Vinod Alias Binnu And Others vs State Of Haryana And Others on 17 April, 2026

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    Punjab-Haryana High Court

    Vinod Alias Binnu And Others vs State Of Haryana And Others on 17 April, 2026

    Author: Jasjit Singh Bedi

    Bench: Jasjit Singh Bedi

                                                                       ::1::
    
    
    
                                    (225) IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
                                                       CHANDIGARH
    
                                                                                   CRWP-1543-2026 (O & M)
                                                                                   Reserved on:-09.04.2026
                                                                           Date of Pronouncement:17.04.2026
                                                                              Date of Uploading:- 17.04.2026
                               Vinod alias Binnu and ors.
                                                                                             ... Petitioners
                                                                     Versus
                               State of Haryana and ors.                                      ...Respondents
    
    
                               CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASJIT SINGH BEDI
                               Present:     Ms. Preeti Singh, Advocate and
                                            Ms. Vani Singh, Advocate,for the petitioners.
    
                                            Ms. Geeta Rani, AAG, Haryana.
    
                                         Mr. R.A. Sheoran, Advocate,
                                         Mr. Parmod, Advocate, for the complainant.
                                                           ****
                               JASJIT SINGH BEDI, J.
    

    The prayer in the present Criminal Writ Petition under Article

    226/227 of the Constitution of India is for the issuance of a writ, order or a

    SPONSORED

    direction especially in the nature of Habeas Corpus directing the respondents

    No.1 to 3 to release the petitioners from custody and declare the arrest of the

    petitioners as illegal with a further prayer that a writ of Mandamus be also

    issued to protect the life and liberty of the petitioners.

    2. The brief facts as emanating from the pleadings are that an FIR

    No.0021 dated 03.02.2026 under Sections 109(1), 190, 191(3), 3(5), 351(3),

    61 of BNS, 2023 and Sections 25-54-59 of the Arms Act, Police Station Civil

    Lines, Bhiwani, came to be registered at the instance of Arvind son of

    Krishan Kumar and reads as under:-

    SUKHPREET KAUR
    2026.04.17 06:03
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    integrity of this document
    chandigarh

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    To the SHO Sahab, Police Station Civil Lines, Bhiwani, Sir,
    Request that I am Arvind son of Krishna Kumar resident of Jain
    Chowk Bhiwani and I work in property business. I also deal in
    buying and selling of land. It is because of land that I have a
    rivalry with Vinod alias Binnu, son of Ramesh resident of
    Jituwala Johad Bhiwani. Vinod alias Binnu shot me in 2024 with
    the intent to kill me. Case number 189/ 2024 has been registered
    in connection with the case at the City Police Station Bhiwani. I
    survived in the incident and I have been holding a grudge
    against Vinod alias Binnu ever since. Today I went to the
    Bhiwani Court with my maternal uncle sons Shubham son of
    Ramesh Kumar resident of Mokhra District Rohtak, because my
    friend Shubham son of Sawariya resident of Halwas gate
    Bhiwani, who is imprisoned in the district jail for attempting
    murder was granted bail today in the Court of Mr D.S. Challia
    Sessions Judge Bhiwani. I was present in the Bhiwani Court
    today near the main gate between the Lawyers Chambers. There
    I met Vinod alias Binnu his associates Sandeep resident of
    Lohani, Ajay Punjabi resident of Gausian Chowk Bhiwani, Ayush
    resident of Bhiwani, Shripal resident of Dinod Gate Bhiwani and
    8-10 other boys. The abovesaid Vinod alias Binnu threatened me
    and said that today we will not let you come out of the Court
    Bhiwani alive you had escaped earlier at the same time I called
    my brother Ravindra 9354507000 from my phone number
    9813442512 and told him about the threat given by Vinod alias
    Binnu after this at about 11:15/ 11:30 AM I and my aunt’s son
    Shubham reached my car on LIC road outside the premises then
    suddenly Israel son of Latif Khan, resident of Hindol, Ayush alias
    Boxer son of Ramesh, resident of street no. 19, Dabar Colony
    Bhiwani and Jitender son of Vijay resident of Brahma Colony
    Bhiwani came there whom I already knew Israel, Aayush and
    Jitendra was holding pistols in their hands Israel, Aayush and
    Jitendra tried to fire directly at me with the pistols in their hands
    with the intention of killing me, so I and my aunt’s son Shubham
    got scared and ran back towards the court complex Bhiwani then
    these 3 alongwith their 4/5 other companions ran behind me with
    pistols and I heard the sound of gun shots being fired at me,
    when I was running towards the canteen near the lawyers’ bar in
    the court complex at 11:30 AM Jitender and Aayush suddenly ran
    in front of Me and fired directly at me with the pistol in their
    respective hands with the intention of killing me. I got hit and fell

    SUKHPREET KAUR
    2026.04.17 06:03
    I attest to the accuracy and
    integrity of this document
    chandigarh
    ::3::

    down. I got scared and started shouting, meanwhile hearing the
    gunshots many police personnels came running towards me
    seeing them Israel, Aayush and Jitendra along with their
    weapons ran away from the LIC road side of the Court complex
    towards HUDA Park. The police officials who were following
    them Israel was wearing a white colour sweater and black jeans
    and Aayush was wearing a white shirt and blue jeans. Jitender
    was wearing a black sweater and black colour jeans after this
    incident I was scared and someone I know lost his temper full
    today in the Court of Bhiwani Vinod alias Binnu due to
    conspiracy along with his associates fired bullet on his on his
    road with the intention of killing me. I am in a dilemma that he
    had attacked me with the intention of killing me. Strict to strict
    action be taken against Vinod, Aayush, Jitender and other 8/10
    accused who had formed a conspiracy and attacked me with the
    intention of killing me. SD Arvind applicant.

    3. Pursuant to the registration of the FIR, Vinod alias Binnu-

    petitioner No.1, Aman son of Vinod Kumar-petitioner No.3, Deepanshu alias

    Panu-petitioner No.2 and Kartik alias Sunny came to be arrested on

    03.02.2026 i.e. on the date of the occurrence at different times. The arrested

    accused were produced before the Illaqa Magistrate on 04.02.2026 at about

    03:30 p.m. alongwith an application for 05 days police remand. The scanning

    timing of the application for remand is 03:22 p.m. on 04.02.2026. During the

    course of the hearing of the remand application, the grounds of arrest were

    supplied to the accused. However, in view of the violation of the judgment of

    the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Vihaan Kumar versus The State of Haryana

    and another 2025 AIR Supreme Court 1388 and Mihir Rajesh Shah versus

    State of Maharashtra and another 2025 AIR Supreme Court 5554′, the

    Court declared the arrest of the accused as illegal and ordered their release

    SUKHPREET KAUR
    2026.04.17 06:03
    I attest to the accuracy and
    integrity of this document
    chandigarh
    ::4::

    from custody. As per the prosecution case, the accused persons were released

    immediately at about 03:35 p.m. on 04.02.2026.

    4. An application for permission to re-arrest of the above accused

    was filed between 03:50 p.m. to 04:00 p.m.. There was an averment in the

    said application that the grounds of arrest had been supplied two hours earlier.

    Based on the said application, the same Court that directed the release of the

    accused passed an order granting permission for their re-arrest.

    5. Thereafter, as per the prosecution case, the accused were arrested

    in the parking area of the District Court Complex, Bhiwani at about 06:20

    p.m. and their families were also informed regarding their re-arrest.

    6. All the accused persons were produced before the Duty

    Magistrate at about 08.00 p.m. to 08.15 p.m. alongwith an application for 05

    days police remand.

