Delhi High Court
Allahabad Bank vs G.K.Kaushik on 23 April, 2026
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 04.02.2026
Date of decision: 23.04.2026
Uploaded on: 23.04.2026
+ W.P.(C) 6617/2008 & CM APPL. 12689/2008
INDIAN BANK (FORMERLY KNOWN AS ALLAHABAD BANK)
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Rajat Arora, Mr. Niraj Kumar &
Mr. Sourabh Mahla, Advs.
versus
G.K. KAUSHIK .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Umesh Singh, Mr. Ankit
Bhandari & Mr. R.S. Saini, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN
JUDGMENT
SHAIL JAIN, J.
1. The present Petition has been filed by the Petitioner herein under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, challenging the Award
dated 10th April, 2008, passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government
Industrial Tribunal Cum Labour Court-II in Industrial Dispute (ID) No.
15/2006, whereby the learned Tribunal directed the Petitioner to reinstate the
Respondent herein, after stopping four (4) increments with cumulative effect,
along with 40% back wages and continuity of service.
2. To begin with, the Respondent-Workman was appointed with the
Petitioner Bank on 02nd July, 1973, as a Head Cashier and was a permanent
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employee of the Bank. In the course of his service, Disciplinary Proceedings
were initiated against him in respect of certain alleged irregularities. The said
proceedings culminated in the passing of an Order dated 07th February, 1995,
whereby the Respondent-Workman was dismissed from service pursuant to
a departmental enquiry.
3. Aggrieved thereby, the Respondent-Workman preferred an Appeal
before the Appellate Authority; however, the said Appeal came to be rejected,
and the order of dismissal was affirmed. Thereafter, the Respondent-
Workman sought to raise an Industrial Dispute, and upon failure of the
Conciliation Proceedings, the appropriate Government made a Reference in
the year 2006 to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour
Court-II for adjudication.
4. Upon consideration of the material on record and the submissions
advanced by the parties, the learned Labour Court, by way of the Award dated
10th April, 2008, directed reinstatement of the Respondent-Workman with
continuity of service, along with 40% back wages and stoppage of four
increments with cumulative effect. The said Award is under challenge in the
present Petition.
5. The relief sought in the present Petition is the setting aside of the
impugned Award dated 10th April, 2008, passed by the learned Labour Court.
6. At the outset, it is further noted that the Petitioner was formerly known
as ‘Allahabad Bank’. Subsequently, pursuant to its merger with Indian Bank,
necessary steps were taken to reflect the change in the array of parties. In this
regard, this Court, by way of Order dated 04th July, 2022, directed the
Petitioner to bring on record the ‘Amended Memo of Parties’. Consequently,
the Petitioner is now described as “Indian Bank”.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
7. The brief background of facts in the present Petition is as follows:
A. The Respondent-Workman joined the services of the Petitioner
Bank on 02nd July, 1973, as a Head Cashier and was a permanent
employee thereof.
B. In the course of his service, an order of suspension came to be
issued against him on 12th September, 1992. Thereafter, FIR No. 348
dated 18th September, 1992 was registered against the Workman on the
basis of the said suspension order.
C. Subsequently, a Chargesheet dated 19th May, 1992, was issued
to the Workman, containing, inter alia, allegations that he did not sign
the registers maintained while taking cash, had a practice of taking cash
from the receiving/paying cashier and permitting transactions between
cashiers, failed to record cash payments made to cashiers/payment
cashiers, and that there was a shortage of Rs. 500/- (Rupees Five
Hundred only) notes in the packets sent to the Reserve Bank of India
(also referred to as ‘RBI’) through the deposit of the currency chest. The
Chargesheet is stated to have been received by the Respondent-
Workman on 26th May, 1994, to which a reply was submitted on 02nd
June, 1994.
D. Pursuant thereto, a Departmental Enquiry was initiated and
conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure, culminating in
an Enquiry Report dated 26th September, 1994. Based on the findings
recorded therein, a Show Cause Notice (also referred to as “SCN”) was
issued to the Workman vide Letter No. 2543 dated 26th November, 1994,Signature Not Verified
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informing him of the proposed punishment. A Personal Hearing was
fixed for 10th December, 1994; however, the Workman did not appear.
Thereafter, vide Letter No. 4521 dated 07th February, 1995, the
Respondent-Workman was dismissed from service, with reference to
Clause 19.6(a) of the First Bipartite Agreement.
E. Aggrieved thereby, the Workman preferred an Appeal before the
Appellate Authority (also referred to as ‘AA’) on 10th February, 1995,
which came to be rejected and disposed of vide Letter No. NZO/VIG/F-
16/217. Thereafter, the Workman made a representation before the
Regional Labour Commissioner in relation to the present dispute;
however, the Conciliation Proceedings also failed.
