Chattisgarh High Court
Naresh Kumar Netam vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 29 April, 2026
1
2026:CGHC:19855
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 6785 of 2021
Naresh Kumar Netam S/o Late Ganguram Netam Aged About 32
Years Terminated From Post Of Constable, Constable No. 137
Police Station Devbhog, R/o Village Kokobhata, P.S. Pithora
District- Mahasamund (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through- The Secretary Home (Police)
Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan Naya Raipur, District-
Raipur (C.G.)
2. Director General Of Police Police Head Quarter, Civil Line Raipur,
District- Raipur (C.G.)
3. Inspector General Of Police Office At Raipur Range I.G. Office,
District- Raipur (C.G.)
4. Superintendent Of Police District- Gariyaband (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner : Mr. Jitendra Nath Nande, Advocate
For State : Mr. Anil Pandey, Govt. Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order On Board
29.4.2026
1) In this petition, petitioner has challenged the orders passed by
disciplinary authority, appellate authority and revisional authority
whereby services of petitioner have been terminated.
2
2) Facts of present case are that initially petitioner was appointed to
the post of Constable in respondent department vide order dated
3.11.2010 and he was posted as Constable at Police Station
Mainpur, District Gariyaband at the relevant time. Services of
petitioner were transferred to Police Station Devbhog vide order
dated 10.7.2017 and he was relieved on the same date. However,
petitioner did not join service at the transferred place. On
29.9.2018, show-cause notice and article of charges were issued
against the petitioner and the same were also served upon him
through special messenger on 27.10.2018 for his presence before
Inquiry Officer/ SDO(P), Mainpur on 2.11.2018 but petitioner did
not turn up. Inquiry Officer served notices upon the petitioner on
2.11.2018, 9.11.2018, 13.11.2018, 25.11.2018 and 5.1.2019 but
petitioner did not participate in the proceeding, therefore he was
proceeded ex-parte. Following allegations were made against the
petitioner:-
(i) अपचारी आरक्षक क्रमांक 137 नरेश नेताम द्वारा दिनांक
10.07.2017 को नवीन पदस्थापना पर थाना ( मैनपुर से
थाना देवमोग के लिए रवाना करने के उपरांत समयावधि में
आमद न लेकर बिना अनुमति व सूचना के आरोप पत्र जारी
दिनांक तक अनाधिकृ त रूप से गैरहाजिर रहकर कर्तव्य के
प्रति लापरवाही, स्वेच्छाचारिता एवं अनुशासनहीनता प्रदर्शित
कर पुलिस रेग्युलेशन के पैरा 64 (5) सेवा के सामान्य शर्तों
का उल्लंघन करना।
(ii) अपचारी आरक्षक क्रमांक 137 नरेश नेताम के द्वारा
कर्तव्य पर उपस्थित होने के लिए नोटिस जारी कर तामील
कराने के बावजुद कर्तव्य पर उपस्थित न होकर पुलिस
रेग्युलेशन के पैरा 64 (4) सेवा के अन्य शर्तों का उल्लंघन
करना।
3) Respondent department examined its witnesses and exhibited
documents. Inquiry Officer considered oral as well as
3
documentary evidence and found the allegations made against
the petitioner proved. Disciplinary authority concurred with the
findings arrived at by the Inquiry Officer and inflicted the
punishment of removal from service vide order dated 27.2.2019
and the period of absence from 10.7.2017 till 18.9.2018 was
officially classified under the ‘no work, no pay’ principle. Petitioner
preferred departmental appeal before the Inspector General of
Police, Raipur Range and same was dismissed vide order dated
28.7.2020. Petitioner preferred mercy petition/ revision before
Director General of Police, State of Chhattisgarh and same was
dismissed vide order dated 31.8.2021.
4) Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits penalty
inflicted on the petitioner is wholly excessive and disproportionate
looking to the alleged misconduct and Inquiry Officer as well as
Disciplinary Authority ought to have considered the medical
condition of petitioner’ father. He further submits that petitioner
was not afforded sufficient opportunity of hearing and show-cause
notice was never served upon him. He prays to quash the orders
passed by the disciplinary authority, appellate authority and
revisional authority.
5) On the other hand, learned State counsel submits that petitioner
was a member of armed force and he failed to report at the
transferred place. He further submits that a full fledged
department inquiry was conducted wherein article of charges was
4
issued ; Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed ;
department examined its witnesses and exhibited relevant
documents. He further contends that Inquiry Officer submitted its
report before the disciplinary authority, who concurred with the
inquiry report and inflicted the penalty of removal from services
according to Rule 221(A) of Police Regulation. He argues that this
petition deserve to be dismissed.
6) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents placed on record with utmost circumspection.