    7. The present petition has been filed seeking declaration of their

    re-arrest as illegal and their consequential release from custody.

    8. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the accused

    after being ordered to be released from custody were never, in fact, actually

    released, though, they have been shown to have been released. Therefore,

    there has been flagrant violation of the first order of the Magistrate ordering

    their release from custody. She contends that as per the record, the scanning

    of the first remand application took place at about 03:22 p.m. The grounds of

    arrest were given during the course of hearing of the first remand application

    which was dismissed and the arrest was declared illegal. The application

    seeking permission to re-arrest was moved between 03:50 p.m. to 04:00 p.m.

    SUKHPREET KAUR
    2026.04.17 06:03
    I attest to the accuracy and
    integrity of this document
    chandigarh
    ::5::

    and it was stated in the said application that the grounds of arrest had been

    given two hours earlier which is absolutely incorrect as the grounds of arrest

    were supplied at about 03:20 p.m. during the hearing of the first remand

    application. Therefore, once again there has been the violation of the

    judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mihir Rajesh Shah (supra). As

    per record, the re-arrest of the accused was at 06:20 p.m. The second

    application for remand was moved at around 08.00 p.m. Once again, there has

    been no supply of the grounds of the arrest two hours prior to the remand.

    She, thus, contends that re-arrest of the petitioners be declared illegal and they

    be released from custody.

    9. The learned counsel for the State and the counsel for the

    complainant, on the other hand, contend that the grounds of arrest were

    admittedly supplied at about 03:20 p.m. or so or during the course of hearing

    of the first application for police remand when the arrest of the petitioners

    was declared illegal. Merely because the contents of the application seeking

    permission to re-arrest contains an incorrect averment to the extent that it

    states that the grounds of arrest were supplied two hours earlier, though, the

    application seeking permission to arrest itself was moved between 03:50 p.m.

    to 04:00 p.m. would have little relevance because as per the record, the

    grounds of arrest were supplied at about 03.20 p.m. during the hearing of the

    application for the first police remand and the re-arrest of the petitioners is

    admittedly at 06:20 p.m. as per record after which they were produced before

    the Court at about 08.00 p.m. Thus, if the grounds of arrest were supplied

    anytime between 03:20 p.m. and 03:30 p.m., the arrest was declared illegal at

    SUKHPREET KAUR
    2026.04.17 06:03
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    integrity of this document
    chandigarh
    ::6::

    about 03:35 p.m. and the re-arrest was at about 06:20 p.m., then there has

    been due compliance of the judgment in Mihir Rajesh Shah (supra). They,

    thus, contend that the present petition is liable to be dismissed, moreso, as the

    petitioners are serial offenders.

    10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

    11. Before proceeding further, the relevant judgment on the subject

    at hand may be adverted to.

    12. In ‘Mihir Rajesh Shah versus State of Maharashtra and

    another 2025 AIR’, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:-

    55. It goes without saying that if the above said schedule for
    supplying the grounds of arrest in writing is not adhered to, the
    arrest will be rendered illegal entitling the release of the
    arrestee. On such release, an application for remand or custody,
    if required, will be moved along with the reasons and necessity
    for the same, after the supply of the grounds of arrest in writing
    setting forth the explanation for non-supply thereof within the
    above stipulated schedule. On receipt of such an application, the
    magistrate shall decide the same expeditiously and preferably
    within a week of submission thereof by adhering to the principles
    of natural justice.

    56. In conclusion, it is held that:

    i) The constitutional mandate of informing the arrestee the
    grounds of arrest is mandatory in all offences under all
    statutes including offences under IPC 1860 (now BNS
    2023);

    ii) The grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing
    to the arrestee in the language he/she understands;

    iii) In case(s) where, the arresting officer/person is unable
    to communicate the grounds of arrest in writing on or soon
    after arrest, it be so done orally. The said grounds be

    SUKHPREET KAUR
    2026.04.17 06:03
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    integrity of this document
    chandigarh
    ::7::

    communicated in writing within a reasonable time and in
    any case at least two hours prior to production of the
    arrestee for remand proceedings before the magistrate.

    iv) In case of non-compliance of the above, the arrest and
    subsequent remand would be rendered illegal and the
    person will be at liberty to be set free.

    In ‘Anwar Khan @ Chacha and others versus The State of NCT

    of Delhi 2025 NCDHC 5600’, the Delhi High Court held as under:-

    2. The central issue that falls for consideration is whether the re-

    arrest of the petitioners – after their earlier arrest in the same
    FIR was held to be non-est in the eyes of law by the learned ASJ
    on the ground of non-supply of grounds of arrest – can now be
    sustained in view of fresh material and compliance with
    procedural safeguards.

    XXXX XXXX XXXX

    8. Eventually, it came to light that the present petitioners – Hasim
    Baba @ Asim, Sameer @ Baba, Anwar Khan @ Chacha, and
    Zoya Khan – were the peripheral figures who sat at the helm of
    the organized crime syndicate itself. Following the revelations
    regarding their alleged role in the organised crime syndicate, the
    four petitioners were interrogated inside Tihar Jail with prior
    permission of the Court. Based on what the investigating agency
    claimed to be sufficient evidence of their involvement in
    organised criminal activities, all four were formally arrested in
    the present case on 12.05.2025. The next day, the police sought
    seven days of custody remand before the learned ASJ, Patiala
    House Courts.

    9. However, notably, the learned ASJ declined the request on
    13.05.2025, observing that the due process of law had not been
    followed during the petitioners’ arrest in jail. It was observed
    that the investigating agency had failed to communicate the gist
    of the material forming the grounds for arrest to the accused, as
    SUKHPREET KAUR
    2026.04.17 06:03
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    chandigarh
    ::8::

    legally mandated. Consequently, the Court declared the arrest of
    all four petitioners as non-est, ordering their release in the
    present case, while also granting liberty to the State to undertake
    appropriate legal steps in accordance with law. The relevant
    portion of the order dated 13.05.2025 is set out below:

    “12. The Grounds of Arrest is a six line description which
    states after name and credential of accused, ‘accused is
    hereby informed that on the basis of sufficient evidence
    against you under Section 3 & 4 of MCOCA in the present
    case under various offences, PS Farsh Bazar, investigated
    by Special Cell, New Delhi, you are hereby arrested in this
    case’. Thus, essentially, the only reason mentioned is ‘on
    the basis of sufficient evidence against you. In the present
    matter, another accused has already been arrested and the
    case file/diary contains Grounds of Arrest of that accused
    namely Sukhbir Singh. This document (Grounds of Arrest
    of accused Sukhbir Singh) gives the details of Grounds of
    Arrest and mentioned live points indicating various aspects
    on the basis of which the ground of arrest have emerged.

    13. In the case titled as Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT
    of Delhi
    ) in Crl. Appeal D.No. 42896/2023, Hon’ble
    Supreme Court of India, inter-alia, has held that it has been
    the consistent view of this court (Hon’ble Supreme Court
    of India) that grounds on which the liberty of citizen is
    curtailed must be supplied in writing so as to enable him to
    seek remedial measures against the deprivation of liberty.
    It is also held that non-compliance of this constitutional
    requirement and statutory mandate would lead to custody
    or detention being rendered illegal, as the case may be.

    14. Adverting to the facts of this case as noted above, that
    Grounds of Arrest mentioned only on the basis of
    sufficient evidences which a generic term and does not
    enable accused to present his case or put up his defence.
    Whenever a requirement is laid down by law especially the
    condition, purpose of which is to redeem the promise
    which Constitution of India makes regarding upholding
    Fundamental Rights of Citizens/Persons, said condition
    cannot be reduced to just an empty formality which is
    observed as moonshine rather than in substance.
    Permitting this would amount to licensing honoring of law
    in letter only without respect for spirit and purpose of law.

