― Advertisement ―

HomeVikas Wadhwa vs Punjab And Sind Bank ... on 21 April, 2026

Vikas Wadhwa vs Punjab And Sind Bank … on 21 April, 2026

ADVERTISEMENT

Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur

Vikas Wadhwa vs Punjab And Sind Bank … on 21 April, 2026

Author: Anand Sharma

Bench: Anand Sharma

[2026:RJ-JD:19003]

 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR
                     S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6607/2026

PETITIONER:
Vikas Wadhwa S/o Rajesh Wadhwa, Aged About 43 years, R/o 83 D
Block, Ward No. 06, Gajsinghpur City, Padampur, Ganganagar
(Raj.)
(Presently working at Zonal Office, Mogha Zone, Punjab).
                                                                          ----Petitioner
                                         Versus
RESPONDENTS:
1.       Punjab and Sind Bank, through General Manager, Corporate
         Office, Block 3M, NBCC Building, 2Nd Floor, Plate B, East
         Kidwai, Nagar, New Delhi-110023.
2.       Deputy General Manager (HRD), Punjab and Sind Bank,
         Zonal Office, Mogha Branch.
                                                                       ----Respondents


For Petitioner                 :    Mr. Madhav Vyas Advocate.
For Respondents                :    Mr. Vikas Balia Senior Advocate
                                    assisted by Prateek Charan Advocate
                                    and Mr. Rajat Arora Advocate.



               HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA

Judgment

21/04/2026

SPONSORED

1. Although the instant petition has come up on an

application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India, yet

during the course of arguments, a preliminary objection with regard

to maintainability of the writ petition on account of lack of territorial

jurisdiction was raised on behalf of the respondents, therefore, with

the consent of learned counsel for the parties, arguments were heard

on such preliminary objection.

2. Petitioner has filed the present writ petition with following

prayers:

(Uploaded on 23/04/2026 at 11:46:48 AM)
(Downloaded on 23/04/2026 at 09:34:32 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:19003] (2 of 9) [CW-6607/2026]

“It is, therefore, most humbly prayed that the present petition
for writ in the nature of mandamus may kindly be allowed and;
by an appropriate writ, order or direction:

(i) The order dated 20.03.2026 (Annx.12) may kindly be
quashed and the same may kindly be set aside.

(ii) The respondents may kindly be directed to permit the
petitioner to discharge his duties at Zonal Office, Moga Zone.

(iii) Any other writ or direction that may be deemed fit, just and
proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be
issued in favour of the petitioner.

(iv) Costs may kindly be awarded.”

3. At the threshold, Mr. Vikas Balia, learned Senior Counsel

appearing for the respondents raised a preliminary objection that

since no part of cause of action has accrued in the territory of state

of Rajasthan, therefore, this court lacks territorial jurisdiction to

entertain and adjudicate the present writ petition. It was submitted

that the petitioner is presently posted and residing at Moga, Punjab,

while the impugned suspension order dated 20.03.2026 has been

passed by the competent authority, i.e., Deputy General Manager

(HRD), at the Head Office situated in New Delhi, both of which lie

outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

4. It was further argued that the petitioner has failed to

plead or establish any integral or material facts constituting a part of

the cause of action within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

Mere assertion of residence or incidental facts is not sufficient to

confer jurisdiction unless such facts form an essential part of the

cause of action.

5. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that it is settled

proposition of law that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction only

when the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within its

territorial limits and such facts must be specifically pleaded and

demonstrated. In the present case, no such foundational facts have
(Uploaded on 23/04/2026 at 11:46:48 AM)
(Downloaded on 23/04/2026 at 09:34:32 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:19003] (3 of 9) [CW-6607/2026]

been disclosed in the writ petition. It was, therefore, contended that

since the impugned order has been passed by an authority situated

outside the jurisdiction of this Court and no part of the cause of

action has arisen within territorial limits of this Court, the writ

petition is not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed on the

ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.

6. Learned Senior Counsel relied upon judgment dated

07.08.2023 delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in M/s

Divya Upchar Sansthan & Others vs. Directorate General of

Goods and Service Tax Intelligence & Others (D.B. Civil Writ

Petition No. 8526/2022) as well as recent judgment dated

26.02.2026 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Jaipur

Bench in Surendra Singh vs. The State of Rajasthan & Others

(S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 21768/2013).

7. Per contra, Mr. Madhav Vyas, learned counsel for the

petitioner opposed the preliminary objection regarding lack of

territorial jurisdiction by placing reliance on Article 226(2) of the

Constitution of India, contending that a High Court can exercise

jurisdiction if the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within its

territorial limits, irrespective of the location of the respondent

authority.

8. It was submitted that the expression “cause of action”

must be understood in the same sense as under Section 20(c) of the

Code of Civil Procedure, i.e., the bundle of material facts which are

required to be proved for obtaining relief. For determining territorial

jurisdiction, the Court is required to examine only the averments

(Uploaded on 23/04/2026 at 11:46:48 AM)
(Downloaded on 23/04/2026 at 09:34:32 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:19003] (4 of 9) [CW-6607/2026]

made in the writ petition, without adjudicating upon their

correctness.

