Aristo Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Limited vs Manorma Jha, on 20 April, 2026

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    Patna High Court – Orders

    Aristo Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Limited vs Manorma Jha, on 20 April, 2026

                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
                                           CIVIL REVISION No.142 of 2025
                     ======================================================
                     Aristo Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Limited having its Regd. Office at 23A, Shah
                     Industrial Estate, Off Veera Desai Road, Andheri (West), Mumbai 400053 and
                     having its Patna Office at Shashi Lane, S.P. Verma Road, Post G.P.O, P.S.
                     Gandhi Maidan, Town and District Patna represented through its Branch
                     Manager Prashuram Roy, Male, aged about 74 Years, son of Late Triveni Roy,
                     resident of S.P. Verma Road, Patna P.S. Gandhi Maidan, Town and District
                     Patna-800001.
    
                                                                                 ... ... Petitioner/s
                                                         Versus
               1.    Manorma Jha, wife of late Amrendra Jha. resident of Plot No. 20B,
                     Patliputra Colony, P.O and P.S. Patliputra, Town and District Patna-800813.
               2.    Saket Kumar Jha, son of late Amrendra Jha. resident of Plot No. 20B,
                     Patliputra Colony, P.O and P.S. Patliputra, Town and District Patna-800813.
               3.    Rakesh Kumar Jha, son of Late Amrendra Jha. resident of Plot No. 20B,
                     Patliputra Colony, P.O and P.S. Patliputra, Town and District Patna-800813.
    
                                                               ... ... Respondent/s
                     ======================================================
                     Appearance :
                     For the Petitioner/s   :       Mr. Lovekush Kumar, Advocate
                     For the Respondent/s   :       Mr. Jitendra Pd. Singh, Sr. Advocate
                                                    Mr. Varun Krishna Singh, Advocate
                     ======================================================
                     CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAMESH CHAND
                     MALVIYA
                                            CAV ORDER
    
    7   20-04-2026

    Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned

    counsel for the opposite party.

    SPONSORED

    2. The civil revision application no. 142 of 2025 has

    been preferred under the proviso to Section 14(8) of the Bihar

    Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (as

    amended in 1982) (Hereinafter referred to as “the BBC Act”)

    against the judgment and decree dated 13.05.2025 passed by

    learned Civil Judge, Junior Division-III, Patna Sadar(hereinafter

    referred to as “Trial Court”) in Eviction Suit No. 69 of 2015
    Patna High Court C.R. No.142 of 2025(7) dt.20-04-2026
    2/16

    whereby and where under the learned trial court decreed the

    eviction suit filed under Section 11(1)(c) read with Section 14 of

    the BBC Act. The learned Trial Court directed the

    petitioner/defendant to vacate and hand over vacant physical

    possession of the suit premises. The suit premises constitute the

    entire first floor of the old block at Plot No. 20B, Patliputra

    Colony, Patna.

    3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the suit

    premises form part of a double-storeyed building situated at Plot

    No. 20B, Patliputra Colony, Patna, owned by the plaintiffs, who

    are the widow of Late Amrendra Jha and his two sons. The

    ground floor comprises the eastern half in occupation of the

    plaintiffs themselves, consisting of one hall, two bedrooms, one

    drawing room, dining space, two bathrooms, and one kitchen,

    the western half of the house comprises two separate tenanted

    units measuring 850 sq. ft. and 360 sq. ft. respectively. On the

    first floor, the suit premises constitute the largest block under

    the tenancy of the petitioner since 01.06.2003, initially through

    successive registered lease deeds for 11 months each, with the

    last unregistered lease deed dated 11.07.2009 for a period of

    three years expiring on 30.07.2012, rendering the tenancy

    month-to-month thereafter upon service of notice of termination.
    Patna High Court C.R. No.142 of 2025(7) dt.20-04-2026
    3/16

    4. Further, Plaintiff No. 1 had earlier instituted

    Eviction Suit No. 73 of 2012 before the court of Sub Judge-I,

    Patna Sadar, impleading the petitioner/defendant, its Patna

    branch, and Prashuram Roy as defendants, seeking eviction inter

    alia on the grounds of expiry of lease period and a general

    averment of “bonafide personal necessity” as pleaded in

    paragraphs 9 and 12 of the plaint thereof (Ext. A), without

    specifying the nature thereof. Concomitantly, amid alleged

    threats of forceful dispossession by the plaintiffs or their

    associates, the petitioner had filed Title Suit No. 448 of 2012

    seeking perpetual injunction against such eviction.