F. Consequently, on 23rd February, 2006, a Reference was made to
the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-II for
adjudication of the dispute.
“Whether the action of the Asstt. General Manager, Regional
Office, Allahabad Bank, Parliament Street, New Delhi
passing the order of dismissal of Sh. G.K. Kaushik, Ex. Hd.
Cashier “E” w.e.f. 07.02.1995 is just, fair and legal? If not,
to what relief the workman is entitled and from which date.”
G. Before the learned Labour Court, the Workman contended that
the chargesheet and the suspension order were contradictory, and that
changes were made by the Disciplinary Authority (DA) without prior
intimation, in violation of law and the Bipartite Settlement, thereby
vitiating the enquiry. It was further alleged that the Management failed
to furnish the list of documents and witnesses along with the chargesheet.
The Workman also contended that his request to engage a legal
practitioner was denied, compelling him to cross-examine witnesses
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without experience, as reflected in letters dated 25th July, 1994 and 18th
August, 1994, one of which was denied while the other remained
unaddressed. It was further submitted that he participated in the enquiry
only to avoid ex parte proceedings, but he was not afforded an adequate
opportunity to prove his claim. Further, it was contended that he had no
proper knowledge of the proceedings, and that the Enquiry Officer
exceeded his powers, and lastly, that the enquiry report was not
communicated to him.
H. In response, the Management contended before the learned
Labour Court that, being the Head Cashier and custodian of public
money, the Workman was responsible for preventing such shortages. It
was further submitted that the enquiry was conducted in accordance with
the principles of natural justice, that the Workman cross-examined all
witnesses, and that there was no requirement to provide a legal
practitioner as defence assistance. The Management also contended that
the proceedings were conducted through proper channels, that the orders
of the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority were reasoned and
based on evidence. It was also submitted that no genuine attempts at
settlement were made by the Workman, and that the charges stood
proved, constituting a breach of trust.
I. Upon conclusion of the proceedings, the learned Labour Court,
by way of the Award dated 10th April, 2008, directed reinstatement of
the Workman, after stoppage of four increments with cumulative effect,
along with 40% back wages and continuity of service.
J. Aggrieved by the said Award, the present Petition has been
instituted seeking the following reliefs.
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“(a) issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ or direction
to set aside the impugned Award dated 10th April, 2008,
passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government
Industrial Tribunal Cum Labour Court-ll in ID No, 15/2006,
and/or
(b) pass such other or further Writ(s) or order(s) as this
Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the present case.”
K. In addition to the reliefs sought hereinabove, the present Petition
has been preferred on several grounds, which also constitute the
principal contentions advanced on behalf of the Petitioner in support of
the challenge to the impugned Award.
I.It is contended, in the first instance, that the impugned Award is
contrary to settled principles of law, inasmuch as it does not
disclose cogent or sustainable reasons for the conclusions arrived
at. According to the Petitioner, the findings recorded by the learned
Labour Court are not borne out from the material on record and,
therefore, render the Award unsustainable in law.
II.It is further urged that the learned Labour Court has failed to return
any finding on the issue of delay and laches, despite the industrial
dispute having been raised after a lapse of nearly eight years from
the date of dismissal of the Respondent-Workman. It is submitted
that such delay ought to have been adjudicated, particularly when
stale claims are liable to be rejected on settled principles.
III.It is further submitted that the learned Labour Court has interfered
with the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority without
recording any finding that the departmental enquiry was vitiated, or
that the principles of natural justice were violated, or even that the
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charges levelled against the Workman were not proved. In the
absence of such findings, it is contended that the interference with
the order of dismissal was wholly unwarranted and beyond the
permissible scope of adjudication.
IV.Lastly, it is submitted that the impugned Award is in teeth of the
well-established principles governing judicial interference in
disciplinary matters, which restrict such interference to cases of
illegality, procedural impropriety, or perversity, none of which are
made out in the present case.
L. It is also pertinent to note that during the pendency of the present
Petition, vide Order dated 10th September, 2008, an interim stay was
granted on the operation of the impugned Award, which was
subsequently made absolute till the disposal of the present Writ Petition
vide Order dated 28th September, 2011. Moreover, by the said Order
dated 28th September, 2011, the Petitioner-Management was directed to
pay wages to the Respondent-Workman under Section 17B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (also referred to as the ‘Act’).
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
8. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the following
contentions were urged on behalf of the Petitioner/Management to strengthen
their claim.
a. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submitted
that the reference raised by the Respondent-Workman in the year 2006
is vitiated by delay and laches. Though the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
does not prescribe a limitation period, the dispute is required to be raised
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within a reasonable time. In the present case, the dismissal took place on
07th February, 1995, whereas the reference was raised after
approximately 11 years, rendering it stale and liable to be rejected.