    SUKHPREET KAUR
    2026.04.17 06:03
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    integrity of this document
    chandigarh

    ::9::

    14.1 It was pointed out by the Ld. Addl. PP for the State
    that there are statements of public witnesses including
    statement under Section 183 of BNSS. Said statements are
    in fact part of the record, however, same in itself is not
    sufficient. As per the established position of law noted
    above, gist of the material on the basis of which the
    investigating agency believed that Grounds of Arrest
    existed is to be conveyed but same is amiss in the present
    matter. Therefore, as sequel to above discussion, it is held
    that arrest of above four accused is not proper and not in
    terms of law. Hence, it is held to be non-est. Accused are
    directed to be released from custody in this case. It is
    clarified that since the arrest is held to be non-est on
    technical ground, State has liberty to complete the process
    as per law.

    15. Application disposed of accordingly.”

    The Controversy of Re-Arrest

    10. The investigating agency returned to Court on 15.05.2025,
    seeking further interrogation and re-arrest of the petitioners,
    after complying with all procedural safeguards. It was submitted
    that the earlier order dated 13.05.2025 had not restrained them
    from proceeding afresh and that the nature of offences, i.e.
    punishable even with death, clearly necessitated their arrest. The
    matter was heard in detail, and by order dated 09.006:2025, the
    learned ASJ permitted the interrogation of the petitioners within
    jail premises in accordance with the applicable rules. As to the
    question of re-arrest, the Court carefully clarified that it was not
    within its legal mandate to grant advance permission for arrest.
    The Court observed that it is for the investigating agency to
    decide whether arrest is warranted, and the Court’s role to
    assess the legality of such arrest would arise only once it is
    effected. The Court observed that any pre-emptive judicial
    sanction would amount to placing the cart before the horse and
    would be impermissible under law. The relevant portion of order
    dated 09.006:2025 reads as under:

    SUKHPREET KAUR
    2026.04.17 06:03
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    integrity of this document
    chandigarh

    ::10::

    “6. Having heard contentions of both the parties and
    perused the record, it emerges that issue in hand before the
    court is to consider the prayer of State for further
    interrogation of above named accused persons and prayer
    to permit re-arrest of all these four persons. As far as,
    interrogation/questioning of accused persons are
    concerned, there was no quarrel on behalf of 4. Defence
    counsel representing the accused persons that investigating
    agency has right to continue their investigation rather it
    was argued that investigating agency may continue their
    investigation and for that, arrest of accused is not required.
    Otherwise also, to question a person who is suspect or an
    accused, the investigation may summon that person as
    many times as is required from the material on record and
    for proper investigating agency in the case. Even if on any
    occasion, if the proper procedure is not followed, it does
    not create a bar that, henceforth, accused cannot be called
    for questioning/ interrogation. Therefore, as far as the
    request regarding further interrogation of all the accused
    persons are concerned, in view of the submissions on
    behalf of above accused and in the backdrop of position of
    law on this issue, the investigating agency is well within
    their right to continue or to do further interrogation of the
    above four persons. Accused are stated to be in custody in
    other case. Therefore, it is directed that
    applicant/investigating agency shall be facilitated by Jail
    authorities in terms of applicable jail rules for interrogation
    of accused by applicant/ investigating agency.

    7. As far as, permission to re-arrest is concerned, it is
    beyond the scope of mandate of law for court that during
    investigation, any observation be given by court before
    arrest of accused that if or not arrest of accused is required.
    It is for the investigating agency to decide in terms of
    applicable law that if or not any accused is to be arrested.
    The role of court to evaluate the said arrest will begin once
    the arrest is effected. Needless to say that arrest is to be
    evaluated from two dimensions. Firstly, on the basis of
    material on record which shows that their exists sufficient
    and reasonable material showing involvement of accused.
    Secondly, it is the duty of court to ensure that. procedural
    safeguards laid down by statues as well as brought in by
    judicial interpretation in various pronouncement of
    Hon’ble High Courts and Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
    are observed in the letter and spirit. To make an
    observation in respect of arrest or re-arrest in advance
    would amount to putting the cart before the horse and will

    SUKHPREET KAUR
    2026.04.17 06:03
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    integrity of this document
    chandigarh
    ::11::

    amount to tacit approval of court that material on record is
    sufficient to justify the arrest of accused on the basis of his
    involvement in the case. Such an observation on part of
    court, at this stage, is not warranted and permissibile under
    law. Therefore, at this stage, this part of application/prayer
    is not required to be adjudicated upon pre-mature.
    Application stands disposed of accordingly. Copy dasti.
    Copy of this order be sent to Jail concerned for informing
    applicant/ accused accordingly.”

    11. All four petitioners were rearrested in the present case on
    10.006:2025. This time, more detailed and written grounds of
    arrest were furnished to the petitioners. Following their arrest,
    they were brought to the Patiala House Court and produced
    before the learned Vacation Judge. An application for seeking 10
    days of police custody remand was also filed by the State, which
    was opposed by the learned defence counsels. Taking cognizance
    of the circumstances, the learned Vacation Judge, by order dated
    11.006:2025, directed the investigating agency to place on record
    a synopsis of fresh evidence gathered post the earlier judicial
    order dated 13.05.2025, and to demonstrate the legal
    permissibility of the petitioners’ rearrest. The petitioners were
    initially remanded to judicial custody till 16.006:2025, and on
    that date, their custody was further extended, with the matter
    posted before the learned ASJ for 01.07.2025.

    12. Subsequently, after hearing arguments on the legality of the
    rearrest, the learned ASJ passed the impugned order dated
    04.07.2025, holding that the re-arrest of the petitioners in FIR
    No. 629/2024 was lawful and within the four corners of the
    applicable legal framework. The relevant observations of the
    learned ASJ in the impugned order dated 04.07.2025, which have
    been assailed by the petitioners, are set out below:

    “14.1 I have gone through the order dated 09.006:2025.
    The relevant paragraph in the said order is para no.7. It
    was emphasized on behalf of accused that the court has
    observed that it is beyond the scope of the court to permit
    arrest of accused. However, reading of para no.7 shows
    SUKHPREET KAUR
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    ::12::

    that said observation is only in respect of the mandate of
    law in respect of qua the stage of the case. In other words,
    the observation has been given in respect of mandate of
    law on the powers of court for direction for arrest during
    investigation. It is trite law that court cannot dictate and
    should not dictate as to which accused should be arrested
    or when. It is an established position of law that such
    authority is vested in the investigating agency to decide
    whether or not accused is to be arrested. It has been clearly
    held in para no.7 that said issue regarding permission to re-
    arrest need not to be adjudicated as it was premature. Once
    it is held that an issue is premature, it means that court has
    not made any observation on the substance of the issue
    cither in terms of approval of the issue or disapproval of
    the issue. Hence, the arguments for permission to re-arrest
    having been rejected as it does not hold water.

    15. It was also argued that prosecution has not complied
    with the direction issued by the order dated 11.006:2025
    but by filing the progress of the investigation, the
    compliance has been made. It was argued on behalf of
    prosecution that accused being sent in judicial custody in
    two occasions and the said remand in judicial custody
    having been not opposed amounts to approval of the
    accused by the court cannot be accepted as the arguments
    raised on behalf of accused by Ld. Defence Counsel that
    the issue of legality of arrest being still pending, the
    direction for keeping the accused in custody till disposal of
    the issue does not amount to remand of JC after
    application of mind on the facts of the case has force.

    16. The major thrust of the argument of Ld. Defence
    Counsel is that there is no legal basis for re-arrest of the
    accused and if such rearrest is allowed, it will amount to
    rendering the orders of the Constitutional Courts being
    infractuous as the prosecution/ investigating agency will
    attempt to wipe out the illegalities by making good of the
    lapses committed by them.

    17. Whenever a person is arrested as an accused in a case
    and is produced before the court, before remanding the
    accused in custody of any kind i.e. police custody or
    judicial custody, court must ask prosecution to cross the
    twin test in respect of legality of arrest.

    17.1 The first test would be regarding the compliance of
    procedural safeguards incorporated in statutes and brought

    SUKHPREET KAUR
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    ::13::

    in by various pronouncements of Hon’ble Constitutional
    Courts. Once, the investigating agency is able to show that
    all the safeguards have been observed in compliance, then
    the investigating agency need to show that material on
    record is sufficient to indicate prima facie involvement of
    accused warranting his arrest and need for investigation. In
    case the prosecution/investigating agency fails to cross the
    first test, the second stage is not reached and thus, material
    produced will not be evaluated as such.

    17.2 In the present matter also, there has been similar
    circumstances for observance of mandate of supplying the
    grounds of arrest in defiance through a formal compliance
    rather than meaningful supply of grounds of arrest. Thus,
    vide order dated 13.05.2025, the arrest was declared illegal
    as in the judgments referred above, Hon’ble Supreme
    Court of India has held that the requirement of supplying
    meaningful grounds of arrest is part of fundamental rights.

    18. It was also argued on behalf of accused that there is
    noncompliance of Article 22 and Section 50 of erstwhile
    Cr.PC. Article 22 of Constitution of India requires supply
    of grounds of arrest to the arrestee and Section 50 of Cr.PC
    goes a step further whereby it is required that the ground
    of arrest are to be supplied ‘forthwith’.

    19. Chapter 5 of the erstwhile Cr.PC incorporates the
    provision in respect of arrest of person. Section 46 of
    erstwhile Cr.PC stipulates as to how the arrest is to be
    made. Necessary corollary is that this provision
    incorporates procedural safeguards in respect of the
    manner in which arrest is to be made. Article 21 of
    Constitution of India requires that life and liberty of a
    person shall not be curtailed without procedure established
    by law. Therefore, if the procedure established by law in
    the above noted provisions are not followed, it will amount
    to violtion of fundamental rights and consequently, arrest
    shall stands vitiated.

    20. In this regard, it will be apposite to refer to judgment
    of Hon’ble High Court of Mumbai in the case titled
    as Kavita Manikikar v. CBI Writ Petition No. 1142/2018.

    In the said matter, a female was arrested in violation of
    provision of Section 46(4) of erstwhile Cr.PC. Hon’ble
    High Court of Mumbai had declared the said arrest to be
    illegal and in utter violation of provisions contained in
    Section 46(4) of erstwhile Cr.PC. It was further held that

    SUKHPREET KAUR
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    ::14::

    arrest of petitioner is illegal and contrary to provision of
    Section 46(4) of erstwhile Cr.PC, however, CBI is not
    precluded to arrest the petitioner if investigation warrants
    so, by following the due process of law. This court in its
    order dated 13.05.2025 has also held that though the arrest
    of accused is illegal on the basis of ground of arrest having
    been not supplied, State had the liberty to complete the
    process as per law.

    21. It was argued on behalf of accused that ‘what is the law
    in this regard on the basis of which the re-arrest can be
    made. The tenor of argument indicated that there is no
    provision in the statute regarding re-arrest of accused.

    However, in the Chapter on Arrest of Person, Section 43(2)
    Cr.PC incorporates the provision ‘if a person is arrested in
    terms of Section 43(1) and if there are reason to believe
    that such person comes under the provisions of Section 41,
    a police officer shall re-arrest him’. Similarly, Section
    437(5)
    Cr.PC, which is part of the Chapter on Bail,
    incorporates a provision stipulating that ‘any court which
    has released a person on bail under sub-section (1), or
    subsection(2), may, if it considers it necessary so to do,
    direct that such person be arrested and commit him to
    custody’. Further, Section 439(2) Cr.PC provides that ‘a
    High Court or Court of Session may direct that any person
    who has been released on bail under this Chapter be
    arrested and commit him to custody’.

    21.1 One may argue that this provision relates to
    cancellation of bail before re-arrest of accused. In this
    regard, suffice it to observe that concept of re-arrest is not
    completely new to Cr.PC or to the judicial pronouncement
    as is argued by Ld. Defence Counsel. In the case titled
    as Mohd. Alim @ Abdul Alim v. State of UP, Crl. Appeal
    No. 2376/2023, it is, inter-alia, held by the Hon’ble High
    Court of Allahabad that:

    “68. When the appellants applied for bail, they had no
    notice of extension of time granted by the Special Court.
    Moreover, the application was made before the filing of the
    charge-sheet, hence, the appellants are entitled to default
    bail. At this stage, we may note here that in the case of
    Sanjay Dutt (Supra) as well as in the case of Bikramjeet
    Singh (Supra), the Supreme Court held that grant of
    default bail does not prevent re-arrest of the appellant on
    the cogent ground after filing the charge-sheet. Thereafter,
    the accused can always apply for regular bail. However, as

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    ::15::

    held by Supreme Court in the case of Mohamed Iqbal
    Madar Sheikh and others v. State of Maharashtra
    reported
    in (1996) 1 SCC 722, re-arrest cannot be made only on the
    ground of filing a charge-sheet. It all depends on the facts
    of each case.”

    22. Further, in the case titled as Prahald Singh Bhati v.
    NCT of Delhi, Appeal
    (crl.) 324 of 2001, it has been held
    as under:

    “In the instant case while exercising the jurisdiction,
    apparently under Section 437 of the Code, the
    Metropolitan Magistrate appears to have completely
    ignored the basic principles governing the grant of bail.
    The Magistrate referred to certain facts and the provisions
    of law which were not, in any way, relevant for the
    purposes of deciding the application for bail in a case
    where accused was charged with an offence punishable
    with death or imprisonment for life. The mere initial grant
    of anticipatory bail for lesser offence, did not entitle the
    respondent to insist for regular bail even if he was
    subsequently found to be involved in the case of murder.
    Neither Section 437(5) nor Section 439(1) of the Code was
    attracted. There was no question of cancellation of bail
    carlier granted to the accused for an offence punishable
    under Sections 498A, 306 and 406 IPC. The Magistrate
    committed a irregularity by holding that “I do not agree
    with the submission made by the Ld.Prosecutor in as much
    as if we go by his submissions then the accused would be
    liable for arrest every time the charge is altered or
    enhanced at any stage, which is certainly not the spirit of
    law”. With the change of the nature of the offence, the
    accused becomes dis-entitled to the liberty granted to him
    in relation to a minor offence, if the offence is altered for
    an aggravated crime. Instead of referring to the grounds
    which entitled the respondent-accused the grant of bail,
    the Magistrate adopted a wrong approach to confer him
    the benefit of liberty on allegedly finding that no grounds
    were made out for cancellation of bail.”

    23. It was also argued on behalf of accused that if after
    declaring the arrest of the accused persons as illegal, there
    subsequent arrest is approved, it will amount to rendering
    the law laid down by the Hon’ble Constitutional Courts as
    infractuous. This argument cannot be accepted for the
    reason that the purpose of procedural safeguards
    incorporated in statutes are required to be strictly observed

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    ::16::

    in terms of law laid down by Hon’ble Constitutional
    Courts, it can never mean to permit or allow accused to
    have an advantage of lapse or inefficiency on the part of an
    officer of prosecuting agency.

    23.1 In the case titled as Vicky Bharat Kalyani v. The State
    of Maharashtra & Anr. Writ Petition No.5254 of 2024, it
    was argued that it has been referred to the Larger Bench
    and therefore, cannot be relied upon. Para no. 66 of said
    judgment deals with terms of reference to Larger Bench,
    however, perusal of these questions/points raised in such
    reference to Larger Bench are in respect of application of
    Section 50 of erstwhile Cr.PC, whereas, the question and
    the observation in the earlier paragraph are in respect of
    the post non-compliance of Section 50 Cr.PC in terms of
    not providing grounds of arrest to accused.

    23.2 It was also argued that the reliance by the prosecution
    is such which amounts to noting the contentions of
    government Reader and they do not assume the status of
    law. However, a clear observation has been made in para
    no. 58 of the above judgment that any embargo or bar
    upon re-arrest could be pointed out and the court agreed
    with the contention that there is no bar for rearrest the
    person who are released for non-furnishing the grounds of
    arrest in writing. It is further held that if accused are
    released on the grounds of not supplying the grounds of
    arrest leading to violation of provisions of Cr.PC would
    amount to infringing their constitutional right under
    Article 21 of Constitution of India, thereafter, if grounds of
    arrest are supplied to them, they cannot have any
    grievance. It is further apposite and germane to have
    reference to para no.57 of the said judgment and same is
    reproduced hereinunder:

    “57. The accused has certain rights, as discussed earlier.
    Similarly the victims also have their own rights. In cases
    involving heinous crimes like rape, murder, those under
    POCSO, MCOCA, NDPS, the victims and even the society
    are the sufferer. The victims do not have any control over
    the investigation and the investigating officers’ efficiency
    or inefficiency. Therefore, if an accused is released on the
    ground of non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest in
    writing if required under Section 50 of Cr.P.C. that would
    cause serious prejudice to the victims. Such lapse can be
    attributed to various factors viz. inefficiency, lack of
    awareness etc. In that case, the consequences would be

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    ::17::

    causing serious prejudice to the victims. In a given case,
    the investigating agency may have material in their
    possession that propensity of the accused indicated that he
    is likely to commit a similar offence, and that would be a
    serious threat to the security and safety of the potential
    victims in the offences like rape, under POCSO etc. If an
    accused is released on that ground then there could be
    serious threat to the witnesses also. Therefore, there is
    need to strike a balance between the rights of the victims
    and the rights of the accused. There is also a possibility of
    destruction of evidence, threatening of witnesses etc..
    Merely imposing conditions in these cases may not suffice.
    On the other hand, when the bail applications are
    considered, then looking at the background of the case, the
    Court would exercise jurisdiction in bail matters taking
    into account all the factors including merits of the matter;
    which in the cases of violation of alleged rights of the
    accused under Section 50 of Cr.P.C. would not be possible
    for the Court to exercise.”

    24. The purpose behind the procedural safeguards and
    direction of Hon’ble Constitutional Courts to ensure that
    Grounds of Arrest to be provided to accused in writing is
    to ensure that accused is being clearly informed as to why
    he/she has been arrested and also to ensure that accused
    are in position to defend themselves since very beginning.
    The purpose of such safeguard can never been to let an
    accused go scot free for procedural lapses. It is trite law
    that procedure is handmaid of justice and the contention of
    the prosecution and Ld. Defence Counsel are required to
    be evaluated in this background.”

    XXXX XXXX XXXX

    26. It is, therefore, incorrect to argue that the re-arrest could
    only be justified on the basis of discovery of new material after
    13.05.2025. Accordingly, the argument of the learned counsel for
    the petitioners that the re-arrest was impermissible in the
    absence of new material is unmerited.

    XXXX XXXX XXXX

    28. A key issue in the present matter also relates to compliance
    with the requirement of furnishing grounds of arrest, both at the
    time of the first arrest and upon the subsequent re-arrest of the
    petitioners.

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    ::18::

    29. It is undisputed that during the initial arrest, the petitioners
    were not provided with detailed written grounds of arrest. This
    formed the basis for the order dated 13.05.2025, whereby the
    learned ASJ declared the arrest as non-est, holding that such
    non-compliance violated the petitioners’ fundamental rights and
    the settled law laid down in decisions such as Prabir
    Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi
    ): 2024 INSC 414. That order
    attained finality, as it was not challenged by the State.

    30. However, at the time of the re-arrest on 10.006:2025, this
    Court finds that detailed grounds of arrest were furnished to
    each of the petitioners, which have been placed on record before
    this Court by the State along with the Status Report. These
    grounds specifically outline the alleged roles of the petitioners in
    the organised crime syndicate and the specific allegations
    against them for commission of alleged offences. The extract of
    grounds of arrest, supplied to one of the petitioner, i.e. petitioner
    no. 1, is set out below for reference:

    Case FIR No. 629/2024 Dated 07.12.2024 under section
    103(1)/3(5)/303/318/336/341 BNS & 25/27 Arms Act,
    43/66/66(B)/72 IT Act, 3 & 4 MCOC Act PS Farsh Bazar
    (Investigated by Special Cell) Delhi.

    Grounds of Arrest of accused Anwar Khan @ Chacha s/o
    Jumma Khan Age 52 years r/o H.No. C-35, Welcome,
    Shahdara, Delhi.

    HINDI MATTER

    31. Therefore, at the time of re-arrest, the mandatory
    requirements of law, as interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme
    Court, were prima facie complied with. Thus, this Court is of the
    considered view that the defect which had vitiated the initial
    arrest was not repeated during the re-arrest, and the requirement
    of informing the accused of the grounds of arrest in writing was
    duly fulfilled. Whether Re-Arrest is Permissible After

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    ::19::

    Declaration of Initial Arrest as Non-Est due to Procedural
    Irregularity’

    32. The essential question that now falls for determination is
    whether an accused person, whose arrest has previously been
    declared non-est or illegal on procedural grounds, can be
    lawfully re-arrested after compliance with the requisite legal
    formalities.

    XXXX XXXX XXXX

    34. This Court finds merit in the State’s argument. Clearly, the
    Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as well as the Bharatiya
    Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, does not contain any provision
    that either expressly prohibits or bars re-arrest of an individual
    in such circumstances. Moreover, to accept the proposition
    advanced by the petitioners would be to grant complete immunity
    to an accused from any future arrest, even in cases involving
    serious offences, merely because the initial arrest was vitiated by
    a procedural lapse, however, sufficient incriminating material is
    found against him, qua the same offence, later.

    35. This Court is of the considered view that a lapse or omission
    on the part of the investigating agency, whether inadvertent or
    deliberate, cannot and should not result in a blanket immunity to
    the accused against any future arrest in the same case. To hold
    otherwise would amount to laying down a precedent which, in
    the long run, may prove perilous to the administration of
    criminal justice. It would essentially mean that a serious offender
    may escape the process of law solely on account of a procedural
    lapse committed by the investigating agency, even if sufficient
    material exists justifying his arrest.

    36. This issue also raises a more complex question: what
    happens when the arrest of an accused in a serious offence is
    declared illegal or non-est purely on technical grounds’ Can the
    State, after rectifying the procedural irregularity, not arrest the
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    ::20::

    said accused again, even if cogent grounds exist’ The learned
    counsel for the petitioners contended that once the arrest is held
    to be non-est, the petitioners cannot be re-arrested. This Court is
    unable to accept such a proposition of law. Let us test this
    argument in a hypothetical but plausible situation: suppose a
    police officer, either due to oversight or deliberately, does not
    communicate the grounds of arrest in writing, and therefore the
    arrest is declared illegal by the Court, however, at the same time
    clarifying that such declaration was solely on technical ground
    and the investigating agency was at liberty to rectify such lapse,
    it would necessarily lead to a conclusion that there was no
    immunity or bar in future to arrest the accused qua the same
    offence. Assume further that the case in question involves grave
    allegations – say, charges of organized crime, murders, etc.
    Should the procedural lapse committed by one officer, however
    serious, be allowed to permanently shield the accused from
    arrest, even after the defect has been remedied? The answer, in
    this Court’s view, must be in the negative.

    37. This question assumes even greater significance in the
    context of the present case, where the petitioners are not first-
    time offenders but individuals with a long list of criminal
    antecedents. As per the material placed on record, some of the
    petitioners are involved in as many as 10, 15, or even 26
    criminal cases, including offences such as robbery, extortion,
    attempt to murder, and even murder. The provisions of MCOCA
    have been invoked in this case, and the prosecution’s allegations,
    at least prima facie point towards the existence of a structured
    organised criminal syndicate. In such a context, the argument
    that an illegal or non-est arrest should completely shield the
    accused persons from future arrest, after complying with all
    procedural safeguards, cannot be accepted by this Court.

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    ::21::

    38. The view that re-arrest is not impermissible in such
    circumstances has also received judicial recognition. In Kavita
    Manikikar of Mumbai v. CBI: 2018 SCC Online Bom 1095, the
    Bombay High Court held that while the initial arrest of the
    petitioner therein was declared illegal due to violation of Section
    46(4)
    of Cr.P.C. (arrest of a woman after sunset), it was clarified
    that the police was not barred from affecting a subsequent arrest
    after rectifying the procedural irregularity. The relevant
    observations in this regard are as under:

    “34. In result, of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition
    is allowed in terms of prayer clause (a) and it is held that
    the arrest of the petitioner is illegal and contrary to the
    provisions of Section 46(4) of the Code of Criminal Proce-
    dure. However, the CBI is not precluded to arrest the
    petitioner if investigation warrants so, by following the
    due procedure of law.”

    39. Similarly, in Vicky Bharat Kalyani v. State of
    Maharashtra
    (supra), the Division Bench of the Bombay High
    Court clearly observed in paragraph 58 of the judgment that
    there was no legal bar on re-arresting an accused who had been
    released earlier due to failure to furnish written grounds of
    arrest. Though the Division Bench referred six questions,
    including the issue of re-arrest, to a Larger Bench, it
    nevertheless recorded a clear and reasoned view in favour of
    permissibility of re-arrest in paragraph 58, and no contrary
    opinion was expressed anywhere in the said judgment. The
    relevant observations in this regard are as under:

    “58. In this context, we have seriously considered the
    arguments advanced by learned Advocate General about
    re-arrest of the accused who is released with or without
    bail bonds on the ground of alleged non-compliance of the
    provisions of Section 50 of Cr.P.C. for not giving the
    grounds of arrest in writing. In this context, Shri. Bhuta
    could not point out any embargo or bar upon such re-
    arrest. Shri. Amit Desai, however, submitted that once the
    accused is released on that ground, re-arrest would violate
    the protection of the accused under Article 21 of the
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    ::22::

    Constitution of India. The State should not be given a
    second chance. In this connection,we are inclined to agree
    with the learned Advocate General that there is no bar in
    re-arresting the persons who are released for non-
    furnishing the grounds of arrest in writing. What the
    accused are claiming in this situation, is that, they were
    arrested in violation to the provisions of Cr.P.C. and it
    infringes their constitutional right under Article 21 but if
    they are released on that ground and thereafter if the
    grounds of arrest are supplied to them, they cannot have
    any grievance. The purpose behind these provisions is to
    make the accused aware as to why he was arrested and
    thereafter enable him to defend himself. Leaving aside the
    issue whether such ground should be communicated orally
    or should be given in writing for the time being; if on the
    ground of non-communication they are released and if
    thereafter the grounds are furnished as per the requirement;
    then the accused cannot have any grievance, that they were
    not aware as to why they were arrested. From that point
    onward, the procedure for remand can be followed and the
    shortcoming of non-compliance of the provision is wiped
    out. In that context, reference can be made to the case of
    Kavita Manikikar. In that case, the Petitioner before the
    Court was a lady. She was released because she was
    arrested after sun-set for breach of Section 46(4) of Cr.P.C.
    Having held her arrest illegal, the Division Bench of this
    Court went on to observe that considering the seriousness
    of the allegations, she could be re-arrested after following
    due procedure of law. The same course can be adopted in
    the cases where the investigating agency wants to re-arrest
    the accused if they are released for non-compliance of
    Section 50 of Cr.P.C.”

    (Emphasis added)

    40. On the other hand, reliance on decision in Vihaan Kumar v.
    State of Haryana & Anr. (supra) can be of no help to the
    petitioners, inasmuch as the said judgment does not decide the
    question of whether re-arrest is legally permissible after an
    initial arrest is declared illegal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in
    that case expressly noted that it was not necessary to adjudicate
    on that issue in the given set of facts of that case. Thus, no
    proposition of law was laid down in the said decision on the

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    ::23::

    permissibility of re-arrest. The relevant observations in this
    regard are as under:

    “22. Another argument canvassed on behalf of the
    respondents is that even if the appellant is released on the
    grounds of violating Article 22, the first respondent can
    arrest him again. At this stage, it is not necessary to decide
    the issue.”

    41. However, this Court’s attention was drawn to the judgment
    of Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam (supra) by the State
    wherein while releasing the petitioner on default bail, on the
    ground that chargesheet had not been filed within a period of 60
    days, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had clarified that the release of
    petitioner shall not prohibit or otherwise prevent the arrest or
    rearrest of the petitioner on cogent grounds in respect of the
    subject charge. The relevant observations in this regard are as
    under:

    “49. The petitioner is held entitled to the grant of “default
    bail” on the facts and in the circumstances of this case. The
    Trial Judge should release the petitioner on “default bail”

    on such terms and conditions as may be reasonable.
    However, we make it clear that this does not prohibit or
    otherwise prevent the arrest or re-arrest of the petitioner on
    cogent grounds in respect of the subject charge and upon
    arrest or re-arrest, the petitioner is entitled to petition for
    grant of regular bail which application should be
    considered on its own merit. We also make it clear that
    this will not impact on the arrest of the petitioner in any
    other case.”

    42. Thus, in the considered view of this Court, there is merit in
    the argument advanced on behalf of the State that when an
    accused is released or his arrest is declared illegal solely on
    technical or procedural grounds – such as in the cases of Rakesh
    Kumar Paul v. State of Assam
    (supra), Kavita Manikikar v.
    CBI (supra), or Vicky Bharat Kalyani v. State of
    Maharashtra
    (supra) – the State cannot be precluded from taking
    steps to re-arrest such a person, provided the subsequent arrest
    is affected strictly in accordance with the procedure established
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    ::24::

    by law. The mere fact that the earlier arrest was vitiated on
    account of procedural lapses does not, by itself, create any
    blanket immunity from future arrest, especially where the
    investigating agency continues to be in possession of material
    implicating the accused and there has been no adjudication on
    the merits of such material by the court declaring the arrest
    illegal.

    Conclusion

    43. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the
    initial arrest of the petitioners was declared non-est solely due to
    non-furnishing of written grounds of arrest and not due to
    insufficiency of material against them. Further, detailed and
    sufficient grounds of arrest were furnished to the petitioners at
    the time of re-arrest on 10.006:2025. This Court also concludes
    that there is no statutory or judicial bar on re-arrest of an
    accused after curing the procedural defects of a prior illegal
    arrest; and that the judicial precedents, including those of the
    Hon’ble Supreme Court and Bombay High Court (as discussed
    above) support the proposition that a subsequent arrest is
    permissible in law, provided procedural safeguards are followed.

    In ‘Manish Kumar versus State of H.P. 2025 NCHHC 41249′,

    the Himachal Pradesh High Court held as under:-

    7. The aforesaid release of the bail petitioner in the case at hand
    does not preclude the respondent from re-arresting the accused
    after the rectifying procedural defects of prior illegal arrest.

    There is no statutory or judicial bar on re-arrest. In this respect,
    it would be appropriate to refer to the pronouncement of the
    Delhi High Court in judgment delivered on 15.7.2025 titled
    as Anwar Khan @ Chacha and others v. The State of NCT of
    Delhi. Relevant extract whereof is being reproduced hereinbelow
    for a reference:-

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    ::25::

    36.This issue also raises a more complex question: what
    happens when the arrest of an accused in a serious offence
    is declared illegal Digitally Signed or non-est purely on
    technical grounds? Can the State, after rectifying the
    procedural irregularity, not arrest the said accused again,
    even if cogent grounds exist? The learned counsel for the
    petitioners contended that once the arrest is held to be non-

    est, the petitioners cannot be re-arrested. This Court is
    unable to accept such a proposition of law. Let us test this
    argument in a hypothetical but plausible situation: suppose
    a police officer, either due to oversight or deliberately,
    does not communicate the grounds of arrest in writing, and
    therefore the arrest is declared illegal by the Court,
    however, at the same time clarifying that such declaration
    was solely on technical ground and the investigating
    agency was at liberty to rectify such lapse, it would
    necessarily lead to a conclusion that there was no
    immunity or bar in future to arrest the accused qua the
    same offence. Assume further that the case in question
    involves grave allegations – say, charges of organized
    crime, murders, etc. Should the procedural lapse
    committed by one officer, however serious, be allowed to
    permanently shield the accused from arrest, even after the
    defect has been remedied? The answer, in this Court’s
    view, must be in the negative.

    37. This question assumes even greater significance in the
    context of the present case, where the petitioners are not
    first-time offenders but individuals with a long list of
    criminal antecedents. As per the material placed on record,
    some of the petitioners are involved in as many as 10, 15,
    or even 26 criminal cases, including offences such as
    robbery, extortion, attempt to murder, and even murder.
    The Digitally Signed provisions of MCOCA have been
    invoked in this case, and the prosecution’s allegations, at
    least prima facie point towards the existence of a
    structured organised criminal syndicate. In such a context,
    the argument that an illegal or non-est arrest should
    completely shield the accused persons from future arrest,
    after complying with all procedural safeguards, cannot be
    accepted by this Court.

    38. The view that re-arrest is not impermissible in such
    circumstances has also received judicial recognition.
    In Kavita Manikikar of Mumbai v. CBI: 2018 SCC Online
    Bom 1095, the Bombay High Court held that while the
    initial arrest of the petitioner therein was declared illegal
    due to violation of Section 46(4) of Cr.P.C. (arrest of a

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    ::26::

    woman after sunset), it was clarified that the police was
    not barred from affecting a subsequent arrest after
    rectifying the procedural irregularity. The relevant
    observations in this regard are as under:

    “34. In result, of the aforesaid discussion, the writ
    petition is allowed in terms of prayer clause (a) and
    it is held that the arrest of the petitioner is illegal
    and contrary to the provisions of Section 46(4) of
    the Code of Criminal Proce-dure. However, the CBI
    is not precluded to arrest the petitioner if
    investigation warrants so, by following the due
    procedure of law.”

    39. Similarly, in Vicky Bharat Kalyani v. State of
    Maharashtra
    (supra), the Division Bench of the Bombay
    High Court clearly observed in paragraph 58 of the
    judgment that there was no legal bar on re-arresting an
    accused who had been released earlier due to Digitally
    Signed failure to furnish written grounds of arrest. Though
    the Division Bench referred six questions, including the
    issue of re-arrest, to a Larger Bench, it nevertheless
    recorded a clear and reasoned view in favour of
    permissibility of re-arrest in paragraph 58, and no contrary
    opinion was expressed anywhere in the said judgment. The
    relevant observations in this regard are as under:

    “58. In this context, we have seriously considered
    the arguments advanced by learned Advocate
    General about re-arrest of the accused who is
    released with or without bail bonds on the ground of
    alleged non-compliance of the provisions of
    Section 50 of Cr.P.C. for not giving the grounds of
    arrest in writing. In this context, Shri. Bhuta could
    not point out any embargo or bar upon such re-
    arrest. Shri. Amit Desai, however, submitted that
    once the accused is released on that ground, re-
    arrest would violate the protection of the accused
    under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The
    State should not be given a second chance. In this
    connection, we are inclined to agree with the
    learned Advocate General that there is no bar in re-
    arresting the persons who are released for non-
    furnishing the grounds of arrest in writing. What the
    accused are claiming in this situation, is that, they
    were arrested in violation to the provisions of
    Cr.P.C. and it infringes their constitutional right

    SUKHPREET KAUR
    2026.04.17 06:03
    I attest to the accuracy and
    integrity of this document
    chandigarh
    ::27::

    under Article 21 but if they are released on that
    ground and thereafter if the grounds of arrest are
    supplied to them, they cannot have any grievance.
    The purpose behind these provisions is to make the
    accused aware as to why he was arrested and
    thereafter enable him to defend himself. Leaving
    aside the issue whether such ground should be
    communicated orally or should be given in writing
    for the time being; if on the ground of non-

    communication they are released and if thereafter
    the grounds are furnished as per the requirement;
    then the accused cannot have any grievance, that
    they were not aware as to why they were arrested.
    From that point onward, the procedure for remand
    can be followed and the shortcoming of non-

    compliance of the provision is wiped out. In that
    context, reference can be made to the case of Kavita
    Manikikar. In that case, the Petitioner before the
    Court was a lady. She was released because she was
    Digitally Signed arrested after sun-set for breach of
    Section 46(4) of Cr.P.C. Having held her arrest
    illegal, the Division Bench of this Court went on to
    observe that considering the seriousness of the
    allegations, she could be re-arrested after following
    due procedure of law. The same course can be
    adopted in the cases where the investigating agency
    wants to re-arrest the accused if they are released
    for non-compliance of Section 50 of Cr.P.C.”

    (Emphasis added)

    40. On the other hand, reliance on decision in Vihaan
    Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr. (supra) can be of no
    help to the petitioners, inasmuch as the said judgment does
    not decide the question of whether re-arrest is legally
    permissible after an initial arrest is declared illegal. The
    Hon’ble Supreme Court in that case expressly noted that it
    was not necessary to adjudicate on that issue in the given
    set of facts of that case. Thus, no proposition of law was
    laid down in the said decision on the permissibility of re-
    arrest. The relevant observations in this regard are as
    under:

    “22. Another argument canvassed on behalf of the
    respondents is that even if the appellant is released
    on the grounds of violating Article 22, the first
    respondent can arrest him again. At this stage, it is
    not necessary to decide the issue.”

