― Advertisement ―

HomeVinod Kumar Sethi vs Uco Bank Thru Regional Manager And ... on...

Vinod Kumar Sethi vs Uco Bank Thru Regional Manager And … on 23 April, 2026

ADVERTISEMENT

Allahabad High Court

Vinod Kumar Sethi vs Uco Bank Thru Regional Manager And … on 23 April, 2026

Author: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery

Bench: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery





HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 



 

 

 

 

 
AFR
 
Reserved on 10.04.2026
 
Delivered on 23.04.2026
 

 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 

 
WRIT - A No. - 34539 of 2009
 

 
Vinod Kumar Sethi
 

 
..Petitioner(s)
 

 

 
Versus
 

 
UCO Bank Thru Regional Manager And Others
 

 

 
..Respondents(s)
 

 

 
Counsel for Petitioners(s)
 
:
 
Amit Saxena, Arvind Srivastava, Vatsal Srivastava
 
Counsel for Respondent(s)
 
:
 
Adarsh Bhushan, Sanjai Singh, S.C., V.K Srivastava, V.K.Srivastava, Yashwant Singh
 

 

 

 
Court No. - 32
 

 
HONBLE SAURABH SHYAM SHAMSHERY, J.

1. Petitioner, while working as Manager, UCO Bank at Ghaziabad Branch, has allegedly indulged in several acts of omissions and commissions. Initially an Statement of Allegations and Articles of Charge dated 18.10.2004 was submitted to petitioner on as many as five charges including an allegation of a Fake Bank Guarantee of M/s Bhavya Credit and Investment Pvt. Ltd. for U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam, NOIDA and for that petitioner was earlier put under suspension vide order dated 11.09.2004.

2. Subsequently, on basis of further internal inquiry another Statement of Allegations dated 29.03.2005 was submitted to petitioner which limit the allegation only qua to Fake Bank Guarantee. For reference the Article of Charge dated 29.03.2005 and Statement of Allegations dated 29.03.2005, in its entirety, is reproduced hereinafter:

SPONSORED

ARTICLES OF CHARGE

Mr. V.K. Seth, PFM No. 17334, while working as Manager at B/o Ghaziabad from August 2000 to 19.7.2004 had indulged in several acts of omission and commissions. These acts are set out in the enclosed Statement of Allegations for which he is charged as under:

1. Mr. Sethi failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Bank Officer, which is violative of Regulation 3(1) of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations 1976 as amended.

2. Mr. Sethi failed to take all possible steps to ensure and protect interest of the Bank which is violative of Regulations 3(1) of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations 1976 as amended.

STATEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS

Mr. V.K. Sethi, PFM No. 17334, while working as Manager, Ghaziabad Branch, had indulged in several acts of omissions and commissions. The allegations are given hereunder: –

1. M/s Bhavya Credits and Investment Pvt. Ltd. a Private Limited Company with its address B-9/6351 Vasant Kunj, New Delhi having two directors namely Mr. Anshuman Tewari and Ambrish Tiwari, opened a current account with our Ghaziabad branch on 4.10.2002. A case of issuance of a fraudulent Bank Guarantee came to the notice of the Bank upon which the matter was got investigated which confirmed that a Bank Guarantee No. 1/03 for Rs. 57,71,500/- dated 4.4.03 had been issued by Mr. V.K. Sethi without following laid down procedure of the Bank. For this lapse on the part of Mr. V.K. Sethi, a Charge sheet dated 18.10.2004 has been issued to him.

During the course of investigation of fraudulent Bank Guarantee No. 1/03 the Investigating Officer came across a credit entry dated 12.11.04 of Rs. 45,89,000/- in the account of M/s Bhavya Credits and investment Pvt. Ltd. On getting the matter further investigated, it transpired that this amount had been released by U.P. Jal Nigam, NOIDA to M/s Bhavya Credits and Investment Pvt. Ltd. as advance on the strength of Bank Guarantee No.28/02 dated 9.11.02 for Rs.47.00 Lac purportedly issued by B/o Ghaziabad. When the Authorities of U.P. Jal Nigam were approached regarding the said Bank Guarantee they furnished a photocopy of the Bank Guarantee No.28/02 to the Investing Officer, which bore one of the signatures of Mr. V.K. Sethi.

Mr. Sethi issued a Bank Guarantee No.28/02 dated 9.11.02 for Rs.47.00 Lac in favour of U.P. Jal Nigam on behalf of M/s Bhavya Credits and Investment Pvt. Ltd. and signed the Bank Guarantee as Manager of the Branch whereas the Bank Guarantee should have been signed by the Senior Manager of the Branch with advance In-charge. Mr. Sethi, deliberately, did not follow any laid down procedure of the Bank viz. bringing it in the knowledge of the Senior Manager, taking an application from the party, Counter Guarantee, Margin, Security for the residual value, obtaining sanction from Regional Office, Bareilly, processing charges and commission entering the Guarantee in Guarantee Register. Nor did he keep any record in the Branch for issuing the said Bank Guarantee. Further, Mr. Sethi extended the validity period of this Guarantee up to 9.11.2004 by a letter dated 4.11.2003 signed by him addressed to Project Manager, U.P. Jal Nigam, NOIDA, written on Stamp Paper of Res.100/-. Mr. Sethi did not keep any record of such extension of Bank Guarantee in Bank’s record. On the basis of this Bank Guarantee, M/s Bhavya Credits and Investment Pvt. Ltd. managed to secure a payment of Rs.45.89 Lac from U.P. Jal Nigam, NOIDA which was collected through the account on 12.11.04. In this way, Mr. Sethi, in collusion with the account holder, extended undue gain to M/s Bhavya Credits and Investment Pvt. Ltd. and loss to the Bank and tarnished the image of the Bank. Mr. Sethi also exposed the bank to grave risk. Mr. Sethi has also caused loss to State Government of U.P.

3. Simultaneously a First Information Report was also lodged against petitioner and others under Sections 420, 409, 467, 468, 471, 120B IPC and petitioner was arrested also, though he was granted bail by this Court vide an order dated 23.09.2005.

4. When petitioner has denied allegations and failed to submit any reasonable explanation, the Disciplinary Authority decided to get an inquiry conducted in this matter and appointed Sri H.P. Varshney, an Ex-Scale-IV Officer of Bank as an Enquiry Authority and also appointed a Manager of Branch at Meerut as Presenting Officer.

