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HomeMangesh Ulhasrao Zambre vs State Of Rajasthan (2026:Rj-Jd:17491) on 15 April, 2026

Mangesh Ulhasrao Zambre vs State Of Rajasthan (2026:Rj-Jd:17491) on 15 April, 2026

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Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur

Mangesh Ulhasrao Zambre vs State Of Rajasthan (2026:Rj-Jd:17491) on 15 April, 2026

Author: Anil Kumar Upman

Bench: Anil Kumar Upman

[2026:RJ-JD:17491]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
         S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 736/2025

Mangesh Ulhasrao Zambre S/o Sh. Ulhasrao Martandrao Zambre,
Aged About 40 Years, R/o Khadki Takali, Post Sukoda, Taluka-
Akota,     District    Akola       (Maharashtra)          Presently     Working     As
Director Varhad Grains Agriculture Producer Company Ltd. Agar,
Tehsil And District Akola (Maharashtra)
                                                                        ----Petitioner
                                        Versus
1.       State Of Rajasthan, Through PP
2.       Rakesh       Joshi       S/o   Sh.     Jagdish        Prasad    Joshi,     R/o
         Parbatnagar       Thermal         Colony,      Suratgarh,       District   Sri
         Ganganagar.
                                                                    ----Respondents


For Petitioner(s)             :     Mr. CS Rathore, Adv.
For Respondent No.1           :     Mr. Vikram Singh Rajpurohit, PP
For Respondent No.2           :     Mr. Pankaj Kumar Gupta, Adv.



           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR UPMAN

Order

15/04/2026

SPONSORED

1. This Criminal Misc. Petition under Section 528 of the BNSS

has been preferred on behalf of the accused petitioner with the

prayer to quash the FIR No.309/2024, registered at Police Station

Rajiasar, District Sriganganagar for offences punishable under

Sections 420, 406 and 120B of the IPC and all consequential

proceedings arising out of it.

2. Brief facts in nutshell are that the complainant-respondent

No.2, employed as a Manager with Maa Parvati Transport

Company, which is engaged in the business of transportation of

goods, filed a complaint under Section 175(4) of the BNSS before

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the Judicial Magistrate, Suratgarh, District Sriganganagar, alleging

inter alia that in the year 2019, he came into contact with the

accused-petitioner, who is working as a Manager in Varhad Grains

Agriculture Producer Company Ltd. along with co-accused Jitesh

Nalak. An agreement dated 19.11.2019 was executed between the

complainant’s company and petitioner’s company for the

transportation of gypsum @ Rs. 2,750/- per ton. In pursuance of

the said agreement, the complainant’s company transported a

total of 804 tons of gypsum during the period from 12.11.2019 to

06.12.2019, amounting to Rs. 22,11,000/-. Out of the said

amount, a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- was paid on 20.11.2019 while

the remaining amount of Rs. 17,11,000/- remained outstanding.

The complainant kept on demanding the outstanding amount but

but the accused did not make the payment on one pretext or the

other and always gave false assurances and lastly, refused to pay

the outstanding amount. It was thus, alleged that the accused

persons had dishonestly induced the complainant and thereby

committed offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust. Upon

consideration of the complaint, the learned trial Court sent the

complaint to Police Station Rajiasar, District Sriganganagar for

investigation, pursuant to which FIR No.309/2024 came to be

registered against the accused-petitioner and co-accused Jitesh

Nalak for offences punishable under Sections 420, 406 and 120B

of the IPC.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the

impugned FIR is based upon false and fabricated facts. He submits

that essentially, there is a civil dispute between the parties arising

out of business transactions. However, in order to create pressure

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and take undue advantage in such dispute, the

respondent/complainant has intentionally given it a colour of

criminal conspiracy and thus, the impugned FIR is nothing but an

abuse of process of law. Counsel submits that both petitioner and

complainant are engaged in the business of transportation of

agricultural goods. In the year 2019, an agreement was executed

between the parties for transportation of gypsum @ Rs. 2,750/-

per ton. It is further submitted that, in pursuance of the said

agreement, 804 tons of gypsum, amounting to Rs. 22,11,000/-

were transported by the complainant to the petitioner’s company,

out of which a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- was paid by the petitioner’s

company. Counsel submits that thereafter, certain disputes arose

between the parties with regard to payment of the remaining

amount of Rs. 17,11,000/- and in order to settle the said dispute,

the complainant/respondent has filed the impugned FIR, which is

bad in the eyes of law. It is also contended that the impugned FIR

has been lodged after an inordinate delay of more than five years,

without there being any reasonable or plausible explanation for

such delay.

4. Learned counsel further submits that even if the allegations

in the FIR are taken at their face value, no criminal offence is

made out against the petitioner and the co-accused. The dispute

between the parties arises out of an agreement executed for

transportation of goods on certain terms and conditions. The

so-called non-payment of the outstanding amount, owing to

subsequent disputes between the parties, at best gives rise to a

civil liability and does not attract any criminal culpability. Counsel

thus, prays that the entire criminal proceedings arising out of the

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impugned FIR be quashed. It is further contended that the

allegations levelled in the FIR at best constitute a breach of

contract, and the initiation of criminal proceedings in such

circumstances would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

Counsel places reliance upon the following judgments:-

(i). Sachin Garg versus State of U.P. and Anr., reported in
(2024) 11 SCC 687.

(ii). Paramjeet Batra versus State of Uttarakhand & Ors.,
reported in (2013) 11 SCC 673.

(iii).Mohd. Ibrahim & Ors. versus State of Bihar & Anr.,
reported in (2009) 8 SCC 751.

(iv).Dalip Kaur & Ors. versus Jagnar Singh & Anr., reported in
(2009) 14 SCC 696.

5. Per contra, learned State Counsel and learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the respondent No.2 have vehemently and

fervently opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the

petitioner. It is submitted that in terms of the agreement, the

complainant delivered 804 tons of gypsum, amounting to

Rs. 22,11,000/- to the petitioner however, the petitioner paid only

Rs.5,00,000/- towards the said amount. Despite repeated

reminders, the petitioner failed to pay the outstanding balance,

compelling the complainant to lodge the impugned FIR. It is

submitted that the petitioner had no intention, from the very

inception, to make payment of the due amount and has

deliberately withheld the same. In response to the contention

raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the dispute is

purely civil in nature and that the criminal proceedings are not

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maintainable, it is submitted that even in disputes arising out of

contractual obligations, if there exists an element of mens rea and

breach of trust, the same may give rise to criminal liability. It is

thus, contended that merely because the dispute also has civil

aspects, the criminality involved therein cannot be disregarded.

6. It is submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has

repeatedly cautioned that the inherent powers under Section 528

of the BNSS (Corresponding to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.) should

be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the

rarest of rare cases. Lastly, it is submitted that if this misc.

petition is accepted and the proceedings of the impugned FIR are

quashed, then, such a course would result in miscarriage of justice

and would encourage the accused in repeating the crime. They

have placed reliance upon the following judgments:-

(i). Google India Private Ltd. versus Visaka Industries,
reported in AIR 2020 SC 350.

(ii). Dr. Lakshman versus State of Karnataka & Ors., reported
in (2019) 9 SCC 677.

(iii).Rajesh Bajaj versus State NCT of Delhi & Ors., reported in
(1999) 3 SCC 259.

(iv).Sanapareddy Maheedhar Seshagiri & Anr. versus State of
Andra Pradesh & Anr., reported in (2007) 13 SCC 165.

7. I have heard and considered the submissions advanced at

bar and have gone through the material available on record.

8. It is well settled law that criminal proceedings cannot be

resorted to for the purpose of resolving civil disputes or for

recovery of money. In simple terms, a breach of contract

constitutes an infringement of a private right, which is ordinarily

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remediable under civil law, such as by instituting proceedings for

recovery of money. However, for such a dispute to attract criminal

liability, there must be evidence indicating that the accused had no

intention to fulfill the promise from the very inception of the

agreement and, with such dishonest intention, persuaded the

other party to believe the promise. Hence, where the breach is

due to mere non-fulfillment of the contract without any fraud or

deceitful intentions during the initial stages of signing the

contract, the dispute remains civil in nature and does not warrant

initiation of criminal proceedings.

9. A careful reading of the complaint, the gist of which, this

Court has extracted above, would show that none of the

ingredients of any of the offences complained against the

petitioner are made out. Even if all the averments contained in the

FIR are taken to be true, they do not make out any of the offences

alleged against the petitioner. Therefore, I am unable to

understand how an FIR was registered and offences have been

found proved. When FIR itself disclosed nothing more than

business relations, which broke, it is not possible for respondent

No.2 to enlarge the scope of his complaint by merely adding the

language used in the text of the Indian Penal Code. A perusal of

the FIR would indicate that there were business transactions

between the parties. In terms of agreement, the complainant

delivered 804 tons of gypsum, amounting to Rs. 22,11,000/- to

the petitioner, however, the petitioner paid only Rs.5,00,000/- and

as per the allegations of the FIR, despite repeated reminders, the

petitioner did not make payment of outstanding balance,

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compelling the complainant to lodge the impugned FIR. Thus, it is

clear that the dispute between the parties is purely of civil nature

but in order to attract criminal liability and for initiation of criminal

proceedings against the petitioner, language used in the text of

Indian Penal Code, has been added in the FIR.

10. This Court finds that no offence is made out and the

continuation of further proceedings based on the FIR against the

petitioner and/or the co-accused would undoubtedly amount to an

abuse of the process of law. It is well settled law that where the

foundational allegations do not disclose a cognizable offence,

permitting criminal proceedings to continue would defeat the very

purpose of instituting such a case and would result in injustice and

harassment to the accused.

11. In Dalip Kaur & Ors. versus Jagnar Singh & Anr.,

reported in (2009) 14 SCC 696, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

considered the earlier cases regarding scope and ambit of

jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and concluded as follows:-

“10. The High Court, therefore, should have posed
a question as to whether any act of inducement on
the part of the appellant has been raised by the
second respondent and whether the appellant had
an intention to cheat him from the very inception.
If the dispute between the parties was essentially a
civil dispute resulting from a breach of contract on
the part of the appellants by non-refunding the
amount of advance the same would not constitute
an offence of cheating. Similar is the legal position
in respect of an offence of criminal breach of trust
having regard to its definition contained in Section

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405 of the Indian Penal Code. (See Ajay Mitra v.
State of M.P.
reported in (2003) 3 SCC 11).

11. There cannot furthermore be any doubt that
the High Court would exercise its inherent
jurisdiction only when one or the other propositions
of law, as laid down in R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta
and Ors.
, reported in (2009) 1 SCC 516, is
attracted, which are as under:

“(1) The High Court ordinarily would not
exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a
criminal proceeding and, in particular, a First
Information Report unless the allegations
contained therein, even if given face value
and taken to be correct in their entirety,
disclosed no cognizable offence.
(2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and
except in very exceptional circumstances,
would not look to any document relied upon
by the defence.

(3) Such a power should be exercised very
sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR
disclose commission of an offence, the Court
shall not go beyond the same and pass an
order in favour of the accused to hold
absence of any mens rea or actus reus.
(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute,
the same by itself may not be a ground to
hold that the criminal proceedings should not
be allowed to continue.”

12. Yet again, in Hira Lal and Ors. v. State of U.P.
and Ors.
, reported in (2009) 11 SCC 89, this Court
held:

“12. The parameters of interference with a
criminal proceeding by the High Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Code are well known. One of the

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grounds on which such interference is
permissible is that the allegations contained
in the complaint petition even if given face
value and taken to be correct in their
entirety, commission of an offence is not
disclosed. The High Court may also interfere
where the action on the part of the
complainant is mala fide.” (See also
Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia and Ors. v.
State of Punjab and Ors.
, reported in (2009)
7 SCC 712).”

12. Recently in the case of Sachin Garg versus State of U.P.

and Anr., reported in (2024) 11 SCC 687, Hon’ble Supreme

Court has held as under:-

“14. Past commercial relationship between the
appellant’s employer and the respondent no.2 is
admitted. It would also be evident from the petition
of complaint the dispute between the parties
centered around the rate at which the assigned
work was to be done. Neither in the petition of
complainant nor in the initial deposition of the two
witnesses (that includes the complainant) the
ingredients of the offence under Section 405 of the
1860 Code surfaced. Such commercial disputes
over variation of rate cannot per se give rise to an
offence under Section 405 of the 1860 Code
without presence of any aggravating factor leading
to the substantiation of its ingredients. We do not
find any material to come to a prima facie finding
that there was dishonest misappropriation or
conversion of any material for the personal use of
the appellant in relation to gas supplying work
done by the respondent no.2. The said work was
done in course of regular commercial transactions.

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It cannot be said that there was misappropriation
or conversion of the subject property, being
dissolved acetylene gas which was supplied to the
factory for the purpose of battery manufacturing at
EIL. The dispute pertains to the revision of rate per
unit in an ongoing commercial transaction. What
has emerged from the petition of complaint and the
initial deposition made in support thereof that the
accused-appellant wanted a rate variation and the
entire dispute arose out of such stand of the
appellant. On the basis of these materials, it cannot
be said that there was evidence for commission of
offence under Section 405/406. The High Court
also did not apply the test formulated in the case of
Dalip Kaur (supra). We have narrated the relevant
passage from that decision earlier.”

13. While expressing similar view, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

case of Paramjeet Batra versus State of Uttarakhand & Ors.,

reported in (2013) 11 SCC 673 has held as under:-

“7. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section
482
of the Code the High Court has to be cautious.
This power is to be used sparingly and only for
the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of
any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice.
Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or
not depends upon the nature of facts alleged
therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal
offence are present or not has to be judged by the
High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions
may also have a criminal texture. But the High
Court must see whether a dispute which is
essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of
criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil
remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has

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happened in this case, the High Court should not
hesitate to quash criminal proceedings to prevent
abuse of process of Court.

8. As we have already noted, here the dispute is
essentially about the profit of the hotel business
and its ownership. The pending civil suit will take
care of all those issues. The allegation that forged
and fabricated documents are used by the
appellant can also be dealt with in the said suit.
Respondent 2’s attempt to file similar complaint
against the appellant having failed, he has filed the
present complaint. The appellant has been
acquitted in another case filed by respondent 2
against him alleging offence under Section 406 of
the IPC. Possession of the shop in question has
also been handed over by the appellant to
respondent 2. In such a situation, in our opinion,
continuation of the pending criminal proceedings
would be abuse of the process of law. The High
Court was wrong in holding otherwise.”

14. Section 528 of the BNSS plays a vital role in ensuring no civil

cases are turned into criminal cases. Inherent power of the High

Courts allow them to quash any such cases which have been

initiated due to mala fide incidents. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in

the famous case of State of Haryana & Ors. versus Bhajan Lal

& Anr., reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, stated that the

case should be quashed “where a criminal proceeding is manifestly

attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is

maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking

vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to

private and personal grudge.”

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15. This Court is cognizant of the fact that the co-accused,

against whom criminal proceedings are pending, has not

separately approached and sought any relief from this Court but

this Court cannot overlook the fact that the allegations levelled in

the FIR are identical against both the petitioner and the

co-accused, and that the facts of the case are interdependent.

Therefore, since no offence is made out even on a prima facie

consideration of the FIR, this Court holds that the co-accused is

equally entitled to the relief granted to the petitioner,

notwithstanding the fact that he has not approached this Court.

This proposition is bolstered by the long held legal doctrine

established by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which recognizes that

a Court has the power, in the interest of justice, to extend the

benefit of its judgment to similarly situated persons, even if they

are not before the Court. It is evident that a failure to grant such

relief would result in a grave anomaly and injustice, particularly

where the very foundation of the proceedings is found to be

untenable. Earlier, this Court has already decided this issue in the

case of Sanyukt Shekhari Vs. State of Rajasthan [2026:RJ-

JD:16370] while relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi

versus State of Gujarat, reported in (2023) 9 SCC 164.

16. In the backdrop of the aforesaid discussions, this Court

deems it a fit case for exercising powers under Section 528 of the

BNSS (Corresponding to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.) for quashing

the impugned FIR and all other subsequent proceedings arising

out of it against the petitioner, as well as the co-accused Jitesh

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Nalak, though he is not before this Court but his case stands on

same footing as that of the petitioner.

17. Accordingly, the impugned FIR No.309/2024 registered at

Police Station Rajiasar, District Sriganganagar for offences

punishable under Sections 420, 406 and 120B of the IPC and all

consequential proceedings arising out of it are hereby quashed

against the petitioner as well as co-accused, Jitesh Nalak.

18. Needless to observe here that the respondent/complainant

would be free to adopt civil proceedings against the petitioner and

co-accused Jitesh Nalak for recovery of outstanding amount, as

alleged in the impugned FIR.

19. The Criminal Misc. Petition is allowed accordingly.

20. The stay application and pending application(s), if any, also

stand disposed of.

(ANIL KUMAR UPMAN),J
58-Manoj Solanki/-

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