Gauhati High Court
Md Sabdul Ali vs The State Of Assam And 17 Ors on 29 April, 2026
Author: S.K. Medhi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Medhi
Page No.# 1/18
GAHC010001452017
2026:GAU-AS:5972
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : Crl.A./103/2020
MD SABDUL ALI
S/O LATE ABIR HUSSAIN,
R/O- VILLAGE DAITALBORI, P.O.-DAITALBORI, P.S.- LAHORIGHAT, DIST-
MORIGAON, ASSAM.
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM and 17 ORS
REPRESENTED BY PP, ASSAM.
2:MD. SHABBIR AHMED ANSARI
S/O- TALEB ANSARI
R/O- DAITALBORI
P.O.- DAITALBORI
DISTRICT- MORIGAON
ASSAM
PIN- 782126.
3:MD. TAMIZUDDIN AHMED
S/O- LATE ALI HUSSAIN
R/O- DAITALBORI
P.O.- DAITALBORI
DISTRICT- MORIGAON
ASSAM
PIN- 782126.
4:MD. NURUL HAQUE
S/O- LATE ABDUL BARIK
R/O- KALIKAJARI
P.O- NAGABANDHA
P.S.- MIKIRBHETA
DIST- MORIGAON
ASSAM, PIN-782106.
Page No.# 2/18
5:MD. MUSTAK AHMED
S/O- ABDUL MOZID
R/O- VILLAGE MOROIMARI
P.O- GOROIMARI
P.S.- LAHORIGHAT
DIST- MORIGAON
ASSAM
PIN-782104.
6:MD. SURHAB ALI
S/O- LATE HASMAT ALI
R/O- VILLAGE LAHARIPAM
P.O.- GOROIMARI
P.S.- LAHARIGHAT
DIST- NAGAON
ASSAM
PIN- 782104.
7:MD. MARFAT ALI @ MARFAT MANDAL
S/O- LATE SABED ALI
R/O- VILLAGE KACHARIBARI
P.S.- LAHARIGHAT
DIST- MORIGAON
ASSAM
PIN- 782127.
8:MD. ABDUL MATLEB
S/O- LATE AFAZUDDIN
R/O- VILLAGE GOROIMARI
P.O- GOROIMARI
P.S.- LAHARIGHAT
DIST- MORIGAON
ASSAM
PIN- 782104.
9:MD. JALALUDDIN
S/O- LATE MAHAMMAD ALIM UDDIN
R/O- VILLAGE KALIKAJARI
P.O.- NAGABANDHA
P.S.- LAHARIGHAT
DIST- MORIGAON
ASSAM. PIN-782106.
10:MD. NAJIBUR RAHMAN ALIAS MD. NASIR
S/O- MOKBUL HUSSAIN
R/O- VILLAGE GOROIMARI
P.O.- NAGABANDHA
Page No.# 3/18
P.S.- LAHARIGHAT
DIST- MORIGAON
ASSAM
PIN- 782104.
11:MD. AINUL HOQUE
S/O- LATE SAMAR ALI
R/O- VILLAGE KALIKAJARI
P.O.- NAGABANDHA
P.S.- LAHARIGHAT
DIST- MORIGAON
ASSAM.PIN- 782106.
12:MD. NAJRUL HAQUE ALIAS MD. NAZU
S/O- LATE JUBED ALI
R/O- VILLAGE LAHARIPAM
P.O.- GOROIMARI
P.S.- LAHARIGHAT
DIST- NAGAON
ASSAM
PIN- 782104.
13:MD. MUSTAQ AHMED
S/O- LATE MOULABI MUBARAK ALI
R/O- VILLAGE GOROIMARI
P.O.- NAGABANDHA
P.S.- LAHARIGHAT
DIST- MORIGAON
ASSAM. PIN- 782104.
14:MD. NUR HUSSAIN
S/O- LATE ABDUL JABBAR
R/O- VILLAGE GOROIMARI
P.O.- NAGABANDHA
P.S.- LAHARIGHAT
DISTRICT- MORIGAON
PIN-782104.
