Son Of D. P. Jain vs The State Of Jharkhand on 27 April, 2026

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    Jharkhand High Court

    Son Of D. P. Jain vs The State Of Jharkhand on 27 April, 2026

    Author: Rajesh Shankar

    Bench: Rajesh Shankar

                                                      ( 2026:JHHC:12223-DB )
    
    
    IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                      W.P. (C) No. 5235 of 2025
    Terracis Technologies Limited (Formerly known as Ecentric Digital
    Limited), a Company Registered under the Companies Act, 2013, having it's
    Corporate Office at- 3rd Floor, Ambience Corporate Tower 1, Ambience
    Island, NH-8, P.O Sector 24, P.S DLF Phase 2 District- Gurugram, Haryana-
    122010, through it's Senior Manager Mr. Sajal Jain, Aged about 53 years,
    Son of D. P. Jain, residing at 1946, Ground Floor Outram Lines, Kingsway
    Camp, Near Guldasta Park, Mukherjee Nagar, P.O. & P.S.- GTB Nagar,
    North West Delhi, District-Delhi-110009.
                                                        ... ... Petitioner
                                     Versus
    1. The State of Jharkhand.
    2. Secretary, Department of Information Technology & e-Governance,
         Jharkhand, Ground Floor, Engineer's Hostel - I, Near Golchakkar, P.O.
         & P.S.- Dhurwa, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand-834004.
    3. The CEO, Jharkhand Agency for Promotion of Information Technology
         (JAP-IT) Ground Floor, Engineer's Hostel - I, - Near Golchakkar, P.O.
         & P.S.- Dhurwa, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand-834004.
    4. The Officer-on-Special Duty, Jharkhand Agency for Promotion of
         Information Technology (JAP-IT) Ground Floor, Engineer's Hostel - I,
         Near Golchakkar, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand-
         834004.
    5. The Registrar General, Jharkhand High Court, New Building P.O.
         &P.S.-Dhurwa, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand-834004.
                                                        ... ... Respondents
                              ------
        CORAM : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
                    HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
                              ------
    For the Petitioner        :      Mr M. S. Mittal, Sr. Advocate
                                     Mrs Swati Shalini, Advocate
    For the Resp. Nos. 1 to 4 :      Mr Ashutosh Anand, AAG-III
                                     Ms Rishi Bharti, AC to AAG-III
    For the Respondent No. 5:        Dr (Mrs) Vandana Singh, Advocate
                              -----
    Reserved On: 23.04.2026                     Pronounced On: 27.04.2026
    
    Per M.S. Sonak, C.J.
    

    1. Heard Mr M.S. Mittal, learned senior counsel with Mrs Swati Shalini,

    learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ashutosh Anand, learned AAG-III for

    SPONSORED

    the respondent Nos. 1 to 4, as also Dr (Mrs) Vandana Singh, learned counsel

    for 5th respondent.

    2. At the request of and with the consent of the learned counsel for the

    parties, this petition was heard finally on 23.04.2026 and closed for ‘Orders’.

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    3. The petitioner, by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court

    under Article 226 of the Constitution, has sought for the following

    substantive reliefs in this petition: –

    “a. For issuance of appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/direction(s),
    particularly in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the Intimation
    of Cancellation of Tender dated 21.08.2025 (Annexure-14), along
    with the Corrigendum for Cancellation, bearing PR Ref. No. 349383,
    (Annexure- 14/1), issued by the Respondent No. 4, whereby and
    whereunder, the respondent Authorities in a most mechanical and
    arbitrary manner, without assigning any cogent reasons have
    cancelled the NIT bearing Tender Ref.: JAPIT/HIGHCOURT-
    DMS/01/2025 for “Purchase, Installation, Configuration &
    Integration of two Server System (Live & Backup) & Other Equipment
    with 05 Years Comprehensive Warranty along with 24×7 Technical
    Manpower at Data Center of Hon’ble Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi”

    And,
    b. For further issuance of appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/direction(s),
    particularly in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the Letter No.
    1719 dated 13.06.2025 (Annexure-10), issued under the sign and seal
    of the Respondent No. 4, whereby and whereunder despite issuance of
    LOI in favor of the Petitioner, the Respondent No. 4 in a most
    arbitrary and whimsical manner, at a belated stage, on the grounds of
    Budgetary Constraint has directed the Petitioner to reduce the quoted
    price from Rs. 30,52,16,321/- to Rs. 22,86,027,91.70/-. And,
    c. For issuance of further appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/direction(s)
    upon the Respondent authorities, directing them to execute the
    contract in furtherance of NIT bearing Tender Ref.:

    JAPIT/HIGHCOURT-DMS/01/2025 for “Purchase, Installation,
    Configuration & Integration of Two Server Systems (Live & Backup)
    and Other Equipment with 05 Years Comprehensive Warranty along
    with 24×7 Technical Manpower at the Data Center of the Hon’ble
    Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi,” in favor of the Petitioner, inasmuch
    as the Petitioner has already been declared as the L-1 bidder and the
    Respondent authorities have issued the Letter of Intent (LOI) in its
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    favor on 19.05.2025, pursuant to which the Petitioner has already
    furnished a Performance Bank Guarantee amounting to Rs.
    1,52,60,816/- And,
    d. During the pendency of this writ petition, Intimation of
    Cancellation of Tender dated 21.08.2025 (Annexure-14), and the
    Corrigendum for Cancellation, bearing PR Ref. No. 349383,
    (Annexure- 14/1), issued by the Respondent No. 4 may kindly be
    stayed; And,
    e. (Amended vide order dated 09.03.2026) For issuance of further
    appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/, direction(s) for quashing the bid No.
    GEM/2025/B/6984701 dated 10.12.2025 vide which the proposals for
    the same work that was earlier awarded to the petitioner vide letter
    dated 19.05.2025, bearing Letter No. 1433 have been floated by the
    respondents.”

    4. Mr Mittal submitted that the State or its Instrumentalities cannot,

    relying upon the clause that purportedly permits them to cancel any tender or

    decline to accept any tender bid without assigning any reasons, proceed to

    arbitrarily and without indicating any reason, cancel the tender. The arbitrary

    cancellation of the tender violates Article 14 of the Constitution and defies

    the doctrine of legitimate expectation. He relied on Shivnandan C.T. Vs.

    High Court of Kerala, (2024) 3 SCC 799 in support of this contention.

    5. Mr Mittal submitted that even otherwise, arbitrary and unreasoned

    cancellation of the tender process or the contracts entered pursuant to such

    tender process violates Article 14 of the Constitution. He relied on the

    judgments of Golden Food Products India Vs. State of U.P., (2026) SCC

    OnLine SC 24, Prakash Asphaltings & Toll Highways (India) Ltd. Vs.

    Mandeepa Enterprises and others, [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1959], Mahabir

    Auto Stores and others Vs. Indian Oil Corporation and others, (1990) 3

    SCC 752, M/s Star Enterprises and others Vs. City and Industrial

    Development Corporation Of Maharasthra Ltd. and others, (1990) 3 SCC
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    280, Kalu Ram Ahuja and Another Vs. Delhi Development Authority and

    Another (2008) 10 SCC 696 and State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Sudhir Kumar

    Singh and others, (2021) 19 SCC 706 in support of this contention.

    6. Mr Mittal submitted that, in this case, the petitioner was informed of

    the acceptance of its tender bid through a Letter of Intent (LOI). Post such

    acceptance, the petitioner was required to submit a performance bank

    guarantee for an amount of Rs. 1,52,60,816/-. He, therefore, submitted that

    there was a concluded contract between the parties and such a concluded

    contract could not have been arbitrarily terminated by the respondents

    without assigning any reasons or, in any event, on a cogent reason.

    7. Mr Mittal submitted that there was no provision for any modification

    to the terms of the Notice Inviting Tender (NIT), and, in any event, clause

    1.8 contemplates modification before the submission of bids. He submitted

    that in this case, modification was attempted after the petitioner was

    declared as a successful bidder, LOI was issued to the petitioner, and the

    petitioner was made to furnish a bank guarantee for Rs. 1,52,60,816/-. He

    submitted that this was in breach of the terms and conditions of the NIT and,

    consequently, is arbitrary, unreasonable, and null and void.

    8. Mr Mittal submitted that there was no provision in the NIT under

    which the petitioner was called upon to reduce its duly accepted bid of Rs.

    30.52 crores, which was incidentally the lowest bid, to Rs. 22.86 crores;

    such insistence of reduction was arbitrary, unreasonable, null and void.

