA for the State respondent.

2. Present application under Section 528 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (in short BNSS) has been preferred for quashing the entire proceedings of the Sessions Trial No.1792 of 2025 (State of UP vs. Mayank Tyagi and Others), arising out of Case Crime No.645 of 2019, under Sections 147, 323, 341, 376D, 511, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code (in short IPC), Police Station Partapur, District Meerut, pending in the court of F.T.C./CAW, Meerut as well as chargesheet dated 20.12.2019, cognizance/summoning order dated 25.01.2021 and the order rejecting the discharge application of the applicant dated 09.03.2026.

SPONSORED

3. The brief facts of the present case are to the effect that a first information report was lodged by the victim of the present case on 25.09.2019 at 15:15 hours in respect of the alleged incident dated 25.09.2019 at 10:00 AM, under Sections 147, 323, 341, 354, 511, 504 and 506 IPC, Police Station Partapur, District Meerut as Case Crime No.645 of 2019. It is alleged in the FIR that on 25.09.2019 at 10:00 AM, the victim was going to her college alongwith her friend namely Rahul. They were stopped by three unknown persons and subsequently two more unknown persons joined them and the victim was dragged in the sugarcane fields where physical assault was made and they tried to outrage the modesty of the victim. On resistance, life threat was given by the accused persons. It is also alleged that the friend of the victim was physically assaulted too by the accused persons. No one was named in the FIR.

4. The victim and her friend Rahul were medically examined on 26.09.2019, however, no external injury was seen on the body of the victim and her friend Rahul but pain and tenderness over the body of the injured was noticed in the medical report of the victim and Rahul.

5. During the course of the investigation, an application was moved by Rahul, friend of the victim, and disclosed the name of accused persons as Mohit, Anuj @ Chhotu, Mayank Tyagi and Raju. However, name of one unknown person was not mentioned in the application moved by the injured/witness- Rahul.

6. The statement of the victim was recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short Cr.P.C.) wherein she reiterated her earlier version mentioned in the FIR and stated that she was dragged into the sugarcane fields by unknown persons and Rahul tried to rescue her but he was abused by the accused persons. It is also alleged by the victim that physical assault was made by the accused persons. The victim somehow managed to escape from the place of occurrence. Similar statement was given by her under Section 164 Cr.P.C. wherein she stated that she was dragged into sugarcane fields and her clothes were torn and caste related abuses were hurled by the accused persons. Her video in torn clothes was also made by the accused persons.

7. The investigating officer on perusal of the statement of the victim converted the case from Section 354 IPC to Section 376, 511 IPC and later on, he found that 5 persons had committed the offence, therefore, he converted the case from Section 376 and 511 IPC to Section 376-D IPC and finally charge-sheet was submitted by the investigating officer on 20.12.2019, under Section 147, 323, 341, 376D, 511, 504 and 506 IPC. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of offence vide order dated 25.01.2021 and case was committed to court of sessions vide order dated 08.10.2025.

8. The applicants-accused moved an application dated 23.02.2026 before the learned trial court and claimed discharge in this case on the ground that they were not named in the FIR by the victim and their names were not disclosed by the victim in her statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. The FIR was lodged after a long delay which has not been satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. The victim and her friend Rahul did not sustain any injury in the alleged incident and no independent witness supported the prosecution case. The discharge application dated 23.02.2026 was dismissed by the learned trial court vide impugned order dated 09.03.2026.

9. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the applicants that it was the duty of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of identification but no identification test parade was conducted in the present case, therefore, prosecution has failed to prove the charges against the applicants beyond reasonable doubt. It is also submitted that as per the allegation, the accused persons physically assaulted both the victim and her friend Rahul but the medical reports of both persons do not support the case of the prosecution. The injured did not suffer any visible injury. It is further submitted that there are major contradictions in the statement of the victim and her friend and prosecution case does not inspire much confidence to frame charges in this case. There are major discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of the witnesses. Thus, the statements of the witnesses qua the genesis of the incident cannot be relied upon.

10. In this view of the matter, the case of the prosecution becomes suspicious, therefore, no reliance can be placed on their statements so as to make a case for framing charge against the applicant. It is further submitted that the place of occurrence was a busy area but very surprisingly no independent witness was produced by the police to prove the case of the prosecution. All these facts demonstrate that the occurrence had not taken place in the manner as has been depicted by the prosecution. The prosecution has failed to prove its case against the applicants-accused beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, no charge can be framed against the accused-persons. It is also submitted that the victim has not alleged in her statement that any attempt to commit rape was made by the accused persons. Therefore, no offence under Section 376-D and 511 IPC is made out and the case of the prosecution would not travel beyond Section 354 IPC.