9. Reliance was placed upon the judgments of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal

Kumar Basu & Others (1994) 4 SCC 711 and Kusum Ingots &

Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India & Another (2004) 6 SCC 254,

wherein it has been held that even if a part of the cause of action

arises within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, it would be

sufficient to confer jurisdiction and such determination must be

based on the pleadings in the petition.

10. Applying the aforesaid principles, it was contended that in

the present case, a part of the cause of action has clearly arisen

within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The allegations against

the petitioner pertain to his functioning at the branch located within

jurisdiction of this Court; the show cause notice, suspension orders

and subsequent actions are intrinsically connected with such place

and the FIR has also been registered within the territorial limits of

this Court. Earlier interim orders passed by this Court in earlier writ

petitions were also complied with by the respondents. It was further

pointed out that at the time of alleged incidents referred in the

impugned order, the petitioner was posted and residing within the

jurisdiction of this Court. Learned Counsel submitted that as the

impugned order is in furtherance of earlier incidents which took place

within the territory of Rajasthan and the fundamental cause as well

as facts related to the impugned order are also interlinked and

interwoven, therefore, it is established that the impugned action has

direct nexus thereto.

(Uploaded on 23/04/2026 at 11:46:48 AM)
(Downloaded on 23/04/2026 at 09:34:32 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:19003] (5 of 9) [CW-6607/2026]

11. In view of above, it was submitted by learned counsel for

the petitioner that the pleadings clearly disclose that at least a part

of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of

this Court and therefore, the objection raised by the respondents is

liable to be rejected.

12. This Court has given thoughtful consideration to the rival

submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and

perused the material available on record.

13. The objection raised by the respondents goes to the root

of the matter, as it pertains to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court

to entertain the present writ petition. It is a settled proposition of

law that the jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution is primarily determined by the situs of the cause of

action, wholly or in part, as envisaged under Article 226(2).

14. The expression “cause of action” has consistently been

interpreted to mean a bundle of material facts which are necessary

for the petitioner to plead and prove in order to obtain the relief

claimed. For the purposes of determining territorial jurisdiction, the

Court is required to examine the averments made in the writ

petition, without entering into the correctness or otherwise of such

pleadings. However, it is equally well settled that such facts must

constitute integral, essential or material facts forming part of the

cause of action and not merely incidental or ancillary facts.

15. In the present case, the admitted position which emerges

from the record is that the petitioner is presently posted at Moga,

Punjab and is residing there. The impugned order dated 20.03.2026

has been passed by the competent authority, namely the Deputy

(Uploaded on 23/04/2026 at 11:46:48 AM)
(Downloaded on 23/04/2026 at 09:34:32 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:19003] (6 of 9) [CW-6607/2026]

General Manager (HRD), at the Head Office of the respondent-Bank

situated in New Delhi. Thus, both the situs of the petitioner’s posting

as well as the authority passing the impugned order fall outside the

territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

16. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the

petitioner, in the cases of Oil and Natural Gas Commission

(supra) and Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. (supra), do not

advance the case of the petitioner; rather, they reinforce the

principle that only those facts which are integral to the cause of

action can confer jurisdiction. In the present case, such foundational

facts are conspicuously absent.

17. After duly considering the aforesaid two judgments

delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, Division Bench of this Court in

the case of M/s Divya Upchar Sansthan & Others(supra) has

held as under:

“14. The undisputed facts which emerges from the pleadings
are that the petitioner-Firm and its registered office of business
is located in the State of Punjab. The authority, who has issued
show cause notice to the petitioner-Firm, is located in the State
of Punjab. The business transaction of the petitioner-Firm was
with respondent No.7- M/s. Gagan Pharmaceuticals,
Sriganganagar, who is located in the State of Rajasthan. The
show cause notice has been issued to the petitioner-Firm and
service of the same was also effected in the State of Punjab
although the show cause notice emanates from the file of the
respondent-Department which is common to both the
petitioner-Firm and respondent No.7 for issuance of notices. It
is also clear that the evasion of the Tax liability on both
petitioner-Firm as well as the respondent No.7 is not similar
and they are held liable for the violations/infractions
respectively at their own ends. The petitioners were receiving
the goods for onward sale etc. in the State of Punjab were
manufactured by the respondent No.7 in the State of
Rajasthan.

16. On a careful scrutiny of the above mentioned facts clearly
show that no part of cause of action has arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Merely because the
petitioner-Firm was having a business transaction with
respondent No.7 and certain evasions having been pointed out
in the same, will not give any cause of action to the petitioner-
Firm to approach this Court by way of filing the present writ
petition.