15:MD. MAINUL HAQUE
S/O- LATE SAMAR ALI
R/O- VILLAGE KALIKAJARI
P.O.- NAGABANDHA
P.S.- MIKIRBHETA
DIST- MORIGAON
ASSAM
PIN- 782106.
16:MD. MAINUL HAQUE
Page No.# 4/18
S/O- LATE YAKUB ALI
R/O- VILLAGE LAHARIPAM
P.O.- GOROIMARI
P.S.- LAHARIGHAT
DIST- MORIGAON
ASSAM PIN- 782104.
17:MD. HIBZUR RAHMAN
S/O- ABDUL RASHID
R/O- VILLAGE HUGUTOLI
P.O.- DATIALBORI
P.S.- LAHARIGHAT
DIST- MORIGAON
ASSAM
PIN-782126.
18:MD. MOJIBUR RAHMAN
S/O- MAKBUL HUSSAIN
R/O- VILLAGE GOROIMARI
P.O.- NAHARLAGUN
P.S.- LAHARIGHAT
DIST- MORIGAON
ASSAM. PIN- 782104
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. P KATAKEY, MR J C BORAH,MS. M DEVI
Advocate for the Respondent : PP, ASSAM, MR. N B GOHAIN,MR. N SAIKIA,MRS. R
BORBORA,MR A C BORBORA
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRANJAL DAS
Advocate for the appellant : Shri P. Katakey, Advocate
Advocate for the respondents: Shri A. C. Borbora, Sr. Advocate
Shri N. Saikia, Advocate.
Ms. A. Begum, APP, Assam.
Date(s) of hearing : 26.03.2026
Date of judgment : 29.04.2026
Page No.# 5/18
JUDGMENT & ORDER
(S.K. Medhi, J )
The appeal has been preferred under Section 372 of the Cr.PC against the
judgment and order dated 31.08.2017 passed by the learned Sessions Judge,
Morigaon in Sessions Case No. 30 of 2013 acquitting the accused persons of the
offence under Section 341/302/325/34 IPC.
2. Before going to the aspect of adjudicating an appeal against an order of
acquittal, it is required to keep in mind the principles which are to be followed in
such adjudication process. The principles are judicially evolved in a catena of
judgments and one of the landmark case was rendered by the Hon’ble Privy
Council in the case of Sheo Swarup vs King-Emperor reported in AIR
1934 PC 227, wherein the following principles were laid down:
“Sects. 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to
review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded,
and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal
should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be
found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred by
the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should
and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1.) the
views of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses ; (2.) the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not
weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3.) the right of
the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4.) the slowness of an appellate
Page No.# 6/18Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the
advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that
the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance
with rules and principles well known and recognized in the administration of
justice.”
3. The aforesaid principles have been followed and reiterated in a catena of
judgments by the Hon’ble Supreme Court including the case of Ghurey Lal Vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2008) 10 SCC 450, the relevant
observations being extracted herein below:
“3. We have endeavoured to set out the guidelines for the appellate courts in
dealing with appeals against acquittal. An overriding theme emanates from the
law on appeals against acquittals. The appellate court is given wide powers to
review the evidence to come to its own conclusions. But this power must be
exercised with great care and caution. In order to ensure that the innocents are
not punished, the appellate court should attach due weight to the lower court’s
acquittal because the presumption of innocence is further strengthened by the
acquittal. The appellate court should, therefore, reverse an acquittal only when
it has “very substantial and compelling reasons.”
73. On marshalling the entire evidence and the documents on record, the view
taken by the trial court is certainly a possible and plausible view. The settled
legal position as explained above is that if the trial court’s view is possible and
plausible, the High Court should not substitute the same by its own possible
views. The difference in treatment of the case by two courts below is
particularly noticeable in the manner in which they have dealt with the
prosecution evidence. While the trial court took great pain in discussing all
important material aspects and to record its opinion on every material and
Page No.# 7/18
relevant point, the learned Judges of the High Court have reversed the
judgment of the trial court without placing the very substantial reasons given by
it in support of its conclusion. The trial court after marshalling the evidence on
record came to the conclusion that there were serious infirmities in the
prosecution’s story. Following the settled principles of law, it gave the benefit of
doubt to the accused. In the impugned judgment, the High Court totally ignored
the settled legal position and set aside the well-reasoned judgment of the trial
court.