    Therefore, merely because the petitioner refused to reduce its accepted bid

    of Rs. 30.52 crores, the respondents had no right or authority to cancel the

    entire tender process. Such cancellation is illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional,

    null and void.

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    9. Mr Mittal submitted that from the perusal of the affidavit filed on

    behalf of Jharkhand Agency for Promotion to Information Technology (JAP-

    IT), it is evident that no reason or, in any event, no cogent reason is

    disclosed for cancellation of the tender process, after accepting the

    petitioner’s bid. He submitted that the entire blame is sought to be placed on

    the High Court. Similarly, on perusal of the affidavit filed on behalf of the

    High Court, no reason as such is forthcoming for the cancellation of the

    tender, and the entire blame is sought to be apportioned to the JAP-IT. He

    submitted that neither the JAP-IT nor the High Court assumes responsibility

    for the cancellation of the tender, thereby rendering the cancellation

    unreasonable, arbitrary, unconstitutional, null and void.

    10. For all the above reasons, Mr Mittal submitted that the arbitrary

    cancellation of the tender process warrants interference and an appropriate

    writ is liable to be issued to the respondents to execute the contract in

    furtherance of the NIT.

    11. Mr Ashutosh Anand learned AAG-III, at the outset, submitted that the

    petitioner had suppressed the fact that, post the cancellation of the tender

    process for good and valid reasons, the JAP-IT returned the Earnest Money

    Deposit (EMD) amount of Rs. 60.00 lakhs to the petitioner on 22.08.2025,

    and the petitioner accepted the same without raising any protest.

    12. Mr Ashutosh Anand submitted that this petition was instituted on the

    6th of September. 2025, after accepting the EMD return, post the cancellation

    of the tender process. Therefore, on the suppression of material facts and the

    acquiescence, this petition ought not to be entertained and should be

    dismissed.

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    13. Mr Ashutosh Anand, without prejudice to the above, submitted that

    cogent reasons were given in the affidavit filed on behalf of JAP-IT for the

    cancellation of the tender process. He submitted that the JAP-IT was the

    Executing Agency of the contract for the purchase, installation,

    configuration and integration of two server systems and other equipment

    with a 05-year comprehensive warranty. This purchase, etc., was on behalf

    of the Jharkhand High Court. From the NIT, it was clear that the final

    acceptance of any bidder’s bid was subject to approval by the High Court,

    since it was the High Court that was to pay for the purchase, etc., through

    funds received or receivable from the National Computer Committee, New

    Delhi. He submitted that the entire High Court budget for this project was in

    the range of Rs. 22.00-23.00 crores. Therefore, after receiving the

    petitioner’s bid, the petitioner was called for negotiation to determine

    whether the bid amount could be reduced to bring it within the High Court’s

    budgetary limits.

    14. Mr Ashutosh Anand submitted that on three occasions, the petitioner

    sought an extension of time and finally expressed an inability to reduce the

    bid amount from Rs. 30.52 crores to Rs. 22.86 crores, even though a revised

    estimated proposal was made vide letter No. 224 dated 28.01.2025.

    15. Mr Ashutosh Anand submitted that the JAP-IT placed the matter

    before the Computer and Digitization Committee of the High Court,

    informing the Committee that the petitioner was unwilling to negotiate on

    the bid. The JAP-IT also sought approval from the High Court for

    cancellation of the tender process, so that a fresh tender could be invited,

    based upon the revised proposals, so that the project could be completed

    within the budgetary limit of the High Court. Upon receipt of the High

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    Court’s approval, the tender process was cancelled, and the EMD amount

    was returned to the bidders, including the petitioner. Mr Ashutosh Anand

    submitted that the petitioner having accepted the EMD amount of Rs. 60.00

    lakhs without lodging any protest and further after suppressing this material

    fact, should not be allowed to maintain this petition.

    16. Mr Ashutosh Anand submitted that in any event, the respondents had

    every right to reject the petitioner’s bid before the execution of a contract.

    He pointed out that in this case, only an LOI was issued and that did not

    amount to any acceptance of the petitioner’s offer. Therefore, the petitioner

    cannot seek relief requiring the respondents to execute a contract with the

    petitioner at the bid price of Rs. 30.52 crores, though this bid amount was

    well beyond the High Court’s budgetary limits.