Reliance is also placed by the learned Counsel on “Nedungadi Bank
Ltd. v. K.P. Madhankutty” (2000) 2 SCC 455 (para 6) and “U.P. State
Road Transport Corporation v. Babu Ram” (2006) 5 SCC 433 (para
10).
b. It is further submitted in this regard that the Tribunal erred in
interfering with the punishment, which was commensurate with serious
charges of misappropriation and cash shortage. Courts do not ordinarily
interfere unless the punishment shocks the conscience. The Respondent
was also named in FIR No. 348 of 1992, yet the Tribunal treated the
misconduct as mere negligence.
c. It is submitted on behalf of the Petitioner that the issue of the
fairness of the enquiry ought to have been decided as a preliminary issue,
and upon finding any defect, the Management should have been granted
an opportunity to prove the charges. Despite specific pleadings, such an
opportunity was denied, rendering the finding of perversity
unsustainable. Reliance is placed by the learned Counsel on Neeta
Kaplish v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (1999) 1 SCC 517 (Para 18)
and UCO Bank v. Presiding Officer ILR (1999) IN Delhi 331 (Paras
10).
d. Lastly, it has been submitted that the Respondent attained
superannuation in 2011, rendering reinstatement impossible. In addition,
wages under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in
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pursuance of the Order dated 28th September, 2011, have been paid, and
the awarded amount has also been duly deposited before this Court.
9. Upholding their contestation, the Respondent-Workman advanced the
following submissions.
a. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Workman submitted
that the charges levelled against the Workman were vague and that the
findings of the Enquiry Officer were perverse, as also observed by the
learned Labour Court, which held that the enquiry was not conducted
properly and that the alleged omissions, such as failure to sign registers,
could not justify dismissal.
b. It is further submitted that the Enquiry Officer acted in a biased
manner and failed to return separate findings on each charge with proper
reference to supporting evidence and witness statements.
c. It is contended that the learned Labour Court rightly held that
Charges Nos. 1 to 4 constituted mere negligence or omissions, and
Charge No. 5 was also attributable to negligence either on the part of the
cashier, Head Cashier, or officials of the Reserve Bank of India. It is
further submitted that cash handling involved a chain of employees,
including the cashier and Head Cashier, constituting shared
responsibility; however, only the Respondent-Workman was proceeded
against.
d. It is also contended on behalf of the Workman that, in view of
the Workman’s long service and appreciation, no mala fide intention to
misappropriate a small amount can be attributed to him.
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e. It is contended that the Labour Court correctly held that the
alleged misconduct was minor in nature, without any intention to
misappropriate funds, and that the punishment of dismissal was harsh
and disproportionate, warranting interference with the findings of the
Enquiry Officer as well as the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and
Appellate Authority.
f. It is further submitted that the Labour Court rightly held that the
charges, even if proved, did not constitute grave misconduct and that
there was no allegation of misappropriation warranting dismissal.
g. It is contended that the Labour Court rightly granted
reinstatement with stoppage of four increments, 40% back wages, and
continuity of service, holding the dismissal of the Respondent herein to
be unjustified.
h. It is lastly submitted that the present writ petition is devoid of
merit, no error or perversity in the impugned Award has been shown,
and it is liable to be dismissed with costs.
ISSUES INVOLVED
10. Given the above, the following issues arise for this Court’s
consideration.
I.Whether the learned Labour Court was justified in interfering with the
findings of the Inquiry Officer and setting aside the order of termination?
II.Whether the impugned Award suffers from any perversity, patent
illegality or jurisdictional error warranting interference by this Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?
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ANALYSIS AND REASONING
11. This Court has heard the rival contentions of both parties and perused
the documents placed on record and judgments relied upon by the parties.
12. At the outset, it is necessary to note the well-settled position of law
governing the scope of interference by the High Court in matters arising from
industrial adjudication. It is settled that while exercising jurisdiction under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court does not act
as an Appellate Authority over the findings recorded by the Labour Court or
Industrial Tribunal. The High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence or
substitute its own conclusions merely because another view is possible.
Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that interference with findings
of fact recorded by the Labour Court is permissible only where such findings
are perverse, based on no evidence, or suffer from manifest illegality.
13. The Apex Court in the judgement of Syed Yakoob v. K.S.
Radhakrishnan, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 24 categorically held that the
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the
Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an Appellate Court. This limitation
necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or
Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or
questioned in writ proceedings. The relevant portion of the said judgment is
extracted hereunder:
“7. ………. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and
the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate
Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact
reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the
appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned
in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on theSignature Not Verified
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face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error
of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a
finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari
can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding,
the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and
material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible
evidence which has influenced the impugned finding.
Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that
would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected
by a writ of certiorari. ……”
14. That being said, it may be noted that Issue No. 1 herein pertains to the
scope of interference by the learned Labour Court with the findings recorded
in the domestic inquiry, and the determination of Issue No. 2 herein, which is
whether the impugned Award is perverse, is directly dependent upon the
finding returned on Issue No. 1.
15. A perusal of the impugned Award in the present matter shows that the
Labour Court has examined the enquiry proceedings and recorded the
following-
a. The charges were vague,
b. The findings of the Enquiry Officer were perverse and cryptic, and
c. The misconduct, even if proved, amounted only to negligence.
16. Therefore, the Labour Court primarily proceeded on the premise that
the charges constituted negligence rather than misconduct warranting
dismissal. The Labour Court also concluded that the findings of misconduct
were perverse and hastily arrived at, and were therefore liable to be set aside.
The relevant portion of the final impugned Award is extracted hereunder:
“It is settled law that the inquiry is not an empty formality. It
was the duty of the management to point out the dates on
which this workman failed to sign different registers. In
routine course of duty, there may be some omissions ofSignature Not Verified
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putting signatures. The workman should not be dismissed for
such irregularities and omissions. The findings of the Inquiry
Officer are perverse.
It was the duty of the Inquiry Officer to find every charge
proved by giving separate findings and stating the statement
of the witnesses supporting charges.
It appears that the Inquiry Officer has hastily concluded the
inquiry and held the workman guilty of all the charges with
his cryptic finding of one page.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. The legal position governing the scope of interference by a Labour
Court with the findings of a domestic inquiry is well settled. Once a domestic
inquiry is held to be fair and in compliance with the principles of natural
justice, the Labour Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the
findings of the Inquiry Officer. Interference is permissible only where the
findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or are such that no reasonable
person could have arrived at.
18. To substantiate the aforesaid, reference may be taken from the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of
India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, wherein it has been held as under:
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a
review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of
judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives
fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the
authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the
court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of
misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is
concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a
competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are
complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based
on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to
hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a
finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be basedSignature Not Verified
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on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act
nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to
disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that
evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the
disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent
officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power
of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own
independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal
may interfere where the authority held the proceedings
against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with
the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules
prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or
finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no
evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no
reasonable person would have ever reached, the
Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the
finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to
the facts of each case.”
[emphasis supplied]
19. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Standard
Chartered Bank v. R.C. Srivastava, (2021) 19 SCC 281 has held that in the
disciplinary proceedings, the tribunal cannot convert itself into court of appeal
and also cannot revisit the evidence and in excess of its jurisdiction conferred
by Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Relevant Paragraphs of
the Judgment are extracted hereunder:
“19. In the instant case, after we have gone through the
record, we find that the Tribunal has converted itself into a
court of appeal as an appellate authority and has exceeded
its jurisdiction while appreciating the finding recorded in the
course of domestic enquiry and tested on the broad principles
of charge to be proved beyond reasonable doubt which is a
test in the criminal justice system and has completely
forgotten the fact that the domestic enquiry is to be tested on
the principles of preponderance of probabilities and if a pieceSignature Not Verified
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of evidence is on record which could support the charge
which has been levelled against the delinquent unless it is per
se unsustainable or perverse, ordinarily is not to be
interfered by the Tribunal, more so when the domestic
enquiry has been held to be fair and proper and, in our view,
the Tribunal has completely overlooked and exceeded its
jurisdiction while interfering with the finding recorded
during the course of enquiry in furtherance of which, the
Respondent was dismissed from service and the High Court
has also committed a manifest error while passing the
judgment impugned. 20. The decision of the Labour Court
should not be based on mere hypothesis. It cannot overturn
the decision of the management on ipse dixit. Its jurisdiction
under Section 11-A of the 1947 Act although is a wide one
but it must be judiciously exercised. Judicial discretion, it is
trite, cannot be exercised either whimsically or capriciously.
It may scrutinise or analyse the evidence but what is
important is how it does so.”
20. Additionally, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in General Manager (P),
Canara Bank v. Ganganarasimhaiah [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1939], while
dealing with a similar situation, where the Tribunal had re-appreciated the
evidence after holding the inquiry to be fair, observed that courts and tribunals
are required to examine and determine only the aspects as mentioned
hereunder. The Court further reiterated that strict rules of evidence are not
applicable to departmental proceedings and that charges can be proved on the
principle of preponderance of probabilities.
“(i) Whether the enquiry was held by the competent
authority?
(ii) Whether the rules of natural justice have been complied
with?
(iii) Whether the conclusions arrived at by the Disciplinary
Authority are based on no evidence or the findings are
perverse?”
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21. However, this Court takes note that in the present case, the learned
Labour Court has interfered with the punishment of dismissal without
returning a categorical finding that:
I.The domestic enquiry was vitiated on account of the violation of
principles of natural justice; or
II.The findings of the Inquiry Officer were unsupported by evidence.
