Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Dr. Mahipal Singh Sihag S/O Shri Ramjas … vs State Public Information Officer Cum … on 21 April, 2026
[2026:RJ-JP:16358]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5616/2022
Dr. Mahipal Singh Sihag S/o Shri Ramjas Sihag, Aged About 51
Years, R/o R-8, Rajasthan University Premises, Jaipur, Rajasthan.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Public Information Officer Cum Commissioner,
Commissionerate Of College Education, Govt. Of
Rajasthan, Jaipur.
2. Chief Information Commissioner, Rajasthan Information
Commission, Jhalana Link Road, Ots Crossing Jln Marg,
Jaipur.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Dr. Savita Sihag
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Chinmay Saxena with
Ms. Ritika Naruka for
Mr. SS Naruka, AAG
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN
Judgment
1 Arguments concluded on 08/04/2026
2 Judgment Reserved on 08/04/2026
3 Full Judgment or Operative Part Pronounced Full Judgment
4 Pronounced on 21/04/2026
REPORTABLE:
1. The present writ petition has been filed invoking the
supervisory jurisdiction of this Court as enshrined under Article
227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the legality and
validity of the impugned order dated 18.12.2021 passed by the
Rajasthan State Information Commission, Jaipur (hereinafter
referred to as ‘learned Second Appellate Authority’) under the
Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short, ‘RTI Act‘). By way of the
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said impugned order, the learned Second Appellate Authority
dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner and denied the
disclosure of the requested information.
FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE LIS AT HAND
2. Before adverting to the rival submissions and entering upon
the realm of arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the
respective parties, it is considered apposite to delineate the
factual background and the circumstances, in a nutshell, which
have culminated in the present adjudication.
2.1 The petitioner, vide an RTI application dated 25.02.2020
(Annexure-1) filed under Section 6 of the RTI Act, sought specific
details/information pertaining to a third-party individual, namely
Dr. Ram Narayan Sharma, who was deputed at the post of
Associate Professor, Department of Geography, Rajasthan
University situated at Jaipur, Rajasthan and was discharging his
duties as Lecturer, Geography in the Department of College
Education, Jaipur, Rajasthan.
2.2 The information sought comprised the dates of the lecturer’s
joining, which allegedly occurred in the year 1998, and the dates
of superannuation/retirement, alongside all corresponding office
orders and internal note-sheets containing deliberations regarding
these events.
2.3 The Joint Director (HRD), Department of College Education,
Rajasthan, Jaipur, vide its reply dated 26.05.2020 (Annexure-2),
declined/rejected the said application citing twofold reasons that
the required information pertains to an event that occurred more
than twenty years prior to the date of application and that the said
information pertains to a third-party individual, and therefore, the
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same cannot be provided as per Section 11 read with Section 8(3)
of the RTI Act.
2.4 Against the said rejection order, the petitioner preferred an
appeal (Annexure-3) before the learned First Appellate Authority
and the same was dismissed vide order dated 24.06.2020
(Annexure-4) on the ground that the required information pertains
to a third-party individual, and therefore, the same cannot be
provided as per the provisions enshrined under Section 11 of the
RTI Act.
2.5 Against the said dismissal order, the petitioner preferred an
appeal dated 10.08.2020 (Annexure-5) before the learned Second
Appellate Authority and the said appeal also came to be dismissed
vide order dated 18.12.2021 (Annexure-6) on the aforementioned
grounds as enshrined under Section 11 of the RTI Act.
2.6 Being aggrieved by the said order dated 18.12.2021 passed
by the learned Second Appellate Authority, the present petition
has been filed.
SUBMISSIONS PUT FORTH ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES
3. At the outset, learned counsel for the petitioner contended
that the impugned order is ex facie illegal, arbitrary, and the same
suffers from patent perversity. It was argued that the learned
Second Appellate Authority has misinterpreted the provisions
enshrined under Section 8(3) and Section 11 of the RTI Act. It was
further submitted that the required information vis-a-vis the dates
of joining and retirement of a public servant do not fall under the
ambit of “personal information” as they are intrinsically linked to
the public activity and public interest and the same should
outweigh any possible harm and injury to the interest of the third
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party. In support of the aforesaid contentions, reliance has been
placed upon the dictum enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information
Commissioner & Others, (2013) 1 SCC 212, and in light of
above, it was prayed that the present petition should be allowed
and the impugned order dated 18.12.2021 should be quashed and
set aside.
