Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
State Of Raj. And Ors vs Lrs Of Askaran Singh And Ors. … on 13 April, 2026
[2026:RJ-JD:18018]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Review Petition (Writ) No. 55/2014
1. State of Rajasthan through the Secretary, Local Self
Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur.
2. The Secretary, Revenue, Colonization and Soldiers Welfare
Department
3. The District Collector (Land records), District Barmer
4. The Tehsildar, District Barmer
----Petitioners
Versus
1. Legal Representatives of Askaran Singh, aged about 80 years,
S/o Late Shri Ram Singh, by caste Rajput, resident of Ward No.
33, Shivkar House, Sardarpura, Barmer
1A. Smt. Sugan Kanwar aged about 75 years W/o Lae Shri
Askaran Singh
1B. Bhagirath Singh, aged about 58 years S/o Late Shri Askaran
Singh
1C. Prithvi Singh aged about 56 years S/o Late Shri Askaran
Singh
All resident of Ward No. 33, Shivkar House, Sardarpura, Barmer
2. Padam Singh aged about 72 years, S/o Late Shri Ram Singh
by Cate Rajpur, resident of Ward No. 33, Shivkar House,
Sardarpura, Barmer
3. Mokam Singh aged about 69 years, S/o Late Shri Ram Singh
by Cate Rajpur, resident of Ward No. 33, Shivkar House,
Sardarpura, Barmer
4. Municipal Board, Barmer through its, Commissioner.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ayush Gehlot
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ravi Bhansali Sr.Adv. assisted by
Mr. Usman Gani.
Mr. Vineet Dave
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEET PUROHIT
Judgment
13/04/2026
1. Date of Conclusion of arguments :: 17.03.2026
2. Date on which judgment was reserved :: 17.03.2026
3. Whether the full judgment or only the
operative part is pronounced :: Full Judgment
4. Date of pronouncement :: 13.04.2026
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1. Present review petition has been preferred by State of
Rajasthan (“review petitioner”) under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, seeking
review / recall of order dated 04.01.2013 passed by this Court in
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11943/2010, whereby, on the basis of
specific averments and admission made in reply filed by
respondent No. 4 – Municipal Board, Barmer, writ petition was
disposed of while directing said respondent to pay compensation
to writ petitioner at the rate of reserved price of Rs.400/- per sq.
feet along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the
date of filing of writ petition.
2. Learned counsel for review petitioner stated that challenging
said judgment dated 04.01.2013, D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ)
No. 369/2014 was filed, primarily on the ground that said
judgment was passed on the basis of concession made by counsel
for appellant, though he did not had instructions to that effect.
However, Hon’ble Division Bench observed that it would be
expedient for appellant – review petitioner to file an application for
review against said judgment dated 04.01.2013. Thus, while
closing said appeal, liberty was granted for filing of review
petition.
Hence, present review petition has been filed before this
Court, along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act seeking condonation of delay of 439 days.
3. Before proceeding with merits of review petition, heard
learned counsel for the parties upon application seeking
condonation of delay.
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4. Learned counsel for review petitioner stated that after
passing of judgment dated 01.04.2013, relevant file was obtained
from Municipal Board in May 2013, legal opinion was taken in the
month of October 2013, and final decision of filing special appeal
was taken in the month of December 2013 and special appeal was
filed on 04.02.2014. It was stated that after order dated
28.02.2014 passed by Hon’ble Division Bench, present review
petition was filed.
4.1 Learned counsel for review petitioner submitted that delay
caused in filing instant review petition is bonafide and that review
petition has been filed promptly, pursuant to liberty granted by
Hon’ble Division Bench, and thus, requested for condonation of
delay.
4.2 Per contra, learned counsel for respondents submitted that
special appeal was filed after a lapse of more than 1 year, i.e. on
04.02.2014 and no sufficient reason for said delay has been
explained by review petitioner. It is contended that day-to-day
delay was required to be explained and such casual explanations
of procedural and administrative nature are wholly inadequate to
justify inordinate delay of 439 days.
4.3 This Court duly considered submissions made at Bar. Though
it is found that impugned order dated 04.01.2013 was challenged
before Hon’ble Division Bench after a lapse of more than 1 year,
however, the same only amounts to delayed filing of Special
Appeal (Writ). However, once said special appeal was entertained
by Hon’ble Division Bench and liberty was granted to file present
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review petition, this Court finds it justified to condone delay of 439
days and to adjudicate present review petition on its merits.