5. In aforesaid circumstances, an inquiry was initiated and notice was issued to petitioner (CSOE) as well as Presenting Officer to submit their respective list of documents and witnesses, however, as specifically noted in inquiry report as well as in the order of Disciplinary Authority, the CSOE sought various adjournments between 12.04.2006 to 21.09.2006 on medical grounds for various duration, such as, six weeks, six weeks, six weeks, 10 days and 30 days, therefore, inquiry got delayed.

6. On one hand petitioner himself was guilty of delaying the inquiry and on another hand he has approached this Court by way of filing Writ Petition No. 72210 of 2005 that inquiry be expedited. The writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 15.11.2006 that petitioner cannot ask for documents which were not in the custody of Bank, though a direction was passed that petitioner can inspect the documents likely to be relied on during departmental inquiry.

7. It is also on record that petitioner has appointed his Defense Representative (DR), however, later on he quit and a permission was granted to engage new Defense Representative, however, despite sufficient time was granted, he did not forward a consent letter of his new Defense Representative by 08.11.2006.

8. It is also on record that statement of Management Witness-1 (ME-1) was recorded in presence of CSOE on 13.01.2006, however, cross-examination was adjourned on his request not once but on four dates, i.e., 14.02.2006, 06.02.2006, 21.03.2006 and 22.03.2006 but he still failed to cross-examine MW-1.

9. Similarly examination-in-chief of MW-2 was recorded in presence of CSOE on 22.03.2006 and he was asked for cross-examination, however, he again sought adjournment and still failed to cross-examine on next date, i.e., 20.04.2006 and thereafter he sought adjournment on ground of medical grounds for about four months. Subsequently also, despite petitioner was granted a further opportunity, he repeatedly avoided to cross-examine MW-2 and accordingly a decision was taken to stop opportunity of cross-examination.

10. It is further on record that statement of MW-3 was recorded on 02.11.2006 in presence of petitioner and he was requested to cross-examine MW-3 also, however, again he sought time and finally a last opportunity was granted to petitioner to cross-examine MW-3 on 14.11.2006 but again petitioner failed to cross-examine MW-3 and finally he cross-examined MW-3 on 05.12.2006 and management presentation was declared closed on same day.

11. On basis of aforesaid description, based on material on record, an allegation that petitioner was not afforded opportunity to place his case or to cross-examine MW-1 to MW-3 effectively, has no legal basis since, as referred above, petitioner was granted repeated opportunity to cross-examine management witnesses, however, he failed to cross-examine MW-1 and MW-2 though at very later stage he cross-examined MW-3.

12. The Enquiry Authority submitted report which was forwarded to petitioner by a covering letter dated 05.02.2007. Copy of inquiry report was not enclosed alongwith this writ petition, however, was enclosed alongwith the counter affidavit. Said inquiry report is a very detail report wherein all material including reply of petitioner as well as statements of management witnesses were discussed. It was also noted that CSOE was granted ample opportunity to place defence witness, however, has failed to do so though has filed defence documents, which were considered in inquiry report.

13. The Enquiry Authority after considering all circumstances found both charges to be proved. A detail assessment of evidence was conducted and finally on basis of a reasoned and considered conclusion, Statement of Allegations were found to be proved. For reference conclusion relating to Article of Charges, as mentioned in inquiry report submitted by Enquiry Authority, is reproduced hereinafter:

IX. CONCLUSIONS RELATING TO ARTICLES OF CHARGE:

As mentioned above, the findings of the enquiry show that the matters mentioned in the Statement of Allegations are proved to be correct.

The two charges in Articles of charge reads as under :

1. Mr. Sethi failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Bank Officer, which is violative of Regulation 3 (1) of UCO Bank Officer Employees’ (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 as amended.

2. Mr. Sethi failed to take all possible steps to ensure and protect interest of the Bank which is violative of Regulation 3 (1) of UCO Bank Officer Employees’ (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 as amended.

The findings stated above show that :

1. The C.S.O.E. issued the bank guarantee ME-2 and extended its validity by ME-4 unauthorisedly, beyond powers and against the Banks rules/guidelines as contained in ME-12, ME-13 & ME-14.

2. The C.S.O.E. neither took any application from M/s BCIPL for issuance of ME-2 and ME-4, nor did he process the issuance & extension of guarantee as per Bank’s rules/ procedures/ guidelines, nor did he place the matter before the higher authorities as per Bank’s guidelines/procedures.

3. The C.S.O.E. did not obtain any margin money and collateral security to secure the said guarantee ME-2 as per Bank’s guidelines.

4. The C.S.O.E. neither made any entries in the relevant Bank records nor did he keep any records in the Bank about the issuance of ME-2, ME-4 and ME-21/2, as per Bank’s guidelines, thereby concealing facts from the Bank authorities.

5. The C.S.O.E. did not obtain counter guarantee from the applicant, nor did he obtain any margin and collateral security while issuing ME-2. Thereby, he exposed the Bank to risk of invocation of the guarantee to the extent of Rs.47 Lacs.

6. The C.S.O.E. caused wrongful financial loss to the Bank by not charging and getting deposited in the Bank, the processing charges and “exchange and commission” which should have been earned for issuance of the bank guarantee ME-2 as well as extension thereof, as per Bank’s rules.

7. The C.S.O.E. concealed the material facts from his superior officers/Bank with motive of personal gain, and did not deposit the amount Rs.94,000/- given to him by the representative of the applicant company towards commission for issuing the bank guarantee ME-2, in the Bank.

8. The C.S.O.E. is responsible for doing other such acts for which the C.S.O.E. was not authorised and for causing wrongful benefit to the company M/s BCIPL.

The above findings clearly establish that all the various elements of the Charge No. 1 and Charge No. 2 are individually fully proved.

Here it would be pertinent to mention the ruling given by the Honble Supreme Court in the case Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager and Others Vs- Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (1996) 9 S.C.C.69, (copy attached marked Annexure-IV) where it has been held that

In acting beyond ones authority is by itself a breach of discipline and a breach of Regulation 3. In constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24. No further proof of loss is really necessary ..

In view of all the aforesaid, it is held that:

Charge No. 1- proved

Charge No. 2- proved

14. Petitioner submitted a reply dated 16.02.2007 to the inquiry report that doctrine of preponderance of probability was not correctly followed and erroneously burden was shifted on CSOE; there were two handwriting expert reports, one by Management and other by CSOE, however, only report of Management was considered; Enquiry Authority has wrongly placed reliance on statements made during police investigation; CSOE was not able to put his defence rightly since allegedly there was a confusion in proceedings; CSOE was not granted opportunity to examine or re-examine witnesses for ME-19 to ME-22; despite a request was made and Management Witnesses were not recalled etc.