4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents vehemently opposed the present petition and it was
submitted that the required information could not be provided due
to the fact that the same pertains to an event that occurred more
than twenty years prior to the date of application, and therefore,
the said information cannot be provided as per the provisions
enshrined under Section 8(3) of the RTI Act; that the same
pertains to a third-party individual; that the petitioner miserably
failed to establish any larger public interest before the learned
Second Appellate Authority, and therefore, the information sought
could not be provided as per the provisions enshrined under
Section 11 of the RTI Act. Lastly, it was submitted that the ratio
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Girish Ramchandra
Deshpande (supra), upon which reliance has been placed by the
learned counsel for the petitioner, has been misinterpreted, and in
fact, the legal position emerging therefrom is supportive of the
case of the respondents more than the case of the petitioner.
Making the above submissions, it was prayed by learned counsel
to dismiss the present writ petition with an exemplary cost.
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FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
5. Having heard the rival arguments advanced by learned
counsel for the parties at length and upon assiduous perusal of the
material available on record, including but not limited to the
impugned order dated 18.12.2021 passed by the learned Second
Appellate Authority and considering the judgment cited at the Bar,
this Court has formulated the following views:
6. Upon careful examination of the impugned order, it is
observed by this Court that the required information sought by the
petitioner was denied on multifaceted grounds, one of them being
that the information sought pertains to a third-party individual and
as the petitioner miserably failed to establish any larger public
interest involved, the same could not be provided as per the
provisions enshrined under Section 11 of the RTI Act. Moreover,
relying upon the reasoning adopted by the learned First Appellate
Authority vide order dated 24.06.2020, it was held that as the
information sought pertains to an event that occurred more than
twenty years prior to the date of application, therefore the same
cannot be provided as per the provisions enshrined under Section
8(3) of the RTI Act.
7. Adverting to the exhaustive legal submissions advanced and
put forth before this Court, the nitty-gritty of the instant dispute
revolves around the interpretation of the learned Second Appellate
Authority vis-a-vis Section 11 and Section 8(3) of the RTI Act, and
therefore, as a threshold matter, it is pertinent to have a bird’s eye
view of the said provisions for the proper and appropriate
adjudication of the lis at hand. The relevant extracts of the
aforesaid provisions have been reproduced as under:
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“8. Exemption from disclosure of information.–
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,
there shall be no obligation to give any citizen,–
(a) information, disclosure of which would prejudicially
affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the
security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of
the State, relation with foreign State or lead to
incitement of an offence;
(b) information which has been expressly forbidden to
be published by any court of law or tribunal or the
disclosure of which may constitute contempt of court;
(c) information, the disclosure of which would cause a
breach of privilege of Parliament or the State
Legislature;
(d) information including commercial confidence, trade
secrets or intellectual property, the disclosure of which
would harm the competitive position of a third party,
unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger
public interest warrants the disclosure of such
information;
(e) information available to a person in his fiduciary
relationship, unless the competent authority is satisfied
that the larger public interest warrants the disclosure of
such information;
(f) information received in confidence from foreign
Government;
(g) information, the disclosure of which would
endanger the life or physical safety of any person or
identify the source of information or assistance given in
confidence for law enforcement or security purposes;
(h) information which would impede the process of
investigation or apprehension or prosecution of
offenders;
(i) cabinet papers including records of deliberations of
the Council of Ministers, Secretaries and other officers:
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[2026:RJ-JP:16358] (7 of 20) [CW-5616/2022]Provided that the decisions of Council of Ministers, the
reasons thereof, and the material on the basis of which
the decisions were taken shall be made public after the
decision has been taken, and the matter is complete, or
over:
Provided further that those matters which come under
the exemptions specified in this section shall not be
disclosed;
(j) information which relates to personal information
the disclosure of which has no relationship to any
public activity or interest, or which would cause
unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual
unless the Central Public Information Officer or the
State Public Information Officer or the appellate
authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the
larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such
information:
Provided that the information which cannot be denied
to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be
denied to any person.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in the Official Secrets Act,
1923 (19 of 1923) nor any of the exemptions
permissible in accordance with sub-section (1), a public
authority may allow access to information, if public
interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the
protected interests.