    5. Subsequently, all three plaintiffs filed the present

    Eviction Suit under Section 11(1)(c) read with Section 14 of the

    BBC Act before the learned Trial Court, specifically pleading

    that plaintiff No. 2, a Senior Analyst employed with Major and

    Minor Exims Pvt. Ltd. and residing outside Patna with his wife

    and two grown-up daughters. He had decided to establish his

    base and head office at Patna for operating as a market analyst,

    with the ground floor portion in the plaintiffs’ occupation being

    most suitable for setting up the office and laboratory. The suit

    premises were reasonably and bonafide required for residential

    accommodation of plaintiff No. 2 and his family to enable them
    Patna High Court C.R. No.142 of 2025(7) dt.20-04-2026
    4/16

    to reside jointly with the aged plaintiff No. 1 and no other

    suitable alternative accommodation was available with the

    plaintiffs. The requirement could not be substantially fulfilled by

    partial eviction of the suit premises. The earlier Suit No. 73 of

    2012 was not being pursued owing to subsequent developments

    necessitating the present action under the summary procedure.

    6. The petitioner/defendant filed its written statement

    on 21.09.2015, inter alia contending that the tenancy was

    month-to-month after the unregistered lease denied they pleaded

    personal necessity as sham and motivated alleging availability

    of ample alternative spaces including the plaintiffs’ own ground

    floor portion and a recently vacated unit on the first floor (about

    one year prior to suit). Petitioner/defendant also highlighted the

    inconsistency between the general plea in Ext. A and the specific

    necessity now urged, evincing malafides and referring to the

    threats prompting Title Suit No. 448 of 2012.

    7. The learned Trial Court has examined the pleadings

    as well as oral and documentary evidence of both plaintiffs and

    defendants and framed seven issues which are as follows:

                                        I.    Whether the plaintiffs prove that the
                                        defendant is their tenant in respect of the
                                        suit premises as described in Schedule-I of
                                        the plaint?
                                        II.    Whether the plaintiffs prove that they
    

    Patna High Court C.R. No.142 of 2025(7) dt.20-04-2026
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    require the suit premises reasonably and in
    good faith for their own occupation?

    III. Whether the plaintiffs prove that they
    have no other reasonable suitable
    accommodation?

    IV. Whether the plaintiffs prove that their
    requirement cannot be satisfied by partial
    eviction of the suit premises?

    V. Whether the defendant proves that the
    plaintiffs had threatened to evict the
    defendant forcibly from the suit premises?

    VI. Whether the defendant is liable to be
    evicted from the suit premises?

    VII. To what relief, if any, the plaintiffs are
    entitled?

    The plaintiffs adduced evidence through PW-1 (Manorma Jha),

    PW-2 (Rakesh Kumar Jha), PW-3 (Saket Kumar Jha), and Ext.1

    (project report filed on 11.01.2016) which details about the

    proposed office/lab setup. The petitioner examined DW-1 to

    DW-7 including Prashuram Roy as DW-2. The petitioner relied

    on Ext. A. The trial court decreed the suit vide the impugned

    judgment after due appreciation of evidence.

    8. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently

    assailed the impugned judgment and decree as vitiated by

    material irregularities and perversity warranting revisional

    interference. It was further submitted that the learned Trial Court

    had merely reproduced the oral evidence of PW-1 to PW-3 and
    Patna High Court C.R. No.142 of 2025(7) dt.20-04-2026
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    DW-1 to DW-7 in paragraphs of the judgment without any

    meaningful analysis or reasoned application thereof to the issues

    framed, thereby failing to discharge its primary duty under

    Order XX Rule 1 and Order XLI Rule 31 of the CPC by way of

    analogy, occasioning failure of justice. Further he submitted that

    reliance on Ext.1 (project report) filed belatedly on 11.01.2016

    long after institution of the suit was wholly erroneous as the

    same was not contemporaneous with the plaint averments and

    ought to have been eschewed as an afterthought.