7) Admittedly, petitioner was transferred from Police Station Mainpur
to Police Station, Devbhog vide order dated 10.7.2017 and he
was relieved on the same date but he did not join at the
transferred place. He remained absent from duties from 10.7.2017
to 18.9.2018 i.e. for a period of 434 days. Show-cause notice and
article of charges were served upon him on 29.9.2018 and notices
were issued to petitioner on 27.10.2018, 2.11.2018, 13.11.2018,
25.11.2018, 30.11.2018, 5.12.2018 and 5.1.2019 for his presence
before the Inquiry Officer but no heed was paid.
8) In the departmental inquiry, the department examined Inspector
Sateyenda Singh Shyam (AW/1), Head Constable Purushottam
Yadav (AW/2), Head Constable Rajeshchandra Baghel (AW/3),
Constable Vishnu Pradhan (AW/4), Sub-Inspector Ranjeet Singh
(AW/5). These witnesses stated that petitioner did not participate
in the inquiry and remained absent without any authorization
5
despite service of show-cause notice, article of charges and
subsequent notices. Subsequently, Inquiry Officer submitted its
report to the disciplinary authority, who vide order dated 27.2.2019
passed the order of removal from services. Pertinently, the appeal
as well as revision preferred by the petitioner have been
dismissed vide orders dated 28.7.2020 and 31.8.2021
respectively.
9) Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Punjab and
Others Versus Ex. C. Satpal Singh 1 while dealing with the
similar issue involving a member of armed forces, who remained
absent from services for considerable period was inflicted with the
punishment of removal from services held as under :-
19. This Court, in K. Manche Gowda’s case (supra), has
held that if the past conduct of an employee is the basis
for imposing punishment, the department is obliged to
disclose that his past record will also be taken into
consideration while inflicting punishment. Now, the
question arises for consideration is whether the
disciplinary authority had taken into consideration the
past conduct of the respondent while passing the
dismissal order. From careful reading of the dismissal
order reproduced hereinabove, it appears that the
disciplinary authority had clearly observed that it had
perused the report of enquiry and conclusion thoroughly,
whereby the respondent was held guilty for the
unauthorized absence and agreed with the conclusion of
the enquiry officer. The disciplinary authority had further
mentioned regarding the issuance of show cause notice
to the respondent and had observed that despite the
receipt of the show cause notice, the respondent did not
submit his reply, which shows that the respondent
accepted the allegation against him. Thereafter, the
disciplinary authority had noted that 17 years of service
of the respondent were forfeited as a result of his
absence for 224 days and for which he was punished
1. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1848
6accordingly.
20. To properly understand the controversy in the light of
question framed, it is necessary to examine the relevant
judicial precedents, as discussed below. This Court in
the case of India Marine Services Private Ltd. (supra),
dealt with the case of punishment awarded to an
employee in a similar situation, as follows: –
“7. It is true that the last sentence suggests that the
past record of Bose has also been taken into
consideration. But it does not follow from this that
that was the effective reason for dismissing him. The
Managing Director having arrived at the conclusion
that Bose’s services must be terminated in the
interest of discipline, he added one sentence to give
additional weight to the decision already arrived at.
Upon this view it would follow that the Tribunal was
not competent to go behind the finding of the
Managing Director and consider for itself the
evidence adduced before him. The order of the
Tribunal quashing the dismissal of Bose and
directing his re-instatement is, therefore, set aside
as being contrary to law.”
21. In the case of Director General, RPF & Ors. vs. Ch.
Sal Babu, this Court in appeal while setting aside the
order of Division Bench of High Court, which had
affirmed the order of Single Bench setting aside the
order of removal of respondent, observed in para 6 as
under: –
“6. Normally, the punishment imposed by a
disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the
High Court or a tribunal except in appropriate cases
that too only after reaching a conclusion that the
punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly
disproportionate, after examining all the relevant
factors including the nature of charges proved
against, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier,
the nature of duties assigned having due regard to
their sensitiveness, exactness expected of and
discipline required department/establishment in
which the delinquent person the concerned works.
22. Similarly, in Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. vs. Uttam
Manohar Nakate, wherein the respondent employee was
dismissed from service on account of misconduct having
been found fast asleep on an iron plate during working
hours and had also been earlier imposed with minor
punishment on three occasions, this Court observed as
7
under: –
“32…. In the facts and circumstances of the case
and having regard to the past conduct of the
respondent as also his conduct during the domestic
enquiry proceedings, we cannot say that the
quantum of punishment imposed upon the
respondent was wholly disproportionate to his act of
misconduct or otherwise arbitrary.”
23. Likewise, in the case of Govt. of A.P. and Ors. us.
Mohd. Taher Ali, where the respondent who was
employed as police constable was imposed with a
punishment of compulsory retirement on the account of
unauthorized absenteeism from election duty, this Court
had held that: –
“5. ….In our opinion there can be no hard-and-fast
rule that merely because the earlier misconduct has
not been mentioned in the charge-sheet it cannot be
taken into consideration by the punishing authority.