(3) Subject to the provisions of clauses (a), (c) and (i)
of sub-section (1), any information relating to any
occurrence, event or matter which has taken place,
occurred or happened twenty years before the date on
which any request is made under section 6 shall be
provided to any person making a request under that
section:
Provided that where any question arises as to the date
from which the said period of twenty years has to be
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[2026:RJ-JP:16358] (8 of 20) [CW-5616/2022]be final, subject to the usual appeals provided for in
this Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
“11. Third party information.– (1) Where a Central
Public Information Officer or a State Public Information
Officer, as the case may be, intends to disclose any
information or record, or part thereof on a request
made under this Act, which relates to or has been
supplied by a third party and has been treated as
confidential by that third party, the Central Public
Information Officer or State Public Information Officer,
as the case may be, shall, within five days from the
receipt of the request, give a written notice to such
third party of the request and of the fact that the
Central Public Information Officer or State Public
Information Officer, as the case may be, intends to
disclose the information or record, or part thereof, and
invite the third party to make a submission in writing or
orally, regarding whether the information should be
disclosed, and such submission of the third party shall
be kept in view while taking a decision about disclosure
of information:
Provided that except in the case of trade or commercial
secrets protected by law, disclosure may be allowed if
the public interest in disclosure outweighs in
importance any possible harm or injury to the interests
of such third party.
(2) Where a notice is served by the Central Public
Information Officer or State Public Information Officer,
as the case may be, under sub-section (1) to a third
party in respect of any information or record or part
thereof, the third party shall, within ten days from the
date of receipt of such notice, be given the opportunity
to make representation against the proposed
disclosure.
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(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 7,
the Central Public Information Officer or State Public
Information Officer, as the case may be, shall, within
forty days after receipt of the request under section 6,
if the third party has been given an opportunity to
make representation under sub-section (2), make a
decision as to whether or not to disclose the
information or record or part thereof and give in writing
the notice of his decision to the third party.
(4) A notice given under sub-section (3) shall include a
statement that the third party to whom the notice is
given is entitled to prefer an appeal under section 19
against the decision.”
(emphasis supplied)
8. Upon careful examination of the impugned order dated
18.12.2021 passed by the learned Second Appellate Authority, it
has been observed that the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal
therein rests on two foundational pillars, both of which exhibit
varying degrees of legal infirmity when subjected to rigorous
judicial scrutiny of the provisions enshrined under the relevant
statute, i.e., the RTI Act.
9. The first pillar invokes the privacy exemption, claiming that
the third-party employment details are inherently shielded from
disclosure to prevent an unwarranted invasion of privacy. This
brings into sharp focus Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, which
exempts personal information that has no relation to any public
activity or public interest, or which would cause an unwarranted
invasion of privacy, unless the Central Public Information Officer
(for short, ‘CPIO’) or the learned Appellate Authority is satisfied
that the larger public interest justifies such disclosure. The validity
of denial of the information/rejection of the appeal in the instant
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matter hinges upon whether dates of joining and retirement of
one Dr. Ram Narayan Sharma, along with ancillary and incidental
note-sheets, meet the threshold of “personal information”.
10. The second pillar of the impugned order asserts that the
information sought by the petitioner cannot be provided because it
pertains to an event that occurred over twenty years prior to the
date of filing of the application. This specific reasoning highlights a
profound misinterpretation of the provision enshrined under
Section 8(3) of the RTI Act. Upon an assiduous perusal of the said
provision, as reproduced above, this Court is of the view that it is
a sunset clause intended to lift exemptions and not a statutory bar
to impose them. The learned Authorities i.e., the First Appellate
Authority and the Second Appellate Authority, have weaponized a
provision meant to guarantee disclosure after a temporal lapse,
contorting it into a ground of blanket denial and the same
amounts to the blatant disregard and misapplication of the
statutory provisions. The said finding passed by the learned
Second Appellate Authority is ill-reasoned and legally absurd.
Section 8(3) of the RTI Act explicitly mandates that any
information relating to any occurrence or event that happened
twenty years before the date of the request shall be provided,
operating as a mandatory sunset clause for the majority of the
exemptions enshrined under Section 8(1) of the RTI Act. Such a
blatant statutory misapplication demonstrates a profound non-
application of mind and an absolute failure to appreciate the legal
provisions enshrined under the RTI Act.
11. The legislative intent behind Section 8(3) is unambiguous:
the passage of twenty years acts as a mandatory sunset clause for
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[2026:RJ-JP:16358] (11 of 20) [CW-5616/2022]the majority of the exemptions listed under Section 8(1).
Information that might have been fiercely protected from public
view under the guise privileged and confidential information must
be thrust into the public domain once a period of two decades
have elapsed. The only enduring exemptions that survive the
twenty-year period, as per the literal text of the statute, are those
pertaining to national security and sovereignty [Section 8(1)(a)],
parliamentary privilege [Section 8(1)(c)], and cabinet papers
[Section 8(1)(i)]. Therefore, the finding given by the learned
Second Appellate Authority’s that the passage of twenty years
serves as a justification for denying the information demonstrates
a fundamental ignorance of the law as Section 8(3) categorically
operates to facilitate disclosure, removing conditional exemptions
after the specified time has elapsed.
12. In this regard, it is pertinent to refer to the landmark dictum
encapsulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Central Board of
Secondary Education & Anr. v. Aditya Bandopadhyaya &
Ors., (2011) 8 SCC 497, wherein dealing with the legal contours
and the twenty-year rule as enshrined under Section 8(3) of the
RTI Act, it has categorically been held as under:
“57. Section 8(3) provides that information relating to
any occurrence, event or matters which has taken
place and occurred or happened twenty years before
the date on which any request is made under section 6,
shall be provided to any person making a request. This
means that where any information required to be
maintained and preserved for a period beyond twenty
years under the rules of the public authority, is
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[2026:RJ-JP:16358] (12 of 20) [CW-5616/2022]of section 8(1) of RTI Act, then, notwithstanding such
exemption, access to such information shall have to be
provided by disclosure thereof, after a period of twenty
years except where they relate to information falling
under clauses (a), (c) and (i) of section 8(1).
58. In other words, section 8(3) provides that any
protection against disclosure that may be available,
under clauses (b), (d) to (h) and (j) of section 8(1) will
cease to be available after twenty years in regard to
records which are required to be preserved for more
than twenty years. Where any record or information is
required to be destroyed under the rules and
regulations of a public authority prior to twenty years,
section 8(3) will not prevent destruction in accordance
with the Rules…”
(emphasis supplied
13. Inasmuch as the legal position is no longer res integra, it is
unequivocally established that Section 8(3) of the RTI Act is a
sunset clause which operates fundamentally as an avenue qua the
disclosure of existing records that have survived the test of time,
rather than a blanket statutory bar or standalone ground for
denial of the information. It is not the case of the respondents
that they are not in the possession of the information sought by
the petitioner as it pertains to twenty years prior to the date of
application, therefore, blanket denial under Section 8(3) of the RTI
Act is unwarranted.
14. Moreover, the learned Second Appellate Authority committed
a grave error in bypassing the mandatory procedural safeguards
as enshrined under Section 11 of the RTI Act, failing to issue
notice and afford the third party an opportunity of hearing. If the
public authority determines, upon reviewing the un-severed
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documents, that certain segments of the information sought
contain confidential third-party information and that the third-
party individual, lecturer in the instant case, may object to
disclosing such information, the learned authority has adhered to
the procedure outlined in Section 11 of the RTI Act. The learned
Second Appellate Authority cannot act as a proxy defender of
privacy without consulting the affected third-party. The third-
party must be issued a formal notice and afforded an opportunity
to present privacy defenses. The learned Second Appellate
Authority must then objectively balance these defenses against
the larger public interest, producing a reasoned and speaking
order that reflects the harmonization inter se them.
15. Trite it is to say, the mandatory procedural safeguards as
prescribed under Section 11 of the RTI Act has comprehensively
been dealt with by the Hon’ble Constitution Bench of the Supreme
Court in the case of Central Public Information Officer,
Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal,
(2020) 5 SCC 481, wherein it was categorically held that the
procedure enshrined under Section 11 is not just a mere formality
but a mandatory statutory safeguard necessary to balance the
transparency with the right to privacy. The relevant extracts from
the said dictum collectively elucidate the rigorous procedural
mandate, and read as under:
“68. In R.K. Jain v. Union of India, the applicant had
sought inspection of documents relating to Annual
Confidential Reports (ACRs) of a Member of Customs
Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT)
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[2026:RJ-JP:16358] (14 of 20) [CW-5616/2022]the ACRs. The information sought was treated as
personal information, which, except in cases involving
overriding public interest, could not be disclosed. It was
observed that the procedure under Section 11 of the
RTI Act in such cases has to be followed. The matter
was remitted to examine the aspect of larger public
interest and to follow the procedure prescribed under
Section 11 of the RTI Act which, it was held, was
mandatory.