    17. Mr Anand submitted that this petition seeks a decree of specific

    performance from this Constitutional Court on the mistaken premise that

    there was a concluded contract between the parties, and that only the formal

    execution of the contract document was pending or being unreasonably

    avoided. He submitted that such a writ petition ought not to be entertained,

    inter alia, because this was a case of a non-statutory contract and grant or

    refusal of relief as prayed for by the petitioner would involve adjudication

    into the disputed questions of fact.

    18. Mr Anand finally submitted that cogent reasons were provided for the

    cancellation of the tender process. There was no arbitrariness or

    unreasonableness. None of the petitioner’s vested or contractual rights was

    infringed. The petitioner cannot force or foist a contract upon the

    respondents in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The

    cancellation of the tender process was fair and carried out in a transparent

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    manner, after giving the petitioner an opportunity to reduce the bid amount,

    at least after the respondents offered revised proposals involving much less

    financing.

    19. Mr Ashutosh Anand relied on Dresser Rand S.A. Vs. Bindal Agro

    Chem Ltd & Another, (2006) 1 SCC 751 and Indore Vikas Praadhikaran

    (IDA) and Another Vs. Shri Humud Jain Samaj Trust & Another, (2024)

    SCC OnLine SC 3511 and Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC

    651 in support of his contentions.

    20. Dr (Mrs) Vandana Singh, learned counsel for the Jharkhand High

    Court, submitted that the High Court had a budgetary constraint of Rs.

    22.00-23.00 crores and had, therefore, made it clear that the project should

    be completed within this financial range. For this purpose, the High Court

    was always willing to revise the proposals. She submitted that the

    petitioner’s bid was duly considered but was not found to be financially

    viable, and therefore JAP-IT was requested to commence negotiations with

    the petitioner.

    21. Dr Singh submitted that the petitioner, after seeking three extensions,

    finally refused to reduce the bid amount or even the bid rates, so that the

    revised proposals could be executed within the range of Rs. 22.00-23.00

    crores. In these circumstances, the High Court had no option but to permit

    the JAP-IT to cancel the entire tender process and go for a fresh tender

    process.

    22. Dr Singh submitted that there was absolutely no arbitrariness or lack

    of transparency involved in the entire tender process. Cogent reasons and

    information have been furnished inter alia in the affidavits, and there was

    never any concluded contract with the petitioner.

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    23. Dr Vandana Singh submitted that the JAP-IT, for valid reasons, had

    every right to decline the petitioner’s offer, even though the same may have

    been the lowest and the petitioner had no vested right to insist that its offer

    must, under all circumstances, be accepted simply because the same was the

    lowest from amongst the bidders. She submitted that this petition was

    misconceived and should be dismissed. She relied on Afcon Infrastructure

    Limited Vs. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Limited and Another [(2016)

    16 SCC 818[ and Prakash Asphaltings & Toll Highways (India) Ltd. Vs.

    Mandeepa Enterprises, [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1959] in support of her

    contentions.

    24. The rival contentions now fall for our determination.

    25. To appreciate the rival contentions, it would be apposite to briefly

    summarise the factual contours of the controversy this petition raises.

    26. JAP-IT invited online technical and financial proposals on behalf of

    the Jharkhand High Court (JHC) for the purchase, installation, configuration

    and integration of two server systems (live and back-up) and other

    equipment with a 05-year comprehensive warranty. The Request for

    Proposals (RFP) lists the role and responsibilities of JAP-IT and JHC.

    27. The petitioner participated in the tender process by submitting its bid

    on 17.04.2025. There were two other tenderers, who also submitted their

    respective bids.

    28. The technical bids of three bidders were opened on 21.04.2025. One

    of the bidders was declared technically disqualified, and the petitioner and

    M/S Blue Cloud Softech Solutions Limited were found technically qualified.

    The financial bids of the petitioner and M/s Blue Cloud Soft-tech Solutions

    Limited were opened on 19.05.2005. Since the petitioner was found to be L-

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    I, a computer-generated Letter of Intent (LOI) dated 19.05.2025, as opposed

    to a Letter of Acceptance (LOA), was issued to the petitioner.

    29. Since the petitioner had quoted an amount of Rs. 30.52 crores, the

    petitioner, vide the LOI, was directed to submit a Bank guarantee within

    seven days in the amount of Rs. 1.52 crores corresponding to 5% of the bid

    amount. This the petitioner did on 26.01.2025.