4.4 In view of aforesaid reasons, delay caused in filing present
review petition is hereby condoned.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties upon merits of review
petition.
6. Controversy involved in original writ petition related to land
ad-measuring 2 bighas and 18 biswas, comprising in Khasra No.
1665/5/2 (“land in question”), said to be owned and possessed by
original writ petitioners, i.e. legal representatives of late Shri
Askaran Singh. It was contended in writ petition that Municipal
Board, Barmer had encroached upon land in question and included
/ utilized the same for development of a housing colony without
undertaking any formal acquisition proceedings and without
payment of compensation to the writ petitioners.
6.1 Writ petitioners challenged auction notice dated 05.12.2010
and in the alternative, petitioners prayed for directions to be
issued to Municipal Board, Barmer to pay compensation to
petitioners in lieu of land encroached upon by the Board.
6.2 A reply to writ petition was filed on behalf of Municipal
Board, Barmer, admitting that land of petitioner was taken over
for residential project and that auction notice was issued for sale
of said land for residential / commercial purposes. It is clearly
stated in the reply that Municipal Board is ready to pay
compensation to petitioners in lieu of the land in question at the
reserved price of Rs. 400/- per sq. feet.
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6.3 Review petitioner – State of Rajasthan, however, did not
actively contested the writ petition and rather stated in its reply
that petition was not maintainable qua State of Rajasthan.
6.4 This Court, while relying upon the admission on the part of
respondent Municipal Board as mentioned in its reply, vide
judgment dated 04.01.2013, disposed of the writ petition and
directed Municipal Board to pay compensation at the rate of
reserved price of Rs. 400/-per sq. feet alongwith 6% interest per
annum from the date of filing of writ petition.
6.5 By way of instant review petition, State of Rajasthan –
review petitioner prays for review / recall of said judgment dated
04.01.2013.
7. Learned counsel for review petitioner submitted that said
judgment dated 04.01.2013 suffers from an error apparent on the
face of record inasmuch as the same is based solely upon an
unauthorized concession made on behalf of the Municipal Board as
well as by the learned counsel representing Municipal Board before
this Court. It was contended that the then Executive Officer had
no authority to agree for payment of compensation to writ
petitioners @ Rs. 400/- per sq. feet or interest thereon.
7.1 Learned counsel argued that no resolution of Municipal Board
was passed to authorize such concession in that regard and
therefore, concession so recorded is absolutely illegal.
7.2 It was further submitted that the original writ petition
involved several disputed questions of fact relating to title and
measurement of land in question, which could not have been
adjudicated upon by the Writ Court. It was also contended that
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even fixation of compensation at the rate of Rs. 400/- per sq. feet
was not based upon any objective criteria or valuation. Learned
counsel submitted that said unauthorized concession had imposed
substantial financial liability upon Municipal Board, Barmer, and, in
turn, upon the public exchequer. Therefore, impugned order dated
04.01.2013 is liable to be reviewed.
8. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel Mr. Ravi Bhansali,
appearing for respondents – writ petitioners, vehemently opposed
review petition and also raised preliminary objections regarding
maintainability of review petition at the instance of the State and
submitted that no direction as such was issued against State of
Rajasthan thus, State of Rajasthan cannot be said to be an
aggrieved party thereby. It was also contended that since the
State had chosen, not to contest the original writ petition, it lacks
locus standi to seek review of impugned order.
8.1 On merits, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that scope of
review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC is extremely narrow and
strictly confined to instances where the error is apparent on the
face of record. Whereas, by way of present review petition, review
petitioner has attempted to introduce entirely new set of facts and
arguments, which were not raised at the time of adjudication of
original writ petition and the same is impermissible in view of the
settled position of law.
It was contended that by way of additional affidavit, various
new documents and subsequent events have been sought to be
brought on record, to set up an entirely fresh case, and the same
cannot be considered in review proceedings. It was also stated
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that even respondent Municipal Board has now taken a stand
contrary to the stand taken in its reply to original writ petition, a
shift that is not permissible under law.
To substantiate these arguments, learned counsel has placed
reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed
in the cases of Inderchand Jain Vs. Motilal, (2009) 14 SCC
663; S. Murali Sundaram Vs. Jothibai Kannan & Ors.,
(2023) 13 SCC 515; Malleswari Vs. K. Suguna & Anr., 2025
INSC 1080; Collector of 24 Parganas & Ors. Vs. Lalith
Mohan Mullick & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 2121; Union of India Vs.