22. At this stage, it is apposite to mention the judgment of the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of “Neeta Kaplish vs Presiding Officer, Labour Court
& Anr. (1999) 1 SCC 517″, wherein, while referring to several other
judgments, the procedure to be followed by the Labour Court when a report
of a domestic enquiry comes before it, has been clearly laid down. The
relevant paragraphs of the judgment are extracted hereunder.
“18. In ‘Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. v. Ludh Budh
Singh‘ the Court held that where no enquiry was conducted
by an employer or the enquiry itself was found to be defective,
the employer shall have to be given a chance to adduce
evidence before the Tribunal for justifying his action
provided the employer asks for the permission of the Tribunal
to adduce fresh evidence to justify its action. Such request has
to be made “while the proceedings are pending” and not
after the proceedings had come to an end.
The following propositions were laid down: (SCC pp. 615-
17, para 61) (……..)
“(1) If no domestic enquiry had been held by the
management, or if the management makes it clear that it does
not rely upon any domestic enquiry that may have been held
by it, it is entitled to straightaway adduce evidence before the
Tribunal justifying its action. The Tribunal is bound to
consider that evidence so adduced before it, on merits, and
give a decision thereon. In such a case, it is not necessary for
the Tribunal to consider the validity of the domestic enquiry
as the employer himself does not rely on it.
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(2) If a domestic enquiry had been held, it is open to the
management to rely upon the domestic enquiry held by it, in
the first instance, and alternatively and without prejudice to
its plea that the enquiry is proper and binding,
simultaneously adduce additional evidence before the
Tribunal justifying its action. In such a case no inference can
be drawn, without anything more that the management has
given up the enquiry conducted by it.
(3) When the management relies on the enquiry conducted by
it, and also simultaneously adduces evidence before the
Tribunal, without prejudice to its plea that the enquiry
proceedings are proper, it is the duty of the Tribunal, in the
first instance, to consider whether the enquiry proceedings
conducted by the management are valid and proper. If the
Tribunal is satisfied that the enquiry proceedings have been
held properly and are valid, the question of considering the
evidence adduced before it on merits, no longer survives. It
is only when the Tribunal holds that the enquiry proceedings
have not been properly held, that it derives jurisdiction to
deal with the merits of the dispute and in such a case it has
to consider the evidence adduced before it by the
management and decide the matter on the basis of such
evidence.
(4) When a domestic enquiry has been held by the
management and the management relies on the same, it is
open to the latter to request the Tribunal to try the validity of
the domestic enquiry as a preliminary issue and also ask for
an opportunity to adduce evidence before the Tribunal, if the
finding on the preliminary issue is against the management.
However elaborate and cumbersome the procedure may be
under such circumstances, it is open to the Tribunal to deal
with, in the first instance, as a preliminary issue, the validity
of the domestic enquiry. If its finding on the preliminary issue
is in favour of the management, then no additional evidence
need be cited by the management. But if the finding on the
preliminary issue is against the management, the Tribunal
will have to give the employer an opportunity to cite
additional evidence and also give a similar opportunity to the
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employee to lead evidence contra, as the request to adduce
evidence had been made by the management to the Tribunal
during the course of the proceedings and before the trial has
come to an end. When the preliminary issue is decided
against the management and the latter leads evidence before
the Tribunal, the position, under such circumstances, will be
that the management is deprived of the benefit of having the
finding of the domestic tribunal being accepted as prima facie
proof of the alleged misconduct. On the other hand, the
management will have to prove, by adducing proper
evidence, that the workman is guilty of misconduct and that
the action taken by it is proper. It will not be just and fair
either to the management or to the workman that the Tribunal
should refuse to take evidence and thereby ask the
management to make a further application, after holding a
proper enquiry, and deprive the workman of the benefit of the
Tribunal itself being satisfied, on evidence adduced before it,
that he was or was not guilty of the alleged misconduct.
(5) The management has got a right to attempt to sustain its
order by adducing independent evidence before the Tribunal.
But the management should avail itself of the said
opportunity by making a suitable request to the Tribunal
before the proceedings are closed. If no such opportunity has
been availed of or asked for by the management before the
proceedings are closed, the employer can make no grievance
that the Tribunal did not provide such an opportunity. The
Tribunal will have before it only the enquiry proceedings and
it has to decide whether the proceedings have been held
properly and the findings recorded therein are also proper.
(6) If the employer relies only on the domestic enquiry and
does not simultaneously lead additional evidence or ask for
an opportunity during the pendency of the proceedings to
adduce such evidence, the duty of the Tribunal is only to
consider the validity of the domestic enquiry as well as the
finding recorded therein and decide the matter. If the
Tribunal decides that the domestic enquiry has not been held
properly, it is not its function to invite suo motu the employer
to adduce evidence before it to justify the action taken by it.