11. To buttress his submissions, learned counsel for the applicants has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vinit Kumar and Others vs. State of U.P. and another, (2017) 13 SCC 369 and Judgment of Himanchal Pradesh High Court in the case of Liyakat Ali vs. State of Himanchal Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine HP 2125.

12. The contentions of the counsel for the applicants have been vehemently opposed by the learned AGA and submitted that a misconceived application for discharge was moved by the applicant in order to cause delay in the trial. The victim has categorically stated that she was dragged into the sugarcane fields and her clothes were torn by the accused persons, therefore, the learned trial court rightly and correctly rejected the discharge application and proceeded further under Section 147, 323, 341, 376-D, 511, 504 and 506 IPC. It is further submitted by the learned AGA that charge may be framed on grave suspicion and only a prima facie case is to be seen at the stage of framing of charge. The court cannot appreciate the evidence at this stage and it is the trial court who will examine the evidence on record and will pass a judgment accordingly.

13. I have heard the rival submissions of both the parties and perused the records.

14. Learned counsel for applicants has relied upon the judgment of Vinit Kumar (supra), wherein proceedings against the appellants-accused were quashed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court considering the fact that proceeding was manifestly attended with mala fides and maliciously instituted with ulterior motive. In the case of Vinit Kumar (supra), the complainant, her husband and son had taken different amounts totalling Rs.20 lakhs 50 thousand for business purpose from the appellants-accused and agreements were executed between them for repayment of the aforesaid amount. Several cheques were given to the appellants-accused for ensuring the repayment but on presentation of cheques, they were dishonored and complaint was filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The accused of 138 N.I. Act filed a rape case against the complainant of N.I. Act as a counter move with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance due to private and personal grudge. The rape case was quashed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

15. In the present case, the learned counsel for the applicants could not show that any previous litigation or enmity was going on between the applicants and the victim including the witness Rahul, therefore, facts of the present case are entirely different from the facts of Vinit Kumar (supra) and it cannot be said that malicious prosecution was launched by the victim of the present case. Furthermore, the victim has not lodged any FIR against the applicants. She had lodged the FIR against unknown person and participation of the applicants was disclosed during the course of investigation.

16. In the case of Liyakat Ali (supra) the appellants-accused were convicted and sentenced under Section 147, 333, 332, 353 and 506 (II) read with Section 149 of IPC and they preferred criminal appeal before the Himanchal Pradesh High Court and the judgement was passed after appreciation of evidence on record.

17. In the present case, the appreciation of evidence cannot be done by this Court since the evidence is yet to come before the trial court, therefore, facts of the present case are entirely different from facts of Liyakat Ali (supra).

18. Now, this Court will examine the contention of the applicants, i.e., whether the evidence, led by the prosecution during course of investigation, is sufficient to proceed against the applicants or they may be discharged at this stage. In order to appreciate rival contentions, the relevant provision of Cr.P.C. and B.N.S.S. may be adverted to.

19. The procedure for trial before a court of session is provided under Chapter XVIII of the Cr.P.C. and Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C., which relate to discharge and framing of charges are extracted below:-

“227. Discharge.– If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.

228. Framing of charge.–(1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which–

(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or any other Judicial Magistrate of the first class and direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, on such date as he deems fit,and thereupon such Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases instituted on a police report;

(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused.

(2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b)of sub-section (1),the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.”

20. Now, the procedure for trial before a court of sessions is provided under Chapter XIX of the BNSS and Section 250 and 251 of the BNSS are relating to discharge and framing of charge, which are reproduced hereunder:-

“250. Discharge.-(1) The accused may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of commitment of the case under Section 232.

(2) If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.

251. Framing of charge. (1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which-

(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or any other Judicial Magistrate of the first class and direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, on such date as he deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases instituted on a police report;

(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused within a period of sixty days from the date of first hearing on charge.

(2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub-section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused present either physically or through audio-video electronic means and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.”

21. The prerequisites for framing of charge were subject matter of consideration in Soma Chakravarty vs. State through CBI, reported in (2007) 5 SCC 403, and it was held that the court can frame the charge if on the basis of material on record it can form an opinion that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. The question as to whether the accused committed the offence can only be decided in the trial, and at the stage of framing of charge the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into and the said material has to be accepted as true. The paragraph no. 10 of Soma Chakravarty (supra) is reproduced hereunder:-

“10. It may be mentioned that the settled legal position, as mentioned in the above decisions, is that if on the basis of material on record the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. At the time of framing of the charges the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. Before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commitment of offence by the accused was possible. Whether, in fact, the accused committed the offence, can only be decided in the trial.”

22. The question as to when discharge of an accused would be warranted in exercise of powers under Section 227 Cr.P.C. of the Code in the light of its scope and object was considered in P. Vijayan vs. State of Kerala and another, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 398, and it was held that at the stage of Section 227 Cr.P.C., the Court has merely to sift the elements in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and if the judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 Cr.P.C., if not, he will discharge the accused.