Paul Monickam, AIR 2003 SC 4622; and Avinash Hansraj
Vs. Official Liquidator, AIR 2006 SC 1317.
8.2 Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that impugned
order was passed based on a clear, categorical stand taken by
Municipal Board and mentioned in its reply, rather than any
inadvertent or erroneous concession. It was contended that reply
was filed by the then Executive Officer, while acting as authorized
Officer-in-Charge, which was considered by this Court; therefore,
the order cannot be assailed as being based on an unauthorized
concession.
8.3 Learned Senior Counsel further stated that land of
petitioners was admittedly encroached upon without lawful
acquisition and the compensation agreed upon was based on the
reserved price fixed by Municipal Board for the purposes of auction
of said piece of land, therefore, no error was committed in
directing payment of compensation at said specific rate.
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8.4 It was also submitted that the factum of encroachment by
the Board was duly established through proceedings conducted by
District Administration. Learned Counsel argued that rights of writ
petitioners to get compensation have already crystallized pursuant
to order dated 04.01.2013 and cannot be unsettled at this belated
stage through review proceedings.
9. I have duly considered the submissions made at Bar and
have perused the material available on record.
10. Learned counsel for the respondent – writ petitioners has
questioned locus standi of State of Rajasthan for seeking review of
judgment dated 04.01.2013 on the ground that the State, despite
being a respondent in original writ petition, had chosen not to
contest the matter and had expressly pleaded in its reply that the
petition was not maintainable qua the State, thus, present review
petition on behalf of State of Rajasthan is not maintainable.
10.1 To deal with said objection, this Court has considered specific
averments made in this regard in paras 31-34 of reply filed on
behalf of State of Rajasthan. The same is reproduced herein
below:-
“31-34. That in reply to the averments made in para
nos. 31 to 34 of the writ petition, it is respectfully submitted
that the act, action and proceedings drawn by the present
answering respondents are perfectly legal, valid, justified
and in accordance with the law, governing the field. The
petitioners have not impugned any of the act, action
or order passed by the present answering
respondents, nor any prayer qua the present
answering respondents have been made. In this view
of the matter, present writ petition preferred by the
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[2026:RJ-JD:18018] (9 of 23) [WRW-55/2014]eyes of law qua the present answering respondents
on any of the grounds mentioned in the memo of the
writ petition and the same deserves dismissal by this
Hon’ble Court qua the present answering
respondents.”
10.2 In view of aforesaid averments, this Court is of considered
opinion that State of Rajasthan had taken a categorical stand that
writ petition was not maintainable against it since neither any
action of the State was challenged nor was any relief claimed
against it. Thus, the State had thereby declared its status as
neither a necessary nor a proper party to the litigation. Having
effectively disclaimed any interest in the adjudication, the State
has now challenged the order without assigning any justifiable
cause.
10.3 Once the State took categorical stand that it had no role in
the adjudication of original writ petition and chosen not to contest
the petition, no cause of action can be said to be arisen in its favor
to challenge the order dated 04.01.2013. State’s current stand is
self-contradictory and its shifting stance and also to resile from its
own status in the writ petition, that to while raising entirely new
pleas and averments in the review petition, which is not
permissible in the eyes of law. Such action of State of Rajasthan
is, therefore, deprecated in strong terms.
10.4 However, in view of the fact that liberty for filing review
petition was granted by Hon’ble Division Bench and even while
deciding the D.B. Special Appeal No. 1218/2013 filed by
Municipal Board – Barmer, Hon’ble Division Bench, vide order
dated 29.01.2016 has granted liberty to Municipal Board, Barmer
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to contest its claim in the present review petition, this Court
deems it appropriate to decide the matter on merits.
11. Learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioners also
contended that review petitioner had made false and misleading
statements before Hon’ble Division Bench, which laid to grant of
liberty by Hon’ble Division Bench.
11.1 It was submitted that that false statement has been made
by the review petitioner before Hon’ble Division Bench that order
dated 04.01.2013 was passed solely on the basis of concession
made by ‘counsel for appellant’, who did not have any instructions
in that respect. Whereas original writ petition was not decided on
the basis of the concession given by ‘counsel for the appellant’,
rather it was adjudicated based on the categorical averments
contained in the reply filed by the Municipal Board, wherein the
Board expressly agreed to pay compensation to writ petitioners at
the rate of Rs.400/- per sq. feet. The only concession recorded of
the counsel was relating to payment of interest.
