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Icici Bank Limited vs Union Of India & Ors on 27 April, 2026

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Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Icici Bank Limited vs Union Of India & Ors on 27 April, 2026

                                                                           2026:CHC-AS:641




                       IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
                        Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
                               APPELLATE SIDE

Present:

The Hon'ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)



                             WPA 28603 of 2025

                             ICICI Bank Limited
                                     Vs
                            Union of India & Ors.


For the petitioner                :    Mr. Soumya Majumder, ld. Sr. Adv.
                                       Ms. Pooja Chakraborti,
                                       Mr. Prithwish Roy Chowdhury,
                                       Mr. Aritra Deb.

For the Respondent No. 4      :        Mr. Kamalesh Jha,
                                       Mr. Md. Raihan Islam.


For the Respondent No.1       :        Mr. Asis Mukherjee.


Judgment reserved on           :       18.03.2026

Judgment delivered on              :   27.04.2026

Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:

1. The writ application has been preferred praying for direction upon the

respondent authorities to withdraw/cancel the order of reference dated

SPONSORED

May 22, 2025, passed by the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner

(Central), Government of India, and thus prays for quashing the

impugned reference order dated May 22, 2025.
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2026:CHC-AS:641

2. The petitioner‟s case herein is that the Bank of Madura (hereinafter “e-

BOM”) was amalgamated with the petitioner bank with effect from March 10,

1993 by virtue of a scheme of amalgamation in terms of Section 44A of the

Banking Regulation Act, 1949.

3. The respondent no. 4, originally an employee of e-BOM, became an

employee of the petitioner bank, since the date of amalgamation. He

continued to receive salaries and benefits like the employees of the

Petitioner bank after the merger of e-BOM with the petitioner bank.

4. The employees of the petitioner bank do not have a provision for

pension. However, the employees of e-BOM who had been absorbed in

the service of the petitioner bank, get pension in terms of Employees’

Pension Regulations, 1995 on the basis of the basic pay drawn by them

on the date of amalgamation.

5. This limited liability is owed by the Petitioner bank as a part of the

conditions of the amalgamation. Since the Petitioner bank does not

have its own Pension Regulations, no service condition of the

employees of the Petitioner bank is reconcilable with the Employees’

Pension Regulations, 1995 and the pension calculation under the

Employees’ Pension Regulations, 1995 ceased to have effect post

amalgamation date.

6. Thus, for the purpose of pension, the employees of the erstwhile e-

BOM are separately classed than the employees of the Petitioner bank.

7. The respondent no. 4, on June 30, 2016, superannuated from the

service of the petitioner bank, on attainment of 60 years of age. He was
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2026:CHC-AS:641
holding the post of Assistant Manager on the date of superannuation

and therefore, a managerial employee. He was not a “workman” within

the meaning of the Industrial Dispute Act on the date of

superannuation.

8. The petitioner Bank does not have any trade union to represent its

workers. Post superannuation, the Respondent no. 4 had raised a

purported industrial dispute over the issue of his entitlement to higher

pension in terms of Employees’ Pension Regulations, 1995 by lodging a

complaint with the “Samadhan” Portal.

9. Conciliation proceedings were thereafter initiated in the offices of the

Respondent nos. 2 and 3.

10. The Respondent no. 2, being the Conciliation Officer, submitted a

failure report to the Government of India.

11. The respondent no. 3 then issued the impugned order of reference to

the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour

Court, Kolkata over the issue of calculation of pension.

12. Hence, the writ application on the following grounds:-

I) That there was no material before the Government to make

the impugned order of reference.

II) That in the facts and circumstances of the case, the

conciliation officer had failed to discharge its statutory

duties to enquire as to whether there was any industrial

dispute in existence capable of being conciliated upon.

III) A retired employee, even if he be a ‘workman’, cannot

raise an “industrial dispute.

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2026:CHC-AS:641

13. The present case instituted by an individual employee without being

sponsored as a collective dispute by a substantial number of workmen

of the industry, could not have been referred for adjudication.

14. As, the respondent no. 4 was a managerial personnel, the reference

ought not to have been made by the appropriate Government.

15. Thus, it is stated that the order of reference is bad in law.

16. Written notes have been filed by both the parties.

17. The petitioner has reiterated it‟s case as made out in the writ

application and has relied upon the following judgments:-

i) Hindustan Lever Ltd. vs. Fourth Industrial Tribunal &

Ors. Reported in 2006 SCC OnLine Cal 651, Para 33 and

42.

“33. Thus, if on an admitted fact the issue of
maintainability of the reference can be decided
and when no further evidence is necessary, this
Court is of the view that the question of
maintainability of the reference is required to be
taken up for consideration. The basic admitted
fact in this case, in respect of which there is no
dispute in between the parties, is that the
respondent Nos. 3 to 54 are persons who have
retired from their services and may be termed
as ex-employees of the petitioner. The question
is whether such ex-employees can come within
the definition of “workman” and whether the
dispute raised by them can be said to be an
“industrial dispute” as the said term has been
defined in the said Act of 1947. If the answer
to such question is that the respondent
Nos. 3 to 54 cannot be said to be workmen
and the dispute raised by them cannot be
said to be an industrial dispute, then in
that event the reference has to be declared
5

2026:CHC-AS:641
as bad in law. According to the definition of
the term “workman,” quoted above, it would
appear that the said definition contemplates
any person (including an apprentice) employed
in any industry to do any manual, unskilled,
skilled, technical, operational, clerical or
supervisory works for hire or reward, whether
the terms of the employment are express or
implied. This shows that the person concerned
has to be “employed in any industry” that is to
say such person must be in employment. In the
second part of the definition of the term
“workman” persons who have been dismissed,
discharged or retrenched have been included.

The third part of the definition deals with the
exclusion part. The respondent Nos. 3 to 54 are
neither in employment at present nor were they
in employment when the dispute was raised
and the reference was made. It is also not the
case of the respondent Nos. 3 to 54 that they
were dismissed, discharged or retrenched from
their service. There is no ambiguity in the said
definition. If the words “any person” in the said
definition was intended to include a person
who was employed at any point of time and
had subsequently retired then the latter part of
the definition, which contemplates a
discharged, dismissed or retrenched employee,
would have become redundant and useless.

Thus, this Court is of the view that a plain
reading of the said S. 2(s) would indicate
that a retired person was not intended to
be included in the said definition.

42. In ICI India, Ltd. case (vide supra), the
Hon’ble Single Judge of Bombay High Court
was pleased to hold in Para. 45 of the reports
that “for the purpose of pensionary rights, the
pensioner or retiree would as much be as
workman a other workman whose contracts of
employment are still subsisting” and
subsequently His Lordship was pleased to hold
that “I see no difficulty in holding that, even
6

2026:CHC-AS:641
after retirement, a retiree has the right to take
recourse to the adjudicatory machinery made
available under the provisions of the Act.” It
appears from the same paragraph that His
Lordship was pleased to rely upon a judgment
of a Division Bench of Bombay High Court
in P.L. Mayekar case (vide supra), and also a
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Dimakuchi case (vide supra), but His
Lordship was also pleased to observe that
though “both the decisions were concerned with
relief to a dismissed workman, the principle can
be extended to the case on hand also.” It will
appear from the definition of the term
“workman” in S. 2(s) that a person who
has been dismissed from his service is
included in the definition of the term
“workman” but a retiree does not find
place in the definition of the term
“workman.” In Para. 47 of the said reports His
Lordship was pleased to hold that “every
workman of today is a pensioner or retiree,
after his date of retirement. Conversely, every
retiree or pensioner was a workman at some
earlier point of time.” With respect, such
observation indicates that a retiree does not
continue to be a workman after retirement but
that he was a workman at some earlier point of
time. This Court is of the view that the meaning
of the word “workman” in the present context
will have to be understood as it has been
defined in the said Act of 1947. In the present
case had the respondents concerned been
dismissed or discharged employees or
retrenched employees the situation would have
been different. In the instant case, concerned
respondents are all retirees. In such
circumstances, this Court finds that the said ICI
India Ltd. case (vide supra), cannot be made
applicable to the facts and circumstances of the
instant case.”

7

2026:CHC-AS:641

ii) Secretary, Indian Tea Association vs. Ajit Kumar Barat

& Ors. Reported in (2000) 3 SCC 93, Para 6,7,9 & 10..

“6. In Sultan Singh v. State of Haryana [(1996)
2 SCC 66 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 751 : (1996) 32
ATC 847] this Court held that an order issued
under Section 10 of the Act is an administrative
order and the Government is entitled to go into
the question whether an industrial dispute
exists or is apprehended and it will be only a
subjective satisfaction on the basis of the
material on record and being an administrative
order no lis is involved.

7. The law on the point may briefly be
summarised as follows:

1. The appropriate Government would not be
justified in making a reference under Section 10
of the Act without satisfying itself on the facts
and circumstances brought to its notice that an
industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and
if such a reference is made it is desirable
wherever possible, for the Government to
indicate the nature of dispute in the order of
reference.

2. The order of the appropriate Government
making a reference under Section 10 of the Act
is an administrative order and not a judicial or
quasi-judicial one and the court, therefore,
cannot canvass the order of the reference
closely to see if there was any material before
the Government to support its conclusion, as if
it was a judicial or quasi-judicial order.

3. An order made by the appropriate
Government under Section 10 of the Act
being an administrative order no lis is
involved, as such an order is made on the
subjective satisfaction of the Government.

4. If it appears from the reasons given
that the appropriate Government took into
account any consideration irrelevant or
foreign material, the court may in a given
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2026:CHC-AS:641
case consider the case for a writ of
mandamus.

5. It would, however, be open to a party to
show that what was referred by the
Government was not an industrial dispute
within the meaning of the Act.

9. The appropriate Government would be
justified in making a reference under Section 10
of the Act, if it is satisfied on the facts and
circumstances brought to its notice that an
industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and
“industrial dispute” as per clause (k) of Section
2
of the Act means, inter alia, a dispute or
difference between employers and employers,
or between employers and workmen. Clause (s)
of Section 2 of the Act defines “workman” but
does not include any such person–

“2. (s) (i)-(ii) * * *

(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or
administrative capacity; or

(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory
capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand
six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises,
either by the nature of the duties attached to
the office or by reason of the powers vested in
him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.”

10. Before making a reference under
Section 10 of the Act the appropriate
Government has to form an opinion
whether an employee is a workman and
thereafter has to consider as to whether
an industrial dispute exists or is
apprehended.”

18. The private respondent in the present case on filing written notes

has argued that the respondent was employed in a non-managerial

cadre and is a “workman” within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act,

who retired from service and is presently receiving pension.
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2026:CHC-AS:641

19. It is the further case of the answering respondent that pension is

“deferred wage” and part of service conditions and as it is settled law

that pension is not a bounty but a deferred wage, pension is a valuable

right flowing from past service, it is deferred portion of compensation.

Therefore, pension is intrinsically connected to employment and

squarely falls within the ambit of industrial jurisprudence.

20. The dispute relates to interpretation and implementation of settlement,

and computation of monetary benefits arising out of employment and

such disputes survive retirement and remain industrial disputes.

21. The respondent is receiving lesser pension every month which gives

rise to a recurring and continuous cause of action. Hence, the dispute

is not stale but live and subsisting and the appropriate Government

has, upon due application of mind, referred the dispute.

22. It is settled law that at the stage of reference only the existence of

dispute is to be seen and merits cannot be adjudicated.

23. Labour legislation is beneficial in nature and the beneficial

interpretation is in favour of workman.

24. Without prejudice, even computation of benefits can be claimed under

Section 33C(2) of the Act. This itself establishes that disputes relating

to monetary benefits post retirement are recognized under industrial

law framework.

25. The order of reference dated 22.05.2025 is as follows:-

“……..No in Kos-700020/09/2025.E.Dy.CLC(C):

WHEREAS, the undersigned is of the opinion that an
industrial dispute exists between the employer in relation to
the management of M/S ICICI Bank Limited and their
10

2026:CHC-AS:641
workman in respect of the matter specified in the Schedule
below.

AND WHEREAS, the undersigned considers it desirable to
refer the said dispute for adjudication;
NOW THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by
sub-section (5) of Section 12 read with sub-section (2A)
of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14
of 1947) on the Central Government and Delegated to the
undersigned in pursuance of the Notifications of the
Government of India, in the Ministry of Labour &
Employment published in the Gazette of India,
Extraordinary Part II, Section 3, Sub-Section (ii) vide S.O.
1262 (E) and 1263(E) both dated the 17.03.2023, the
undersigned after complying with the relevant conditions of
the said Notifications hereby refers said dispute for
adjudication to the CGIT-cum-Labour Court, Kolkata. The
said Tribunal shall give its award within a period of three
months on the reference specified in the Scheduled below.
The Schedule
ï‚· “Whether Sri Monoj Kumar Baul, retired employee /
pensioner of ICICI Bank(erstwhile Bank of Madura) is
fall within the meaning of definition of workman
as per Section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act,
1947?”

ï‚· “Whether the action of the management of ICICI Bank
in calculating of pension from the basic pay in the
year 2001 instead of last drawn basic pay of
superannuation in the year 2016 is legal and justified?
If not, what relief the concerned workman is entitled
to?”…………”

26. The report of the conciliation officer dated 27.02.2025 states as

follows:-

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2026:CHC-AS:641
“……….. View of the conciliation officer; when
considering the aggrieved pensioner can raise an ID
under ID act 1947, it is crucial to understand the
definition of workman of the act. The ID act 1947
primarily addresses disputes between the employer
and workman who are employed in an industrial est,
generally retired employees do not fall within the legal
definition of workman under this act since the direct
employer- employee’s relation ceases once the
workman superannuated from the services, while the
Industrial Dispute act may not be the primary avenue,
pensioners may explore other legal remedies to
address their grievances such as raising the
grievances before the competent authority under the
relevant law. While the issue of the instant pensioner
is significant as illustrated in the above submissions,
the ID act has limitation regarding retired workman.
Therefore due to divergent view of both the parties and
as requested by the complaint by way of written
submission today the instant dispute matter is
disposed of as failure…………..”

27. Section 10(2A) of the Industrial Dispute Act lays down:-

Section 10(2-A) An order referring an industrial
dispute to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal under this section shall specify the period
within which such Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal shall submit its award on such dispute to the
appropriate Government:

Provided that where such industrial dispute is
connected with an individual workman, no such period
shall exceed three months:

Provided further that where the parties to an industrial
dispute apply in the prescribed manner, whether
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2026:CHC-AS:641
jointly or separately, to the Labour Court, Tribunal or
National Tribunal for extension of such period or for
any other reason, and the presiding officer of such
Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal considers it
necessary or expedient to extend such period, he may
for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such
period by such further period as he may think fit:
Provided also that in computing any period specified in
this sub-section, the period, if any, for which the
proceedings before the Labour Court, Tribunal or
National Tribunal had been stayed by any injunction or
order of a Civil Court shall be excluded:
Provided also that no proceedings before a Labour
Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall lapse merely
on the ground that any period specified under this sub-
section had expired without such proceedings being
completed.]”

28. Section 12(5) of the Industrial Dispute Act lays down:-

Section 12(5) If, on a consideration of the report
referred to in sub-section (4), the appropriate
Government is satisfied that there is a case for
reference to a Board, [Labour Court, Tribunal or
National Tribunal], it may make such reference. Where
the appropriate Government does not make such a
reference, it shall record and communicate to the
parties concerned its reasons therefor.”

29. Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act lays down:-

Section 33C(2) Where any workman is entitled to
receive from the employer any money or any benefit
which is capable of being computed in terms of money
and if any question arises as to the amount of
money due or as to the amount at which such
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2026:CHC-AS:641
benefit should be computed, then the question may,
subject to any rules that may be made under this Act,
be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified
in this behalf by the appropriate Government [within a
period not exceeding three months:]
[Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour
Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he
may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such
period by such further period as he may think fit.]”

30. Admittedly the petitioner herein superannuated on 30th June,

2016, the petitioner after almost 9 years made an application to the

Assistant Labour Commissioner, Central, Kolkata-1 claiming

discrimination in payment of pension.

31. It is on record that the petitioner was originally an employee of bank of

Madura which amalgamated with the petitioner bank on and from

March 10, 1993. The petitioner was absorbed in the service of the

petitioner bank and gets pension in terms of employees pension

regulation 1995, as per conditions of amalgamation. The petitioner

superannuated when he was holding the post of an Assistant Manager.

32. The reference in the present case is under Section 10(2A) of the

Industrial Dispute Act. The authority concerned has framed a issue,

where it is to be decided as to whether an employee herein a retired

pensioner of the bank, comes under the definition of “workman” as per

Section 2S of the Industrial Disputes Act. The second issue talks about

calculation of pension.

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2026:CHC-AS:641

33. In view of the judgment relied upon by the petitioner in Hindustan

Lever Ltd. (Supra), question of maintainability of a reference can be

taken up for consideration when no further evidences necessary. The

Court clearly held as follows:-

“33…………….. If the words “any person” in the said
definition was intended to include a person who was
employed at any point of time and had subsequently
retired then the latter part of the definition, which
contemplates a discharged, dismissed or retrenched
employee, would have become redundant and useless.
Thus, this Court is of the view that a plain reading of the
said S. 2(s) would indicate that a retired person was not
intended to be included in the said
definition…………………..

42……………. It will appear from the definition of the term
“workman” in S. 2(s) that a person who has been
dismissed from his service is included in the definition of
the term “workman” but a retiree does not find place in
the definition of the term “workman.” In Para. 47 of the
said reports His Lordship was pleased to hold that “every
workman of today is a pensioner or retiree, after his date
of retirement. Conversely, every retiree or pensioner was
a workman at some earlier point of time.” With respect,
such observation indicates that a retiree does not
continue to be a workman after retirement but that
he was a workman at some earlier point of time.
This Court is of the view that the meaning of the word
“workman” in the present context will have to be
understood as it has been defined in the said Act of
1947. In the present case had the respondents concerned
been dismissed or discharged employees or retrenched
employees the situation would have been different. In the
instant case, concerned respondents are all retirees. In
such circumstances, this Court finds that the said ICI
India Ltd. case (vide supra), cannot be made applicable to
the facts and circumstances of the instant case.”

15

2026:CHC-AS:641

34. The Supreme Court in Secretary, Indian Tea Association (Supra)

was of the view that:-

“10. Before making a reference under Section 10 of
the Act the appropriate Government has to form an
opinion whether an employee is a workman and
thereafter has to consider as to whether an
industrial dispute exists or is apprehended.”

35. In the present case, issue no. 1 in the reference shows that no opinion

as whether an employee is a workman or not, has been formed. It has

been left to the tribunal by the authority.

36. The question as to the retired employee being a workman not or is the

issue no. 1. Thus the requirement of Section 10 of the I.D. Act has

not been complied with before holding that an industrial dispute

exists. Secretary, Indian Tea Association (Supra)

37. In view of the judgments in Hindustan Lever Ltd. (Supra) and

Secretary, Indian Tea Association (Supra) issue no. 1 in the

reference is not in accordance with law, as the employee being a retired

employee is not a „workman‟ under Section 2(S) of the Act.

38. Thus the private respondent being a retired employee is not a

„workman‟ under 2(S) of the Act and thus cannot raise an industrial

dispute.

39. Regarding issue no. 2, the same relates to his calculation of pension a

claim made after 9 years.

40. As such it is clear that the employee herein does not come within the

definition of Section 2(S) of the Industrial Dispute Act and the

reference under Section 10 of the Act to that extent is not in
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2026:CHC-AS:641
accordance with law. Regarding issue no. 2 in the reference, as specific

provision is provided under Section 33C of the Industrial Dispute Act

and Section 33C(2) provides for computation of any money due to the

workman and for which an application under the relevant provision

has to be made and while considering the prayer for calculation of

dues, the Court can also prima facie consider the status of the

employee afresh to consider his prayer for computation.

41. Section 33C also provides that such application is to be made within

one year. In the present case admittedly the petitioner has raised the

issue after 9 years.

42. Thus in view of the observations made in this judgment, the reference

in the present case being not in accordance with law is set aside and

quashed.

43. Writ application is accordingly allowed. The reference dated 22.05.2025

passed by the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central),

Government of India, being not in accordance with law is quashed and

set aside.

44. Writ application stands disposed of.

45. Connected application, if any, stands disposed of.

46. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be

supplied to the parties expeditiously after due compliance.

(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)



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