74. The trial court categorically came to the finding that when the substratum
of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was false, then the prosecution
case has to be discarded. When the trial court finds so many serious infirmities
in the prosecution version, then the trial court was virtually left with no choice
but to give benefit of doubt to the accused according to the settled principles of
criminal jurisprudence.”
4. Subsequently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the principles
including in the case of State Of U.P vs Banne @ Baijnath & Ors reported in
(2009) 4 SCC 271. The following broad principles have been laid down:
“27. The following principles emerge from the aforementioned cases. 1. The
appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under
sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of
reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire
evidence on record. It can review the trial court’s conclusion with respect to
both facts and law.2. The accused is presumed to be innocent until proved
guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial
court. The High court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent.3.
There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for reversing an order of
acquittal.This court would be justified in interfering with the judgment of
Page No.# 8/18acquittal of the High Court only when there are very substantial and compelling
reasons to discard the High Court decision. 28. Following are some of the
circumstances in which perhaps this court would be justified in interfering with
the judgment of the High Court, but these are illustrative not exhaustive.
i) The High court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by
ignoring the settled legal position;
ii) The High court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents
on record.
iii) The entire approach of the High court in dealing with the evidence was
patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;
iv) The High court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable
based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case;
v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the
findings of the High Court.
vi) This court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case
when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order
of acquittal.”
5. Keeping the aforesaid principles laid down in mind, the present appeal is
being considered and decided.
6. The criminal law was set into motion by lodging of an Ejahar by one Samsul
Hoque (PW 5) on 16.10.2010. It was alleged that on the previous day i.e.,
15.10.2010 at about 11:30 a.m. while he and his younger brother were
travelling to Morigaon, the accused persons had dragged his younger brother
Page No.# 9/18
Azahar Uddin down from the bus after stopping the same at the road at
Goroimari Chariali. They surrounded him and inflicted grievous injuries on him
by attacking with bricks and wooden baton. The same was resisted by Khairul
and Baharul and they were also assaulted and inflicted grievous injury. At 7:00
p.m. in the evening Azahar Uddin died in the Morigaon Civil Hospital. When the
police of Laharighat Police Station went to rescue the injured person at the
place of occurrence, the accused persons had also assaulted them.
7. Based on the aforesaid Ejahar, Laharighat PS Case No. 162/10 under
Section 302/34 IPC was registered and investigation was carried out. However,
the investigation ended in a Final Report (FR) dated 31.12.2011. The report had
clearly stated that it could not be ascertained as to who was involved in the
assault.
8. The appellant had however filed a Narazi petition (protest petition) on
which the complainant was examined under Section 202 of the Cr.PC
(corresponding to Section 225 of the BNSS, 2023). Thereafter, the case was
committed and the learned Session Judge framed charges under Sections
341/302/325 read with Section 34 of the IPC and there were 5 nos. of
prosecution witnesses.
9. PW1 is one Khairul, who had stated that he was coming from Laharighat
towards Morigaon along with certain other persons including the deceased in a
407 bus. The bus was stopped when the accused persons had dragged him
along with the deceased and took them to a nearby rice mill where 16 – 17
persons had gathered and out of that, he could recognize Marfat Mandal, Hibjur,
Tamizuddin, Sabbir Ahmed. They were beaten by stick from the police who had
come there. Thereafter, they were rescued and taken to the Barsola out post.