11.2 On perusal of order under review dated 04.01.2013, this
Court finds that in para 3 of said judgment, learned Single Judge
took note of the admissions made in the reply of Municipal Board
and recorded the readiness of the Board to pay compensation to
writ petitioners accordingly. Relevant portions of said reply are
reproduced herein below: –
“30. That the contention raised in para 30 of the writ
petition is admitted and the answering respondent is ready
to pay reserved price to the tune of Rs.400/- per square
feet.
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31. …So far the matter pertains to price of the disputed
land is concerned the answering respondent is ready to pay
reserved price to the tune of Rs.400/- sq. ft.
32. …despite of it the answering respondent is ready to
pay the reserved price at the tune of Rs.400/- but the
petitioner is determined to get market price.”
11.3 This Court finds force in the objection of the respondents –
writ petitioners that direction for payment of compensation at the
reserved price was passed by this Court based on the written
pleadings of the Board itself and not merely on the basis of
concession made by counsel representing appellant – State of
Rajasthan. As a matter of fact, the appellant therein has not
chosen to contest the writ petition and the counsel for State of
Rajasthan was not even present at the time judgment dated
04.01.2013 being passed by the Court.
12. Considering the grounds raised in the present review
petition, it is found that the same is based on sole premise that
the then – Executive Officer of the Municipal Board lacked the
authority to concede that the Municipal Board was ready to pay
compensation at the reserved price. It is argued that no formal
resolution was passed by the Board to this effect and, therefore,
the stance taken by Executive Officer in the reply was
unauthorized and also detrimental to the interests of the Board.
12.1 In the considered opinion of this Court, the then Executive
Officer was acting as duly appointed Officer-in-charge on behalf of
the Board and was legally competent to file reply in the matter. It
can also be safely presumed that said reply was filed after proper
administrative review and legal vetting. In this background, the
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contention of the State that averments in the reply were made
without authorization is not acceptable.
12.2 Although the review petitioner has leveled serious allegations
against the then – Executive Officer for making unauthorized
concession resulting in causing financial loss to the Municipal
Board, however, no substantial proof has been produced to show
that any definitive action was taken against the said so-called
erring official.
Notably, even on earlier occasion, Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court had specifically directed review petitioner to apprise the
Court regarding any action being taken against said government
official, i.e., the then Executive Officer. However, apart from
issuance of show cause notice to said officer, the State has failed
to place on record any document establishing a concluded inquiry
or consequential punishment to the said officer.
12.3 During the course of arguments, a specific query was raised
to the counsel for review petitioner regarding action being taken
against the said officer, to which it is stated that an FIR was
lodged against the official in the year 2020. However, the State
could not offer any justification for the inordinate delay in filing
said FIR (seven years after the original order), nor could counsel
apprise the Court of its outcome.
12.4 This Court is of the considered opinion that such a casual and
lackadaisical approach cannot be permitted to be sustained, nor
can it constitute a valid ground for review of a judgment delivered
after a holistic consideration of specific pleadings of the parties
and record of the case. If on such grounds, indulgence in review
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proceedings is allowed to be extended, it would open floodgates
for filing of review petitions merely on the basis of so-called
initiation of subsequent inquiries or on the strength of subsequent
documents, which would frustrate adjudications already made by
a Court of law on the basis of material available on record. Such a
course would seriously undermine the sanctity and finality of
judicial proceedings.
13. It is a settled position of law that the scope of review is very
limited and that a Civil Court, while exercising its review
jurisdiction, does not sit in appeal over the matter at hand and
cannot undertake a re-hearing of all the issues raised. In this
regard it is appropriate to note observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik (2006) 4
SCC 78, wherein it has been held: –
“The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the
purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a
rehearing “on account of some mistake or error apparent on
the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason”.
The former part of the rule deals with a situation
attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action
which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions
are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of
the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the
aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them
more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court
and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict.”
13.1 Recently, in S. Murali Sundaram (supra), the Hon’ble Apex
Court, while placing reliance upon Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti
Madan Kansagra, (2019) 20 SCC 753, has reiterated the
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principles governing the exercise of the powers of review and has
held thus: –
“17. After considering catena of decisions on exercise of
review powers and principles relating to exercise of review
jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC this Court had
summed upon as under: (Perry Kansagra case, SCC pp.