    30. The petitioner, vide email dated 03.06.2025, wrote to JAP-IT to

    execute the agreement/contract. It requested that the draft

    agreement/contract be shared. However, neither was any agreement/contract

    executed by JAP-IT with the petitioner, nor was any work order issued to the

    petitioner.

    31. On 13.06.2025, however, the 4th respondent wrote to the petitioner to

    negotiate the bid amount, as the budgetary provision for the project was

    limited to Rs. 22.86 crores. This was because the bid amount exceeded the

    JHC’s proposed budget. The petitioner sought an extension of time until

    24.06.2025 to negotiate on the bid. On this date, the petitioner sought yet

    another extension till 27.06.2025. A third request was made on 27.06.2025

    to extend the negotiation period until 07.07.2025. On 07.07.2025, the

    petitioner refused to negotiate on the bid price or revise the originally quoted

    rates.

    32. The JAP-IT, after informing the JHC about the petitioner’s refusal to

    negotiate, cancelled the tender process and decided to initiate a fresh

    procurement (re-tender), this time, referring to the budget capping to ensure

    competitive and justified pricing for the revised proposal. After completion

    of the necessary formalities, vide impugned communication dated

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    21.08.2025, the RFP / tender was cancelled, and such cancellation was

    published on the portal and in some specified newspapers.

    33. Since an issue arose as to why the EMD of almost Rs. 60.00 lakhs

    made by the petitioner was not immediately returned or why no prayer was

    made by the petitioner for return of this EMD, Mr Ashutosh Anand

    submitted that because of the absence of any relief relating to the EMD and

    the performance bank guarantee, he had no ready instructions with him on

    these issues. However, he submitted that by 4.00 pm on 23.04.2026, he

    would seek the instructions on these issues.

    34. Mr Ashutosh Anand then submitted a computerised document

    showing that the EMD of Rs. 60.00 lakhs was, in fact, refunded to the

    petitioner on the very next day, i.e. 22.08.2025, because, by communication

    dated 21.08.2025, the entire tender process had been cancelled. Mr Ashutosh

    Anand also produced on record the communication dated 18.02.2026

    addressed to the petitioner’s banker, M/s ICICI Bank Limited, regarding the

    cancellation of the tender and the bank guarantee becoming null and void

    due to such cancellation. This communication stated that official information

    had already been communicated to the petitioner through the Jharkhand

    Tender Portal.

    35. This petition was filed on 06.09.2025, inter alia, to question the

    tender cancellation communication dated 21.08.2025. The factum of the

    return and acceptance of the EMD of Rs. 60.00 lakhs due to the cancellation

    of the entire tender process were not disclosed in the petition. Consequently,

    there is no averment in the petition that the acceptance of this amount and

    the return of this EMD amount were under protest or without prejudice to

    challenge the tender cancellation notice dated 21.08.2025.

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    36. Similarly, there is no reference to the JAP-IT’s communication

    regarding the bank guarantee, though this communication states that

    information in this regard was already communicated to the petitioner

    through the Jharkhand Tender Portal.

    37. Though the impugned tender cancellation communication refers to the

    administrative reasons for the cancellation of the tender, from the counter

    affidavit filed by the JAP-IT and JHC, it is evident that such cancellation of

    the tender process was because the budget for the entire project was in the

    range of Rs. 22.00-23.00 crores, and the petitioner’s bid was almost Rs.

    31.00 crores. Even after revising the specifications, the petitioner was

    unwilling to negotiate and reduce the bid in the range of Rs. 22.00-23.00

    crores, which was the budgetary constraint faced by the JHC. Therefore, this

    is not a case where the cancellation of the tender process was unreasoned, as

    has been alleged by the petitioner in the petition.

    38. Upon due consideration of the rival contentions, in the context of the

    above-referred factual contours, we are satisfied that it is not a fit case for

    granting the petitioner any of the reliefs sought for in this petition. The

    reasons for these conclusions are discussed hereafter.

    39. Following the cancellation of the entire tender process by the

    impugned communication dated 21.08.2025, on the very next date, the

    petitioner’s EMD of Rs. 60.00 lakhs was returned by the JAP-IT to the

    petitioner. There is nothing on the record to suggest that the petitioner

    accepted such an amount under protest or without prejudice to its rights to

    challenge the impugned tender cancellation communication dated

    21.08.2025. This would suggest acquiescence, which is a good ground for

    denying relief to the petitioner.

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    40. However, more serious is the circumstance that the petitioner, after

    having received the refund of EMD on 22.08.2025, did not bother to or

    rather suppressed, indicate this fact in this petition, which was filed on

    06.09.2025. The circumstances regarding the receipt of the refund of the

    EMD amount of Rs. 60.00 lakhs and its acceptance without any protest were

    material facts, since the petitioner was praying for interim relief in this

    matter, or otherwise. Such suppression also disentitled the petitioner to any

    equitable relief in this petition.

    41. However, we clarify that we do not wish to non-suit the petitioner on

    the two grounds mentioned above, because those grounds were not raised in

    the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents, and it should not be

    taken that the petitioner did not have an adequate opportunity to address

    these issues of acquiescence or suppression of material facts. Even the

    learned counsel for the petitioner was unaware of the acceptance of the

    EMD or the letter regarding the PBG. Had they been aware, we have no

    doubt that the same would have found place in the pleadings, possibly with

    some explanation.

    42. Therefore, we have examined the petitioner’s contentions, ignoring

    the issues of acquiescence and non-disclosure of material particulars. Even

    after evaluating those contentions, we are satisfied that no case has been

    made out for the grant of any relief to the petitioner in this petition.

    43. As explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tata

    Cellular (Supra), a tender or an RFP is only an invitation to offer. It is

    something that invites and is communicated to convey acceptance. Pursuant

    to the Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) or an RFP, the bidder submits its bid,

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    which is its offer. After that, it is for the party that issued the NIT or RFP to

    accept or reject the bid.

    44. Although the principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise

    of contractual powers by Government bodies to prevent arbitrariness or

    nepotism, it must be clearly stated that there are inherent limitations on the

    exercise of the power of judicial review, as pointed out in Paragraph 70 of

    Tata Cellular (Supra). The Government is the guardian of the State’s

    finances and is expected to protect the State’s financial interests. The right to

    refuse the lowest or any other tender is always available to the Government.

    However, the principles laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution must be

    kept in mind when accepting or rejecting a tender. There can be no question

    of infringement of Article 14 if the Government seeks the best person or the

    best quotation. The right to choose cannot be regarded as an arbitrary power.

    Of course, if the said power is exercised for even a collateral purpose, or if

    mala fide is involved, the exercise of that power will be struck down.

    45. Tata Cellular (Supra) explains that judicial quest in administrative

    matters has been to find the right balance between the administrative

    discretion to decide matters, whether contractual or political in nature, or

    issues of social policies; thus, they are not essentially justiciable and the

    need to remedy any unfairness. Such unfairness is remedied by judicial

    review. Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the

    decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made, but

    the decision-making process itself.

    46. In Paragraph-77 of Tata Cellular (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme

    Court has explained that the duty of the Court exercising the powers of

    judicial review is to confine itself to the question of the legality of the

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    decision. Its concern should be whether a decision-making authority

    exceeded its powers, committed an error of law, committed a breach of the

    rules of natural justice, reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal

    would have reached, or abused its powers. Three main grounds for

    exercising the powers of judicial review are therefore illegality, irrationality

    and procedural impropriety.

    47. In the present case, there are no allegations of malafides made in the

    petition. There are also no allegations of any extraneous consideration

    vitiating the decision-making process. The petition was based on the premise

    that the decision to cancel the entire tender process was unreasonable in the

    sense that the impugned cancellation communication contained no reasons,

    or the affidavit filed in the petition also disclosed no reasons, or, in any

    event, cogent reasons. Arguments were also advanced that it was

    impermissible to insist upon any negotiation after the financial bid was

    opened, or to change the specification and, based thereon, even request the

    lower bidder to offer a lower rate or bid amount.

    48. From the contours of the facts narrated above, we are satisfied that

    this was not a case of a concluded contract merely because a computer-

    generated LOI was issued to the petitioner after the petitioner was found to

    be the successful bidder, i.e., L-1. A contract was never entered into between

    JAP-IT and the petitioner. No work order was also issued by JAP-IT or the

    JHC to the petitioner. Based on the material on record, therefore, and

    considering the nature of jurisdiction that this Court exercises under Article

    226 of the Constitution, it is difficult to accept that there was some

    concluded contract between the petitioner and JAP-IT and/or JHC. Even the

    petitioner does not allege a concluded contract with the JHC.