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(7) The above principles apply to the proceedings before the
Tribunal, which have come before it either on a reference
under Section 10 or by way of an application under Section
33 of the Act.
19. These principles were adopted in Workmen v. Firestone
Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd., which was decided
after the introduction of Section 11-A in the Act. In ‘Cooper
Engineering Ltd. v. PP Mundhe‘, in which Workmen v.
Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. was followed,
the Court observed: (SCC pp. 666-67, para 21)
“In our considered opinion it will be most unnatural and
impractical to expect a party to take a definite stand when a
decision of a jurisdictional fact has first to be reached by the
labour court prior to embarking upon an enquiry to decide
the dispute on its merits. The reference involves
determination of the larger issue of discharge or dismissal
and not merely whether a correct procedure had been
followed by the management before passing the order of
dismissal.”
The Court further observed: (SCC p. 667, para 22)
“22. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that when a case of
dismissal or discharge of an employee is referred for
industrial adjudication, the labour court should first decide
as a preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry has
violated the principles of natural justice. When there is no
domestic enquiry or defective enquiry is admitted by the
employer, there will be no difficulty. But when the matter is
in controversy between the parties, that question must be
decided as a preliminary issue. On that decision being
pronounced, it will be for the management to decide whether
it will adduce any evidence before the labour court. If it
chooses not to adduce any evidence, it will not be thereafter
permissible in any proceeding to raise the issue.”
[emphasis supplied]
23. Therefore, in light of the aforementioned, this Court is of the opinion
that the approach of the learned Labour Court in the present case suffers from
a fundamental legal infirmity.
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24. A perusal of the impugned Award reveals that, while the learned
Labour Court has proceeded to interfere with the findings of the Enquiry
Officer and the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, it has
failed to return any clear, categorical, or reasoned preliminary finding on the
foundational issue as to whether the departmental enquiry was vitiated on
account of non-compliance with the principles of natural justice.
25. This omission assumes critical significance in view of the settled legal
position that the validity of a domestic enquiry must first be examined before
the adjudicatory authority embarks upon an evaluation of the findings or the
proportionality of punishment. In the present case, despite specific
contentions raised by the Respondent-Workman alleging denial of
opportunity, non-supply of documents, and refusal of representation, and
equally emphatic assertions by the Petitioner-Management that the enquiry
was conducted in accordance with due procedure and that adequate
opportunity was afforded, the learned Labour Court has not adjudicated this
issue in a definitive manner.
26. Further, applying the principles laid down in General Manager (P),
Canara Bank v. Ganganarasimhaiah (supra), the approach adopted by the
learned Labour Court is clearly not in consonance with the settled position of
law. Time and again, it has been categorically held by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court that, before interfering with the findings of a disciplinary authority, the
adjudicatory forum must confine itself to examining, inter alia, whether the
principles of natural justice have been complied with. In the present case,
while proceeding to interfere with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the
learned Labour Court has failed to undertake a clear and reasoned
determination on this essential limb.
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27. Instead, the learned Labour Court has proceeded to re-appreciate the
evidence and substitute its own conclusions without first determining whether
the enquiry itself stood vitiated in law. Such an approach is contrary to the
settled framework governing industrial adjudication, which mandates that the
issue of fairness and validity of the enquiry be treated as a threshold issue.
The failure to do so has resulted in the learned Labour Court bypassing the
essential and foundational step of adjudication, thereby rendering its
subsequent findings vulnerable in law.
28. In effect, the learned Labour Court has missed the base and
foundational requirement of examining the legality of the enquiry before
delving into the merits of the findings and the quantum of punishment. This
deviation from the established legal framework has led to an improper
exercise of jurisdiction, wherein conclusions have been drawn without
addressing the jurisdictional preconditions.
29. Consequently, this omission goes to the root of the matter and vitiates
the entire adjudicatory exercise undertaken by the learned Labour Court. The
impugned Award, therefore, stands rendered legally unsustainable as the
failure to determine the issue of compliance with the principles of natural
justice strikes at the very foundation of the Award.
30. Though certain observations have been made by the learned Labour
Court regarding alleged denial of opportunity, non-supply of documents, and
refusal to permit legal representation, there is no categorical conclusion that
the enquiry stood rendered invalid on account of violation of principles of
natural justice. In fact, the record reflects that the Workman participated in
the enquiry proceedings and cross-examined witnesses.