23. The scope of exercise of powers under Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C. with regard to framing of charge/discharge again fell for consideration in Sajjan Kumar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 368, and it was held that at the stage of framing of charge under Section 228 or while considering discharge petition filed under Section 227 Cr.P.C., it is not for the Magistrate or a Judge concerned to analyse all the materials including pros and cons, reliability or acceptability thereof, and it is at the trial that the Judge concerned has to appreciate evidentiary value, credibility or otherwise of the material and veracity of various documents. The following principles were laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph no. 21:-

“21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Section 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:-

(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.

ii) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.

v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the Court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.

vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value discloses the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.”

24. The relative scope and distinction between Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C. with regard to discharge of accused and framing of charge was discussed and explained in detail in Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander and another, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460 and it was held that at the stage of Section 228, the Court is not concerned with proof, but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence and the final test of guilt is not to be applied at the stage of framing of charge. It was stated thus:-

“15………………….

It was stated thus :-

“17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the ”record of the case’ and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code.

……………….

19. At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage.”

25. In State of Tamil Nadu vs. N. Suresh Rajan and others, reported in (2014) 11 SCC 709, while considering the scope of exercise of jurisdiction and power by Court at the stage of framing of charges or discharge of accused under Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C., it was restated that no mini trial is contemplated at the stage of considering the discharge application and only probative value of materials has to be gone into to see if there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused without any requirement of going deep into the matter.

26. The exercise of powers under Section 227 Cr.P.C. of the Code and the matters to be considered and the extent of inquiry permissible on part of Court was again subject matter of consideration in Asim Shariff vs. National Investigation Agency, reported in (2019) 7 SCC 148, and it was reiterated that the judge while considering the question of framing of charge under Section 227 Cr.P.C. is to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out and the Court, at this stage, is not supposed to hold a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record. It was held as follows:-

“18. ………..

“18. Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject laid down by this Court, it is settled that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 CrPC in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are possible and one of them giving rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion against the accused, the trial Judge will be justified in discharging him. It is thus clear that while examining the discharge application filed under Section 227 CrPC, it is expected from the trial Judge to exercise its judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial has been made out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the Court is not supposed to hold a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record.”

27. The relevant considerations to be made by the Court at the stage of Section 227 Cr.P.C. of the Code were discussed in M.E. Shivalingamurthy vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, Bengaluru, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 768 and it was reiterated that the Court at this stage, without making a roving inquiry into the pros and cons, is only required to consider the broad probabilities and the probative value of material on record is not to be gone into.

28. The ambit and scope of exercise of power under Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C. of the Code, are fairly well settled. It has been consistently held that the standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording of finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of framing of charge. The test to be applied at this stage would be whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. The Court has clearly to sift the elements in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and if the trial court comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, it will frame a charge under Section 228 Cr.P.C. of the Code, if not, it will discharge the accused. At the stage of framing of charge or considering discharge of the accused, no mini trial is contemplated and only probative value of material has to be gone into, to see if there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused.

29. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rakesh Mishra (2015) 13 SCC 8, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that only charge-sheet along with the accompanying material is to be considered at the stage of framing of charges, so as to satisfy whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused. The relevant paragraph no. 7 of Rakesh Mishra (supra) is reproduced hereunder:-

“7. The major argument advanced by the State of Madhya Pradesh before us has been that the High Court traversed beyond the permissible limit while deciding the legality of order framing charges, being a pre-trial stage. Various authorities have been cited before us to prove that point. However, it would suffice to say that the law on this point is crystal clear that only charge-sheet along with the accompanying material is to be considered at the stage of framing of charges, so as to satisfy whether a prima facie case is made out. It has to be the subjective satisfaction of the Court framing charges. In our opinion, the High Court has only examined the material before it against the prevailing law to reach its conclusions. Thus, the impugned judgment may not be assailable on this ground.”

30. In the case of State (By the Inspector of Police, Chennai vs. S. Selvi and another (2018) SCC 455, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with the presumption that materials on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate such material with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose existence of the ingredients of the offences. The relevant paragraph of S. Selvi (supra) are reproduced hereunder:-

“6. It is well settled by this Court in a catena of judgments including Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609], Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra [Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 310], Sajjan Kumar v. CBI [Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371], State v. A. Arun Kumar [State v. A. Arun Kumar, (2015) 2 SCC 417 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 96 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 505], Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta [Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 265], State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2003) 2 SCC 711 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 688], Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya [Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya, (1990) 4 SCC 76 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 47] and Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038] that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 of the Code in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his rights to discharge the accused. The Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the statements and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the materials as if he was conducting a trial.

7. In Sajjan Kumar v. CBI [Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371], this Court on consideration of the various decisions about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, laid down the following principles:

“(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.

(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.

(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.

(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.”