He had sustained injury on head and other parts of the body and such injuries
Page No.# 10/18
were also sustained by Baharul and the deceased. The deceased was sent to
Morigaon Civil Hospital where he had succumbed to his injuries. In the cross-
examination, however, he had stated that as many persons had gathered there
who were not known to him, he could not recognize those persons. He had also
stated that he had only heard their names at the time of occurrence. He had
made a categorical statement that he could not remember the persons present
in the dock whether those persons had assaulted him. It may be noted that PW
1 was re-examined by the prosecution when he had proved his statement
recorded under Section 202 of the Cr.PC (corresponding to Section 225 of the
BNSS, 2023) which was proved as Exhibit 4. In the cross-examination, after
such re-examination, PW 1 had however stated that he had mentioned in
Exhibit 4, the names of some persons who were known to him from others and
that they were accosted and restrained by more than thousand persons who
had assaulted them. He had also stated that he could not exactly say
particularly who had assaulted them and that, he could not identify the persons
since there were more than one thousand persons at the relevant time.
10. PW 2 is the Doctor, who had conducted the post-mortem. He had given an
opinion that the death was caused by random public beating. The post mortem
report was proved as Exhibit 1 and the following opinion was given:
“Opinion: In my opinion the death is due to haemorrhage and shock due to
injury sustained.”
11. PW 3 is one of the co-passengers. He had however stated that he could
not recognize the accused. The said witness was declared hostile.
12. PW 4 had stated that he was travelling in the same bus. However, in the
cross-examination, he had clarified that the accused were not those persons
who were in the dock.
Page No.# 11/18
13. PW 5 is the informant, who had however disclosed that at the relevant
time, he was at his home. It may be mentioned that in the Ejahar he had given
an impression that he was travelling with the deceased in the bus. He had
stated that a dying declaration was made to him which however was not
mentioned in the FIR. He had also stated that after lodging of the FIR, the
statement was recorded in the Court. However, no such statement recorded
under Section 164 of the Cr.PC (corresponding to Section 183 of the BNSS,
2023) was produced or proved.
14. The Court had also examined a Court Witness who is the father of the
deceased and also the present appellant. He has stated that at the time of the
incident, he was at Haladhibari which was 10-11 km from the place of
occurrence when one Kadir had telephoned him and told that Khairul, Baharul
and Azahar Uddin were assaulted by the village people. He had then gone to
the hospital and asked the deceased who told him that Khairul gave a bag to
him inside a car and they had changed their positions of their seats. He had also
stated that the deceased told the names of Marfat Mandal, Hibjur, Tamizuddin
and Sabir Ahmed and he died in the hospital whereafter his nephew had lodged
the Ejahar.
15. After the aforesaid witnesses were examined, the accused were examined
under Section 313 of the Cr.PC. (corresponding to Section 351 of BNSS, 2023)
and the allegations were denied. The learned Session Judge, after considering
the materials on record, had come to a finding that there was nothing on record
to come to a conclusion of guilt of the accused persons and accordingly, the
impugned judgment has been passed acquitting the accused persons. It is the
aforesaid judgment dated 31.08.2017 which is the subject matter of challenge
in the present appeal.
Page No.# 12/18
16. We have heard Shri P. Katakey, learned counsel for the appellant. We have
also heard Shri A. C. Borbora, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri N. Saikia,
learned counsel for the private respondents and Ms. A. Begum, learned Addl. PP,
Assam for the State.
17. Shri Katakey, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the
prosecution did not conduct the case in a proper manner. He has submitted that
there were materials which should have been brought on record and proved in
accordance with law which was not done. He has submitted that it clearly
appears that PW 5 had recorded his statement under Section 164 of the Cr.PC
(corresponding to Section 183 of the BNSS, 2023) and such statement was not
brought on record. He has also submitted that the role played by the
prosecution in the trial, more particularly, the learned APP, was perfunctory. He
accordingly prays that in the interest of justice, the matter be remanded for a
fresh trial.