    8.i. He Further submitted that the learned Trial Court

    was stated to have completely overlooked Ext. A (the plaint of

    Eviction Suit No. 73 of 2012) wherein no whisper of the specific

    necessity which is now pleaded was made, with only a bald

    reference to “personal necessity” in paragraphs 9 and 12 thereof,

    thereby exposing the malafide intent of the plaintiffs in

    fabricating a subsequent necessity to circumvent the earlier

    litigation. He also submitted that the threats issued to the

    petitioner’s representatives, culminating in Title Suit No. 448 of

    2012 have been ignored, further buttressing the malafides.

    Learned counsel for petitioner lastly submitted that the

    availability of alternative accommodations, including the

    plaintiffs’ ground floor portion lying partly vacant and the
    Patna High Court C.R. No.142 of 2025(7) dt.20-04-2026
    7/16

    recently vacated first-floor unit, rendered the pleaded necessity

    unreasonable and unworthy of credence. In sum, it was prayed

    that the decree be set aside, the suit be dismissed and the

    petitioner be granted consequential reliefs.

    9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the opposite

    parties submitted that the revision was assailed as non-

    maintainable in limine for want of locus standi on the part of

    Prashuram Roy, who filed it purportedly as Branch Manager

    without annexing any board resolution or authorization letter

    from the petitioner-company especially when his own deposition

    as DW2 revealed retirement in January 2018 rendering the filing

    a nullity. He placed reliance on State Bank of Travancore v.

    Kingston Computer India Pvt. Ltd. [(2011) 11 SCC 524]

    (paragraphs 8 to 14), in which Apex Court has held that “in

    absence of resolution by the Board of Director delegating power

    to authorize another person to file a suit on behalf of Company

    was nothing but scrape of paper because of the fact that

    authority letter was filed in the aforesaid case.” In the present

    case authority letter as well as resolution of the Board has not

    been filed by the Defendant to contest the suit or to file the civil

    revision. He further placed reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble

    Delhi High Court in a case of MS Nibro Limited v. National
    Patna High Court C.R. No.142 of 2025(7) dt.20-04-2026
    8/16

    Insurance Company [AIR 1991 Delhi 25] (paragraphs 23 and

    25) that Order 29 Rule-1 of the C.P.C. does not authorize person

    mentioned therein to institute suits on behalf of the Corporation,

    thus unless a power to institute a suit is specifically conferred on

    a particular Director, he has no authority to institute a suit on

    behalf of the Company Needless to say that such a power can be

    conferred by the Board of Directors only by passing a resolution

    in that regard.

    9.i. He submitted that the learned Trial Court had

    meticulously appreciated the evidence in paragraphs 10-17, 30,

    and 31 of the judgment, rightly holding the personal necessity

    bonafide and reasonable on the strength of consistent

    testimonies of PW1 to PW3 corroborated by Ext.1, which

    detailed the lab/office requirements. Learned counsel for the

    opposite parties relied upon Kanhaiya Lal Arya v. Md. Ehshan,

    Civil Appeal No. 3222 of 2025 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has

    held that Landlord is the best judge to decide which of his

    property should be vacated for satisfying his need and the tenant

    has no role in dictating as to which premises the landlord should

    get vacated for the need alleged in the suit for eviction and

    therefore claim of the defendant/ tenant to raise objection about

    the other available premises is not sustainable in the eyes of
    Patna High Court C.R. No.142 of 2025(7) dt.20-04-2026
    9/16

    law.

    9.ii. He lastly submitted that the earlier Eviction Suit

    No. 73 of 2012 was expressly withdrawn upon subsequent

    developments, as pleaded and accepted. Partial eviction was

    inapplicable as the petitioner had secured alternate

    accommodation, the need was for the entire block and the

    expedited disposal pursuant to Civil Misc. Case No. 1211 of

    2023 (disposed 04.01.2024) underscored no dilatory tactics. The

    revision was thus prayed to be dismissed with heavy costs, and

    vacation directed forthwith.

    10. After due consideration of the pleadings of the

    parties, the issues framed for adjudication, and the oral as well

    as documentary evidence adduced on behalf of both sides, and

    upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial

    Court, by judgment dated 13.05.2025 passed in Eviction Suit

    No. 69 of 2015, was pleased to allow the suit.