768-69, para 15.1)“15.1. ’33. … ” … Review proceedings are not by way of
appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope
and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
(ii) Power of review may be exercised when some
mistake or error apparent on the fact of record is
found. But error on the face of record must be such an
error which must strike one on mere looking at the
record and would not require any long−drawn process
of reasoning on the points where there may
conceivably by two opinions.
(iii) Power of review may not be exercised on the
ground that the decision was erroneous on merits.
(iv) Power of review can also be exercised for any
sufficient reason which is wide enough to include a
misconception of fact or law by a court or even an
advocate.
(v) An application for review may be necessitated by
way of invoking the doctrine actus curiae neminem
gravabit.” ‘(As observed in : Inderchand Jain v. Motilal,
(2009) 14 SCC 663, p. 675, para 33)It is further observed in the said decision that an error
which is required to be detected by a process of reasoning
can hardly be said to be an error on the face of the record.”
13.2 In the aforesaid case of S. Murali Sundaram (supra),
reliance was also placed upon the case of Shanti Conductors (P)
Ltd. v. Assam SEB, (2020) 2 SCC 677 and was held as under: –
“18. In the case of Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. (supra), it is
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[2026:RJ-JD:18018] (15 of 23) [WRW-55/2014]1 CPC read with Section 114 CPC is limited and under the
guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to
reagitate and reargue questions which have already been
addressed and decided. It is further observed that an error
which is not self−evident and has to be detected by a
process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error
apparent on the face of record justifying the court to
exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.”
13.3 The latest in this long line of authoritative pronouncements
is the judgment delivered in Malleswari v. K. Suguna & Anr.
(supra), wherein the differences between appellate and review
powers and the limitation on the exercise of the power of review
were summed up as follows: –
“15.1 The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal
and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of
Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC.
15.2 Review is not to be confused with appellate powers,
which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner
of errors committed by the subordinate court.
15.3 In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of
CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be
reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must be
remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed
to be an appeal in disguise.
15.4 The power of review can be exercised for the
correction of a mistake, but not to substitute a view. Such
powers can be exercised within the limits specified in the
statute governing the exercise of power.
15.5 The review court does not sit in appeal over its own
order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible. It
constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a
judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered.
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[2026:RJ-JD:18018] (16 of 23) [WRW-55/2014]Hence, it is invoked only to prevent a miscarriage of justice
or to correct grave and palpable errors.”
14. Considering the factual matrix of the case at hand in light of
aforementioned established legal principles, this Court finds that
impugned judgment was found to be based on specific, categorical
averments contained in the reply filed on behalf of respondent
Municipal Board and no error, much less an error apparent on the
face of record was found in judgment dated 04.01.2013.
Furthermore, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
factum of encroachment upon the land of petitioner without lawful
acquisition was not disputed by any party before the Writ Court,
consequently, the award of compensation was both just and
necessary. So far as quantum of compensation is concerned, the
record reveals that the Municipal Board itself had fixed the
reserved price for the land in question at Rs. 400/- per sq. feet in
its own auction notice. In this light, the direction to pay
compensation based on Board’s own valuation cannot be termed
unjustified, disproportionate, or erroneous. The grant of interest
upon delayed payment of compensation is also well settled and
thus, the judgment under review is found to be justified.
15. Counsel for respondents – writ petitioners also objected that
respondent Municipal Board, Barmer, through its reply and
additional affidavit, has attempted to bring on record several new
facts and has adopted an entirely new stand, which is not
permissible. It is contended that such new pleas cannot be
entertained in a review petition as the same would amount to
rehearing, which is against settled position of law.
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15.1 In response to said contention, it is stated that in a Special
Appeal filed on behalf of Municipal Board, Barmer i.e. D.B.
Special Appeal No. 1218/2013 titled Municipal Board,
Barmer Vs. LR’s of Askaran Singh & Ors., Hon’ble Division
Bench, vide order dated 29.01.2016, granted liberty to the Board
to advance additional facts, and thus, facts stated in additional
affidavit are required to be considered by this Court.