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31. Further, despite the absence of any categorical finding on the issue of
compliance with the principles of natural justice, the learned Labour Court
interfered with the findings of the Enquiry Officer as well as the punishment
imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. Once again, such an approach is
clearly contrary to the settled position of law, which is, in cases where the
enquiry is otherwise valid, the scope of interference by courts and tribunals is
circumscribed and cannot extend to a re-appreciation of evidence or
substitution of findings, save in situations where the conclusions are based on
no evidence or suffer from perversity.
32. In the present case, in the absence of any finding that the enquiry stood
vitiated or that the principles of natural justice were violated, the learned
Labour Court could not have assumed jurisdiction to re-evaluate the evidence
and interfere with the conclusions arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority.
The course adopted by the Labour Court, therefore, travels beyond the
permissible limits of judicial scrutiny and renders the impugned Award
unsustainable in law.
33. In furtherance of the aforesaid, under Section 11A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, the Labour Court is empowered to reappraise evidence
and interfere with the punishment imposed by the employer. However, such
power is not to be exercised arbitrarily. The relevant provision reads as
follows-
“[11A. Powers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National
Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or
dismissal of workmen.–Where an industrial dispute relating
to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred
to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for
adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication
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Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of
discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award,
set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct
reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions,
if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman
including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of
discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may
require:
Provided that in any proceeding under this section the
Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case
may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall
not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter.”
34. Even assuming that the learned Labour Court intended to exercise its
jurisdiction under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to
interfere with the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, such
power is neither absolute nor unbridled. The discretion vested under Section
11A is required to be exercised judiciously and within the well-settled
parameters laid down by judicial precedent.
35. It is settled that interference with the quantum of punishment is
permissible only where the punishment is found to be shockingly
disproportionate to the nature and gravity of the misconduct, or where the
findings themselves are unsustainable in law. The Labour Court cannot, under
the guise of exercising powers under Section 11A, substitute its own
subjective assessment of the misconduct or dilute the gravity of the charges
without adequate reasons.
36. In the present case, the learned Labour Court has treated the charges as
mere negligence and has interfered with the punishment of dismissal without
recording any finding that the punishment imposed was shockingly
disproportionate. Further, it is reiterated that such interference has been
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undertaken without first addressing the validity of the enquiry or establishing
that the findings were vitiated.
37. Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 11A, in the facts of the
present case, stands vitiated by the absence of proper reasoning and failure to
adhere to the settled legal standards governing interference with disciplinary
punishment.
38. Another one of the major infirmities in the Award is the complete
absence of any finding on the issue of delay and laches. The factual matrix
reveals that the Respondent-Workman was dismissed from service on 07th
February, 1995, whereas the industrial dispute was raised only in the year
2006, after a lapse of approximately eleven years. The Petitioner had
specifically raised this objection before the Labour Court, relying upon settled
law that disputes must be raised within a reasonable time.
39. While it is true that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not
prescribe any period of limitation, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nedungadi
Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhankutty, (2000) 2 SCC 455, has held that stale claims
ought not to be entertained, as they disturb industrial peace and defeat the very
purpose of adjudication. Similarly, in U.P. State Road Transport
Corporation v. Babu Ram, (2006) 5 SCC 433, it has been reiterated that long
and unexplained delays may prove fatal to an industrial dispute. The relevant
part of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in U.P. State Road
Transport Corporation v. Babu Ram (supra) is extracted hereunder.
“In S.M. Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom District Manager,
Karnataka (2003 (4) SCC 27) the position was reiterated as
follows: (at para 17)
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on
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High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree. It is true, as held in M/s. Shalimar Works
Ltd. v. Their Workmen (supra) (AIR 1959 SC 1217), that
merely because the Industrial Disputes Act does not provide
for a limitation for raising the dispute it does not mean that
the dispute can be raised at any time and without regard to
the delay and reasons therefor. There is no limitation
prescribed for reference of disputes to an industrial tribunal,
even so it is only reasonable that the disputes should be
referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after
conciliation proceedings have failed particularly so when
disputes relate to discharge of workmen wholesale. A delay
of 4 years in raising the dispute after even reemployment of
the most of the old workmen was held to be fatal in M/s.
Shalimar Works Limited v. Their Workmen (supra) (AIR
1959 SC 1217), In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P.
Madhavankutty and others (supra) AIR 2000 SC 839, a delay
of 7 years was held to be fatal and disentitled to workmen to
any relief. In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and others v. Union
of India and others (supra) (1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held
that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives
himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of
time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The
delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material
evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. ……”
[emphasis supplied]
40. In view of the above, it is safe to say that the Labour Court has failed
to even advert to this issue, much less render a finding thereon. This omission,
in the opinion of this Court, as well, constitutes a serious jurisdictional error.