(Uploaded on 23/04/2026 at 11:46:48 AM)
(Downloaded on 23/04/2026 at 09:34:32 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:19003] (7 of 9) [CW-6607/2026]

17. Secondly, merely because the show cause notice has been
issued to the petitioner-Firm on the basis of a common file
maintained by the official respondents, will not be relevant to
draw a presumption that part of cause of action has arisen to
the petitioner-Firm in the territorial jurisdiction of this Court,
merely because on the basis of the same common file, the
show cause notice has been issued to the respondent No.7.

19. In view of authoritative pronouncements of the judgments
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the arguments of learned Sr.
Counsel that the proceedings out of the present show cause
notice have started from a file of even number from which the
proceedings were started against the respondent No.7, has no
bearing giving rise to any cause of action to file the present writ
petition before this Court. Further, merely because the
petitioner-Firm is having a business transaction with
respondent No.7, who is located in the State of Rajasthan and
on certain transactions, the evasion of duty is alleged will not
give any cause of action to the petitioner-Firm for filing writ
petition before this Court for the simple reason that the
evasion, if any, done by the petitioners were taken note of by
the authorities located in State of Punjab and, therefore, they
have rightly issued show cause notice to the petitioners for
undertaking the proceedings in the State of Punjab.”

18. Similarly in the case of Surendra Singh (supra), Co-

ordinate Bench of this Court at Jaipur has sustained the objection

regarding lack of territorial jurisdiction on the basis of following

observations:-

“32. Upon consideration of the various judgments rendered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the High Courts, the consistent
legal position that emerges is that the invocation of territorial
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is
dependent upon the place where the cause of action, wholly or
in part, arises, and not merely upon the location of the parties
or the place where the order is communicated. Ordinarily, in
matters relating to termination of service, the cause of action
arises at the place where the disciplinary proceedings are
initiated, conducted and concluded, and where the impugned
order is passed. The residential address of the employee, by
itself, has no nexus with the disciplinary process. In a different
factual matrix, for instance, where the charge pertains to wilful
absence or abandonment of duty and the charge-sheet or
notices are required to be served at the employee’s residential
address, the place of such service may assume relevance in
determining territorial jurisdiction; however, such
determination would necessarily depend upon the nature of the
charges and the role of service of notice in completing the
cause of action.

33. In the present case, the disciplinary proceedings were
neither initiated nor conducted within the territorial limits of
this Court. The order of termination was issued outside the
State and the appeal preferred by the petitioner was also
considered and decided outside the jurisdiction of this Court.
The petitioner’s place of residence does not constitute an
essential or integral fact for adjudication of the disciplinary
action. The communication of the termination order at the
petitioner’s residential address merely confers knowledge of the
(Uploaded on 23/04/2026 at 11:46:48 AM)
(Downloaded on 23/04/2026 at 09:34:32 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:19003] (8 of 9) [CW-6607/2026]

decision already taken and, at best, furnishes a right to initiate
proceedings; it does not, in the facts of the present case, form
part of the bundle of material facts constituting the cause of
action.”

19. A careful reading of the writ petition does not reveal any

specific pleading demonstrating that any part of the cause of action,

in its material sense, has arisen within the territorial limits of this

Court. The petitioner has made general assertions regarding certain

events having nexus with a place falling within the jurisdiction of this

Court. However, such assertions, even if taken at face value, do not

constitute essential or integral facts for conferring territorial

jurisdiction to this Court.

20. The cause of action in the present case primarily arises

from the passing of the impugned suspension order and its

consequences. Both these aspects are clearly located outside the

territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Mere reference to prior events or

allegations, which are not directly determinative of the relief sought,

cannot be construed as giving rise to a part of the cause of action

within jurisdiction of this Court.

21. The contention of the petitioner that the respondents have

participated in the proceedings or complied with certain interim

directions of this Court also does not confer jurisdiction where none

exists in law. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent,

acquiescence, or waiver, and the principle of approbation and

reprobation cannot override a statutory or constitutional limitation on

jurisdiction.

22. This Court also finds substance in the objection raised by

the respondents that mere residence of the petitioner or existence of

some incidental facts within the State would not, by itself, confer

(Uploaded on 23/04/2026 at 11:46:48 AM)
(Downloaded on 23/04/2026 at 09:34:32 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:19003] (9 of 9) [CW-6607/2026]

territorial jurisdiction unless such facts form a material part of the

cause of action. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate such nexus.

23. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered

opinion that no part of the cause of action, either wholly or in part,

has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court so as to

invoke its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India.

24. Accordingly, the preliminary objection raised by the

respondents is sustained. This Court holds that it lacks territorial

jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition.

25. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground

of lack of territorial jurisdiction. However, it is made clear that the

petitioner shall be at liberty to avail appropriate remedy before the

competent Court having jurisdiction in accordance with law.

26. Pending Applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

(ANAND SHARMA),J
MANOJ NARWANI/179

(Uploaded on 23/04/2026 at 11:46:48 AM)
(Downloaded on 23/04/2026 at 09:34:32 PM)

Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)



Source link