Icici Bank Limited vs Union Of India & Ors on 27 April, 2026

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    Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

    Icici Bank Limited vs Union Of India & Ors on 27 April, 2026

                                                                               2026:CHC-AS:641
    
    
    
    
                           IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
                            Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
                                   APPELLATE SIDE
    
    Present:
    
    The Hon'ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)
    
    
    
                                 WPA 28603 of 2025
    
                                 ICICI Bank Limited
                                         Vs
                                Union of India & Ors.
    
    
    For the petitioner                :    Mr. Soumya Majumder, ld. Sr. Adv.
                                           Ms. Pooja Chakraborti,
                                           Mr. Prithwish Roy Chowdhury,
                                           Mr. Aritra Deb.
    
    For the Respondent No. 4      :        Mr. Kamalesh Jha,
                                           Mr. Md. Raihan Islam.
    
    
    For the Respondent No.1       :        Mr. Asis Mukherjee.
    
    
    Judgment reserved on           :       18.03.2026
    
    Judgment delivered on              :   27.04.2026
    
    Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:
    

    1. The writ application has been preferred praying for direction upon the

    respondent authorities to withdraw/cancel the order of reference dated

    SPONSORED

    May 22, 2025, passed by the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner

    (Central), Government of India, and thus prays for quashing the

    impugned reference order dated May 22, 2025.
    2

    2026:CHC-AS:641

    2. The petitioner‟s case herein is that the Bank of Madura (hereinafter “e-

    BOM”) was amalgamated with the petitioner bank with effect from March 10,

    1993 by virtue of a scheme of amalgamation in terms of Section 44A of the

    Banking Regulation Act, 1949.

    3. The respondent no. 4, originally an employee of e-BOM, became an

    employee of the petitioner bank, since the date of amalgamation. He

    continued to receive salaries and benefits like the employees of the

    Petitioner bank after the merger of e-BOM with the petitioner bank.

    4. The employees of the petitioner bank do not have a provision for

    pension. However, the employees of e-BOM who had been absorbed in

    the service of the petitioner bank, get pension in terms of Employees’

    Pension Regulations, 1995 on the basis of the basic pay drawn by them

    on the date of amalgamation.

    5. This limited liability is owed by the Petitioner bank as a part of the

    conditions of the amalgamation. Since the Petitioner bank does not

    have its own Pension Regulations, no service condition of the

    employees of the Petitioner bank is reconcilable with the Employees’

    Pension Regulations, 1995 and the pension calculation under the

    Employees’ Pension Regulations, 1995 ceased to have effect post

    amalgamation date.

    6. Thus, for the purpose of pension, the employees of the erstwhile e-

    BOM are separately classed than the employees of the Petitioner bank.

    7. The respondent no. 4, on June 30, 2016, superannuated from the

    service of the petitioner bank, on attainment of 60 years of age. He was
    3

    2026:CHC-AS:641
    holding the post of Assistant Manager on the date of superannuation

    and therefore, a managerial employee. He was not a “workman” within

    the meaning of the Industrial Dispute Act on the date of

    superannuation.

    8. The petitioner Bank does not have any trade union to represent its

    workers. Post superannuation, the Respondent no. 4 had raised a

    purported industrial dispute over the issue of his entitlement to higher

    pension in terms of Employees’ Pension Regulations, 1995 by lodging a

    complaint with the “Samadhan” Portal.

    9. Conciliation proceedings were thereafter initiated in the offices of the

    Respondent nos. 2 and 3.

    10. The Respondent no. 2, being the Conciliation Officer, submitted a

    failure report to the Government of India.

    11. The respondent no. 3 then issued the impugned order of reference to

    the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour

    Court, Kolkata over the issue of calculation of pension.

    12. Hence, the writ application on the following grounds:-

    I) That there was no material before the Government to make

    the impugned order of reference.

    II) That in the facts and circumstances of the case, the

    conciliation officer had failed to discharge its statutory

    duties to enquire as to whether there was any industrial

    dispute in existence capable of being conciliated upon.

    III) A retired employee, even if he be a ‘workman’, cannot

    raise an “industrial dispute.

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    2026:CHC-AS:641

    13. The present case instituted by an individual employee without being

    sponsored as a collective dispute by a substantial number of workmen

    of the industry, could not have been referred for adjudication.

    14. As, the respondent no. 4 was a managerial personnel, the reference

    ought not to have been made by the appropriate Government.

    15. Thus, it is stated that the order of reference is bad in law.

    16. Written notes have been filed by both the parties.

    17. The petitioner has reiterated it‟s case as made out in the writ

    application and has relied upon the following judgments:-

    i) Hindustan Lever Ltd. vs. Fourth Industrial Tribunal &

    Ors. Reported in 2006 SCC OnLine Cal 651, Para 33 and

    42.

    “33. Thus, if on an admitted fact the issue of
    maintainability of the reference can be decided
    and when no further evidence is necessary, this
    Court is of the view that the question of
    maintainability of the reference is required to be
    taken up for consideration. The basic admitted
    fact in this case, in respect of which there is no
    dispute in between the parties, is that the
    respondent Nos. 3 to 54 are persons who have
    retired from their services and may be termed
    as ex-employees of the petitioner. The question
    is whether such ex-employees can come within
    the definition of “workman” and whether the
    dispute raised by them can be said to be an
    “industrial dispute” as the said term has been
    defined in the said Act of 1947. If the answer
    to such question is that the respondent
    Nos. 3 to 54 cannot be said to be workmen
    and the dispute raised by them cannot be
    said to be an industrial dispute, then in
    that event the reference has to be declared
    5

    2026:CHC-AS:641
    as bad in law. According to the definition of
    the term “workman,” quoted above, it would
    appear that the said definition contemplates
    any person (including an apprentice) employed
    in any industry to do any manual, unskilled,
    skilled, technical, operational, clerical or
    supervisory works for hire or reward, whether
    the terms of the employment are express or
    implied. This shows that the person concerned
    has to be “employed in any industry” that is to
    say such person must be in employment. In the
    second part of the definition of the term
    “workman” persons who have been dismissed,
    discharged or retrenched have been included.

    The third part of the definition deals with the
    exclusion part. The respondent Nos. 3 to 54 are
    neither in employment at present nor were they
    in employment when the dispute was raised
    and the reference was made. It is also not the
    case of the respondent Nos. 3 to 54 that they
    were dismissed, discharged or retrenched from
    their service. There is no ambiguity in the said
    definition. If the words “any person” in the said
    definition was intended to include a person
    who was employed at any point of time and
    had subsequently retired then the latter part of
    the definition, which contemplates a
    discharged, dismissed or retrenched employee,
    would have become redundant and useless.

    Thus, this Court is of the view that a plain
    reading of the said S. 2(s) would indicate
    that a retired person was not intended to
    be included in the said definition.

    42. In ICI India, Ltd. case (vide supra), the
    Hon’ble Single Judge of Bombay High Court
    was pleased to hold in Para. 45 of the reports
    that “for the purpose of pensionary rights, the
    pensioner or retiree would as much be as
    workman a other workman whose contracts of
    employment are still subsisting” and
    subsequently His Lordship was pleased to hold
    that “I see no difficulty in holding that, even
    6

    2026:CHC-AS:641
    after retirement, a retiree has the right to take
    recourse to the adjudicatory machinery made
    available under the provisions of the Act.” It
    appears from the same paragraph that His
    Lordship was pleased to rely upon a judgment
    of a Division Bench of Bombay High Court
    in P.L. Mayekar case (vide supra), and also a
    judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
    in Dimakuchi case (vide supra), but His
    Lordship was also pleased to observe that
    though “both the decisions were concerned with
    relief to a dismissed workman, the principle can
    be extended to the case on hand also.” It will
    appear from the definition of the term
    “workman” in S. 2(s) that a person who
    has been dismissed from his service is
    included in the definition of the term
    “workman” but a retiree does not find
    place in the definition of the term
    “workman.” In Para. 47 of the said reports His
    Lordship was pleased to hold that “every
    workman of today is a pensioner or retiree,
    after his date of retirement. Conversely, every
    retiree or pensioner was a workman at some
    earlier point of time.” With respect, such
    observation indicates that a retiree does not
    continue to be a workman after retirement but
    that he was a workman at some earlier point of
    time. This Court is of the view that the meaning
    of the word “workman” in the present context
    will have to be understood as it has been
    defined in the said Act of 1947. In the present
    case had the respondents concerned been
    dismissed or discharged employees or
    retrenched employees the situation would have
    been different. In the instant case, concerned
    respondents are all retirees. In such
    circumstances, this Court finds that the said ICI
    India Ltd. case (vide supra), cannot be made
    applicable to the facts and circumstances of the
    instant case.”

    7

    2026:CHC-AS:641

    ii) Secretary, Indian Tea Association vs. Ajit Kumar Barat

    & Ors. Reported in (2000) 3 SCC 93, Para 6,7,9 & 10..

    “6. In Sultan Singh v. State of Haryana [(1996)
    2 SCC 66 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 751 : (1996) 32
    ATC 847] this Court held that an order issued
    under Section 10 of the Act is an administrative
    order and the Government is entitled to go into
    the question whether an industrial dispute
    exists or is apprehended and it will be only a
    subjective satisfaction on the basis of the
    material on record and being an administrative
    order no lis is involved.

    7. The law on the point may briefly be
    summarised as follows:

    1. The appropriate Government would not be
    justified in making a reference under Section 10
    of the Act without satisfying itself on the facts
    and circumstances brought to its notice that an
    industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and
    if such a reference is made it is desirable
    wherever possible, for the Government to
    indicate the nature of dispute in the order of
    reference.

    2. The order of the appropriate Government
    making a reference under Section 10 of the Act
    is an administrative order and not a judicial or
    quasi-judicial one and the court, therefore,
    cannot canvass the order of the reference
    closely to see if there was any material before
    the Government to support its conclusion, as if
    it was a judicial or quasi-judicial order.

    3. An order made by the appropriate
    Government under Section 10 of the Act
    being an administrative order no lis is
    involved, as such an order is made on the
    subjective satisfaction of the Government.

    4. If it appears from the reasons given
    that the appropriate Government took into
    account any consideration irrelevant or
    foreign material, the court may in a given
    8

    2026:CHC-AS:641
    case consider the case for a writ of
    mandamus.

    5. It would, however, be open to a party to
    show that what was referred by the
    Government was not an industrial dispute
    within the meaning of the Act.

    9. The appropriate Government would be
    justified in making a reference under Section 10
    of the Act, if it is satisfied on the facts and
    circumstances brought to its notice that an
    industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and
    “industrial dispute” as per clause (k) of Section
    2
    of the Act means, inter alia, a dispute or
    difference between employers and employers,
    or between employers and workmen. Clause (s)
    of Section 2 of the Act defines “workman” but
    does not include any such person–

    “2. (s) (i)-(ii) * * *

    (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or
    administrative capacity; or

    (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory
    capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand
    six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises,
    either by the nature of the duties attached to
    the office or by reason of the powers vested in
    him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.”

    10. Before making a reference under
    Section 10 of the Act the appropriate
    Government has to form an opinion
    whether an employee is a workman and
    thereafter has to consider as to whether
    an industrial dispute exists or is
    apprehended.”

    18. The private respondent in the present case on filing written notes

    has argued that the respondent was employed in a non-managerial

    cadre and is a “workman” within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act,

    who retired from service and is presently receiving pension.
    9

    2026:CHC-AS:641

    19. It is the further case of the answering respondent that pension is

    “deferred wage” and part of service conditions and as it is settled law

    that pension is not a bounty but a deferred wage, pension is a valuable

    right flowing from past service, it is deferred portion of compensation.

    Therefore, pension is intrinsically connected to employment and

    squarely falls within the ambit of industrial jurisprudence.

    20. The dispute relates to interpretation and implementation of settlement,

    and computation of monetary benefits arising out of employment and

    such disputes survive retirement and remain industrial disputes.

    21. The respondent is receiving lesser pension every month which gives

    rise to a recurring and continuous cause of action. Hence, the dispute

    is not stale but live and subsisting and the appropriate Government

    has, upon due application of mind, referred the dispute.

    22. It is settled law that at the stage of reference only the existence of

    dispute is to be seen and merits cannot be adjudicated.

    23. Labour legislation is beneficial in nature and the beneficial

    interpretation is in favour of workman.

    24. Without prejudice, even computation of benefits can be claimed under

    Section 33C(2) of the Act. This itself establishes that disputes relating

    to monetary benefits post retirement are recognized under industrial

    law framework.

    25. The order of reference dated 22.05.2025 is as follows:-

    “……..No in Kos-700020/09/2025.E.Dy.CLC(C):

    WHEREAS, the undersigned is of the opinion that an
    industrial dispute exists between the employer in relation to
    the management of M/S ICICI Bank Limited and their
    10

    2026:CHC-AS:641
    workman in respect of the matter specified in the Schedule
    below.

    AND WHEREAS, the undersigned considers it desirable to
    refer the said dispute for adjudication;
    NOW THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by
    sub-section (5) of Section 12 read with sub-section (2A)
    of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14
    of 1947) on the Central Government and Delegated to the
    undersigned in pursuance of the Notifications of the
    Government of India, in the Ministry of Labour &
    Employment published in the Gazette of India,
    Extraordinary Part II, Section 3, Sub-Section (ii) vide S.O.
    1262 (E) and 1263(E) both dated the 17.03.2023, the
    undersigned after complying with the relevant conditions of
    the said Notifications hereby refers said dispute for
    adjudication to the CGIT-cum-Labour Court, Kolkata. The
    said Tribunal shall give its award within a period of three
    months on the reference specified in the Scheduled below.
    The Schedule
    ï‚· “Whether Sri Monoj Kumar Baul, retired employee /
    pensioner of ICICI Bank(erstwhile Bank of Madura) is
    fall within the meaning of definition of workman
    as per Section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act,
    1947?”

    ï‚· “Whether the action of the management of ICICI Bank
    in calculating of pension from the basic pay in the
    year 2001 instead of last drawn basic pay of
    superannuation in the year 2016 is legal and justified?
    If not, what relief the concerned workman is entitled
    to?”…………”

    26. The report of the conciliation officer dated 27.02.2025 states as

    follows:-

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    2026:CHC-AS:641
    “……….. View of the conciliation officer; when
    considering the aggrieved pensioner can raise an ID
    under ID act 1947, it is crucial to understand the
    definition of workman of the act. The ID act 1947
    primarily addresses disputes between the employer
    and workman who are employed in an industrial est,
    generally retired employees do not fall within the legal
    definition of workman under this act since the direct
    employer- employee’s relation ceases once the
    workman superannuated from the services, while the
    Industrial Dispute act may not be the primary avenue,
    pensioners may explore other legal remedies to
    address their grievances such as raising the
    grievances before the competent authority under the
    relevant law. While the issue of the instant pensioner
    is significant as illustrated in the above submissions,
    the ID act has limitation regarding retired workman.
    Therefore due to divergent view of both the parties and
    as requested by the complaint by way of written
    submission today the instant dispute matter is
    disposed of as failure…………..”

    27. Section 10(2A) of the Industrial Dispute Act lays down:-

    Section 10(2-A) An order referring an industrial
    dispute to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National
    Tribunal under this section shall specify the period
    within which such Labour Court, Tribunal or National
    Tribunal shall submit its award on such dispute to the
    appropriate Government:

    Provided that where such industrial dispute is
    connected with an individual workman, no such period
    shall exceed three months:

    Provided further that where the parties to an industrial
    dispute apply in the prescribed manner, whether
    12

    2026:CHC-AS:641
    jointly or separately, to the Labour Court, Tribunal or
    National Tribunal for extension of such period or for
    any other reason, and the presiding officer of such
    Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal considers it
    necessary or expedient to extend such period, he may
    for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such
    period by such further period as he may think fit:
    Provided also that in computing any period specified in
    this sub-section, the period, if any, for which the
    proceedings before the Labour Court, Tribunal or
    National Tribunal had been stayed by any injunction or
    order of a Civil Court shall be excluded:
    Provided also that no proceedings before a Labour
    Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall lapse merely
    on the ground that any period specified under this sub-
    section had expired without such proceedings being
    completed.]”

    28. Section 12(5) of the Industrial Dispute Act lays down:-

    Section 12(5) If, on a consideration of the report
    referred to in sub-section (4), the appropriate
    Government is satisfied that there is a case for
    reference to a Board, [Labour Court, Tribunal or
    National Tribunal], it may make such reference. Where
    the appropriate Government does not make such a
    reference, it shall record and communicate to the
    parties concerned its reasons therefor.”

    29. Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act lays down:-

    Section 33C(2) Where any workman is entitled to
    receive from the employer any money or any benefit
    which is capable of being computed in terms of money
    and if any question arises as to the amount of
    money due or as to the amount at which such
    13

    2026:CHC-AS:641
    benefit should be computed, then the question may,
    subject to any rules that may be made under this Act,
    be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified
    in this behalf by the appropriate Government [within a
    period not exceeding three months:]
    [Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour
    Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he
    may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such
    period by such further period as he may think fit.]”

    30. Admittedly the petitioner herein superannuated on 30th June,

    2016, the petitioner after almost 9 years made an application to the

    Assistant Labour Commissioner, Central, Kolkata-1 claiming

    discrimination in payment of pension.

    31. It is on record that the petitioner was originally an employee of bank of

    Madura which amalgamated with the petitioner bank on and from

    March 10, 1993. The petitioner was absorbed in the service of the

    petitioner bank and gets pension in terms of employees pension

    regulation 1995, as per conditions of amalgamation. The petitioner

    superannuated when he was holding the post of an Assistant Manager.

    32. The reference in the present case is under Section 10(2A) of the

    Industrial Dispute Act. The authority concerned has framed a issue,

    where it is to be decided as to whether an employee herein a retired

    pensioner of the bank, comes under the definition of “workman” as per

    Section 2S of the Industrial Disputes Act. The second issue talks about

    calculation of pension.

    14

    2026:CHC-AS:641

    33. In view of the judgment relied upon by the petitioner in Hindustan

    Lever Ltd. (Supra), question of maintainability of a reference can be

    taken up for consideration when no further evidences necessary. The

    Court clearly held as follows:-

    “33…………….. If the words “any person” in the said
    definition was intended to include a person who was
    employed at any point of time and had subsequently
    retired then the latter part of the definition, which
    contemplates a discharged, dismissed or retrenched
    employee, would have become redundant and useless.
    Thus, this Court is of the view that a plain reading of the
    said S. 2(s) would indicate that a retired person was not
    intended to be included in the said
    definition…………………..

    42……………. It will appear from the definition of the term
    “workman” in S. 2(s) that a person who has been
    dismissed from his service is included in the definition of
    the term “workman” but a retiree does not find place in
    the definition of the term “workman.” In Para. 47 of the
    said reports His Lordship was pleased to hold that “every
    workman of today is a pensioner or retiree, after his date
    of retirement. Conversely, every retiree or pensioner was
    a workman at some earlier point of time.” With respect,
    such observation indicates that a retiree does not
    continue to be a workman after retirement but that
    he was a workman at some earlier point of time.
    This Court is of the view that the meaning of the word
    “workman” in the present context will have to be
    understood as it has been defined in the said Act of
    1947. In the present case had the respondents concerned
    been dismissed or discharged employees or retrenched
    employees the situation would have been different. In the
    instant case, concerned respondents are all retirees. In
    such circumstances, this Court finds that the said ICI
    India Ltd. case (vide supra), cannot be made applicable to
    the facts and circumstances of the instant case.”

    15

    2026:CHC-AS:641

    34. The Supreme Court in Secretary, Indian Tea Association (Supra)

    was of the view that:-

    “10. Before making a reference under Section 10 of
    the Act the appropriate Government has to form an
    opinion whether an employee is a workman and
    thereafter has to consider as to whether an
    industrial dispute exists or is apprehended.”

    35. In the present case, issue no. 1 in the reference shows that no opinion

    as whether an employee is a workman or not, has been formed. It has

    been left to the tribunal by the authority.

    36. The question as to the retired employee being a workman not or is the

    issue no. 1. Thus the requirement of Section 10 of the I.D. Act has

    not been complied with before holding that an industrial dispute

    exists. Secretary, Indian Tea Association (Supra)

    37. In view of the judgments in Hindustan Lever Ltd. (Supra) and

    Secretary, Indian Tea Association (Supra) issue no. 1 in the

    reference is not in accordance with law, as the employee being a retired

    employee is not a „workman‟ under Section 2(S) of the Act.

    38. Thus the private respondent being a retired employee is not a

    „workman‟ under 2(S) of the Act and thus cannot raise an industrial

    dispute.

    39. Regarding issue no. 2, the same relates to his calculation of pension a

    claim made after 9 years.

    40. As such it is clear that the employee herein does not come within the

    definition of Section 2(S) of the Industrial Dispute Act and the

    reference under Section 10 of the Act to that extent is not in
    16

    2026:CHC-AS:641
    accordance with law. Regarding issue no. 2 in the reference, as specific

    provision is provided under Section 33C of the Industrial Dispute Act

    and Section 33C(2) provides for computation of any money due to the

    workman and for which an application under the relevant provision

    has to be made and while considering the prayer for calculation of

    dues, the Court can also prima facie consider the status of the

    employee afresh to consider his prayer for computation.

    41. Section 33C also provides that such application is to be made within

    one year. In the present case admittedly the petitioner has raised the

    issue after 9 years.

    42. Thus in view of the observations made in this judgment, the reference

    in the present case being not in accordance with law is set aside and

    quashed.

    43. Writ application is accordingly allowed. The reference dated 22.05.2025

    passed by the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central),

    Government of India, being not in accordance with law is quashed and

    set aside.

    44. Writ application stands disposed of.

    45. Connected application, if any, stands disposed of.

    46. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be

    supplied to the parties expeditiously after due compliance.

    (Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)



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