15. Disciplinary Authority after considering inquiry report submitted by Enquiry Authority and a reply submitted by petitioner, i.e., CSOE, passed a reasoned final order dated 22.03.2007, whereby the outcome of inquiry report was accepted that both charges were found proved and Disciplinary Authority imposed punishment of removal from service. Relevant part of order dated 22.03.2007 is reproduced hereinafter:

I have also gone carefully through the comments of CSOE to the E.A.’s Report and find that

1. By merely writing that “written brief is a long rambling document” by E.A. does not prove or establish any where that E.A. has not taken into consideration the contents of brief submitted by CSOE.

2. For case referred by E.A. to establish the procedure of issuing Bank Guarantee which was prevailing in B/O Ghaziabad, CSOE has mentioned that he has no comments to make on it, meaning thereby his admission to the system & procedure of the Bank which he has violated. By merely mentioning that he has never been punished in the past and has 30 years of unblemished record, does not disprove or negate contents of allegation. No body can be excused from prosecution for commitment of crime/breach of conduct merely on the basis that he has not committed any crime/breach of conduct in the past. The pleas of CSOE is not tenable. The Doctrine of Preponderance of Probabilities is an accepted doctrine, applied by Hon’ble Supreme Court in various cases. It is not generated by either E.A. or P.O. I hereby reject contention of CSOE in this regard.

It was not within the ambit of enquiry to verify such a document, which was not presented during the course of enquiry. Neither the CSOE put up any record for verification from it’s original in the enquiry nor put-up such a demand. I see no tenable reason put forth by CSOE to establish that rules of natural justice have not been satisfied.

Filing of complaint in Police Authorities by MW-3 is not result of any biased attitude but discharge of his official duty. Criminal Proceedings are persued for breach of law while departmental enquiries are meant to look into breach of discipline and/or any act of misconduct as described by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ms. Neera Yadav’s case in January, 2007. Complaint has been filed after thorough investigation into the matter and therefore, was not the result of any biased attitude towards any one. E.A. has relied on the records of trial court because it is connected to the same matter, i.e., B.G. for Rs. 47.00 Lakhs. Hence, I find no substance in CSOE’s comments in this regard. i.e., fraudulently issuing a Bank Guarantee for Rs. 47.00 Lakhs on 09/11/2002, for which criminal proceedings as well as departmental proceedings have been instituted. I find that E.A. has acted in a judicious manner. Pleas advanced by CSOE that E.A. has not realized the consequence of his findings on such record on the life of CSOE have no hearance over the matter. Hence, I reject the same.

3. The matter was investigated by another Senior Officer of the Bank Mr. R.K. Gariyali and on the basis of the facts mentioned in that Report suitable action has been taken by Mr. Bhandari in his capacity of Disciplinary Authority. Contention of CSOE in this regard is hereby rejected.

4. Section 21 of I.P.C. referred to by CSOE is not applicable in this enquiry. The present enquiry has been conducted in accordance with provisions/regulations of UCO Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976 as amended & E.A. has been appointed accordingly. I see no violation of Regulations meant for Officer Employees’. Hence I reject plea raised by CSOE in this regard.

5. E.A. has judiciously analysed the record of enquiry before him and then arrived at the findings as mentioned in his Report. Findings are not errors of judgement.

6. I find that CSOE has again raised the point of “errors of judgement” made by E.A. in his findings. CSOE has just narrated his story of last two years, which has no relevancy here. He was advised to offer his comments on E.A.’s Report. What ever CSOE has mentioned on page 13 & 14 under para 6 of his comments, has no relevancy to the matter. If CSOE remained in judicial custody for 46 days, it was due to breach of law committed by him. Other matters are personal in nature. CSOE is supposed to choose an officer as D.R., who is able to assist him as per the time frame of enquiry. In case of any problem regarding his unavailability, he was free to change his D.R. It is wrong to mention that he had no control over his DR. E.A. has expected nothing much from DR but he was duty bound to conclude the enquiry as early as possible, because it was inordinately delayed. It was supposed to be completed by 31/08/2005. It is also a fact that on one hand the enquiry was being delayed on account of adjournments sought by CSOE/DR, but on the other hand, CSOE has filed CMWP No. 72210/2005 against the Bank & Ors. for causing delay to him in completion of enquiry. Then Honble Allahabad High Court fixed time-frame for completion of enquiry. Even tha0n CSOE has been found to be demanding/gaining time on one ground or another, causing delay in completion of enquiry.

7. What so ever CSOE has mentioned in this para, it has no relevancy with the present matter. It is a matter of record that DR has also sought number of adjournments in enquiry due to one reason or another, causing delay in completion of enquiry. Contrarily, CSOE has charged management for delay in completion of enquiry and even filed Writ Petition against the Bank & Others.

8. I find that due opportunities have been provided by E.A. to defence to conduct cross-examination of Mr. R.K. Gariyali (MW-2) His examination-in-chief was conducted and recorded on 22/03/2006 in enquiry proceedings. There-after, many dates were fixed for enquiry, but CSOE sought continuous adjournments for six months, also defying the instructions of Disciplinary Authority to present himself before C.M.O. Bareilly for his medical check-up. I find that there was no denial to CSOE by E.A. to cross-examine MW-2 and the basic tenets of natural justice have been fully observed by E.A. In fact, lot of time and energy was spent to bring CSOE to participate in the enquiry. Cat & Mouse game is figment of imagination of CSOE.

9. I find that defence only wanted to reserve their right to re-cross-examine MW-3, Mr N P Mangla without assigning any acceptable reason, for which there is no provision as per Regulations of UCO Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976 as amended. Cross-examination of MW-3 was duly conducted by defence and recorded in enquiry proceedings. There was no denial to cross-examine MW-2 Mr. R K Gariyali also. The conditions and stipulations are well described in the aforesaid Regulations regarding engagement of DR. I find no substance in this regard in CSOEs comments to E.A.’s Report.

10. Allegations made by CSOE do not contain any substance. Procedure & norms to conduct departmental enquiry are well settled and defined in Discipline & Appeal Regulations. It is just the figment of imagination of CSOE to describe the proceedings as “cat and mouse game”.

11. The Charge-sheet served on CSOE is based on facts contained in Investigation Report of MW-2 submitted to the Bank. I reject the plea of CSOE. There is no discrimination or bias-ness against CSOE, as revealed by enquiry proceedings.

