Godrej And Boyce Manufacturing Company … vs The Collector Mumbai Suburban District on 24 April, 2026

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    Bombay High Court

    Godrej And Boyce Manufacturing Company … vs The Collector Mumbai Suburban District on 24 April, 2026

    Author: Manish Pitale

    Bench: Manish Pitale

    2026:BHC-AS:19589-DB
    
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                           IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                                       WRIT PETITION NO.12027 OF 2025
                                                   WITH
                                       WRIT PETITION NO.3467 OF 2026
    
                 Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Company Limited               ...      Petitioner
                 Vs.
                 Collector, Mumbai Suburban District and others             ...      Respondents
    
    
                 Mr. Vineet Naik, Senior Advocate with Mr. Bhushan Deshmukh i/b. Bachubhai
                 Munim & Co. for Petitioner in both the Petitions.
                 Dr. Dhruti Kapadia, AGP for Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4-State in both the
                 Petitions.
                 Mr. Anil Singh, Additional Solicitor General a/w. Mr. Prakash Pandey, Ms.Dhruvi
                 Patni, Ms. Savita Rami, Mr. Adarsh Vyas, Mr. Jainendra Sheth, Mr. Rajdatt
                 Nagre, Mr. Krishnakant Deshmukh and Ms. Rama Gupta for Respondent No.3-
                 NHSRCL in both the Petitions.
                 Ms. Arya Ambre, Law Officer, Bandra Collector Office, present.
                 Mr. Rajesh Yadav, SLAO-7 from Collector Office, present.
    
    
                                                CORAM : MANISH PITALE &
                                                             SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, JJ.
                                               Reserved on : APRIL 09, 2026
                                             Pronounced on: APRIL 24, 2026
    
    
                 ORDER :

    (Per Justice Manish Pitale)

    . The petitioner company was the owner of the property that was
    acquired by land acquisition award dated 15.09.2022 passed by the
    respondent Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) No.7, Mumbai under
    the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
    Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013

    (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 2013’). The petitioner company has
    filed these two petitions being aggrieved by orders of the respondent
    Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority (hereinafter
    referred to as ‘LARR Authority’).

    SPONSORED

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    2. Writ Petition No. 12027 of 2025 is filed for challenging order
    dated 21.08.2025 passed by the LARR Authority, allowing application
    filed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 i.e. the Collector, Mumbai and the
    Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) No.7, Mumbai for setting aside
    order dated 15.03.2024, whereby the said Authority had directed that the
    proceedings would continue ex-parte against the said respondents and
    also allowing their application for condoning delay and taking their
    written statement on record. Writ Petition No.3467 of 2026 has been
    filed to challenge order dated 18.02.2026 passed by the LARR
    Authority, allowing application filed by the respondent No.3 i.e. the
    National High Speed Rail Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as
    the ‘respondent Corporation’) for amendment of reply / written
    statement to the reference, particularly to add the objection regarding
    limitation.

    3. According to the petitioner, both the orders, challenged in the writ
    petitions, are unsustainable on facts as well as law. It is submitted that
    the respondents were present before the LARR Authority from the year
    2023 and their aforesaid applications have been allowed belatedly to the
    prejudice of the petitioner and this has the effect of delaying and
    derailing the proceedings before the LARR Authority.

    4. The subject property is located in Village Vikhroli, Taluka Kurla,
    Dist. Mumbai Suburban, admeasuring approximately 10 acres, which
    was acquired by the aforementioned award dated 15.09.2022. The
    petitioner had filed Writ Petition No.3537 of 2019, challenging the
    acquisition undertaken by the respondents. This Court by judgment and
    order dated 09.02.2023 dismissed the said writ petition. The petitioner
    filed Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.3583 of 2023. The special leave
    petition was dismissed on 24.02.2023. However, the Supreme Court
    observed that upon the petitioner filing a reference for enhancement of

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    compensation, the jurisdictional Court shall dispose of the reference
    within a period of six months.

