A disclosure statement U/S 27 of Evidence Act is inadmissible where the place of recovery of the dead body were already known to the police and panch witnesses before the accused’s statement was recorded.

1. Leave granted in SLP (Criminal) Nos. 837 and 1174 of

2024.

2. These appeals challenge the judgment and order dated

2nd January, 2023 passed by the Division Bench of the High

Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal Nos.

194, 232 and 277 of 2013 wherein the Division Bench

dismissed the criminal appeals preferred by the appellants,

namely Ravishankar Tandon (accused No.1), Umend Prasad

Dhrutlahre (accused No.2), Dinesh Chandrakar (accused

No.3) and Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4) and upheld

the order of conviction and sentence dated 5th February, 2013

as recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mungeli

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘trial court’) in Sessions Trial No.

10 of 2012.

3. Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeals

are as under:-

3.1 On 2nd December 2011, Ramavtar (PW-1) lodged a

missing person report being Missing Person Serial No. 10/11

at Police Station Kunda after his son Dharmendra Satnami

(deceased) went missing. While an extensive search was being

conducted, on the basis of suspicion, the police interrogated

the appellants. During the interrogation, the appellants

disclosed that they had strangulated the deceased to death on

the Bhatgaon Canal Road and had thereafter thrown his body

into a pond at Village Bhatgaon. Thereafter, on 3rd December

2011, the police recorded the memorandum statements of

accused Nos.1 to 3 at about 10:00 am, 10:30 am and 11:00

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am, respectively, whereas the memorandum statement of

accused No.4 came to be recorded on 6th December 2011 at

07:00 pm. On the basis of the aforesaid memorandum

statements, the police recovered the dead body of the deceased

from the pond at Bhatgaon on 3rd December 2011 at about

04:05 pm and the dead body was identified. Thereafter, on the

very same day, a First Information Report (‘FIR’ for short) being

No. 402 of 2011 was registered at Police Station Mungeli,

District Bilaspur wherein it is recorded that the aforesaid

offences were committed between the days of 30th November

2011 and 3rd December 2011. According to the Post-Mortem

Report (Ext. P-22), the cause of death of the deceased was

asphyxia due to strangulation and the nature of death was

homicidal.

3.2 The prosecution case stems from the memorandum

statements of the appellants wherein the appellants had

admitted that Dinesh Chandrakar (accused No.3) had

instructed Ravishankar Tandon (accused No.1) and Satyendra

Kumar Patre (accused No.4) to murder the deceased in

exchange for Rs.90,000/-, which was to be paid upon the

execution of the said murder. Upon receiving the aforesaid

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instruction, Ravishankar Tandon (accused No.1) and

Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4) along with Umend

Prasad Dhritalhare (accused No.2) hatched a criminal

conspiracy to kill the deceased and worked out a plan to

execute the same. Accordingly, the aforesaid three accused

persons called the deceased to Mungeli on 30th November 2011

under the ruse of purchasing silver. While Umend Prasad

Dhritalhare (accused No. 2) and Satyendra Kumar Patre

(accused No.4) reached Datgaon which fell within the ambit of

Police Station Mungeli, on a motorcycle belonging to a relative

of Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4), Ravishankar

Tandon (accused No.1) and the deceased reached Datgaon by

a bus. Thereafter, the three accused persons along with the

deceased went to visit the house of the brother-in-law of

Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4), namely, Sunil. On that

same night, after taking the dinner, they left Sunil’s house on

the pretext of returning to their homes. However, when they

reached near Bhatgaon, Ravishankar Tandon (accused No.1),

Umend Prasad Dhritalhare (accused No.2) and Satyendra

Kumar Patre (accused No.4) strangulated the deceased to

death and in order to screen themselves from the said act of

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murder, the accused persons tied the dead body of the

deceased with his own clothes and stuffed it into a jute sack

which had been procured from Sunil’s house. Thereafter, the

appellants transported the dead body of the deceased to a

pond at Village Bhatgaon, on the motorcycle of Satyendra

Kumar Patre (accused No.4), and threw the dead body into the

said pond, wherefrom it was subsequently recovered.

3.3 Upon the conclusion of the investigation, a charge-sheet

came to be filed before the Court of the Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Mungeli, Chhattisgarh, wherein accused Nos. 1, 2

and 4 had been charged for the offences punishable under

Sections 302 read with 34, Sections 120B and 201 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’ for short) whereas accused No.3

had been charged for the offences punishable under Sections

302 read with 34 and 120B of the IPC. Since the case was

exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, the same came to be

committed to the Sessions Court.

3.4 Charges came to be framed by the trial court for the

aforesaid offences. The accused/appellants pleaded not guilty

and claimed to be tried.

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3.5 The prosecution examined 18 witnesses and exhibited 37

documents to bring home the guilt of the accused/appellants.

The defence, on the other hand, did not examine any witness

or exhibit any document.

3.6 At the conclusion of the trial, the trial Court found that

the prosecution had proved the case against the appellants

beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly convicted accused

Nos. 1, 2 and 3 for the offences punishable under Sections 302

read with 34, Sections 120B and 201 of the IPC and convicted

accused No. 4 for the offences punishable under Sections 302

read with 34 and 120B of the IPC and sentenced all of them to

undergo imprisonment for life along with fine.

3.7 Being aggrieved thereby, the appellants preferred three

Criminal Appeals before the High Court. The High Court vide

the impugned judgment dismissed the Criminal Appeals and

affirmed the order of conviction and sentence awarded by the

trial Court.

4. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals.