12. ME-8 is referred only to prove practice/habit of the CSOE of doing such acts. It was not a subject matter of this enquiry. A separate Charge-sheet dt. 18/10/2004 was issued to CSOE regarding the issuance of ME-8. It is very well mentioned in the Charge-sheet that CSOE was in habit of issuing Bank Guarantees like ME-8. This fact had to be proved in this enquiry. Its very purpose was to lay foundation of Charge. I find E A justified to expunge question no. 9 of defence put to MW-3 during his cross-examination in enquiry.

13. ME-19 to ME-22 have been inducted in the enquiry by P.O. in accordance of Regulation 6(14) of Discipline & Appeal Regulations. I find no violation of natural justice or miscarriage of justice by doing so. Re-examination of any witness is the right of each side after completion of cross-examination of that witness by other side, as defined in aforesaid Regulations.

14. It is prerogative of management or defence, as to which witness they want to produce either to substantiate or rebut/refute the Charge. It is not the right of other side to object to that. I find that P.O. has stated on 02/11/2006 during enquiry proceedings that after cross examination and re-examination of MW-3, the management presentation will be closed, as recorded by E.A. during enquiry proceedings. It goes to establish that CSOE had the prior knowledge of closure of management presentation, as mentioned by E.A. in his Report. I find no substance in CSOEs comments on E.A.’s Report in this regard. It is also a fact as cited supra that enquiry was delayed due to adjournments sought by the defence and if a time of one and a half year was consumed to conclude the management presentation, it was due to delaying tactics adopted by CSOE/DR. I find no miscarriage of justice in conducting the enquiry as alleged by the CSOE.

15. It is a wrong notion of CSOF in saying that E.A. has allowed P.O. over 11 months for inspection of original of ME-3. Right from 04/07/05, CSOE sought continuous adjournments till 07/11/05 and there after also from 22/04/06 to 21/09/06, causing delay in completion of enquiry.. After finding location of original of ME-3, it was got inspected by CSOE. It was very well mentioned by E.A. in enquiry proceedings held on 02/11/2006 that no further time will be allowed for the sake of study of the case/papers by new DR and the defence must come fully prepared for their presentation immediately after cross-examination and re-examination, if any, of MW-3 on 14/11/2006, the next date of hearing. CSOE, instead of attending enquiry, submitted a medical certificate w e f 08/11/2006 upto 07/12/2006, seeking adjournment of enquiry. The enquiry was held on 05/12/2006. The defence had sufficient time to prepare their presentation. In the meantime, Hon’ble Allahabad High Court issued directions in CMWP No. 72210/2005 filed by CSOE to conclude enquiry within 4 months w.e.f. 15/11/2006. I find that the defence was allowed sufficient time by E.A. for their presentation and no injustice is caused to CSOE. Directions issued by Hon’ble High Court were to be followed scrupulously by E.A.

16. Through the deposition of management witnesses and with the support of management exhibits, the signatures of CSOE have been confirmed on ME-2, ME-4, ME-8, ME-21/2 and various parts of ME-22 beyond any doubt. It corroborated the findings of Handwriting Expert through his Report (ME-22/2, 3 & 4). I find no substance in the contention of CSOE regarding copying and/or forging his signatures on ME-2, ME-4, ME-8 & ME-21/2.

17. ME-2 to ME-22 were brought in the enquiry as they were thought to be relevant to the enquiry. The authenticity of the signatures of CSOE on ME-2, ME-4, ME-8 & ME-21/2 have been discussed supra and else where in enquiry proceedings on the basis of facts brought in during the course of enquiry & not after it is concluded.

18. I find that P.O. declared his intention of closure of management presentation on 02/11/2006 during the enquiry. CSOE can’t insist upon the management for it’s presentation. I also find that defence was provided sufficient time & opportunity to present their case in the enquiry. I find no material substance in CSOEs contention.

19. It is not correct on the part of CSOE to say that the directions of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court have been used to cut the throat of the CSOE. Through Notification of the Disciplinary Authority issued on 31/05/2005, E.A. was directed to conclude the enquiry by 31/08/05. The enquiry was inordinately delayed. I find no substance of truth in the contention of the CSOE.

20. The doctrine of “res ispa loquitur” as quoted by the CSOE has no application in present context.. CSOE has been provided full opportunity to defend himself in the enquiry. I find no denial of natural justice caused to CSOE in the enquiry.

21. Any record which is tendered after completion of enquiry by either side, has no relevancy, as the documents placed as exhibits in enquiry are to be inspected with their original records, testified by the witnesses about their contents and only then taken in the enquiry.

22. ME-22 has been obtained by Investigating Officer of S.I.S., Ghaziabad after lodging F.I.R. by the Bank in the matter of issuance of Bank Guarantee for Rs. 47.00 Lakhs. What ever documents the CSOE has referred to have been handed over to Police, that has been done as per requirements of law during the course of Police Investigation. CSOE has duly inspected all the contents of ME-22 on 26/09/06 in District Court Ghaziabad in presence of E.A. as recorded in enquiry.

After careful study of enquiry record, exhibits on record, deposition of witnesses, management & defence briefs, E.A.’s Report and CSOEs comments there-on, I further find that

1. Matter relating to existence of originals of ME-2 & ME-4 has been raised by the CSOE before the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court through his CMWP No. 72210/2005. Through it’s Order dt. 15/11/2006, Hon’ble Court has directed that “the Bank is only obliged to show those papers which are in it’s custody and which it proposes to rely upon during the departmental proceedings. The Bank is not obliged to search out, obtain and supply the defence material, on being requisitioned, to the employee. We may mention here that this is a departmental enquiry and not court proceedings which may be governed strictly by the Indian Evidence Act.

2. ME-2 & ME-4 have not been signed by MW-1, but have been signed jointly with CSOE by such a person, who is not official of Ghaziabad branch. This is as per the deposition made by MW-3, Mr. N.P. Mangla, then Senior Manager of the branch who was well versed with and capable of identifying signatures of Officers of branch.

3. While going through the proceedings, it is clear that no bias-ness was exhibited towards CSOE during the enquiry.

4. Management’s case is not based of suspicions but based on hard facts revealed through investigations conducted by MW-2, and the documents connected with the case, alongwith Xerox copies provided to the Bank by concerned beneficiary departments. Contention of CSOE, therefore, does not merit any consideration.

5. Doctrine of Preponderance of Opportunities is applied depending on the circumstances of the case. There are sufficient grounds to apply this doctrine based on management documents and deposition of management witnesses. Contention of CSOE does not merit any consideration.

6. ME-22 is obtained by Investigating Officer, S.I.S., Ghaziabad from Handwriting Expert Mr. Sanjeev Tomar and its conclusion has been drawn on the basis of some documents in original, bearing signatures of CSOE and ME-22/7, 8 & 9, being the copies of ME-2, attested by U P Jal Nigam. It is not obtained by the Bank. While DE-5 is obtained by CSOE himself on 08/12/2006 with the purpose to counter ME-22 and it is not based on any of the documents in original. On perusal of defence brief, it is found that CSOE has annexed Annexure-I, containing (i) Letter of Sh Raj Singh Verma dt. 20/12/2006 addressed to Mr. V.K. Sethi (CSOE) & (ii) Xerox copies of Applications dt. 14/12/2006, moved by Mr. Chetan Kumar Verma & Mr. Raj Singh Verma for conducting Inspection of Records in Cr. Appeal No. 683/05 & 684/05 in the Court of V Addl. District Judge, Ghaziabad. It is hereby established with the record produced by CSOE that inspection of records was conducted by Mr. Raj Singh Verma, Handwriting Expert & writer of DE-5, on 14/12/2006 while he prepared his Report on 08/12/2006, even before he claimed to have inspected the record on 15/12/2006. Hence, its reliance is susceptible and its very purpose seems to negate the effect of ME-22, as mentioned by E.A. in his Report.

7. Bank is under no obligation to consider any such record/ document, which has not been presented in the enquiry at appropriate stage & time by the defence. Extraneous record beyond enquiry is not to be considered.

8. As far as matter of Criminal Court is concerned, the case is regarding fraudulently issuance of Bank Guarantee for Rs. 47.00 Lakhs on 09/11/2002 by CSOE and ME-19, ME-20, ME-21 & ME-22 are connected and related documents pertaining to the present Charge-sheet. There is no such bar in any law, not to use such documents in enquiry.

9. It is also a matter of record that CSOE has caused inordinate delay in completion of enquiry, as mentioned in details by E.A. in his Report. If management presentation was concluded on 05/12/2006, delay was caused due to adjournments sought by CSOE and/or his DR on one reason or other.

10. CSOE has not given any cogent reason to E.A. in the enquiry to further cross-examine any management witness at any stage. He only wanted to reserve his right to further cross-examine MW-3 only, if needed so, which is not permissible in departmental enquiries. There is no provision to re-cross-examine any witness. E.A. is found justified in this regard.

11. As far as the matter of cross-examination of MW-2 is concerned, his examination-in-chief was completed on 22/03/2006 and there-after so many dates were fixed for enquiry, but CSOE sought continuous adjournments of enquiry as recorded by E.A. in his Report and every time, MW-2 had to be informed to attend enquiry and then not to come due to adjournments sought by defence. It is pertinent to mention here that MW-2 is on deputation in Rastriya Mahila Kosh and not under direct control of the Bank. Every time when MW-2 is summoned to appear before the enquiry, Director of Rastriya Mahila Kosh had to be requested. E.A. was justified to mention that CSOE had a sufficient time of 6 months from the date of deposition of MW-2 to prepare for his cross-examination with the assistance of his DR.

12. There is no substance in mentioning by CSOE that enquiry proceedings be kept in abeyance till completion of criminal proceedings. Criminal proceedings are meant for any breach of law, while departmental enquiry is meant to look into breach of discipline and acts of misconduct on the part of an employee. Supreme Courts judgement in Neera Yadavs case pronounced in Jan., 2007 is also referred by E.A. , which has logical application in this matter. The plea of CSOE to keep in abeyance the enquiry till completion of criminal proceedings is not tenable.

13. As alleged by CSOE that findings of E.A. in his Report are errors of judgement, I have gone through all the records of enquiry and do not find any substance of error of judgement in his findings. I consider that the allegation of CSOE is devoid of any reason & is not based on facts.

14. As mentioned by CSOE on page 13 at para (f) that forgetting all the management restrictions at times, he had to shift to Meerut, which was also objected by the management goes to show his indiscipline-ness to the orders and directions of the higher authorities of the Bank. It further proved when he, on three occasions, defied the directions of the Regional Manager/Disciplinary Authority to appear before C.M.O./ Medical Board for his medical check-up.

34. I have further gone through other contents of CSOEs comments on E.A.s Report, but they merit no consideration. He has also inducted quite a few extraneous matters not relating to E.A.s Report, which have no bearings in the present matter. His last prayer mentioned on page 22 of his comments on E.A.s Report is that decision of this enquiry proceedings may please be kept in abeyance till the outcome of frivolous criminal proceeding is not acceptable, considering the views of the Supreme Court expressed in Neera Yadavs case in January, 2007.

I concur with the finding of Enquiring Authority and hold the contents of Statement of Allegations as correct and proven true. His finding are based on records of enquiry, assessment of exhibits/documents presented in the enquiry and deposition of the witnesses during the conduct of enquiry proceedings, management brief and defence brief. He has arrived to the logical conclusion by considering all the aspects in a justified manner. I find that E.A. has provided ample, reasonable & due opportunities to CSOE to defend his case in enquiry and he has further ensured that every norm of natural justice is met and no injustice is caused to CSOE.

I hold contents of Allegation leveled against Mr. V.K. Sethi, CSOE, as proved beyond any doubt or suspicion.

.

Charge No. 2: Mr. Sethi failed to take all possible steps to ensure and protect interest of the Bank, which is violative of Regulation 3(1) of UCO Bank Officer Employees’ (Conduct) Regulations, 1976, as amended.

E A’s findings for this Charge are same as to Charge No. 1. For the sake of brevity, they are not being repeated again. The said findings (from Sl. No. 1 to 8) clearly establish that all the elements of Charge No. 2 are “fully proved”

The Enquiring Authority has referred to the ruling given by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of “Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager & Ors. Vs. Nikunj Behari Patnaik” (1996) 9 SCC 69.

It will be pertinent to mention verdict of the Apex Court in (i) Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager & Ors. Vs. Nikunj Behari Patnaik in Civil Appeal No. 7188 of 1996 decided on dt. 15/04/1996 (1996(9) SCC) and (ii) State Bank of India Vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde decided in August, 2006, in which the Supreme Court has specifically dealt with misconduct of a Bank Officer under Regulation 24 of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 covering Regulation 3 which deals with

(i) utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence of a Bank Officer in discharge of his duties and take all possible steps at all times to protect interest of the Bank and do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank Officer

(ii) every officer employee shall maintain good conduct and discipline and show curtsey and attention to all persons in all transactions & negotiations.

(iii) no officer employee shall, in the performance of his official duties or in the exercise of his powers conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgement except where he is acting under the direction of his official superior.

(iv) every officer employee shall take all possible steps to ensure the integrity and devotion to duty of all persons for the time being under his control and authority

In case of Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager & Ors. Vs. Nikunj Behari Patnaik reported in 1996(9) SCC, Supreme Court held:

In acting beyond ones authority is by itself a breach of discipline and a breach of Regulation 3. It constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24. No further proof of loss is really necessary

24 Acts of misconduct- A breach of any of the provisions of these regulations shall be deemed to constitute a misconduct punishable under the . Bank Officer Employees(Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976 Breach of Regulation 3 is misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24 In the case of a Bank- for that matter; in the case of any other organization every officer/employee is supposed to act within the limits of his authority. If such officer/employee is allowed to act beyond his authority, the discipline of the organization/Bank will disappear. Each officer of the Bank can not be allowed to carve out his own little empire wherein he dispenses favors and largesse. No organization, particularly a Bank, can function properly and effectively if its officers are not emphasized to observe prescribed norms and discipline. Such indiscipline cannot be condoned on the spacious ground that it was not actuated by ulterior motive or by extraneous considerations. The very act of acting beyond authority- that too a course of conduct spreading over a sufficiently long period and involving innumerable instances- is by itself a misconduct. Such acts, if permitted, may bring in profit in some cases, but they may also lead to huge losses. Such adventures are not given to employees of Banks, which deal with public funds. If what we hear about the reasons for the collapse of Barings Bank is true, it is attributable to the acts of one of its employees, Nick Leeson, a minor officer stationed at Singapore, who was allowed by his superiors to act far beyond his authority. As mentioned here-in-before, the very discipline of an organization and more particularly a Bank is dependent upon each of its employees and officers, acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond ones authority is by itself a breach of discipline and a breach of Regulation 3. It constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24. No further proof of loss is really necessary.

Supreme Court has further held in case of State bank of India Vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde (2006) as:

Mr. Justice H.K.Sema and Mr. Justice A.K.Mathur said- a Bank Officer holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are in built requirements. In the banking business, absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty need to be preserved by every Bank-employee and in particular the Bank-officer so that the confidence of the public / depositor is not impaired. It is for this reason that when a Bank-officer commits misconduct for his personal ends and against the interest of the Bank and the depositors, he must be dealt with iron hands and he does not deserve to be dealt with leniently

After careful consideration of the entire material available before me and keeping in mind the due consideration of the above two judgements, I concur with the findings of Enquiring Authority and see no reason to dissent from his findings.

I accordingly, hold

Charge No. 1 proved

Charge No. 2 proved

I, acting as Disciplinary Authority over Mr. V.K. Sethi, PFM No. 17334, delegated to me under Regulation 5(1) of UCO Bank Officer Employees(Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976 as amended, award the following penalties under Regulation 4 of said Regulations:

Charge No. 1

proved

Mr. V. K. Sethi, P.F.M. No. 17334, Manager B/O Nainital Road Bareilly (Under suspension) is removed from Banks service with immediate effect with further directions that his suspension w.e.f. 11/09/2004 vide Order of the Disciplinary Authority in the matter of Charge-sheet dt. 18/10/2004 is hereby lifted with immediate effect & he will not be entitled to draw any subsistence allowance further from the date of this Order

Charge No. 2

proved

Mr. V. K. Sethi, P.F.M. No. 17334, Manager B/O Nainital Road Bareilly (Under suspension) is removed from Banks service with immediate effect with further directions that his suspension w.e.f. 11/09/2004 vide Order of the Disciplinary Authority in the matter of Charge-sheet dt. 18/10/2004 is hereby lifted with immediate effect & he will not be entitled to draw any subsistence allowance further from the date of this Order

16. Petitioner, thereafter, preferred an appeal dated 29.04.2007 under Regulation 17 of UCO Bank Officers Employees (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as Regulations, 1976) and it was dismissed vide order dated 10.05.2008. Subsequently, petitioner filed a review petition before Reviewing Authority, however, it was also dismissed vide order dated 30.03.2009. Accordingly, petitioner has filed present writ petition challenging orders dated 22.03.2007, 10.05.2008 and 30.03.2009.

17. Sri Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel for petitioner has argued at length and referred various documents annexed alongwith this writ petition as well as filed a written argument also. The crux of his arguments are as follows:

(A) The documents provided to petitioner during inquiry and documents submitted by Presenting Officer during inquiry were different and were not provided to petitioner during inquiry. Presenting Officer initially has not disclosed about any management witness though later on proposed to examine four management witnesses.

(B) It was a case of excessive delegation by Disciplinary Authority as he authorized Presenting Officer to submit any other document without presenting or providing it to petitioner and it was a violation of Regulation 6(5) of Regulations, 1976. The Enquiry Authority was not competent to conduct inquiry.

(C) The entire departmental inquiry was proceeded on basis of photocopies of Bank Guarantee and other documents. The photocopies were also incomplete and their original do not exist either at the record of Bank or at U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam.

(D) The inquiry report as well as order of Disciplinary Authority has failed to take note that original Bank Guarantee Bond, if any, was handed over to Branch Manager of Bank, however, it was not specifically denied and despite it was an accepted case of management evidence that photocopies of alleged Bank Guarantee was incomplete, still petitioner was held guilty which was not correct.

(E) The Bank Guarantee was allegedly signed by petitioner and Sri H.C. Lamba, the Disbursing Officer, however, instead to take action against him also, he was produced as MW-1, which was a denial of fair trial.

(F) Management took almost 14 months to present their case, whereas petitioner was provided only six days to present his witnesses. He was not even provided personal hearing before Enquiry Authority or before Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority or Reviewing Authority. Proper opportunity of cross-examination of management witnesses was also denied. The Management has dropped two important witnesses. Punishment is also shockingly disproportionate.

18. In support of his argument, learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on the judgments passed by Supreme Court in Purshottam Lal and others vs. Union of India and another, AIR 1973 SC 1088; UCO Bank and another vs. Vijay Kumar Handa, 2025 INSC 442; and, a judgment passed by High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Ujagar Singh Saini (through LRs) vs. State Bank of Patiala and others (CWP-16738-1999), decided on 09.01.2026.

19. Per contra, Sri Sanjay Singh, learned counsel for respondents, has supported the impugned orders that petitioner has committed fraud and prepared a Fake Bank Guarantee which has given pecuniary advantage to M/s Bhavya Credit & Investment Pvt. Ltd. In disciplinary proceeding repeated opportunities were granted to petitioner to cross-examine the management witnesses but on one or other excuse, he has failed to examine MW-1 and 2 though he has examined MW-3 at very belated stage, as such, principle of natural justice was followed.