18. Per contra, Shri Borbora, the learned Senior Counsel for the accused has
submitted that all opportunities were afforded to the prosecution to prove the
case. He has, however, emphasized that in a criminal trial, such proof has to be
done on the yardstick of “beyond all reasonable doubt”. By highlighting the
aspect that there was re-examination of PW 1, the learned Senior Counsel has
submitted that the learned Trial Court, on its own had given due opportunity to
the prosecution to prove the case which the prosecution had miserably failed.
He has submitted that admittedly there was a crowd of more than 200 people
and none of the prosecution witnesses could prove any involvement of the
accused persons and the materials, on the other hand, would show that the
accused persons were not involved in the incident.
19. By relying upon the observations made by the learned Session Judge in
Page No.# 13/18
paragraph 10 of the judgment, the learned Senior Counsel has submitted that
the learned Judge took into consideration all the relevant materials available and
considering that the incident took place in a huge public gathering, had come to
the aforesaid finding. On the aspect of the deposition of the Court Witness, who
is the father of the deceased, the learned Senior Counsel has submitted that
under Section 154 of the Evidence Act (corresponding to Section 173 of BNSS,
2023) there is a discretion vested with the Court by use of the expression
“may”.
20. On the aspect of declaring the PW3 as hostile, reliance has been put upon
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sat Paul Vs Delhi
Administration reported in AIR 1976 SC 294 and the following observations
are pressed into service:
“51. From the above conspectus, it emerges clear that even in a criminal
prosecution when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave
of the court by the party calling him his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be
treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to
consider in each case whether as a result of such cross-examination and
contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed
in regard to a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the
credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading
and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and
care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his
testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case,
the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the
witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as matter of
prudence, discard his evidence in toto.”
21. On the aforesaid aspect of hostile witnesses, reliance has also been made
Page No.# 14/18
on the case of Pandappa Hanumappa Hanamar & Ors. reported in 1997
10 SCC 197 which had followed the earlier decision of Sat Paul (supra).
22. The learned Senior Counsel has submitted that a retrial cannot be a
matter of routine and can be directed only on exceptional circumstances. In this
connection, he has relied upon the case of Ajay Kumar Ghoshal & Ors.
reported in AIR 2017 SC 804 wherein the condition when a retrial can be
ordered have been laid down. The relevant observations are extracted herein
below:
“11. Though the word “retrial” is used Under Section 386 (b) (1) Code of
Criminal Procedure., the powers conferred by this Clause is to be exercised only
in exceptional cases, where the appellate court is satisfied that the omission or
irregularity has occasioned in failure of justice. The circumstances that should
exist for warranting a retrial must be such that where the trial was undertaken
by the Court having no jurisdiction, or trial was vitiated by serious illegality or
irregularity on account of the misconception of nature of proceedings. An order
for retrial may be passed in cases where the original trial has not been
satisfactory for some particular reasons such as wrong admission or wrong
rejection of evidences or the Court refused to hear certain witnesses who were
supposed to be heard.
12. ‘De novo’ trial means a “new trial” ordered by an appellate court in
exceptional cases when the original trial failed to make a determination in a
manner dictated by law. The trial is conducted afresh by the court as if there
had not been a trial in first instance. Undoubtedly, the appellate court has
power to direct the lower court to hold ‘de novo’ trial. But the question is when
such power should be exercised. As stated in Pandit Ukha Kolhe v. State of
Maharashtra (1964) SCR 926, the Court held that:
Page No.# 15/18
An order for retrial of a criminal case is made in exceptional cases, and not
unless the appellate court is satisfied that the Court trying the proceeding had
no jurisdiction to try it or that the trial was vitiated by serious illegalities or
irregularities or on account of misconception of the nature of the proceedings
and on that account in substance there had been no real trial or that the
Prosecutor or an Accused was, for reasons over which he had no control,
prevented from leading or tendering evidence material to the charge, and in the
interests of justice the appellate Court deems it appropriate, having regard to
the circumstances of the case, that the Accused should be put on his trial again.
An order of re-trial wipes out from the record the earlier proceeding, and
exposes the person Accused to another trial which affords the prosecutor an
opportunity to rectify the infirmities disclosed in the earlier trial, and will not
ordinarily be countenanced when it is made merely to enable the prosecutor to
lead evidence which he could but has not cared to lead either on account of
insufficient appreciation of the nature of the case or for other reasons.