    5. Accordingly, the petitioner filed reference application before the
    respondent Collector on 28.02.2023. The application remained pending
    and hence, the petitioner was constrained to approach the LARR
    Authority for a direction to the Collector to make the reference. On
    23.06.2023, the LARR Authority dismissed the application, on the
    ground that it did not have jurisdiction to give such a direction to the
    Collector. The petitioner was constrained to file Writ Petition (L)
    No.19756 of 2023 before this Court on 18.07.2023, which was disposed
    of by an order dated 11.09.2023, directing the respondent No.1 Collector
    to decide the application of the petitioner within 30 days.

    6. On 25.09.2023, the respondent No.1 passed an order. There is a
    dispute between the petitioner and respondents, as to whether the said
    order specifically condoned the delay for placing the reference before
    the LARR Authority. Be that as it may, on 10.10.2023, the respondent
    No.1 Collector made the reference under Section 64 of the Act of 2013
    before the LARR Authority, which at that point in time, was located at
    Aurangabad. On 18.10.2023, the LARR Authority issued notice to
    respondent Nos.1 and 2 in the reference, posting the same for
    consideration on 03.11.2023. On the said date, respondent Nos.1 and 2
    i.e. the Collector and the Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) failed to
    appear before the LARR Authority and hence, a further notice was
    issued. On 06.12.2023, the petitioner filed its application for amendment
    of the reference. By an order dated 02.02.2024, the LARR Authority
    allowed the application for amendment. By way of amendment, the
    petitioner added detailed pleadings and referred to certain further sale
    instances to ask for further enhanced amount of compensation. On
    02.05.2024, the petitioner filed second application for amendment,

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    further seeking an increase in the quantum of the enhanced
    compensation, to the tune of Rs.1972 crores in the light of the report of
    an expert valuer, which was also sought to be placed on record. On
    10.05.2024, this second amendment was also granted.

    7. It is relevant to note that by the first amendment, the respondent
    No.3 Corporation i.e. the beneficiary of the acquisition was added as a
    party. The LARR Authority issued further notices to respondent Nos.1 to
    3 and despite service of such notices, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 failed to
    appear before the LARR Authority. Respondent No.3 appeared and filed
    its reply / written statement on 05.04.2024.

    8. It is the case of the petitioner that while respondent Nos.1 and 2
    failed to appear before the LARR Authority for as many as 9 hearings,
    respondent No.3 Corporation was represented by its Advocate. In the
    meanwhile, due to the failure on the part of respondent Nos.1 and 2 to
    appear before the LARR Authority, by the order dated 15.03.2024, it was
    directed that the matter would proceed ex-parte against respondent Nos.1
    and 2.

    9. It is in this backdrop that on 19.12.2024, the respondent No.2
    Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) addressed a letter to the Registrar
    of the LARR Authority at Aurangabad, stating that the award issued by
    the said respondent may be treated as its written statement and that
    respondent Nos.1 and 2 do not wish to file any further written statement.
    The petitioner heavily relied upon the said letter in the present
    proceedings. It is also the case of the petitioner that in further hearings
    also, respondent Nos.1 and 2 remained unrepresented and that the
    respondent No.3 was present through its Advocate. On 12.03.2025, the
    reference was transferred to LARR Authority at Nashik. At this stage, in
    April 2025, respondent Nos.1 to 3 filed six applications, including the
    applications leading to orders that have been challenged in these two

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    writ petitions. The impugned orders were passed on application seeking
    setting aside of ex-parte order (exhibit 105); application seeking
    condonation of delay in filing written statement and for taking written
    statement on record of respondent Nos.1 and 2 (exhibit 107); as also
    application filed by respondent No.3 seeking amendment of its reply /
    written statement, particularly to include the ground of limitation
    (exhibit 103).

    10. On 21.08.2025, the LARR Authority passed the impugned order
    on exhibits 105 and 107, setting aside the ex-parte order dated
    15.03.2024, condoning delay in filing written statement and accepting
    the written statement of respondent Nos.1 and 2 on record. The
    petitioner prayed for stay of the said order, which the LARR authority
    granted for a period of four weeks. On 12.09.2025, the petitioner filed
    Writ Petition No.12027 of 2025 to challenge the said impugned order
    dated 21.08.2025. On 17.09.2025, this Court continued the said stay
    granted by the LARR Authority, which has continued to operate during
    the pendency of the said writ petition.

    11. On 18.02.2026, the LARR Authority passed the second impugned
    order, allowing exhibit 103, being the application filed by respondent
    No.3 to amend its reply / written statement to incorporate plea of
    limitation. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed Writ Petition
    No.3467 of 2026. According to the petitioner, both the impugned orders
    are unsustainable. Upon completion of pleadings in the writ petitions,
    the same were taken up for hearing.

    12. Mr. Vineet Naik, learned senior counsel appearing for the
    petitioner in both the writ petitions submitted that the LARR Authority
    committed a grave error in passing the impugned orders. It was
    submitted that the order dated 15.03.2024 was passed by the LARR
    Authority at Aurangabad to proceed against respondent Nos.1 and 2 ex-

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    parte due to their repeated absence in the reference proceedings under
    Section 64 of the Act of 2013. The application for setting aside the ex-
    parte order was filed more than a year after the said order dated
    15.03.2024 and in the interregnum also, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 had
    failed to appear before the LARR Authority. It was submitted that before
    the application for setting aside the ex-parte order was filed, by letter
    dated 19.12.2024, respondent No.2 informed the Registrar of the LARR
    Authority at Aurangabad that the award itself be treated as the written
    statement of the respondent Nos.1 and 2 and further that the respondents
    did not wish to file their written statement. It was submitted that in this
    backdrop, the said applications for setting aside the ex-parte order and
    for permission to take written statement of respondent Nos.1 and 2 on
    record, ought not to have been entertained by the LARR Authority. It
    was submitted that in any case, respondent Nos.1 and 2 had failed to
    show sufficient cause for considering their prayer for setting aside ex-
    parte order and hence, there was no question of taking their written
    statement on record.

    13. By placing reliance on judgement of this Court in the case of
    Kamalabai Bhaskar Mule (dead) through Legal Heirs and others Vs.
    Special Land Acquisition Officer (No.1), Nashik and others
    , 2021 (1)
    Mh.L.J. 521, it was submitted that the reference proceedings before the
    LARR Authority could not be treated as a suit and therefore, strict rules
    of pleadings and consequences of non-filing of written statement were
    not applicable to such proceedings. It was submitted that since the award
    issued by respondent No.2 is the offer made to claimants like the
    petitioner herein, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 could not state anything
    beyond the said award in their reply / written statement. It was submitted
    that the aforesaid letter dated 19.12.2024 sent by the respondent No.2
    was in line with the said position of law, and that therefore, there was no
    question of permitting the said respondents to file their written statement

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    after such a long period of delay. On this basis, it was submitted that the
    impugned order dated 21.08.2025 passed by the LARR Authority was
    based on erroneous appreciation of facts as well as law.

    14. On the second impugned order dated 18.02.2026, it was submitted
    that the respondent No.3, having already filed its written statement on
    05.04.2024, could not have been permitted to amend the same after
    almost two years. It was submitted that in any case, plea of limitation
    could not be raised before the LARR Authority. It was asserted that the
    only authority under the provisions of the Act of 2013 to consider the
    question of limitation and to condone delay, if any, was the respondent
    No.1 Collector and that the LARR Authority does not have jurisdiction
    to consider the said question. Reliance was placed on judgement of the
    Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Commissioner and Special Land
    Acquisition Officer Vs. S. V. Global Mill Limited
    , 2026 SCC OnLine SC
    171, to contend that the respondent No.1 Collector, under Section 64 of
    the Act of 2013, exercises an executive function, and therefore, once the
    reference is made by the Collector to the LARR Authority, the said
    Authority does not have jurisdiction to go into the question of limitation.

    It was submitted that this Court followed the said position of law in a
    recent judgement in the case of Hirabai Sonu Wanjari (Kale) and others
    Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (judgement and order dated
    10.02.2026 passed in Writ Petition No.1508 of 2026), thereby showing
    that the LARR Authority has no jurisdiction to go into the question of
    limitation and that the reference has to be decided on merits. Much
    emphasis was placed on order dated 25.09.2023 passed by the
    respondent No.1 Collector, holding that there was no delay in making
    the reference. On this basis, it was submitted that there was no question
    of allowing respondent No.3 to amend its written statement to raise the
    plea of limitation.

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    15. It was submitted that in any case, there was no question of delay
    in the light of the fact that writ petition challenging the acquisition
    proceeding, and thereafter the special leave petition filed by the
    petitioner were pursued before this Court and the Supreme Court,
    thereby showing that there was no delay in approaching the respondent
    No.1 Collector for reference. In this regard, reliance was placed on
    judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Manharlal Shivlal
    Panchal and others Vs. Deputy Collector & Special Land Acquisition
    Officer and others
    , 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1707. It was submitted that
    therefore, the LARR Authority had committed a jurisdictional error in
    passing the impugned order dated 18.02.2026.

    16. It was submitted that the LARR Authority also failed to appreciate
    that the reference proceedings were delayed due to the recalcitrant
    approach of the respondents and that they could not be permitted to take
    benefit of their own wrong. On this basis, it was submitted that the writ
    petitions ought to be allowed and the impugned orders deserve to be set
    aside.

    17. Dr. Dhruti Kapadia, learned AGP appearing on behalf of
    respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4 – State submitted that the LARR Authority
    had correctly allowed the application for setting aside the ex-parte order
    and for taking the written statement of the said respondents on record. It
    was submitted that although the award is indeed the offer made by the
    said respondents as regards quantum of compensation, in the light of the
    reference application of the petitioner being amended twice, the said
    respondents were entitled to file their written statement. It was further
    submitted that in any case, the said respondents had made out sufficient
    cause as to why they could not file their written statement earlier. In this
    context, attention of this Court was invited to the contents of the
    application seeking condonation of delay and for permission to file

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    written statement, specifically the portion where it was asserted that no
    official or institutional mechanism had been established for representing
    the State of Maharashtra, particularly the office of the Collector before
    the newly constituted LARR Authority. It was submitted that no
    prejudice was caused to the petitioner by the impugned order dated
    21.08.2025 passed by the LARR Authority and on this basis, it was
    submitted that Writ Petition No.12027 of 2025 deserved to be dismissed.

    18. Mr. Anil Singh, learned ASG appearing on behalf of respondent
    No.3 Corporation vehemently opposed the prayer made in Writ Petition
    No.3467 of 2026. It was submitted that as per settled law, the LARR
    Authority allowed the prayer for amendment of the written statement. It
    was repeatedly held by the Supreme Court and this Court that Courts
    have to be liberal in permitting amendment of written statements. The
    proceeding before the LARR Authority, being an original proceeding,
    the said position of law clearly applies, and therefore, the petition
    deserves to be dismissed. In support of the said contention, reliance was
    placed on judgements of the Supreme Court in the cases of B. K.
    Narayana Pillai Vs. Parameswaran Pillai and another
    , (2000) 1 SCC
    712; Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal and others Vs. K. K. Modi and others,
    (2006) 4 SCC 385; Baldev Singh and others Vs. Manohar Singh and
    another
    , (2006) 6 SCC 498; and Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs.
    Sanjeev Builders Private Limited and another
    , (2022) 16 SCC 1.

    19. As regards the jurisdiction of the LARR Authority to consider the
    question of limitation, it was submitted that the Supreme Court had
    categorically held, in a number of judgements, including judgement in
    the case of Mohammed Hasnuddin Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 2
    SCC 572, that the reference court has the jurisdiction to decide the
    question as to whether the reference was made within limitation.
    This
    Court in the case of Shantaram Ganesh Shenoy Vs. Special Land

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    Acquisition Officer, Ratnagiri, 2006 SCC OnLine Bom 314 followed
    the said position of law.

    20. It was submitted that since the LARR Authority, upon enactment
    of the Act of 2013, replaced the Court as regards consideration of
    reference proceedings, the said position of law clearly applied and
    therefore, Writ Petition No.12027 of 2025 filed by the petitioner also
    deserves to be dismissed. It was submitted that in any case, allowing a
    plea of limitation to be raised does not mean that the petitioner cannot
    dispute the same, and therefore, no prejudice has been caused to the
    petitioner.

    21. It was specifically submitted that the order dated 25.09.2023
    merely recorded the contention of the petitioner and it could not be said
    to be condoning delay in making the reference. On this basis, it was
    submitted that there was no substance in the contentions raised on behalf
    of the petitioner.

    22. This Court has considered the rival submissions in the light of the
    voluminous documents filed in the two writ petitions. A perusal of the
    impugned order dated 21.08.2025, subject matter of challenge in Writ
    Petition No.12027 of 2025, shows that the LARR Authority allowed the
    applications for setting aside ex-parte order and for condoning delay and
    taking the written statement of respondent Nos.1 and 2 on record. A
    perusal of the same shows that the LARR Authority referred to the
    contentions of the rival parties as also the judgements relied upon by
    them and it came to a considered conclusion that allowing the
    applications would be in the interest of justice, while rejecting the same
    would not be appropriate. In this context, it was also noted that the
    reference application itself was permitted to be amended on two
    occasions.

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    23. A perusal of the orders allowing the amendment applications
    moved on behalf of the petitioner shows that the LARR Authority
    permitted the petitioner to incorporate pleadings and prayers to
    substantially increase the claim towards enhanced compensation raised
    on behalf of the petitioner. The record shows that originally, in the
    reference application under Section 64 of the Act of 2013, the petitioner
    relied upon the proceedings of the District Level Committee to claim
    enhanced compensation at Rs.572 crores. Upon the two amendments of
    the reference application being granted, the claim had blown up to
    approximately Rs.1972 crores. It cannot be said that this was a wholly
    irrelevant consideration when the LARR Authority thought it fit to set
    aside the ex-parte order and to allow the written statement of respondent
    Nos.1 and 2 to be taken on record.

    24. On the aspect of sufficient cause being made out by the said
    respondents, we are inclined to accept the contention of the learned AGP
    that since official and institutional mechanism for representing the State
    before the newly constituted LARR Authority was yet to be established
    and notified, the exercise of appearance on behalf of the Collector and
    the Special Land Acquisition Officer as also the drafting of pleadings
    could not be undertaken in reasonable time. It was specifically pleaded
    before the LARR Authority that the exercise of identifying and
    appointing special counsel for handling the matters before the LARR
    Authority was delayed, due to which steps could not be taken for
    representation of respondent Nos.1 and 2 in the proceedings initiated by
    the petitioner and reply / written statement could not be placed on record
    in time. It was specifically pleaded before the LARR Authority that
    drafting of written statement required a detailed examination of the
    voluminous record and co-ordination between the departments so as to
    respond to the detailed grounds taken in the reference application of the
    petitioner. This Court is of the opinion that there were sufficient

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    pleadings placed on record on behalf of respondent Nos.1 and 2 to press
    their prayer for setting aside the ex-parte order, condoning delay in filing
    written statement and for taking the same on record. The approach
    adopted by the LARR Authority in this regard cannot be said to be
    erroneous. In any case, the petitioner has not suffered any prejudice.
    Even if the respondent No.2 had sent the aforesaid letter dated
    19.12.2024 to the Registrar of the LARR Authority, stating that
    respondent Nos.1 and 2 would not file their written statement and that
    the award itself could be treated as the written statement, it cannot be
    said that the LARR Authority was denuded of its power from
    considering and allowing the said applications for setting aside the ex-
    parte order, condoning the delay in filing written statement and for
    taking the same on record. We find that reliance placed by the learned
    AGP on the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of G. P.
    Srivastava Vs. R. K. Raizada and others
    , (2000) 3 SCC 54, in the
    context of ‘sufficient cause’ is appropriate.

    25. We also find that the petitioner cannot insist that the written
    statement of the respondent Nos.1 and 2 ought not to be brought on
    record on the basis of the position of law laid down by a learned Single
    Judge of this Court in the case of Kamalabai Bhaskar Mule (dead)
    through Legal Heirs and others Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer
    (No.1), Nashik and others
    (supra). Even if it is to be stated that the
    reference proceedings before the LARR Authority need not strictly
    adhere to the rules of pleadings in a civil suit, considering the fact that
    they are original proceedings and in the light of the reference of the
    petitioner being amended on two occasions, no prejudice is caused to the
    petitioner if the written statement of respondent Nos.1 and 2 has been
    taken on record. Hence, we are not inclined to interfere with the
    impugned order dated 21.08.2025.

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    26. As regards impugned order dated 18.02.2026, we find that the
    LARR Authority permitted the respondent No.3 Corporation to amend
    the written statement in order to raise the plea of limitation. The
    petitioner contends that such an amendment could not be permitted as
    the LARR Authority does not have jurisdiction to decide the question of
    limitation. We are unable to agree with the said contention. We find
    substance in reliance placed on behalf of the respondent No.3
    Corporation on the aforementioned judgements in the cases of
    Mohammed Hasnuddin Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) and
    Shantaram Ganesh Shenoy Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer,
    Ratnagiri
    (supra), wherein it was held that the reference court under
    Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, had the jurisdiction to
    decide the question as to whether the reference before the Collector had
    been made within limitation or not. Since the LARR authority under the
    provisions of the Act of 2013 has replaced the Court for considering
    reference applications under Section 64 of the Act of 2013, the said
    position of law applies with equal force in the context of the LARR
    Authority also.

    27. This Court in the aforesaid judgement in the case of Shantaram
    Ganesh Shenoy Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ratnagiri

    (supra) followed the position of law clarified by the Supreme Court in
    the aforementioned judgement in the case of Mohammed Hasnuddin
    Vs. State of Maharashtra
    (supra), to categorically hold that the
    reference court had the jurisdiction to decide whether the reference
    application was made within limitation. We are of the opinion that it
    would be illogical to hold that while the LARR Authority has the
    jurisdiction to decide the reference on the question of enhancement of
    compensation on merits, it does not have jurisdiction to decide the
    question of limitation. This is for the reason that the LARR Authority
    certainly has the jurisdiction to decide whether it can enter upon

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    reference and this aspect goes to the very root of the matter. The
    anomaly in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner becomes
    evident from the settled position of law that the issue of limitation can be
    raised at any point of time as it impinges upon the very exercise of
    jurisdiction. Yet, if the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is
    accepted, only the LARR Authority would not have the jurisdiction to
    consider the said issue. In other words, in a challenge raised to the order
    of the LARR Authority, the question of limitation could be considered
    and indeed even in a further challenge, but the LARR Authority, despite
    being the original authority, would not have such jurisdiction. This
    cannot be countenanced.

    28. We also find no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the
    petitioner that since the Supreme Court in the case of Deputy
    Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer Vs. S. V. Global
    Mill Limited
    (supra) and followed by this Court in the case of Hirabai
    Sonu Wanjari (Kale) and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and
    others (supra) have held that since the Collector under Section 64 of the
    Act of 2013 exercises an executive function, any plea regarding
    limitation cannot be raised before the LARR Authority. We do not find
    that the aforementioned judgements of the Supreme Court and this Court
    support such a proposition in any manner. We are unable to agree with
    the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that Section 64 of the
    Act of 2013, being a complete Code in itself, shows that only the
    Collector has the power to decide the question as to whether the
    reference is made within limitation or not, and that the correctness of the
    conclusion reached by the Collector on the question of limitation cannot
    be assailed before the LARR Authority.

    29. Once it is held that the LARR Authority indeed has jurisdiction to
    go into the question of limitation, the opportunity granted to respondent

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    No.3 Corporation to raise the plea of limitation by way of amendment of
    its written statement, merely leads to the issue of limitation being raised
    before the LARR Authority. Allowing the respondent No.3 Corporation
    to raise such plea of limitation does not mean that its stand has been
    accepted by the LARR Authority. The petitioner clearly has an
    opportunity to contest the said issue and demonstrate that the reference
    was clearly within limitation. No prejudice is caused to the petitioner by
    the order 18.02.2026. Reliance placed on behalf of the petitioner on the
    judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Ambya Kalya Mhatre
    (dead) through LRs and others Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 9 SCC
    325 can also not take its case any further. In the said judgement, the
    Supreme Court considered the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
    and the fact that the award is merely an offer and the broad contours of
    reference proceedings. The said judgement does not aid the petitioner in
    showing any error committed by the LARR Authority, while passing the
    impugned order dated 18.02.2026.

    30. Since the issue of limitation is yet to be contested and answered in
    the reference proceedings, we find that reliance placed on the judgement
    of the Supreme Court in the case of Manharlal Shivlal Panchal and
    others Vs. Deputy Collector & Special Land Acquisition Officer and
    others
    (supra) is also misplaced. As to whether the petitioner is justified
    in claiming that the reference was clearly within limitation in the light of
    the pendency of its writ petition challenging acquisition before this
    Court and the special leave petition filed before the Supreme Court, is an
    issue to be agitated before the LARR Authority and hence, this Court
    will not comment upon the same.

    31. We find substance in the contention raised on behalf of
    respondent No.3 Corporation that the Supreme Court in the
    aforementioned judgements in the cases of B. K. Narayana Pillai Vs.

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    Parameswaran Pillai and another (supra), Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal
    and others Vs. K. K. Modi and others
    (supra), Baldev Singh and
    others Vs. Manohar Singh and another
    (supra) and Life Insurance
    Corporation of India Vs. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited and
    another
    (supra) has repeatedly laid down that hyper-technical approach
    ought not to be adopted while considering prayer for amendment of
    pleadings. It is settled position of law that while considering amendment
    of written statement, a more liberal approach is to be adopted as
    compared to when amendment of a plaint is sought. Applying the said
    position of law, in the present case, we find no error committed by the
    LARR Authority while passing the impugned order dated 18.02.2026. A
    perusal of the said order shows that while the language could have been
    better, the reasoning for allowing the application of respondent No.3
    Corporation is contained in paragraph 9 of the said order. The LARR
    Authority correctly observed that the question of limitation is a mixed
    question of facts and law and on occasions, even in appeal, issue of
    limitation is framed and that therefore, no harm would be caused to the
    petitioner if the amendment was allowed. We find that the impugned
    order dated 18.02.2026 contains sufficient justifiable reasons for
    allowing the application for amending the reply / written statement filed
    on behalf of the respondent No.3 Corporation for including the plea of
    limitation. As noted hereinabove, no prejudice is caused to the petitioner
    on such an amendment being allowed.

    32. We also find substance in the contention raised on behalf of the
    respondent No.3 as regards the contents of the order dated 25.09.2023. A
    perusal of the said order shows that the Collector, while considering the
    application moved by the petitioner under Section 64 of the Act of 2013,
    recorded the pleading of the petitioner that by excluding the period from
    15.09.2023 to 24.02.2023, there was no delay as stated in paragraph 7 of
    the application. This period obviously referred to the pendency of the

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    writ petition before this Court and the special leave petition before the
    Supreme Court. Thereafter, the Collector simply recorded ‘closed for
    orders / necessary submission to authority under Section 64’. It is not
    clear that as to whether the Collector actually held that there was no
    delay by excluding the said period. There is no specific finding in that
    regard. A perusal of the reference application forwarded to the LARR
    Authority shows that in Form 4 against column No.3 pertaining to the
    question ‘whether the applicant has filed the application within the
    prescribed time period’, the endorsement is recorded as ‘no’. The
    forwarding letter from the respondent No.2 Deputy Collector (Land
    Acquisition) dated 10.10.2023 addressed to the Registrar of the LARR
    Authority, Aurangabad recorded that delay was condoned as per letter
    dated 19.05.2023 sent by the respondent No.1 Collector. Such material
    indeed indicates that the issue as to whether there was any delay and if
    so, whether it was condoned by the Collector needs to be thrashed out
    before the LARR Authority. This is another reason why we are not
    inclined to interfere with the impugned order dated 18.02.2026 passed
    by the LARR Authority.

    33. We are of the opinion that reference proceedings, being original
    proceedings, wherein the parties lead evidence in support of their
    respective stands, once the LARR Authority has exercised discretion in a
    reasonable manner and allowed the applications filed by respondent
    Nos.1, 2 and 3, it would not be appropriate for this Court, exercising writ
    jurisdiction, to interfere with the same. All that the petitioner is now
    required to do is to contest the matter on merits and such a situation
    cannot be said to be prejudicial to it.

    34. In view of the above, we find no merit in the writ petitions and
    accordingly, the writ petitions are dismissed. The interim orders
    operating in the writ petitions are vacated. The LARR Authority at

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    Nashik is directed to take up the reference proceedings and to decide the
    same expeditiously, and preferably within six months.

    (SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, J.)                       (MANISH PITALE, J.)
    
    
    Minal Parab
    
    
    
    
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