20. The examine-in-chief of management witnesses were conducted in presence of petitioner. Opportunity of oral hearing was equally granted. Learned counsel referred the outcome of inquiry report as well as Disciplinary Authority that each and every aspect of case was considered and on basis of proved charges major punishment of removal was imposed.

21. I have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the material on record.

22. It is well settled that in a case arising out of disciplinary proceeding, the High Court under writ jurisdiction has a very limited power to review an order of punishment and it can be interfered only on limited grounds and for that the Court takes note of broad parameters of exercising power under judicial review as elaborated in Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, 2015 (2) SCC 610 and its paragraphs no. 12 and 13, being relevant, are reproduced hereinafter:

12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;

(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;

(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;

(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;

(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

(i) reappreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.

23. The Court also takes note of various judgments referred in another judgment passed by Supreme Court in Union of India and other vs. Dalbir Singh, 2021(11) SCC 321.

24. In the background of above referred legal position, the first issue is, whether inquiry was conducted by a Competent Authority or not?

25. The Disciplinary Authority has appointed Sri H.P. Varshney, an Ex-Scale-IV Officer of Bank, as an Enquiry Authority. In this regard, the Court takes note that it was under the powers of Disciplinary Authority and for that the Court takes note of a Circular dated 20.10.2001 whereby sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 6 of Regulations, 1976 were substituted in following manner:

“(2) Whenever the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct of misbehaviour against an officer employee, it may itself enquire into, or appoint any other person who is or has been, a public servant (hereinafter referred to as the inquiring authority) to inquire into the truth thereof.”

26. In aforesaid circumstances, the Disciplinary Authority has a right to appoint any person who is or has been a public servant and since in present case the Enquiry Authority was an Ex-Scale-IV Officer of Bank, therefore, there was no illegality so far as appointment of Enquiry Authority is concerned.

27. The second issue is to consider, whether during disciplinary proceeding due procedure was followed or not?

28. As already referred above, the memorandum of charge was submitted to which petitioner submitted his reply. Petitioner has participated in inquiry. He was granted ample opportunity to cross-examine management witnesses and when he repeatedly failed to do so, there was no illegality when opportunity was closed.

29. It is also on record that petitioner sought adjournments for number of months on medical grounds and despise examination-in-chief was conducted in his presence, still he failed to cross-examine the management witnesses as well as that petitioner was granted opportunity to examine documents as directed by this Court and he was confronted with all documents placed during inquiry. Therefore, any allegation that documents were not confronted, being contrary to record, cannot be accepted.

30. I have perused the inquiry report as well as the order passed by Disciplinary Authority. Every argument and objections were considered and only thereafter it was held that both charges were found proved. Therefore, it is not a case that conclusion, on very face of it, was wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person can arrive to such conclusion as well as it is not a case of no evidence.

31. Now the Court deals with other submissions as under:

(A) Petitioner has not denied that there was an established procedure to issue a Bank Guarantee and admittedly it was not followed.

(B) It was a case of Fake Bank Guarantee and it was acted upon on basis of its photocopy and only for a reason that original Bank Guarantee was not available, does not make present case, a case of no evidence rather absence of original Bank Guarantee and photocopy of Bank Guarantee having signature of petitioner makes a case much stronger against him.

(C) An argument that petitioner was denied to ask relevant questions to management witnesses has no legal basis since in disciplinary proceedings, charges are proved on basis of preponderance of probability and does not require to prove beyond reasonable doubt as in a criminal trial. From the record, it is evident that petitioner has multiple questions to MW-3 and Enquiry Authority has expunged very few questions being irrelevant. Petitioner has failed to show any prejudice.

(D) The concerned Company was earlier involved in a fake Solvency Certificate, where petitioners involvement was not found, would not absolve petitioner from subsequent allegation of Fake Bank Guarantee and in the present case on basis of Fake Bank Guarantee a huge transaction was made in the account of M/s Bhavya Credit and Investment Pvt. Ltd. as well as Banks reputation was also compromised.

(E) In a case where no action was taken against other signatory would not itself render disciplinary proceeding concluded against the petitioner bad in law. The petitioner has to place his case on its own merit, which he failed to do so.

(F) When the inquiry was initiated management documents were marked from ME-1 to ME-12 and on same day ME-13 to ME-18 were included on request of Presenting Officer and petitioner was accordingly informed, therefore, an argument that management documents were presented without confronting to petitioner and without information, was wrong. According to details of proceeding it was done in presence of defence and ME-13 to ME-18 were provided to CSOE and he inspected it on 29.03.2005 as recorded in enquiry proceedings. There is no denial on behalf of petitioner. Original record was also shown except few documents since certified copies of same were shown. Copies of ME-13 to ME-18 were also provided to CSOE on 29.03.2005. Therefore, said submission of petitioner has also no force.

32. So far as objection on report of handwriting expert is concerned, the expert report was part of investigation in criminal case and the same was though placed on record in disciplinary proceeding but not much relied on. So far as signature of petitioner on Fake Bank Guarantee is concerned, it was proved from deposition of MW-1, 2 and 3 as well as on basis of Bank record, which are also mentioned in inquiry report under the heading of Findings that document was signed by petitioner and had acknowledged the receipt which was also proved from document bearing No. ME-21/2, i.e., certified copy of letter dated 13.11.2002 of Construction and Design Service Unit 27, U.P. Jal Nigam seeking confirmation of BG No. 28/02 dated 09.11.2002 for Rs. 47 lacs of M/s Bhavya Credit and Investment Pvt. Ltd. which was received and acknowledged by CSOE.

33. In inquiry report not much reliance was placed on document No. ME-22, i.e., a certified copy of handwriting experts report and it was used only for the purpose of corroboration and for that paragraph no. 15 of inquiry report under above referred heading is reproduced hereinafter:

15. The document ME-22 and its Annexures give the Handwriting Expert’s findings that the documents ME-2, ME-4 and ME-21/2 do contain the signatures of the C.S.O.E. The evidence produced & circumstances shown in the enquiry proceedings independently lead to the same conclusion, that the documents ME-2, ME-4 and ME-21/2 bear the signatures of C.S.O.E., as mentioned above earlier in point No.5. Thus the findings of the enquiry and ME-22 are corroboratory but arrived at in independent manner.

34. The Court also takes note of copy of proceedings annexed alongwith counter affidavit that petitioner was given ample opportunity and he has cross-examined ME-3 at length and it was his default that cross-examination of ME-1 and ME-2 was closed since he has taken number of adjournments and has not taken any steps to cross-examine said witnesses when call for.