15.2 The stand so taken by the respondent Board is not only
against the law settled in this regard but also against the
directions contained in order dated 29.01.2016. For ready
reference, order dated 29.01.2016 passed by Hon’ble Division
Bench in D.B. Special Appeal No. 1218/2013 is quoted below: –
“The judgment impugned dated 4th of January, 2013 is
subject matter of a review petition preferred by the State of
Rajasthan i.e. S.B. Civil Review Petition No.55/2014,
wherein the present appellant is also a party.
In view of this fact, we deem it appropriate to dispose
of this appeal by keeping the respondent-Municipal
Board at liberty to contest the matter as per its reply
to the writ petition. The appellant shall also be at liberty
to advance additional facts, if necessary, to meet the ends
of justice, subject to all just objections available to the
original petitioner.”
15.3 A perusal of said order dated 29.01.2016 reveals that
Hon’ble Division Bench has granted liberty to respondent Board to
contest in the review petition filed by the State of Rajasthan “as
per its reply to the writ petition”. It is a settled principle that
directions contained in a judicial order cannot be read in isolation,
but they must be considered in the context in which they have
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been issued. Since the liberty granted was to contest the matter
only in terms of reply already filed in writ petition, the Board
cannot now be permitted to adopt a self-contradictory stand or
introduce additional documents which were not produced at the
time of adjudication of original writ petition with a view to set up
entirely new case.
16. Above said observation of this Court also gets support from
the settled position of law that review proceedings cannot be
converted into a re-hearing of original case. Permitting the Board
to raise entirely new arguments at this stage would not only
violate the principles of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC but would also
result in grave miscarriage of justice by unsettling rights that have
already crystallized. It has repeatedly been held that new grounds
cannot be raised while invoking the review jurisdiction. In the case
of Collector of 24 Parganas and Others (supra), Hon’ble
Supreme Court, on the issue of new grounds being raised in
review petition, held as under: –
“So far as this ground is concerned, it was not raised before
this Court when the appeal was heard on merits. It does not
appear to have been raised even before the High Court. The
new ground cannot be taken into consideration for the
purposes of the review application, apart from the fact that
it would also involve investigation of new facts which were
not on record till the point of time when the appeal was
disposed of by this Court on 13-2-1986. We see no reason
to entertain this review petition which accordingly fails and is
dismissed.”
16.1 Similarly, in Union of India v. Paul Monickam (supra),
where the issue related to preventive detention and consideration
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[2026:RJ-JD:18018] (19 of 23) [WRW-55/2014]
of representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, while criticizing the exercise of the review
jurisdiction by the High Court in the matter at hand, held as
follows:
“19. As noted supra, for the first time in the review
application it was disclosed that the representation was
made to the President of India and no representation was
made to the State of Tamil Nadu or the Union of India who
were arrayed in the writ petition as parties. This attempt to
create a deliberate doubt to create confusion and reap an
undeserved benefit by adopting such dubious device. The
High Court also transgressed its jurisdiction in entertaining
the review petition with an entirely new substratum of
issues. Considering the limited scope for review, the High
Court ought not to have taken into account factual aspects
which were not disclosed or were concealed in the writ
petition.”
16.2 Again, in Avinash Hansraj (supra), special appeal was filed
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the order of the
Division Bench of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court refusing to
review its judgment passed in a Company Appeal. Upholding the
judgment of the Division Bench, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed as follows:
“5…Therefore, what was involved in Company Appeal No. 3
of 2002 was only the correctness of that order of the
Company Judge and the Division Bench by its judgment
dated 19-9-2002, found no reason to interfere. The review
was sought by the appellant on the basis of certain
additional material which according to him had relevance
and the Company Judge had found that no ground based on
discovery of new and important matter which after the
exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of
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[2026:RJ-JD:18018] (20 of 23) [WRW-55/2014]when the original order was passed, was made out. This
finding by the Company Judge was affirmed by the Division
Bench in its order dated 19-9-2002. When the appellant
sought a review of that order, as indicated earlier, the
Division Bench considered the conduct of the appellant right
through the proceedings and found that the appellant was
indulging in dilatory tactics just to thwart the order passed
by the Company Judge on the misfeasance application. The
Court also found that there was no ground made out for
reviewing its order dated 19-9-2002. On a consideration of
the relevant aspects, we find that the Division Bench and
the learned Single Judge were both justified in not acceding
to the prayer for review made by the appellant.”
17. In light of foregoing discussion, this Court is of the firm
opinion that subsequent documents cannot be considered during
adjudication of a review petition. Parties cannot be permitted to
shift their stance or resile from positions already adopted in
original proceedings. Given the restricted scope of review
jurisdiction, new facts sought to be introduced by way of reply /
additional affidavit filed by Municipal Board, Barmer, cannot be
taken into consideration by this Court at this stage.