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    49. In Dresser Rand S.A (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court at

    paragraphs-39 and 40 has explained that it is now well settled that a letter of

    intent merely indicates a party’s intention to enter into a contract with the

    other party in future. A letter of intent is not intended to bind either party

    ultimately to enter into any contract.

    50. After referring to Rajasthan Coop. Dairy Federation Ltd. versus

    Maha Laxmi Mingrate Marketing Service (P) Ltd.[(1996) 10 SCC 405],

    the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that the letter of intent merely

    expressed an intention to enter into a contract. There was no binding legal

    relationship between the parties at this stage, and the appellant was entitled

    to look at the totality of circumstances in deciding whether to enter into a

    binding contract with the 1st respondent or not.

    51. Therefore, the relief in terms of the prayer clause-c of this petition

    seeking a direction upon the respondent authorities to execute a contract in

    furtherance of the NIT or RFP cannot be granted. In any event, this relief is

    in the nature of a decree for specific performance, which is ordinarily not

    entertained or granted in the exercise of the High Court’s extraordinary

    jurisdiction. The grant or refusal of such a relief would involve an

    investigation into the disputed questions of fact and have regard to a host of

    considerations that go into the grant or refusal of such relief in the

    contractual sphere.

    52. For the petitioner to succeed, the petitioner had to establish that the

    cancellation of the entire tender process was for some malafide reasons or

    extraneous consideration. Failing this, the petitioner had to establish that

    such cancellation was ex facie arbitrary, unreasoned, merely a product of

    whim and caprice, thereby ex facie arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of

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    ( 2026:JHHC:12223-DB )

    the Constitution, or at least the petitioner ought to have made out a case of

    such a decision for cancellation being vitiated by illegality, irrationality and

    procedural impropriety.

    53. As noted earlier, there are no allegations of mala fides or extraneous

    considerations. This is not a case of unreasoned or even unreasonable

    cancellation of the tender process. The affidavits filed by JAP-IT and JHC

    set out the reasons for cancelling the entire tender process. Ultimately, this

    project was for the JHC, and JAP-IT was engaged to invite tenders to

    execute it on behalf of JHC. Records show that the budgetary provision for

    this project with the JHC was in the range of Rs. 22.00-23.00 crores.

    54. Though the petitioner’s bid may have been the lowest, it was still in

    the range of Rs. 31.00 crores or above. Therefore, the JHC informed the

    JAP-IT to negotiate the rates with the petitioner. Even the specifications

    were scaled down in the hope that the petitioner would proportionately

    reduce its bid to match the budget available to the JHC for this project. Even

    after the revised and scaled-down specifications, the petitioner expressed an

    inability to reduce its bid.

    55. Under the above circumstances, it cannot be said that the JAP-IT or

    the JHC acted arbitrarily or lacked valid reasons for opting to cancel the

    entire tender process and invite a fresh tender based on the scaled-down

    requirements. There was complete transparency in the process, with no

    arbitrariness or unreasonableness.

    56. The arguments on behalf of the petitioner as to how its bid was the

    most competitive or on some technical aspects of the project cannot be

    considered in this proceeding. As held in Tata Cellular (Supra), in such

    matters, judicial review concerns the decision-making process, not the merits

    17
    ( 2026:JHHC:12223-DB )

    of the decision itself. Here, there is nothing to fault the decision-making

    process, or, for that matter, the decision itself.

    57. The arguments that the specifications should have been finalised

    before the opening of the bids, etc., are not entirely convincing in the facts

    and circumstances of the present case. Only after the opening of the bids

    from the two technically qualified bidders, JAP-IT and JHC, did they realise

    that the bids were well beyond the budgetary provisions. Therefore, as a

    measure of reasonableness, some negotiation was proposed. After that, even

    the specifications were scaled down to see whether lower amounts could be

    agreed upon to execute the scaled-down specifications, so that the budgetary

    limits were not breached or strained. All this does not fall within the realm

    of arbitrariness or unreasonableness, as alleged by the petitioner in this

    petition.

    58. The decisions relied upon by Mr Mittal in support of this petition only

    point out that the cancellation of the tender process is permissible if such

    cancellation is not the product of any arbitrariness, unreasonableness or

    malafides. In the present case, these decisions would not apply because the

    cancellation cannot be held to be either unreasoned or arbitrary or

    unreasonable.