    11. The learned trial Court recorded a categorical

    finding that the plaintiffs/opposite parties is the owner and

    landlord of the suit premises and that the relationship of landlord

    and tenant between the parties stands admitted. It was further

    held that the rate of monthly rent and the occupation of the

    petitioners as a tenant in the suit premises were not in dispute.
    Patna High Court C.R. No.142 of 2025(7) dt.20-04-2026
    10/16

    The learned trial Court, upon appreciation of the evidence on

    record, accepted the case of the plaintiffs/opposite parties that

    the suit premises is reasonably and bonafide required for their

    own use and occupation. The learned Trial Court further

    accepted the evidence that the son of the plaintiffs/opposite

    party (Plaintiff No. 2) need to start a separate business in the suit

    premises and that the location of the suit premises is suitable for

    such purpose.

    12. Upon an overall appreciation of the pleadings,

    evidence and material available on record, the learned Trial

    Court concluded that the plaintiffs/opposite parties had

    successfully established their entitlement to a decree of eviction

    under Section 11(1)(c) of the BBC Act, 1982. Consequently, the

    suit was decreed on contest in favour of the plaintiffs/opposite

    parties and against the defendants/petitioners. The petitioners

    were directed to vacate the suit premises Plot no. 20B within a

    period of sixty days from the date of the judgment, failing which

    the plaintiffs/opposite parties was granted liberty to obtain

    eviction of the petitioners through the process of the Court

    13. At the outset, it is necessary to reiterate that the

    scope of revisional jurisdiction under the said provision is

    extremely limited as the present Civil Revision has been
    Patna High Court C.R. No.142 of 2025(7) dt.20-04-2026
    11/16

    preferred under Section 14 (8) of the BBC Act, 1982. The

    revisional Court does not sit as a Court of appeal and cannot

    reappreciate evidence merely because a different view is

    possible. Interference is permissible only when the findings of

    the learned trial Court are shown to be perverse, based on no

    evidence, or suffering from jurisdictional error. The legal

    position in this regard stands conclusively settled by the

    Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hindustan

    Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh (supra). In

    paragraph 43, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:

    “The revisional court does not have the
    power to re-appreciate evidence. The
    jurisdiction is confined to examine whether
    the findings of fact recorded by the court
    below are according to law and do not
    suffer from perversity or jurisdictional
    error.”

    In the present case, the learned trial Court has framed specific

    issues, appreciated oral and documentary evidence adduced by

    both sides, and gave reasoned findings. No perversity or

    jurisdictional error has been demonstrated warranting

    interference.

    14. Coming to the core issue of bonafide personal

    necessity, the law is well settled that the landlord is the best

    judge of his requirement, and the Court cannot substitute its own
    Patna High Court C.R. No.142 of 2025(7) dt.20-04-2026
    12/16

    wisdom for that of the landlord. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in

    Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. v. Vimalabai Prabhulal,

    reported in (2005) 8 SCC 252, held in paragraph 15 that:

    “It is always the prerogative of the landlord
    to decide how and in what manner he
    should live or conduct his business. The
    tenant cannot dictate the terms to the
    landlord.”

    15. The learned trial Court, upon appreciation of

    evidence, accepted this requirement as genuine and bonafide.

    The nature and test of bonafide requirement have been

    elaborately explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shiv

    Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, reported in

    (1999)6SCC 222, paragraph 11 observed that:

    “The requirement of the landlord must be
    honest, genuine and conceived in good
    faith. It need not be a dire necessity but
    must be a real and sincere need.” Applying
    the above test, the learned Trial Court has
    rightly concluded that the respondents’ need
    is honest and real, and not a mere pretext
    for eviction.

    Applying the above test, the learned Trial Court has rightly

    concluded that the opposite parties’ need is honest and real, and

    not a mere pretext for eviction.

    16. On the core issue of bonafide and reasonable

    personal necessity, the law gives primacy to the landlord’s
    Patna High Court C.R. No.142 of 2025(7) dt.20-04-2026
    13/16

    assessment of his own need. In Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan,

    reported in (1996) 5 SCC 353, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

    categorically held in paragraph 2 that the landlord is the best

    judge of his residential requirement and the tenant cannot

    dictate the manner of his living. Further, in Ramashray Singh v.

    Bindeshwari Prasad, reported in 2009 (3) PLJR 91, paragraph

    10, it was held that requirement of premises for dependent

    family members is a legitimate and bonafide requirement.

    17. The contention for partial eviction has been

    consistently followed by co-ordinate bench of this Court in

    PLJR 2005 (3) 719, PLJR 2013 (2) 491, PLJR 2005 (3) 19,

    and PLJR 2016 (4) 20, wherein it has been held that the plea of

    partial eviction must be specifically pleaded and proved by the

    tenant and cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time at

    the revisional stage. With regard to the existence of cause of

    action, it is settled law that cause of action is not confined to a

    single event but consists of a bundle of facts which may arise at

    different stages. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.B.C.

    Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies, reported in (1989) 2 SCC

    163, held in paragraph 12 that cause of action comprises all

    those facts which the plaintiff must prove to obtain relief and

    may arise partly at one place and partly at another.
    Patna High Court C.R. No.142 of 2025(7) dt.20-04-2026
    14/16

    18. Further, in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assistant

    Charity Commissioner, reported in (2004) 3 SCC 137, the

    Supreme Court held in paragraph 15 that the cause of action

    crystallizes when the right to sue accrues, particularly upon

    termination of the legal relationship. Applying this principle, the

    co-ordinate bench of this Court in Ram Prasad v. Sita Ram,

    reported in 1998 (2) PLJR 12, held in paragraph 7 that issuance

    of a notice terminating tenancy furnishes a fresh and valid cause

    of action for eviction. From the aforesaid principles it is clear

    that the finding of the learned Trial Court that the opposite

    parties had a valid and continuing cause of action.

    19. The contention raised by the learned counsel for

    the petitioner relating to the personal need of the Respondent’s

    son, wherein it is well settled principle laid down by Hon’ble

    Supreme Court in Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava, reported

    in (2001) 2 SCC 604, held in paragraph 10: “Subsequent events

    which strengthen the bona fide requirement of the landlord can

    be taken into consideration.” In the present case, the primary

    ground of eviction remains the personal necessity of the

    opposite parties

    20. Upon an overall consideration of the pleadings,

    evidence, and settled principles of law, this Court finds that the
    Patna High Court C.R. No.142 of 2025(7) dt.20-04-2026
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    learned trial Court has exercised its jurisdiction properly, applied

    the correct legal tests, and recorded findings supported by

    evidence. The impugned judgment does not suffer from any

    illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional infirmity so as to warrant

    interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

    21. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is

    of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court has

    correctly appreciated the pleadings, evidence and the settled

    principles of law governing eviction on the ground of bonafide

    personal necessity under Section 11 (1) (c) of the BBC Act,

    1982. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court

    regarding the existence of landlord-tenant relationship, the

    bonafide and reasonable requirement of the opposite parties for

    the suit premises, and the non-feasibility of partial eviction are

    based on cogent evidence and do not suffer from any perversity,

    illegality or jurisdictional error.

    22. This Court further finds that the scope of

    interference under Section 14 (8) of the BBC. Act is limited, and

    the present Civil Revision does not disclose any ground

    warranting interference with the well-reasoned judgment and

    decree dated 13.05.2025 passed in Eviction Suit No. 69 of 2015.

    The contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner are devoid of
    Patna High Court C.R. No.142 of 2025(7) dt.20-04-2026
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    merit and do not persuade this Court to take a different view.

    Accordingly, the present Civil Revision No. 142 of 2025 is

    dismissed. The judgment and decree 13.05.2025 passed by

    learned Civil Judge, Junior Division-III, Patna Sadar in Eviction

    Suit No. 69 of 2015 are hereby affirmed and pending IA with

    regard to the civil revision no. 142 of 2025 is also disposed off.

    23. The petitioner/defendant is directed to vacate and

    hand over peaceful possession of the suit premises, as described

    in the plaint, to the opposite parties/plaintiffs within a period of

    sixty (60) days from passing of the order of this Court otherwise

    opposite parties will have right to vacate the suit premise as per

    process of law.

    (Ramesh Chand Malviya, J)
    Mayank/-

    U

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