18. The power of review is an extraordinary jurisdiction;
however, it is extremely circumscribed in scope. It is neither a
substitute for an appeal nor a license to re-agitate a matter on its
merits. To permit parties to introduce new documents at this stage
would be tantamount to inviting this Court to disturb adjudications
that have attained finality. Such a course is not only beyond the
review jurisdiction of Courts but also contravenes the Doctrine of
Finality. Interest Reipublicae ut Sit Finis Litium – it is in the
interest of the State that there be an end to litigation. Were every
adjudged cause to be reopened under the guise of review, the
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[2026:RJ-JD:18018] (21 of 23) [WRW-55/2014]
resulting perpetuation of litigation would not only prejudice the
parties but also unnecessarily burden judicial forums and public
resources.
19. Allowing the fresh contentions sought to be raised would
necessarily result in a de novo adjudication of the dispute under
the guise of review, thereby defeating the principle of judicial
finality.
Thus, taken from any stand point, this Court finds that no
case for review of the order dated 04.01.2013 is made out in the
present case.
20. During the pendency of review petition, an application was
filed under Order I Rule 10 CPC by applicants, who identify
themselves as residents of Barmer, seeking impleadment in the
instant review petition.
20.1 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of applicants submitted
that several irregularities were committed in the allotment of land
in question and applicants seek to bring the true state of facts to
the notice of this Court. It was further argued that since issues at
hand concerns financial liability upon the public exchequer, the
applicants, being vigilant citizens, are necessary and proper
parties for final adjudication of the matter.
20.2 Learned counsel for respondents vehemently opposed said
impleadment application and submitted that said application is
wholly frivolous, vexatious and has been filed with an oblique
motive. It was contended that application is stereotyped in nature
and is an attempt to mislead the Court and unnecessarily enlarge
the limited scope of review petition.
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[2026:RJ-JD:18018] (22 of 23) [WRW-55/2014]
20.3 Heard, learned counsel for the parties on said application.
This Court finds that applicants were not parties in original writ
proceedings or the Special Appeal filed by the State Government.
Even present review petition was filed in the year 2014,
application for impleadment was filed after gross delay of seven
years i.e. in the year 2017, for which no sufficient explanation has
been given.
A perusal of application shows that several disputed
questions of facts / allegations are levelled by the applicants,
which cannot be adjudicated by this Court. Core issue involved in
present review petition pertains to the grant of compensation to
writ petitioners for land taken upon by Municipal Board, Barmer,
without lawful acquisition. Consequently, the averments in
impleadment application are extraneous to the specific
controversy currently before this Court. More so, outcome of
present review petition is nowhere going to affect any vested
rights of the applicants. No relief as such has been prayed for
against the applicants, in the writ petition, therefore, the
applicants are neither necessary nor proper parties to the present
review petition.
20.4 This Court is considered opinion that present application is
filed with oblique motives, therefore, application seeking
impleadment as party respondents is hereby dismissed.
21. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
read with Order 22 Rule 10-A CPC, has been filed by respondent –
writ petitioners placing to inform the factum of demise of
respondent no. 2.
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[2026:RJ-JD:18018] (23 of 23) [WRW-55/2014]
21.1 This Court finds that while said application was filed on
26.08.2025, however, review petitioner – State of Rajasthan has
failed to take any steps to bring legal representatives of deceased
respondent no. 2 on record even till date. Consequently, review
petitioner is no longer entitled to pursue present petition against
deceased Respondent No. 2. The review petition to the extent of
respondent no.2 is, therefore, dismissed as abated.
22. As an upshot of above discussion, it is found that original
writ petition was decided on the basis of averments made in the
reply and submissions advanced before the Writ Court.
Notwithstanding the same, present review petition was filed by
State of Rajasthan, which, during adjudication before the Writ
Court, had specifically denied any involvement in the matter. The
pendency of this review petition has only resulted in depriving the
writ petitioners of both their land as well as the compensation
lawfully due to them for over a decade.
23. Accordingly, present review petition, being devoid of any
merit, is hereby dismissed. Impugned order dated 04.01.2013
passed by learned Single Judge is upheld.
(SANJEET PUROHIT),J
39-sumer-praveen/-
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