71. In Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Public Information
Officer, the Delhi High Court had examined and
interpreted Section 11 of the RTI Act in the following
manner:
“12. Sections 11(1), (2), (3) and (4) are the procedural
provisions which have to be complied with by the
PIO/appellant authority, when they are required to
apply the said test and give a finding whether
information should be disclosed or not disclosed. If the
said aspect is kept in mind, we feel there would be no
difficulty in interpreting Section 11(1) and the so called
difficulties or impartibility as pointed out by the
appellant will evaporate and lose significance. This will
be also in consonance with the primary rule of
interpretation that the legislative intent is to be
gathered from language employed in a statute which is
normally the determining factor. The presumption is
that the legislature has stated what it intended to state
and has made no mistake. (See Prakash Nath Khanna
vs. CIT, (2004) 9 SCC 686; and several judgments of
Supreme Court cited in B. Premanand and Ors. vs.
Mohan Koikal and Ors.)
13. Read in this manner, what is stipulated by Section
11(1) is that when an information seeker files an
application which relates to or has been supplied by
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[2026:RJ-JP:16358] (15 of 20) [CW-5616/2022]as confidential by the third party. If the answer is in
the possible sphere of affirmative or “maybe yes”, then
the procedure prescribed in Section 11 has to be
followed for determining whether the larger public
interest requires such disclosure. When information per
se or ex facie cannot be regarded as confidential, then
the procedure under section 11 is not to be followed.
All information relating to or furnished by a third party
need not be confidential for various reasons including
the factum that it is already in public domain or in
circulation, right of third party is not affected or by law
is required to be disclosed etc. The aforesaid
interpretation takes care of the difficulties visualised by
the appellant like marks obtained in an examination,
list of BPL families, etc. In such cases, normally plea of
privacy or confidentiality does not arise as the said list
has either been made public, available in the public
domain or has been already circulated to various third
parties. On the other hand, in case the word “or” is
read as “and”, it may lead to difficulties and problems,
including invasion of right of privacy/confidentiality of a
third party. For example, a public authority may have
in its records, medical reports or prescriptions relating
to third person but which have not been supplied by
the third person. If the interpretation given by the
appellant is accepted then such information can be
disclosed to the information seeker without following
the procedure prescribed in Section 11(1) as the
information was not furnished or supplied by the third
person. Such examples can be multiplied. Furthermore,
the difficulties and anomalies pointed out can even
arise when the word “or” is read as “and” in cases
where the information is furnished by the third party.
For example, for being enrolled as a BPL family,
information may have been furnished by the third party
who is in the list of BPL families. Therefore, the(Uploaded on 24/04/2026 at 09:46:22 AM)
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[2026:RJ-JP:16358] (16 of 20) [CW-5616/2022]reasonable and proper manner of interpreting Section
11(1) is to keep in mind the test stipulated by the
proviso. It has to be examined whether information can
be treated and regarded as being of confidential
nature, if it relates to a third party or has been
furnished by a third party. Read in this manner, when
information relates to a third party and can be prima
facie regarded and treated as confidential, the
procedure under Section 11(1) must be followed.
Similarly, in case information has been provided by the
third party and has been prima facie treated by the
said third party as confidential, again the procedure
prescribed under Section 11(1) has to be followed.
xx xx xx
16. Thus, Section 11(1) postulates two circumstances
when the procedure has to be followed. Firstly when
the information relates to a third party and can be
prima facie regarded as confidential as it affects the
right of privacy of the third party. The second situation
is when information is provided and given by a third
party to a public authority and prima facie the third
party who has provided information has treated and
regarded the said information as confidential. The
procedure given in Section 11(1) applies to both
cases.”
83. The aforesaid passages highlight the relevance of
confidentiality in the government and its functioning.
However, this is not to state that plea of confidentiality
is an absolute bar, for in terms of proviso to Section
11(1) of the RTI Act, the PIO has to undertake the
balancing exercise and weigh the advantages and
benefits of disclosing the information with the possible
harm or injury to the third party on the information
being disclosed. We have already referred to the
general approach on the right of access to government
records under the heading “Section 8(1)(j) and Section
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11 of the RTI Act” with reference to the decisions of the
High Court of Australia in John Fairfax and Sons Ltd.
(supra).
96. In the RTI Act, in the absence of any positive
indication as to the considerations which the PIO has to
bear in mind while making a decision, the legislature
had intended to vest a general discretion in the PIO to
weigh the competing interests, which is to be limited
only by the object, scope and purpose of the protection
and the right to access information and in Section
11(1), the ‘possible’ harm and injury to the third party.