Consideration of the earlier misconduct is often
(necessary) only to reinforce the opinion of the said
authority.”
24. This Cout in Bishamber Das Dogra’s case (supra),
has examined a similar issue and, after taking into
consideration the judgment of this Court rendered in K.
Manche Gowda’s case (supra) held as under: –
“24.In State of Mysore u. K. Manche Gowda, this
Court held that the disciplinary authority should
inform the delinquent employee that it is likely to take
into consideration the past conduct of the employee
while imposing the punishment unless the proved
charge against the delinquent is so grave that it may
independently warrant the proposed punishment.
Though his previous record may not be the subject
matter of the charge at the first instance xx xx
xx xx
30.In view of the above, it is evident that it is
desirable that the delinquent employee may be
informed by the disciplinary authority that his past
conduct would be taken into consideration while
imposing the punishment. But in case of misconduct
of grave nature or indiscipline, even in the absence
of statutory rules, the authority may take into
8consideration the indisputable past conduct/service
record of the employee for adding the weight to the
decision of imposing the punishment if the facts of
the case so require. [Emphasis Supplied]
31. lt is settled legal proposition that habitual
absenteeism means gross violation of discipline (vide
Burn & Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (AIR p. 530, para 5) and
L&T Komatsu Ltd. v. N. Udayakumar (SCC p. 226,
para 6).]
32. The instant case is required to be examined in
the light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions.
33.Admittedly, the respondent employee has not
completed the service of six years and had been
imposed punishment three times for remaining
absent from duty. On the fourth occasion when he
remained absent for ten days without leave, the
disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him.
The show-cause notice could not be served upon
him for the reason that he again deserted the line
and returned back after fifty days. Therefore the
disciplinary proceedings could not be concluded
expeditiously. The respondent submitted the reply to
the show-cause notice and the material on record
reveal that during the pendency of the enquiry he
further deserted the line for ten days. There is
nothing on record to show any explanation for such
repeated misconduct or absenteeism. The
court/tribunal must keep in mind that such
indiscipline is intolerable so far as the disciplined
force is concerned.
34. The respondent was a guard in CISF. No attempt
had ever been made at any stage by the respondent
employee to explain as to what prejudice has been
caused to him by non-furnishing of the enquiry
report. Nor had he ever submitted that such a course
has resulted in failure of justice. More so, the
respondent employee had never denied at any stage
that he had not been punished three times before
initiation of the disciplinary proceedings and deserted
the line twice even after issuance of the show-cause
notice in the instant case. No explanation could be
furnished by the respondent employee as under what
circumstances he has not even considered it proper
to submit the application for leave. Rather, the
respondent thought that he had a right to desert the
line at his sweet will. It was a case of gross violation
of discipline. Appeal filed by the respondent
9employee was decided by the statutory appellate
authority giving cogent reasons.
35. The facts of the present case did not present
special features warranting any interference by the
Court in limited exercise of its powers of judicial
review. In such a fact situation, we are of the view
that the High Court should not have interfered with
the punishment order passed by the disciplinary
authority on such technicalities…”
30. This Court, in the case of State of Punjab & Ors. vs.
Ram Singh Ex- Constable while interpreting Rule 16.2(1)
of the Rule of 1934 has held as under: –
“7.Rule 16.2(1) consists of two parts. The first part is
referable to gravest acts of misconduct which entails
awarding an order of dismissal. Undoubtedly there is
distinction between gravest misconduct and grave
misconduct. Before awarding an order of dismissal it
shall be mandatory that dismissal order should be
made only when there are gravest acts of
misconduct, since it impinges upon the pensionary
rights of the delinquent after putting long length of
service. As stated the first part relates to gravest acts
of misconduct. Under General Clauses Act singular
includes plural, “act” includes acts. The contention
that there must be plurality of acts of misconduct to
award dismissal is fastidious. The word “acts” would
include singular “act” as well. It is not the repetition of
the acts complained of but its quality, insidious effect
and gravity of situation that ensues from the
offending ‘act’. The colour of the gravest act must be
gathered from the surrounding or attending
circumstances. Take for instance the delinquent who
put in 29 years of continuous length of service and
had unblemished record; in thirtieth year he commits
defalcation of public money or fabricates false
records to conceal misappropriation. He only
committed once. Does it mean that he should not be
inflicted with the punishment of dismissal but be
allowed to continue in service for that year to enable
him to get his full pension. The answer is obviously
no. Therefore, a single act of corruption is sufficient
to award an order of dismissal under the rule as
gravest act of misconduct.