    SUKHPREET KAUR
    2026.04.17 06:03
    I attest to the accuracy and
    integrity of this document
    chandigarh

    ::28::

    41. However, this Court’s attention was drawn to the
    judgment of Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam (supra)
    by the State wherein while releasing the petitioner on
    default bail, on the ground that chargesheet had not been
    filed within a period of 60 days, the Hon’ble Supreme
    Court had clarified that the release of petitioner shall not
    prohibit or otherwise prevent the arrest or rearrest of the
    Digitally Signed petitioner on cogent grounds in respect of
    the subject charge. The relevant observations in this regard
    are as under:

    “49. The petitioner is held entitled to the grant of
    “default bail”on the facts and in the circumstances
    of this case. The Trial Judge should release the
    petitioner on “default bail” on such terms and
    conditions as may be reasonable. However, we make
    it clear that this does not prohibit or otherwise
    prevent the arrest or re-arrest of the petitioner on
    cogent grounds in respect of the subject charge and
    upon arrest or re-arrest, the petitioner is entitled to
    petition for grant of regular bail which application
    should be considered on its own merit. We also make
    it clear that this will not impact on the arrest of the
    petitioner in any other case.”

    42. Thus, in the considered view of this Court, there is
    merit in the argument advanced on behalf of the State that
    when an accused is released or his arrest is declared illegal
    solely on technical or procedural grounds – such as in the
    cases of Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of
    Assam
    (supra), Kavita Manikikar v. CBI (supra), or Vicky
    Bharat Kalyani v. State of Maharashtra
    (supra) – the State
    cannot be precluded from taking steps to re-arrest such a
    person, provided the subsequent arrest is affected strictly
    in accordance with the procedure established by law. The
    mere fact that the earlier arrest was vitiated on account of
    procedural lapses does not, by itself, create any blanket
    immunity from future arrest, especially where the
    investigating agency continues to be in possession of
    material implicating the accused and there has been no
    adjudication on the merits of such material by the court
    declaring the arrest illegal.

    43. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds
    that the initial arrest of the petitioners was declared non-est
    solely due to non-furnishing of written grounds of arrest
    and not due to insufficiency of material against them.
    Further, detailed and sufficient grounds of arrest were

    SUKHPREET KAUR
    2026.04.17 06:03
    I attest to the accuracy and
    integrity of this document
    chandigarh
    ::29::

    furnished to the petitioners at the time of re-arrest on
    10.006:2025. This Court also concludes that there is no
    statutory or judicial bar on re-arrest of an accused after
    curing the procedural defects of a prior illegal arrest; and
    that the judicial precedents, including those of the Hon’ble
    Supreme Court and Bombay High Court (as discussed
    above) support the proposition that a subsequent arrest is
    permissible in law, provided procedural safeguards are
    followed.

    13. As per settled law as laid down in Mihir Rajesh Shah (supra),

    ‘Anwar Khan @ Chacha (supra) and Manish Kumar (supra), the grounds

    of arrest must be supplied to an accused in writing at least two hours prior to

    him being presented before the Magistrate for his police remand. Further, re-

    arrest of the accused is permissible after due compliance of the law laid down

    in Mihir Rajesh Shah (supra), if the facts so warrant.

    14. Coming back to the facts of the present case, as per the admitted

    position available by way of documentary evidence, the application for the

    first police remand was scanned at about 03:22 p.m. and the grounds of arrest

    were supplied to the accused during the hearing of the first application when

    the arrest was declared illegal. As per the prosecution case, the arrest of the

    petitioners was declared illegal at about 03:35 p.m and they were ordered to

    be released from custody. As per the prosecution case, they were released

    from custody. Thereafter, an application was moved for their re-arrest.

    Apparently, the averment in the application that two hours have elapsed since

    the time the grounds of arrest were supplied is incorrect in view of the fact

    that the application for re-arrest was moved between 03:50 p.m. and 04:00

    p.m. and the grounds were supplied sometime between 03:20 p.m. and 03:35

    p.m. However, the same would have little relevance as the subsequent arrest

    SUKHPREET KAUR
    2026.04.17 06:03
    I attest to the accuracy and
    integrity of this document
    chandigarh
    ::30::

    of the petitioners is at 06:20 p.m. as per the arrest memos and they were

    produced for police remand later between 08:00 to 08:15 p.m. Therefore, it is

    apparent that the grounds of arrest were supplied to the accused more than

    two hours before the second application for police remand.

    Further, there is no requirement in law that the grounds of arrest

    must be supplied prior to each arrest in the same FIR. Admittedly, the same

    were provided when the accused were produced for police remand first time

    between 03:20 p.m. and 03:35 p.m. When they were subsequently arrested at

    06:20 p.m. and produced for police remand later that evening there was no

    requirement of the re-supply of the grounds of arrest.

    15. It would not be out of place to mention here that the allegations

    levelled against the petitioners are grave inasmuch as they have resorted to

    firing in the Court premises. As per the affidavit of Mahesh Kumar, HPS,

    Deputy Superintendent of Police (HQ), Bhiwani, Haryana, dated 19.02.2026,

    petitioner No.1-Vinod alias Binnu and petitioner No.3-Aman are both serial

    offenders. The relevant extract of the affidavit showing their antecedents is as

    under:-

    12. That as per the record of concerned police station, the petitioner
    Vinod @ Binnu is also involved as accused in the following cases
    also-

    a. FIR No. 530 dated 17.08.2017, under Sections 323, 506,
    341, 34 IPC and Section 3(2)(VA) of SC/ST Act, P.S. City
    Bhiwani, in which, he has been convicted on 04.09.2019.

    b. FIR No. 520 dated 27.08.2020, under Sections 25/54/59
    Arms Act, P.S. City Bhiwani, which is pending adjudication.

    c. FIR No. 692 dated 22.12.2021, under Sections 147, 149,
    323, 506, 307 IPC & Section 25/54/59 Arms Act, P.S. City
    Bhiwani, which is pending adjudication.

    SUKHPREET KAUR
    2026.04.17 06:03
    I attest to the accuracy and
    integrity of this document
    chandigarh

    ::31::

    d. FIR No. 651 dated 13.11.2022, under Sections 147, 149,
    323, 506, 307 IPC, P.S. City Bhiwani, which is pending
    adjudication.

    e. FIR No. 299 dated 19.05.2022, under Sections 147, 148,
    149, 323, 506 IPC, P.S. City Bhiwani, which is pending
    adjudication.

    f. FIR No. 318 dated 27.05.2022, under Sections 147. 149.

    323. 506, 379 IPC & SC/ST Act, P.S. City Bhiwani, which is
    pending adjudication.

    g. FIR No. 485 dated 27.09.2023, under Sections 323, 506,

    341. 365, 34 IPC, P.S. City Bhiwani, which is pending
    adjudication.

    h. FIR No. 189 dated 29.04.2024, under Sections 147, 148,
    149, 307,452, 506 IPC & Sections 25/54/59 of Arms Act, P.S.
    City Bhiwani, which is pending adjudication.

    13. That as per the record of concerned police station, the petitioner
    Aman is also involved as accused in the following cases also-

    a. FIR No. 606 dated 03.10.2023, under Sections 25/54/59
    Arms Act, P.S. City Bhiwani, which is pending adjudication.

    b. FIR No. 558 dated 09.09.2023, under Sections 307, 506, 34
    IPC, P.S. City Bhiwani, which is pending adjudication.

    16. In view of the aforementioned facts and circumstances, I find no

    merit in the present petition and the same stands dismissed.

    17. The pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of

    accordingly.

    (JASJIT SINGH BEDI)
    JUDGE
    April 17, 2026
    sukhpreet
    Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No
    Whether reportable :- Yes

    SUKHPREET KAUR
    2026.04.17 06:03
    I attest to the accuracy and
    integrity of this document
    chandigarh

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