35. In aforesaid circumstances, Court is of the considered opinion that there is no irregularity in the process of disciplinary proceeding. The charges were found proved on basis of material as well as examination and cross-examination of management witnesses.

36. So far as submission that management took about 14 months to present its case and petitioner was granted only a weeks time to put his defence, is also contrary to record since reason to took 14 months to conclude managements case was that petitioner has taken various adjournments and has not appeared on various dates. Effective dates were very few on which managements case was concluded and thereafter further opportunity was granted to petitioner to present his defence, if any.

37. After cross-examination of MW-3 was over on 02.11.2006, defence was advised to submit his final list of defence documents and witnesses to Enquiry Authority and he sought 15 days time and further take adjournment on ground of illness from 08.11.2006 to 28.11.2006, however the prayer was rejected by a reasoned order that petitioner despite having granted ample opportunity has not able to produce any defence witness. Defence documents were already on record, which were considered by Enquiry Authority and Disciplinary Authority.

38. Request to recall MW-2 for cross-examination was rightly rejected since there was no reason to recall him. The detail of days are also recorded in inquiry report that why request for further time was rejected. Court takes note that there was no illegality in not approaching further time to produce defence witness. The petitioner has made no averment or argument that how he has prejudiced. For reference the same is mentioned hereinafter:

(1) Submission of brief by PO 15 days

(2) Submission of brief by CSO 15 days

(3) Submission of EAs report – 30 days

(4) Calling for comments of CSO on EAs report – 15 days

(5) The time taken in communication/transit of papers – min. 3×15-15 days.

(6) Time already passed – 21 days.

Thus total 111 days are accounted as above and just 9 days are available out of total 120 days to conclude the hearings in the enquiry. So you will find that it will not be possible & practicable for you to allow the time as demanded by defence. You are requested to take a note of above citations & decide the matter as you deem fit.

39. The outcome of above discussion is that all arguments of petitioner has no legal force.

40. Now the only question is, whether punishment, i.e., removal from Bank service, was contrary to bipartite agreement that petitioner was denied pension.

41. Learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on a judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of UCO Bank vs. Vijay Kumar Handa (supra) that in terms of bipartite settlement arrive between Indian Banks Association latest being on 10.04.2002 Clause 6(b) was inserted in earlier bipartite settlement providing for one of the penalties which may be imposed on delinquent employee found guilty of misconduct. Clause 6(b) reads as follows:

6. An employee found guilty of gross misconduct may:

(a)

(b) be removed from service with superannuation benefits i.e. pension and/ or provident fund and gratuity as would be due otherwise under the rules or regulations prevailing at the relevant time and without disqualification from future employment; or

42. On basis of above and its interpretation mentioned in UCO Bank vs. Vijay Kumar Handa (supra) learned counsel for petitioner submitted that even in proved gross misconduct as in present case petitioner though can be removed from service, however, it must be with superannuation benefits, still Respondent-Bank has not taken note of above referred clause of bipartite settlement.

43. In aforesaid background the Court takes note of paragraphs no. 21 to 23 of UCO Bank vs. Vijay Kumar Handa (supra) and for reference the same are reproduced hereinafter:

21. Interplay of Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement and Regulation 22 of the Regulations, 1995 was examined by this Court in S.K. Kool (supra) and after due consideration answered the same in the following manner:

13. From a plain reading of the aforesaid Regulation, it is evident that removal of an employee shall entail forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently such an employee shall not qualify for pensionary benefits. If we accept this submission, no employee removed from service in any event would be entitled for pensionary benefits. But the fact of the matter is that the Bipartite Settlement provides for removal from service with pensionary benefits “as would be due otherwise under the rules or regulations prevailing at the relevant time”. The consequence of this construction would be that the words quoted above shall become a dead letter. Such a construction has to be avoided.

14. The Regulations do not entitle every employee to pensionary benefits. Its application and eligibility is provided under Chapter II of the Regulations whereas Chapter IV deals with qualifying service. An employee who has rendered a minimum of ten years of service and fulfils other conditions only can qualify for pension in terms of Regulation 14 of the Regulations. Therefore, the expression “as would be due otherwise” would mean only such employees who are eligible and have put in minimum number of years of service to qualify for pension. However, such of the employees who are not eligible and have not put in required number of years of qualifying service shall not be entitled to the superannuation benefits though removed from service in terms of Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement. Clause 6(b) came to be inserted as one of the punishments on account of the Bipartite Settlement. It provides for payment of superannuation benefits as would be due otherwise.

15. The Bipartite Settlement tends to provide a punishment which gives superannuation benefits otherwise due. The construction canvassed by the employer shall give nothing to the employees in any event. Will it not be a fraud Bipartite Settlement? Obviously it would be. From the conspectus of what we have observed we have no doubt that such of the employees who are otherwise eligible for superannuation benefit are removed from service in terms of Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement shall be entitled to superannuation benefits. This is the only construction which would harmonise the two provisions. It is well-settled rule of construction that in case of apparent conflict between the two provisions, they should be so interpreted that the effect is given to both. Hence, we are of the opinion that such of the employees who are otherwise entitled to superannuation benefits under the Regulations if visited with the penalty of removal from service with superannuation benefits shall be entitled for those benefits and such of the employees though visited with the same penalty but are not eligible for superannuation benefits under the Regulations shall not be entitled to that.

22. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench had followed the aforesaid decision of this Court. Learned Single Judge noted that respondent had submitted his option for pension on 05.10.2010. Learned Single Judge also held that objection of the appellant to the claim of pension by the respondent was without any basis in as much as the appellate authority had specifically held that respondent would be entitled to receive terminal benefits for the period of service he had rendered. This order of the appellate authority has attained finality. Therefore, it was held that respondent was entitled to receive pension in view of the order passed by the appellate authority. This view of the learned Single Judge has been endorsed by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment. The decision in S.K. Kool (supra) is binding on us. Therefore, we do not find any compelling reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench while exercising our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

23. Accordingly, the civil appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to cost.

44. In aforesaid circumstances, Court finds that there is substance in the argument of learned counsel for petitioner so far as nature of punishment (removal from service) is concerned as well as that while passing impugned orders the appropriate authority of Respondent-Bank has not taken note of above referred clause of bipartite settlement.

45. Accordingly, without disturbing finding that both charges were found proved and petitioner has committed gross misconduct, the matter is remitted back only to the extent that a fresh order be passed on nature of punishment taking note of above referred clause of bipartite settlement as well as UCO Bank vs. Vijay Kumar Handa (supra). The aforesaid exercise shall be concluded within six weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is placed before concerned respondent.

46. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.

APRIL 23, 2026

AK

 

 



Source link