8. The second part of the rule connotes the
cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving
incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police
service and that the length of service of the offender
10and his claim for pension should be taken into
account in an appropriate case. The contention that
both parts must be read together appears to us to be
illogical. Second part is referable to a misconduct
minor in character which does not by itself warrant
an order of dismissal but due to continued acts of
misconduct would have insidious cumulative effect
on service morale and may be a ground to take
lenient view of giving an opportunity to reform.
Despite giving such opportunities if the delinquent
officer proved to be incorrigible and found completely
unfit to remain in service then to maintain discipline
in the service, instead of dismissing the delinquent
officer, a lesser punishment of compulsory retirement
or demotion to a lower grade or rank or removal from
service without affecting his future chances of re-
employment, if any, may meet the ends of justice.
Take for instance the delinquent officer who is
habitually absent from duty when required. Despite
giving an opportunity to reform himself he continues
to remain absent from duty off and on. He proved
himself to be incorrigible and thereby unfit to
continue in service. Therefore, taking into account
his long length of service and his claim for pension
he may be compulsorily retired from service so as to
enable him to earn proportionate pension. The
second part of the rule operates in that area. It may
also be made clear that the very order of dismissal
from service for gravest misconduct may entail
forfeiture of all pensionary benefits. Therefore, the
word ‘or’ cannot be read as “and”. It must be
disjunctive and independent. The common link that
connects both clauses is “the gravest act/acts of
misconduct.”
32.We have perused the show cause notice and the
order of dismissal passed against the respondent. After
going through the same, it is clear that penalty of
dismissal is a consequence of proved misconduct.
Therefore, the order impugned is within the first part of
Rule 16.2 (1) of the Rules. While passing the order
dismissing the appeal, the disciplinary authority recorded
the finding that the act of absence of the respondent
from duty is a grievous act of misconduct. The
respondent was appointed as a constable in the Punjab
Armed Forces and then transferred to the Commando
Force, which is a disciplined force. The authority while
passing the order has referred to his previous act of
absence from duty besides proving an gravest act of
misconduct leading to the order of dismissal.
11
10) Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and
Others Versus P. Gunasekaran2 while dealing with the scope of
interference in service matters held as under :-
12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing
to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate
authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating
even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding
on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority
and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative
Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings. the High Court is
not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The
High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture
into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can
only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice
in conducting the proceedings:
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case:
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous
considerations
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person
could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to
admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
2. (2015) 2 SCC 610
12
13.Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the
High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case
the same has been conducted in accordance with
law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may
appear to be:
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it
shocks its conscience.
14.In one of the earliest decisions in State of A.P. v. S. Sree
Rama Rao. many of the above principles have been
discussed and it has been concluded thus: (AIR pp.
1726-27, para 7)
“7…. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding
under Article 226 of the Constitution as a court of
appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is
concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held
by an authority competent in that behalf, and
according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf,
and whether the rules of natural justice are not
violated. Where there is some evidence, which the
authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry
has accepted and which evidence may reasonably
support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High
Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to
review the evidence and to arrive at an independent
finding on the evidence. The High Court may
undoubtedly interfere where the departmental
authorities have held the proceedings against the
delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
authorities have disabled themselves from reaching
a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to
13
the evidence and the merits of the case or by
allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations or where the conclusion on the very
face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no
reasonable person could ever have arrived at that
conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the
departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is
otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and
if there be some legal evidence on which their
findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of
that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted
to be canvassed before the High Court in a
proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution.”
11) Likewise, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India
and Others Versus Datta Linga Toshatwad 3 held that penalty
inflicted in a departmental inquiry can be interfered by the High
Court while exercising power under Article 226 of Constitution of
India if the order has been passed by an incompetent authority or
if procedure to inflict the penalty has not been followed or if the
penalty if disproportionate looking to the misconduct.
12) In the present case, petitioner failed to demonstrate that penalty
order was passed by the incompetent authority or the procedure
prescribed under the rules have not been followed. With regard to
proportionality of penalty, in my opinion, petitioner who was a
member of the uniformed force cannot absent himself on frivolous
pleas, having regard to the nature of the duties enjoined on those
forces. Such indiscipline, if it goes unpunished, will greatly affect
the discipline of the forces. Such matters cannot be taken lightly,
particularly when it relates to uniformed forces of this country. In
3. (2005) 13 SCC 709
14
cases of this nature, dismissal from the force is a justified
disciplinary action and cannot be described as disproportionate to
the misconduct alleged.
13) In consequence, the instant writ stands dismissed.
14) No order as to costs.
15) Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Sd/-
(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
JUDGE
Ajinkya
Digitally signed by
AJINKYA
PANSARE
Date: 2026.04.30
12:24:44 +0530
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