13. This Court, while dealing with the question whether the High Court should
have quashed the trial proceedings only on account of declaration of the legal
position made by the Supreme Court concerning the procedural aspect about
the cases involving offences under the SC/ST Act, this Court stated, “a de novo
trial should be the last resort and that too only when such a course becomes so
desperately indispensable; it should be limited to the extreme exigency to avert
‘a failure of justice’. Observing that any omission or even the illegality in the
procedure which does not affect the core of the case is not a ground for
ordering a de novo trial”. In State of M.P. v. Bhooraji and Ors, (2001) 7 SCC
679, the Court went on to say further as follows:
8…. This is because the appellate court has plenary powers for
revaluating and reappraising the evidence and even to take additional
evidence by the appellate court itself or to direct such additional evidence
Page No.# 16/18to be collected by the trial court. But to replay the whole laborious
exercise after erasing the bulky records relating to the earlier
proceedings, by bringing down all the persons to the court once again for
repeating the whole depositions would be a sheer waste of time, energy
and costs unless there is miscarriage of Justice otherwise. Hence, the
sald course can be resorted to when it becomes unpreventable for the
purpose of averting “a failure of justice”. The superior court which orders
a de novo trial cannot afford to overlook the realities and the serious
impact on the pending cases in trial courts which are crammed with
dockets, and how much that order would inflict hardship on many
innocent persons who once took all the trouble to reach the court and
deposed their versions in the very same Case. To them and the public the
re-enactment of the whole labour might give the impression that law is
more pedantic than pragmatic Law is not an instrument to be used for
inflicting sufferings on the people but for the process of justice
dispensation.”
23. The learned Senior Counsel accordingly submits that the present appeal
does not warrant any merit and is liable to be dismissed.
24. Ms. A Begum, learned APP has however submitted that the cross-
examination of the prosecution witnesses appears to have been done after a
long gap and therefore there were certain inconsistencies.
25. The rival contentions advanced by learned counsel for the parties have
been duly considered and the materials placed before this Court including the
TCRs have been carefully perused.
26. The yardstick of proof in a criminal trial is beyond all reasonable doubt and
there is no dispute to the aforesaid proposition of law. In the instant case, there
are 5 nos. of Prosecution Witnesses and one Court Witness. None of the
Page No.# 17/18
witnesses presented by the prosecution could make any accusation against the
accused persons. All the witnesses were subjected to cross-examination in
which they had admitted that there was no direct evidence of involvement of
the accused persons. This Court has also noted that PW 1 was also re-examined
so as to bring on record his statement recorded under Section 202 of the Cr.PC.
(corresponding to Section 225 of the BNSS, 2023) However, in the cross-
examination made thereafter, no incriminating materials could be brought out
against the accused persons. So far as the Court Witness No. 1, who is the
appellant is concerned, a careful perusal of his depositions would show that he
is merely a hearsay witness and he had candidly admitted that one Kadir had
phoned him who himself was not examined. He had also made a bald statement
that the attack was made by village people. He had also stated that the
deceased had told some names but no act has been attributed at all to any of
the deceased.
27. As laid down by the various judicial pronouncements including the Privy
Council as noted above, there is a presumption of innocence of an accused
person in a criminal case and such assumption is fortified by a judgment of
acquittal in which the party preferring an appeal against such judgment is under
a heavy burden to make out a case that the materials on record would
inevitably lead to a conclusion of guilt of the accused person beyond all
reasonable doubt. In the opinion of this court, the said burden has not been
discharged at all. This court has also carefully perused the materials on record
including the evidence and the exhibits and the same would not be sufficient at
all to come to a conclusion of guilt.
28. We are of the opinion that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Session
Judge in the impugned judgment is in accordance with law which does not
Page No.# 18/18
require any interference.
29. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
30. Send back the records.
JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant