Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur vs Ranjeet Singh Meena S/O Lt. Sh. Neta … on 17 April, 2026
[2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 348/2026
In
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5098/2023
1. Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, Through Its
Commissioner, Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Ram Kishore
Vyas Bhawan, Jaipur.
2. Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, Through Its
Secretary, Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Ram Kishore Vyas
Bhawan, Jaipur.
----Appellants/Respondents
Versus
1. Ranjeet Singh Meena S/o Lt. Sh. Neta, Aged About 64
Years, R/o Village Chainpura, Tehsil Sanganer, District
Jaipur, Rajasthan (Deceased).
1/1. Soni Devi W/o Ranjeet Singh Meena, R/o
Chainpura Near By Jawahar Cirlce Neta Baba Ki
Dhani, Jaipur-302017.
1/2. Geeta Devi Meena W/o Hari Narayan Meena D/o
Ranjeet Singh Meena, R/o Village Dulatpura
Bagwada, Th. Amer, Jaipur.
1/3. Shila Meena W/o Ram Kailash Meena D/o Ranjeet
Singh Meena, R/o Village Jhar Kothi Wali Ki Dhani,
Doodhli Bassi, Jaipur.
1/4. Rajvanti Meena W/o Vishram Singh Meena D/o
Ranjeet Singh Meena, R/o Village Sungadi,
Unbadagav, Tehsil Baswa, District Dausa.
1/5. Kanta Meena W/o Sarwan Kumar D/o Ranjeet
Singh Meena, R/o Village Dayarampura Kanota,
Tehsil Bassi, Jaipur.
1/6. Savitri Meena W/o Deendayal Meena D/o Ranjeet
Singh Meena, R/o Village Chainpura Panchu, Ghar
Wali Dhani, Tehsil Bassi, Jaipur.
1/7. Hari Mohan Meena S/o Ranjeet Singh Meena, R/o
Chainpura Near By Jawahar Circle Neta Baba Ki
Dhani, Jaipur.
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1/8. Ram Babu Meena S/o Ranjeet Singh Mena, R/o
Chainpura Near By Jawahar Circle Neta Baba Ki
Dhani, Jaipur.
—-Respondents/Petitioners
2. State Of Rajasthan, Through Principle Secretary To The
Government, Department Of Urban Development And
Housing, Govt. Secretariat, Jaipur.
3. State Of Rajasthan, Through Joint Secretary (1) To The
Government, Department Of Urban Development And
Housing, Govt. Secretariat, Jaipur.
—-Respondents
And
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 347/2026
In
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.9017/2023
1. Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, Through Its
Commissioner Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Ram Kishore
Vyas Bhawan, Jaipur.
2. Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, Through Its
Secretary Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Ram Kishore Vyas
Bhawan, Jaipur.
—-Appellants/Respondents
Versus
1. Shri Hanumant Singh, (Since Deceased) Through His
Legal Heir-
1/1. Smt. Archana Singh W/o Late Hanumant Singh,
Aged About 41 Years, R/o 4-K-10, Jawahar Nagar,
Jaipur, Rajasthan.
—-Respondent – Petitioner No.1
2. Shri Nangram Meena S/o Shri Gopal Lal Meena, Aged
About 52 Years, R/o Plot No. A 18-19, Prem Colony,
Aamali Kothi, Taaro Ki Khonth, Sanganer, Jaipur
Rajasthan.
—-Respondent-Petitioner No.2
3. Rakesh Meena S/o Late Ram Kumar Meena, Aged About
31 Years, R/o Village Chainpura, Near Jawahar Circle,
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Tehsil-Sanganer, District Jaipur (Raj.)
—-Respondent-Petitioner No.3
4. State Of Rajasthan, Through Principle Secretary To The
Government, Department Of Urban Development And
Housing, Govt. Secretariat, Jaipur.
5. State Of Rajasthan, Through Joint Secretary (1) To The
Government, Department Of Urban Development And
Housing, Govt. Secretariat, Jaipur.
----Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Amit Kuri
For Respondent(s) : Ms. Alankrita Sharma with
Mr. Yogesh Kalla,
Mr. Harshil Bansal and
Ms. Nimisha Danga
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE INDERJEET SINGH
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN
Order
REPORTABLE
17/04/2026
1. These D.B. Special Appeals are filed by the appellants-non
petitioners aggrieved from order dated 07.03.2026 in SB Civil
Writ Petition No. 5098/2023 (Ranjeet Singh (Dead)
through LRs Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.) and SB Civil
Writ Petition No. 9017/2023 (Shri Hanumant Singh (Dead)
through LR and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.
2. Defect(s) in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 347/2026 are over
ruled.
3. Learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petitions, has
directed as under:-
“14. In view of the discussion made above, both
the writ petitions deserve to be allowed and are
accordingly allowed. The respondents are directed(Uploaded on 21/04/2026 at 12:34:34 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (4 of 19) [SAW-348/2026]to allow/allot 25% developed land (20% residential
+ 5% commercial) in lieu of compensation for the
land acquired according to the title and share of
the petitioners as established in accordance with
law. This exercise of approval from the State
Government and the allotment be made within a
period of one month from the date of submitting a
certified copy of this order.”
4. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants
submit that the writ petitions were filed for direction to allot 25%
developed land (20% residential + 5% commercial), in view of the
policy dated 24.09.2020 (amended on 04.11.2020) as well as
circular dated 01.06.2022 and 12.07.2024 issued by the State
Government, in lieu of compensation for acquired land. He further
submits that the writ petitioners have claimed that their ancestral
land was acquired and compensation has not been paid to them.
5. Learned counsel further submits that a notification under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (for short ‘the Act of
1953’) was issued on 21.08.1969 for acquiring aforesaid land for
expansion of Aerodrome and objections were filed by khatedars
and ultimately, notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1953 was
issued in the year 1973 and thereafter, award was passed on
17.05.1975. He further submits that the khatedars have not
accepted the compensation amount and same was deposited in
the Reference Court on 10.02.1979, 12.07.1979 and 09.12.1999
respectively. He also submits that earlier the land acquisition was
challenged by the landholders but the writ petitions were
dismissed. He further submits that the possession over the land
has already been taken by the Jaipur Development Authority (for
short ‘JDA’) and the land in question has already been mutated in
the name of JDA.
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6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of JDA has further
submits that a false and frivolous writ petitions were filed by legal
heirs of erstwhile Khatedars on the ground that the JDA and the
State Government be directed to allot 25% of developed land to
the Khatedar in lieu of compensation, without disclosing the fact
that the compensation amount has already deposited in the Court.
He also submits that the learned Single Judge has overlooked the
principle of law while allowing the writ petitions and directing the
appellants for allocation of 25% of land to the writ petitioners. He
further submits that possession memo dated 23.11.1976 and
fensing order dated 21.04.2017 are sufficient to establish the de
jure and de facto possession of JDA. He also submits that the
compensation amount has already been deposited in the
Reference Court and nothing is survived after deposition of
compensation amount and taking over of possession of the land
by JDA.
7. Aforesaid contentions were opposed by learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondents. She further submits that
after notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act of 1953,
neither compensation was paid nor possession was taken by the
appellants. She also submits that land in question is still in
possession of landholders and as per judgment dated 16.03.2026
in DB Special Appeal (Writ) No.658/2010 (Jaipur
Development Authority Vs. Sai Darshan Hotels and Motels
Private Limited and Anr.), the writ petitioners are entitled for
developed land from JDA. She submitted that learned Single Judge
has rightly considered the contentions of the writ petitioners in
light of the policy of the Government. She also submits that the
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policy to allot developed land in lieu of compensation is already
approved by Hon’ble Supreme Court, and the writ petitioners are
entitled for allocation of land as per policy.
8. She further submits that in the instant case, neither
compensation is paid nor possession was taken, therefore, the
dispute with regard to land acquisition is still pending, thus the
appellants are duty bound to consider their case on basis of
notification and circulars as referred by learned Single Judge. She
further submits that the land acquisition was prior to 2005 and the
guidelines as referred by learned Single Judge are applicable upon
the facts of the case.Thus there is no illegality in allowing the writ
petitions by learned Single Judge.
9. Learned counsel for the respondents-writ petitioners further
submits that several representations were made by the writ
petitioners to the JDA and also the State Government but no
action was taken till filing of the writ petitions. She also submits
that after examining the case of the writ petitioners, the
appellants have recommended the case of the writ petitioners for
allocation of developed land to the writ petitioners and same was
lying pending on date of filing of writ petitions but all of sudden,
the appellants have informed to this Hon’ble Court that a decision
has been taken by the State Government and the proposal has
been returned. She further referred the cases of regularization as
mentioned in writ petitions and submitted that similarly situated
schemes were regularized by the appellants and the State
Government. The case of the writ petitioners is already covered
under the guidelines and circular, issued by the State Government.
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10. Heard learned learned counsel for the parties and perused
the judgments as referred by learned counsel for the respondents-
writ petitioners and also perused the record.
11. The brief facts of the case are that on 21.08.1969, a
notification under Section 4 of the Rajastan Land Acquisition Act of
1953 was issued for village Chainpura acquiring the Khatedari land
bearing Khasra Nos. 63, 64, 65 & 67 (new Khasra Nos. 288, 286,
289) recorded in the name of Shri Neta (father of original
petitioner Ranjeet Singh) and land bearing khasra Nos. 68, 168,
169, 170, 173, 179 & 185 (new Khasra Nos. 290, 296, 291, 294,
295, 306, 308 & 304/271) in the khatedari of one Tariya for
expansion of Jaipur Airport. On 22.04.1973, a notification under
Section 6 of the Act of 1953 was issued and award was passed on
17.05.1975.
Litigation History Relating to Same Land:-
12. The Writ Petition No.942/1974 titled as Neta Vs. State and
Ors. was filed after the acquisition and same was decided on
08.05.1975. Thereafter, a Civil Writ Petition No. 743/1975 titled as
Tarya Vs. State and Ors. was filed and same was decided on
19.03.1978. Alleging that the appellants-JDA is taking possession
of land bearing Khasra Nos.63, 65, 67, 179, 185, 68, 168, 169,
170 and 173 situated in village Chainpura, Sanganer, District
Jaipur, Ranjeet Singh Meena and others (writ petitioners) have
filed a D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.3534/2010 to challenge vires of
Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which was dismissed
on 13.08.2012 by a Division Bench of this Court. Admittedly, an
SLP (Civil) was also filed by Ranjeet Singh Meena and others but
same was also dismissed by Hon’ble Supreme Court.
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13. The writ petitioners Ranjeet Singh Meena and others have
again filed a Writ Petition No. 578/2015 which was dismissed on
13.04.2017 and aggrieved from said order a D.B. Special Appeal
(Writ) No.612/2017 was filed. The D.B. Special Appeal (Writ)
No.612/2017 was dismissed on 22.08.2023 by a Division Bench of
this Court considering judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case
of Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors.
reported as (2020) 8 SCC 129.
14. The facts mentioned in Writ Petition No.9017/2023 also
demonstrate that S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1923/2022 titled
as Ranjeet Singh Meena and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and
Ors. was also filed but the writ petition was dismissed on
29.11.2022.
Discussions and Analysis-
15. The list of dates and events mentioned by appellants in D.B.
Special Appeals (Writ) are as under:-
Date Event 21.08.1969 Section 4 Notification issued for the expansion of Jaipur Airport (Village Chainpura). 17.05.1975 Land Acquisition Award passed. The land stood vested in the State 08.05.1975 First Litigation Round: S.B.C.W.P. No. 942/1974
(Neta v. State) challenging the acquisition was
Dismissed on merits.
23.11.1976 Transfer of Possession: Possession of Khasra Nos.
63, 65, 67, 179, 185 was otaken via Khabza-
Fard.
10.02.1979 Compensation Deposited: Compensation
deposited in Civil Court (Ref. No. 1576) as
Khatedars refused to accept.
21.04.2017 Physical Enforcement: Following the dismissal of
a fresh challenge (Ranjeet Singh v. State, CW
578/2015), JDA removed encroachments and
fenced the land under Order No. 1055.
17.10.2022 State Government Objection: The UDH
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Department returned JDA’s proposal for further
verification and exercise.
16. The payments details as mentioned by the appellants in D.B.
Special Appeals (Writ) are as under:-
Kasra Nos. Area Amount Date/Ref No.
(Old) Deposited
68, 168, 169, 7 Bigha 9 Rs.45,259.25/- D-1576 dt.
170, 173 Biswa 09.12.1999 (Chq
831440)
63, 65, 67, 4 Bigha 19 Rs.35,066.37/- D-89 dt. 10.02.1979
179, 185 Biswa (Chq 034673)
64 (1/2 share) 10 Biswa Rs.7,170/- D-82 dt. 12.07.1979
(Chq 936378)
17. The writ petitioners have submitted representation to the
appellants and State Government on basis of policy dated
01.06.2022 for giving 25% developed land in lieu of the
compensation for the land for which award has been passed prior
to 27.10.2005. The writ petitioners have sent legal notice for
demand of justice as no heed is paid to their representation. In
the meanwhile, certain orders were issued by the Urban
Development and Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan.
The petitioners have filed writ petitions before learned Single
Judge and allowed by impugned order.
18. The material on record clearly indicated that before filing of
writ petitions, the compensation was already deposited after
passing of the award and no record is placed to show that any
reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was ever
made to the reference Court by the writ petitioners. After passing
of award, the land acquisition proceedings were challenged by
filing writ petitions and same were dismissed. Thereafter, on
multiple times, the writ petitions were filed and every point of
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time, the writ petitioners remained unsuccessful, which is evident
from the records.
19. In case of Indore Development Authority Vs.
Manoharlal and Ors. reported as (2020) 8 SCC 129, Hon’ble
Supreme Court has overruled earlier judgment in case of Pune
Municipal Corp.& Anr vs Harakchand Misirimal Solanki &
Ors. reported as (2014) 3 SCC 183 and held that satisfaction of
either of the conditions, namely taking possession of acquired land
or payment of compensation to land owners would be sufficient to
save the acquisition from being left in terms of Section 24(2) of
the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013, (hereinafter
referred as ‘the Act of 2013’). The relevant paragraphs of the
judgment in case of Indore Development Authority Vs.
Manoharlal and Ors. (supra) are reproduced as under:-
“355. We are unable to accept the submission on
behalf of the landowners that it is by operation of
law the proceedings are deemed to have lapsed
and that this Court should give full effect to the
provisions. It was submitted that lapse of
acquisition proceedings was not contemplated
under the Act of 1894, and there is departure
made in Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Thus,
Section 24 gives a fresh cause of action to the
landowners to approach the courts for a declaration
that the acquisition lapsed, if either compensation
has not been paid or the physical possession has
not been taken. The decision of this Court in the
Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. V. Dossibai
N.B. Jeejeebhoy :(1970) 1 SCC 613 was relied
upon to contend that there cannot be res judicata
in the previous proceedings when the cause of
action is different; reliance is also placed on Canara
Bank Vs. N.G. Subbaraya Setty and Anr. : (2018)
16 SCC 228, where the decision of Mathura Prasad(Uploaded on 21/04/2026 at 12:34:34 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (11 of 19) [SAW-348/2026]Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. (supra) was followed as to
belated challenges. Reliance was further placed on
Anil Kumar Gupta Vs. The State of Bihar : (2012)
12 SCC 443 in which it was held that vesting of
land in the Government can be challenged on the
ground that possession had not been taken in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. The
invocation of the urgency clause in Section 17, can be
questioned on the ground that there was no real
urgency. The notification issued under Section 4 and
declaration under Section 6 can be challenged on the
ground of non-compliance of Section 5-A(1). Notice
issued under Section 9 and the award passed under
Section 11 can also be questioned on permissible
grounds. Reliance has also been placed on Ram Chand
and Ors. v. Union of India : (1994) 1 SCC 4 to contend that
inaction and delay on the part of the acquiring
authority would also give rise to a cause of action
in favour of the landowner.
356. The entire gamut of submissions of the
landowners is based on the misinterpretation of the
provisions contained in Section 24. It does not
intend to divest the State of possession (of the
land), title to which has been vested in the State.
It only intends to give higher compensation in case
the obligation of depositing of compensation has
not been fulfilled with regard to the majority of
holdings. A fresh cause of action in Section 24 has
been given if for five years or more possession has
not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In
case possession has been taken and compensation
has not been deposited with respect to the majority
of landholdings, higher compensation to all
incumbents follows, as mentioned above. Section
24 does not confer a new cause of action to
challenge the acquisition proceedings or the
methodology adopted for the deposit of
compensation in the treasury instead of reference
court, in that case, interest or higher
compensation, as the case may be, can follow. In
our considered opinion, Section 24 is applicable to
pending proceedings, not to the concluded
proceedings and the legality of the concluded
proceedings, cannot be questioned. Such a
challenge does not lie within the ambit of the
deemed lapse under Section 24. The lapse under
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Section 24(2) is due to inaction or lethargy of
authorities in taking requisite steps as provided
therein.
357. We are also of the considered opinion that the
decision in an earlier round of litigation operates as
res judicata where the challenge to the legality of
the proceedings had been negatived and the
proceedings of taking possession were upheld.
Section 24 does not intend to reopen proceedings
which have been concluded. The decision in
Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. (supra) is of
no avail. Similar is the decision in Anil Kumar Gupta
v. State of Bihar (supra). No doubt about it that
proceedings (i.e., the original acquisition, or
aspects relating to it) can be questioned but within
a reasonable time; yet once the challenge has been
made and failed or has not been made for a
reasonable time, Section 24 does not provide for
reopening thereof.
358. So far as the proposition laid down in Ram
Chand and Ors. v. Union of India (supra) is
concerned, inaction and delay on the part of
acquiring authorities have been taken care of under
Section 24. The mischief rule (or Heydon’s Mischief
Rule) was pressed into service on behalf of
landowners relying upon the decision in Bengal
Immunity Co v. The State of Bihar (supra), it was
submitted that Act of 1894 did not provide for
lapse in the case of inordinate delay on the part of
acquiring Authorities to complete the acquisition
proceedings. Mischief has been sought to be cured
by the legislature by introducing the Act of 2013 by
making provisions in Section 24 of the lapse of
proceedings. The submission is untenable. The
provisions made under section 24 have provided a
window of 5 years to complete the acquisition
proceedings, and if there is a delay of 5 years or
more, there is a lapse and not otherwise. The
provision cannot be stretched any further,
otherwise, the entire infrastructure, which has
come up, would have to go and only the litigants
would reap the undeserving fruits of frivolous
litigation, having lost in several rounds of litigation
earlier, which can never be the intendment of the
law.
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363. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer
the questions as under:
1. Under the provisions of Section 21(1)(a) in
case the award is not made as on 1.1.2014 the
date of commencement of Act of 2013, there is
no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to
be determined under the provisions of Act of
2013.
2. In case the award has been passed within the
window period of five years excluding the period
covered by an interim order of the court, then
proceedings shall continue as provided under
Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013 under the
Act of 1894 as if it has not been repealed.
3. The word ‘or’ used in Section 24(2) between
possession and compensation has to be read as
‘nor’ or as ‘and’. The deemed lapse of land
acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of
the Act of 2013 takes place where due to
inaction of authorities for five years or more
prior to commencement of the said Act, the
possession of land has not been taken nor
compensation has been paid. In other words, in
case possession has been taken, compensation
has not been paid then there is no lapse.
Similarly, if compensation has been paid,
possession has not been taken then there is no
lapse.
4. The expression ‘paid’ in the main part of
Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not
include a deposit of compensation in court. The
consequence of non-deposit is provided in
proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been
deposited with respect to majority of land
holdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as
on the date of notification for land acquisition
under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall be
entitled to compensation in accordance with the
provisions of the Act of 2013. In case the
obligation under Section 31 of the Land
Acquisition Act of 1894 has not been fulfilled,
interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be
granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court)
does not result in the lapse of land acquisition
proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect
to the majority of holdings for five years or
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more, compensation under the Act of 2013 has
to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of
notification for land acquisition under Section 4
of the Act of 1894.
5. In case a person has been tendered the
compensation as provided under Section 31(1)
of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him to claim
that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2)
due to non-payment or non-deposit of
compensation in court. The obligation to pay is
complete by tendering the amount under
Section 31(1). Land owners who had refused to
accept compensation or who sought reference
for higher compensation, cannot claim that the
acquisition proceedings had lapsed under
Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.
6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of
2013 is to be treated as part of Section 24(2)
not part of Section 24(1)(b).
7. The mode of taking possession under the Act
of 1894 and as contemplated under Section
24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/
memorandum. Once award has been passed on
taking possession under Section 16 of the Act of
1894, the land vests in State there is no
divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the
Act of 2013, as once possession has been taken
there is no lapse under Section 24(2).
8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for
a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in
case authorities have failed due to their inaction
to take possession and pay compensation for
five years or more before the Act of 2013 came
into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition
pending with concerned authority as on
1.1.2014. The period of subsistence of interim
orders passed by court has to be excluded in the
computation of five years.
9. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not
give rise to new cause of action to question the
legality of concluded proceedings of land
acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding
pending on the date of enforcement of the Act
of 2013, i.e., 1.1.2014. It does not revive stale
and time-barred claims and does not reopen
concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to
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question the legality of mode of taking
possession to reopen proceedings or mode of
deposit of compensation in the treasury instead
of court to invalidate acquisition.”
20. A Division Bench of this Court at Principal Seat, Jodhpur in
case of LRs of Late Sh. Takhat Singh Kothari Vs. State of
Rajasthan and Ors. : D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.
1452/2025 (decided on 07.03.2026) after relying upon
judgment in case of Indore Development Authority Vs.
Manoharlal (supra) has observed as under:-
“9. Firstly, we notice that the observations made in
paras 359 and 360 clearly reflect that the present
proceedings are nothing but misuse of the
provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. In the
present case, we have already noticed that earlier
challenge to the acquisition proceedings had failed,
therefore, fresh proceedings under Section 24 of
the Act of 2013 could not have been taken up and
a fresh cause of action does not arise merely
because Section 24 having come into force under
the new Act of 2013. Secondly, we notice that so
far as the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court relating to Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013,
the same are to hold that before coming into force
of Section 24 if there had been no action taken for
last 5 years then the proceedings would lapse in
terms of the Section 24 (2). However, the counting
has to be done from the date of coming into force
of the Act of 2013 i.e. with effect from 01.01.2014
backwards. Thus, if the compensation would not
have been paid or possession would not have been
taken for any acquisition proceedings in the
previous 5 years i.e. from 2011 to 2014, the right
would accrue for claiming lapse of the acquisition
proceedings. But in the present case, we find that
the compensation was already deposited in the
year 2007 and further the paper possession had
also been taken in 2007 itself, therefore, the claim
of the petitioner for benefit of Section 24 (2) of the
Act of 2013 of there being no action taken for 5
years is misconceived. It is apparent that the(Uploaded on 21/04/2026 at 12:34:34 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (16 of 19) [SAW-348/2026]petitioner is counting the 5 years from the date of
award till the date of making the compensation
whereas, the provisions of Section 24 (2)
contemplate counting the 5 years’ period back from
the date of coming into force of Section 24 (2) of
the Act of 2013. The concept of claiming “Lapse”
clause has been introduced in the Act of 2013 and,
therefore, the time period has to be counted with
reference to the Act of 2013 which has come into
force from 01.01.2014. The arguments, therefore,
fail.”
21. In case of Jaipur Development Authority Vs. Sai
Darshan Hotels and Motels Private Limited and Anr. (supra),
a Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court while dismissing DB
Special Appeal (Writ) has observed as under:-
“27. With regard to policy dated 13.12.2001
regarding validity of allotment of 15% developed
land is no more res integra, the Apex Court in
Lalaram Vs. Jaipur Development Authority and Anr.
(2016) 11 SCC 31 has upheld the said decision of
the State. The JDA is bound by the orders passed
by the State Government. The orders have attained
finality by dismissal of the appeal as well as SLP.
28. Independently, we have examined the case of
the JDA and find no force in its submissions. The
orders passed by the State Government cannot be
said to be illegal and unjustified and are strictly in
accordance with the policy of the State
Government, moreso, as the enhanced
compensation which was awarded in reference,
increasing price of land from Rs.6000/- to
Rs.24000/- per bigha vide order dated 24.03.1990
and not been paid, as is apparent from the affidavit
filed by the Principal Secretary, Department of UDH
(supra).”
22. Here in this case, after issuance of notification under section
6 of the Land Acquisition Act, an award was passed on
17.05.1975. The timeline as referred hereinabove indicate that the
compensation was deposited in the reference Court and
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[2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (17 of 19) [SAW-348/2026]
possession was taken. Even after physical enforcement of
possession, writ petitions were filed in the year 2010 and 2015
respectively, but the writ petitioners were unsuccessful, all the
time. The writ petitioners have filed this writ petition in year 2023,
meaning thereby, there were multiple rounds of litigation since
2010. Earlier round of litigation was instituted by predecessors of
the writ petitioners as last writ petition was dismissed on
19.03.1978. The appellants have placed reliance upon Moka report
(on site report) prepared pursuant to order dated 21.04.2017, to
show that possession was affirmed after removal of encrochment
made by the writ petitioners. The claim of deposition of
compensation in Reference Court and further taking over of
possession is not only pleaded in the current writ petitions but
also in previous litigations. The writ petitioners remained
unsuccessful as they have failed in DB Civil Writ Petition No.
3534/2010, when they were dispossessed.
23. Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, reproduced as
under:-
“16. Power to take possession. When the
Collector has made an award under section 11, he
may take possession of the land, which shall
thereupon [vest absolutely in the [Government]
[Substituted by A.O.1937.]], free from all
encumbrances.”
24. It means possession can be taken soon after passing of
award. In the instant case, after award on 17.05.1975, the
possession can be taken at any time. The resistance to such
attempt by the writ petitioners have failed on multiple times.
Thus, the appellants have affirmatively established factum of
possession pursuant to land acquisition proceedings.
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[2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (18 of 19) [SAW-348/2026]
25. The material placed on record, including previous litigations
between the parties (instituted by writ petitioners) clearly indicate
that the rights of these writ petitioners were already decided and
time and again they reapproached to this Court. After the award
dated 17.05.1975, no proceedings were filed for enhancement of
compensation, as contemplated under Section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act. The writ petitioners or their predecessors-in-title
have not made any effort for making a reference under section 18
of the Land Acquisition Act. The challenge to land acquisition has
already came to an end in year 1978, but all of a sudden in 2010,
one round of litigation was instituted and thereafter in 2015,
another round of litigation and now again a fresh round of
litigation for seeking compensation in lieu of acquired land for
which award was passed on 17.05.1975.
26. The deposition of Amount has already been made and same
is stated by the appellants, not only in current proceedings but
also in previous proceedings between the parties. Therefore,
considering the legal position as mentioned hereinabove, the writ
petitioners have no right to assert that the dispute pertaining to
land acquisition is still pending and they are entitled for allotment
of 25% of land in lieu of compensation amount. Thus, the learned
Single Judge has committed serious error by allowing the writ
petitions.
27. In case of Udyami Evam Evan Khadi Gramodyog Welfare
Sanstha Vs. State of UP reported in (2008) 1 SCC 560, it was
held that one should not take recourse to the legal proceedings
over and over again which amount to abuse of the process of law.
In case of Krishna Lal Chawla and Ors. Vs. State of UP and
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[2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (19 of 19) [SAW-348/2026]
Anr. reported as 2021 SCC Online SC 191, it was held that
frivolous litigation should not become the order of day in India.
Therefore, these Special Appeals (Writ) are liable to be allowed.
28. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, DB Civil Special
Appeal (Writ) Nos. 348/2026 and 347/2026 are hereby allowed
and judgment and order dated 07.03.2026 in S.B. Civil
Writ Petition Nos. 5098/2023 and 9017/2023 are set aside.
As a result, the Writ Petition Nos. 5098/2023 and 9017/2023 are
dismissed.
29. Misc. application, if any, also stands disposed.
30. No order as to costs.
(ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J (INDERJEET SINGH),J
MR/202 & 205
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