9. In the matter on hand, the main allegation against the first respondent-Accused 2 as found in the charge-sheet is that while the complainant along with the relevant documents proceeded to the residence of Accused 1 and 2 at Door No. 28, West Gopalapuram, Chennai-86, to get back his money due to him on 20-9-2011, at about 1730 hours, Accused 1 and 2 threatened the complainant, snatched away the documents from him, denied him permission to enter into their house and threatened him with dire consequences if he entered into their house. It is relevant to note that in the complaint dated 21-9-2011 it is stated that when the complainant went to West Gopalapuram and met the accused for an enquiry about payment, the accused got furious, beat him and with the help of four henchmen pushed him out of their house. On the basis of these discrepancies, the contention of the learned counsel for the accused that the case as made out by the prosecution cannot be believed inasmuch as the material on record is not consistent. It may give rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion, though appears to be attractive, but is not acceptable in view of entire material on record. On going through the judgment of the High Court, we find that the High Court has virtually appreciated the entire material on record as if the High Court is trying a criminal case. It would be difficult to lay down the rule of universal application as to how the prima facie case should be determined. Though the Judge has got power to sift and weigh the evidence, such sifting and weighing evidence is for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out for framing of charge. The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case. At this preliminary stage, the High Court was not justified in concluding that the accused is entitled for discharge merely on the ground of discrepancy in the timings of the incident. The question as to whether Respondent 1 was present on the place of incident or not during the relevant point of time or she had been in Calcutta as sought to be argued before this Court is a matter of proof. Such fact needs to be gone into by the trial court after recording the evidence.”

31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Suo Moto Writ Petition (Criminal) No.1 of 2025, decided on 10.02.2026 has held that an attempt towards the commission of offence of rape would be made out, prima facie, if the victim is dragged towards culvert and if accused committed sexually offensive acts. The finding of the High Court that offence would be made out under Section 354-B IPC, was set aside by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

32. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the applicants that the learned trial court should have proceeded under Section 354 and 511 IPC instead of Section 376-D and 511 IPC and therefore, the order impugned may be set aside on this ground.

33. The Section 221 of the Cr.P.C., is very much clear that a court if in doubt as to which offence was committed, the court may frame charge with having committed all or any of such offences, and any number of such charges may be tried at once; or he may be charged in the alternative with having committed some of the said offences. The Section 221 of the Cr.P.C. is reproduced as hereunder:- “221. Where it is doubtful what offence has been committed 1. If a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences, and any number of such charges may be tried at once; or he may be charged in the alternative with having committed some one of the said offences. 2. If in such a case the accused is charged with one offence, and it appears in evidence that he committed a different offence for which he might have been charged under the provisions of Sub-Section (1), he may be convicted of the offence which he is shown to have committed, although he was not charged with it.”

34. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the victim has stated in her statements recorded during the course of investigation that she was dragged towards sugarcane fields and her clothes were torn by the accused persons and identity of the accused persons was disclosed during the course of investigation, therefore, a prima facie offence is made out against the applicants and they cannot be discharged on the ground that no test identification parade was conducted by the prosecution in order to prove their identity.

35. This Court is of the view that the charge can be framed on strong suspicion against the accused persons. There is no material contradiction with regard to the prosecution case mentioned in the first information report as well as in the statements of the witnesses. The statements of witnesses recorded by the Investigating Officer during course of investigation cannot be brushed aside at the stage of considering the discharge application or framing of charge. It is a well settled law that at the stage of considering the discharge application, the defence of the accused cannot be taken into consideration. The ground taken by the applicants in the present application is a disputed question of fact, which cannot be adjudicated at the time of framing of charge. This Court is of the view that the appreciation of evidence is a function of the trial court at the appropriate stage. It is crystallized judicial view that at the stage of discharge the court is to examine the materials only with a view to be satisfied that prima facie case of the commission of offence alleged has been made out against the accused. If there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence, the court can justifiably say that prima facie case exists against the accused. Marshalling and appreciation of facts is not in the domain of the trial court at the time of considering discharge application. The broad test to be applied is whether the material on record, if unrebutted, makes a conviction reasonably possible. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage.

36. Considering the facts, circumstances and material available on record, in view of the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court, this court does not find any illegality, infirmity or perversity in the impugned order dated 09.03.2026 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, FTC/CAW, Meerut.

37. The concerned trial court while passing the impugned order dated 09.03.2026 has considered all the relevant materials on record and decided the discharge application of the applicants in accordance with law in the light of well settled legal principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. The applicants have a remedy under the law to raise all such plea in his defence before the trial court at the appropriate stage.

38. In view of the above, the present application lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.

39. No orders as to costs.

40. Registrar (Compliance) is directed to send a copy of this order to the trial court concerned.

(Vivek Kumar Singh,J.)

May 1, 2026

Nitendra