It imports a discretionary value judgment on the part
of the PIO and the appellate forums as it mandates that
any conclusion arrived at must be fair and just by
protecting each right which is required to be upheld in
public interest. There is no requirement to take a
fortiori view that one trumps the other.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. In view of the overarching facts and the aforementioned
dictum passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the learned Second
Appellate Authority has to follow the mandatory statutory
procedure prescribed under Section 11 of the RTI Act, and has to
subsequently pass a reasoned and speaking order balancing the
horizons of right to privacy and larger public interest.
17. Adverting to the dictum passed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande (supra), upon which
reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner,
this Court finds itself in consonance with the contentions advanced
by the learned counsel for the respondent that the said reliance is
misplaced and the aforesaid dictum is supportive of the case of
the respondent more than the case of the petitioner. However, the
said dictum vide its paragraphs 13 and 14, categorically held that
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[2026:RJ-JP:16358] (18 of 20) [CW-5616/2022]
although the onus to establish that the information sought is in
the larger public interest lies upon the applicant, but if the learned
Appellate Authority deems fit that the larger public interest
justifies the disclosure of the information sought, appropriate
orders could be passed in light of the same. Hence, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has also recognized that the learned Appellate
Authority, after considering the facts and circumstances of the
case, has to pass an appropriate, well-reasoned, and speaking
order while rejecting or allowing the appeal preferred by the
petitioner. The relevant extracts of the aforesaid dictum are
reproduced as under:
“13. We are in agreement with the CIC and the courts
below that the details called for by the petitioner i.e.
copies of all memos issued to the third respondent,
show cause notices and orders of censure/punishment
etc. are qualified to be personal information as defined
in clause (j) of Section 8(1) of the RTI Act. The
performance of an employee/officer in an organization
is primarily a matter between the employee and the
employer and normally those aspects are governed by
the service rules which fall under the expression
“personal information”, the disclosure of which has no
relationship to any public activity or public interest. On
the other hand, the disclosure of which would cause
unwarranted invasion of privacy of that individual. Of
course, in a given case, if the Central Public
Information Officer or the State Public Information
Officer of the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the
larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such
information, appropriate orders could be passed but the(Uploaded on 24/04/2026 at 09:46:22 AM)
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[2026:RJ-JP:16358] (19 of 20) [CW-5616/2022]petitioner cannot claim those details as a matter of
right.
14. The details disclosed by a person in his income tax
returns are “personal information” which stand
exempted from disclosure under clause (j) of Section
8(1) of the RTI Act, unless involves a larger public
interest and the Central Public Information Officer or
the State Public Information Officer or the Appellate
Authority is satisfied that the larger public interest
justifies the disclosure of such information.”
(emphasis supplied)
PARTING NOTE AND CONCLUSION
18. Before parting, this Court deems it apposite to express its
strong deprecation of the manner in which the learned Second
Appellate Authority has adjudicated the statutory appeal in the
instant matter. By absurdly weaponizing the twenty-year mandate
as enshrined under Section 8(3) of the RTI Act, a clause which is
meant for the disclosure, the learned Second Appellate Authority
has acted contrary to the very spirit of the legislation and wrongly
upheld the order passed by the learned First Appellate Authority
qua non-disclosure of the information sought by the petitioner
without any cogent and justifiable reasoning. It is sorry state of
affairs that such cavalier and ill-founded interpretations of the
statutory provisions by the learned Appellate Authorities place an
unnecessary and vexatious burden upon the citizens and they are
compelled to approach the Constitutional Courts.
19. In view of the foregoing discussion and findings, this Court is
of the view that the said impugned order suffers from patent
illegality and jurisdictional overreach.
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[2026:RJ-JP:16358] (20 of 20) [CW-5616/2022]
20. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 18.12.2021 passed
by the learned Second Appellate Authority is hereby quashed and
set aside.
21. As the information sought pertains to more than twenty
years prior to the date of application, and considering that a
period of approximately six years has already been passed from
the date of application filed under Section 6 of the RTI Act, the
learned Second Appellate Authority or the Competent Authority of
the respondents is/are directed to supply a copy of the
information sought to the petitioner as per the provisions
enshrined under Section 8 of the RTI Act within an upper limit of
sixty (60) days from the date of passing of this order.
22. In light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the present
writ petition stands allowed. Pending applications, if any, also
stand disposed.
23. Registrar (Judicial) is directed to send a copy of the present
order to the learned Second Appellate Authority i.e., Rajasthan
State Information Commission, Jaipur, for necessary compliance.
(SAMEER JAIN),J
Preeti Asopa
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