    59. In Golden Food Products India (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme

    Court was concerned with the auction process in which the reserve price had

    been fixed and the highest bid exceeded it. Hon’ble Court found that such

    the highest bid was discarded without any rationale or reasons for not

    accepting it. Such is not the case at all in the present matter.

    60. Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Limited (Supra)

    holds that the mere possibility of more money in the public coffers does not

    18
    ( 2026:JHHC:12223-DB )

    in itself serve public interest and that consideration of public interest should

    not be narrowly confined to the financial aspect only. Again, facts in this

    case offer no parallel words to those in the present case. Incidentally, this

    decision reminds the courts that while judicial review is not excluded to

    assail the administrative decisions even in matters of tender and contract,

    there is a long line of consistent judicial pronouncements that the

    Constitutional Courts should exercise utmost restraint in interfering with the

    tender process unless the threshold of judicial review is met.

    61. Mahabir Auto Stores (Supra) provides that even in the contractual

    field, the government or its agencies cannot act unfairly or arbitrarily. M/s

    Star Enterprises (Supra) provides that while dealing with the tender, the

    State is entitled to look for the best deal, and for that, it can refuse to accept

    even the highest bid. But while rejecting the highest offer in the tender, it

    must record the reasons for such action and communicate them to the

    parties. Here, it is not as if there were no reasons for the decision to cancel

    the entire tender process. This is not the case where the highest tenderer’s

    bid was rejected, and the works were awarded to another bidder/tenderer.

    62. Kalu Ram Ahuja (supra) reiterates that the rejection of the highest

    bid without assignment of any reason is not proper. Again, this was an

    auction, and the highest bidder bid over and above the reserve price.

    63. Sudhir Kumar Singh (supra) is concerned with the application of

    principles of natural justice even in the contractual spheres. Such an issue

    does not strictly speaking arise in this matter. In any event, the cancellation

    of the entire tender process is not due to anything adverse against the

    petitioner herein. The cancellation is due to the petitioner’s bid being well

    above the budgetary provisions set by the JHC for this project. The decision

    19
    ( 2026:JHHC:12223-DB )

    cited even refers to the requirement that the party alleging breach of natural

    justice plead and establish prejudice on account of non-compliance.

    64. In Afcons Infrastructure Limited (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme

    Court has held that the decision-making process in accepting or rejecting

    the bid should not be ordinarily interfered with, unless the decision-making

    process suffers from mala fides or is intended to favour someone.

    Interference is also permissible if the decision is arbitrary or irrational or is

    such that no responsible authority acting reasonably in accordance with law

    would have reached such a decision. Further, perversity of the decision-

    making process or decision, and not merely a faulty, erroneous or incorrect

    approach, is one of the grounds for interference by Courts.

    65. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Constitutional Courts are

    expected to exercise restraint when interfering with administrative decisions

    and ought not to substitute their view for that of the administrative

    authority. Even a mere disagreement with the decision-making process or

    the authority’s decision is no reason for a Constitutional Court to interfere.

    The Constitutional Courts must defer to this understanding and appreciation

    of the tender documents unless there is mala fides or perversity in the

    understanding or appreciation, or in the application of the terms of the

    tender conditions.

    66. Applying the above principles to the facts of this case, the decision-

    making process cannot be faulted. This is also not a case of arbitrary or

    unreasoned cancellation of the tender process. There are no allegations of

    mala fides, nepotism or any other extraneous considerations vitiating the

    decision or the decision-making process. This is also not a case of a

    concluded contract, as was sought to be projected. The Petitioner was

    20
    ( 2026:JHHC:12223-DB )

    offered opportunities to negotiate the rates, given JHC’s financial

    constraints. Even the specifications were scaled down to see whether the

    Petitioner could proportionately reduce the rates.

    67. There was no compulsion on the petitioner to either negotiate or scale

    down the rates, but then the petitioner cannot also object to the offer of

    negotiations or force the respondents to accept its bid/offer on the sole

    premise that it was the lowest. In such matters, free play in the joints must be

    accorded to the respondents, provided that the decision-making process is

    transparent and not arbitrary.

    68. For all the above reasons, we see no merit in this petition and

    consequently dismiss the same, without any order for costs.

    (M.S. Sonak, C.J.)

    (Rajesh Shankar, J.)
    April 27, 2026
    Ranjeet / R.Kr.

    AFR
    Uploaded on 27.04.2026

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