41. On a different note, in the aforesaid backdrop, the Respondent-
Workman was admittedly working as a Head Cashier, a position involving a
high degree of trust and responsibility in handling public funds. The charges
against him, as borne out from the record, include failure to maintain proper
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records, irregular cash handling practices, and shortages in currency remitted
to the Reserve Bank of India. The conclusion of the Labour Court that the
misconduct did not warrant dismissal appears to be based on an
oversimplification of the charges and a failure to appreciate the position of
trust held by the Workman. The Labour Court, however, has failed to
adequately consider this aspect while modifying the punishment.
42. Also, the Labour Court has observed that the responsibility for the
alleged shortage could be attributed to multiple officials in the chain of cash
handling. While this may be a relevant consideration, it cannot, ipso facto,
absolve the Workman of his own responsibilities as Head Cashier. The
existence of shared responsibility does not negate individual accountability,
particularly when the employee occupies a supervisory or custodial role.
43. Therefore, the Labour Court has diluted these charges by categorising
them as mere negligence without undertaking a deeper examination of the
nature of duties discharged by the Workman and the standard of care expected
of him. This ought not to have been done.
44. Further, the learned Labour Court accepted the contention regarding
the denial of legal representation without examining whether any prejudice
was caused. It is settled law that there is no absolute right to be represented
by a legal practitioner in domestic enquiries, unless the rules so provide or the
presenting officer is legally trained, thereby causing prejudice. No such
finding has been returned by the learned Labour Court in the present case.
45. Another serious aspect which renders the validity of the impugned
Award doubtful is the reliance placed by the learned Labour Court on certain
observations pertaining to the enquiry report, despite the same not having
been properly brought on record or examined in accordance with law. It is
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evident that the Labour Court has proceeded to comment upon alleged
deficiencies in the enquiry report without the report forming part of the
evidentiary record in the manner required.
46. Such an approach is legally untenable. Once again, a quasi-judicial
authority is required to base its conclusions on material that is duly proved
and forms part of the record. In the absence of the enquiry report being
properly exhibited or examined, any observations drawn therefrom would
necessarily be speculative.
47. The learned Labour Court, instead of undertaking a scrutiny of the
evidence available on record, appears to have proceeded on assumptions and
presumptions, thereby departing from the settled principles of reasoned
adjudication.
48. Lastly, the learned Labour Court failed to consider that the Disciplinary
Authority and the Appellate Authority had recorded concurrent findings of
guilt based on the enquiry report. In the absence of perversity or lack of
evidence, such findings ought not to have been interfered with.
49. In essence, the learned Labour Court has substituted its own subjective
assessment of the gravity of misconduct in place of that of the disciplinary
authority, without first establishing any legal infirmity in the enquiry or the
findings. Such an approach amounts to transgressing the limits of its
jurisdiction.
50. The Award lacks a structured analysis of the evidence and submissions
advanced by the parties. The conclusions are recorded in a cursory manner,
without dealing with the specific contentions raised by the Management,
particularly with regard to the fairness of the enquiry, the gravity of
misconduct, and the proportionality of punishment.
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51. Therefore, this Court is satisfied that the impugned Award suffers from
patent illegality, perversity, and jurisdictional infirmities, thereby warranting
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
52. The impugned Award is vitiated by manifest non-application of mind,
since it fails to address the issue of inordinate delay and laches in raising the
industrial dispute, grants back wages without assigning cogent reasons, and
proceeds on generalised observations rather than a structured evaluation of
the material on record. The failure to adhere to the procedure mandated in
law, including the requirement of deciding the validity of the enquiry as a
preliminary issue, also renders the Award legally unsustainable.
53. The reasoning adopted by the learned Labour Court does not meet the
standard of a reasoned quasi-judicial determination and falls within the ambit
of perversity, as it overlooks material considerations and proceeds on an
erroneous understanding of the nature of misconduct involved, particularly in
the context of a bank employee holding a position of trust.
54. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court holds that:
I.The learned Labour Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in
interfering with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and setting aside
the order of termination, in contravention of the settled law governing
the scope of interference under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947.
II.The impugned Award suffers from patent illegality, perversity, and
non-application of mind, warranting interference under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
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55. The learned Labour Court was not justified in interfering with the
findings of the Inquiry Officer in the absence of any finding that the enquiry
was vitiated or that the findings were perverse.
56. Accordingly, the impugned Award dated 10th April, 2008, passed by
the learned Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court-II in ID No. 15/2006, is hereby set aside.
57. As a result thereof, the order of termination, vide Letter No. 4521,
dated 07th February, 1995, passed against the Respondent/Workman stands
restored.
58. It is clarified that the amounts paid to the Respondent under Section
17B of the Act during the pendency of the present Writ Petition were paid
pursuant to interim orders of this Court and shall not be recoverable from the
Respondent.
59. The Writ Petition is accordingly allowed in the above terms. Pending
applications, if any, stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.
SHAIL JAIN
JUDGE
APRIL 23, 2026/MM
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