5. We have heard Shri Manish Kumar Saran, learned

counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in Criminal

Appeal No. 3869 of 2023, Shri Chandrika Prasad Mishra,

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learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in

Criminal Appeal No. 2740 of 2023, appeals arising out of SLP

(Criminal) Nos. 837 and 1174 of 2024, and Shri Praneet

Pranav, learned Deputy Advocate General (‘Dy. AG’ for short)

appearing on behalf of the respondent-State at length.

6. Shri Saran and Shri Mishra, learned counsel appearing

on behalf of the appellants, submitted that the present case

rests on circumstantial evidence. It is submitted that the

prosecution has failed to prove any of the incriminating

circumstances beyond reasonable doubt. It is submitted that,

in any case, the prosecution has failed to establish the chain

of proven circumstances which leads to no other conclusion

than the guilt of the accused persons. They therefore

submitted that the appeals deserve to be allowed and the

judgments and orders of conviction need to be quashed and

set aside.

7. Shri Pranav, learned Dy. AG appearing on behalf of the

respondent-State, on the contrary, submitted that both the

High Court and the trial court have concurrently held that the

prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. He

submitted that the findings of the trial court and the High

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Court are based upon cogent appreciation of evidence and as

such, no interference is warranted.

8. Undoubtedly, the prosecution case rests on

circumstantial evidence. The law with regard to conviction on

the basis of circumstantial evidence has very well been

crystalized in the judgment of this Court in the case of Sharad

Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra1, wherein this

Court held thus:

“152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the

High Court we would like to cite a few decisions on

the nature, character and essential proof required in

a criminal case which rests on circumstantial

evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic

decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of

Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343

: 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129]. This case has

been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in

a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for

instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of

Uttar Pradesh [(1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55]

and Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC

625 : AIR 1972 SC 656]. It may be useful to extract

what Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant case

[(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091

: 1953 Cri LJ 129] :

“It is well to remember that in cases where

the evidence is of a circumstantial nature,

the circumstances from which the

conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should

in the first instance be fully established,

and all the facts so established should be

consistent only with the hypothesis of the

1 (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC 121

9

guilt of the accused. Again, the

circumstances should be of a conclusive

nature and tendency and they should be

such as to exclude every hypothesis but

the one proposed to be proved. In other

words, there must be a chain of evidence

so far complete as not to leave any

reasonable ground for a conclusion

consistent with the innocence of the

accused and it must be such as to show

that within all human probability the act

must have been done by the accused.”

153. A close analysis of this decision would show

that the following conditions must be fulfilled before

a case against an accused can be said to be fully

established:

(1) the circumstances from which the

conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should

be fully established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated that

the circumstances concerned “must or should” and

not “may be” established. There is not only a

grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be

proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was

held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v.

State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC

(Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations

were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]

“Certainly, it is a primary principle that

the accused must be and not merely may

be guilty before a court can convict and

the mental distance between ‘may be’ and

‘must be’ is long and divides vague

conjectures from sure conclusions.”

(2) the facts so established should be

consistent only with the hypothesis of the

guilt of the accused, that is to say, they

should not be explainable on any other

hypothesis except that the accused is

guilty,

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(3) the circumstances should be of a

conclusive nature and tendency,

(4) they should exclude every possible

hypothesis except the one to be proved,

and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so

complete as not to leave any reasonable

ground for the conclusion consistent with

the innocence of the accused and must

show that in all human probability the act

must have been done by the accused.

154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,

constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based

on circumstantial evidence.”

9. It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the

prosecution that the circumstances from which the

conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully

established. The Court held that it is a primary principle that

the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ proved guilty

before a court can convict the accused. It has been held that

there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between

‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’. It has been

held that the facts so established should be consistent only

with the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not

be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the

accused is guilty. It has further been held that the

circumstances should be such that they exclude every

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possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It has been

held that there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not

to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent

with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all

human probabilities the act must have been done by the

accused.

10. It is settled law that suspicion, however strong it may be,

cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An

accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no

matter how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be

innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

11. In the light of these guiding principles, we will have to

examine the present case.

12. The prosecution case basically relies on the

circumstance of the memorandum of the accused under

Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short

“Evidence Act”) and the subsequent recovery of the dead body

from the pond at Bhatgaon. The learned Judges of the High

Court have relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of

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State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru2.

The High Court has relied on the following observations of the

said judgment:

“121. The first requisite condition for utilising

Section 27 in support of the prosecution case is that

the investigating police officer should depose that he

discovered a fact in consequence of the information

received from an accused person in police custody.

Thus, there must be a discovery of fact not within the

knowledge of police officer as a consequence of

information received. Of course, it is axiomatic that

the information or disclosure should be free from any

element of compulsion. The next component of

Section 27 relates to the nature and extent of

information that can be proved. It is only so much of

the information as relates distinctly to the fact

thereby discovered that can be proved and nothing

more. It is explicitly clarified in the section that there

is no taboo against receiving such information in

evidence merely because it amounts to a confession.

At the same time, the last clause makes it clear that

it is not the confessional part that is admissible but

it is only such information or part of it, which relates

distinctly to the fact discovered by means of the

information furnished. Thus, the information

conveyed in the statement to the police ought to be

dissected if necessary so as to admit only the

information of the nature mentioned in the section.

The rationale behind this provision is that, if a fact is

actually discovered in consequence of the

information supplied, it affords some guarantee that

the information is true and can therefore be safely

allowed to be admitted in evidence as an

incriminating factor against the accused. As pointed

out by the Privy Council in Kottaya case [AIR 1947

PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA 65] : (AIR p. 70, para

10)

2 (2005) 11 SCC 600 : 2005 INSC 333

13

“clearly the extent of the information

admissible must depend on the exact

nature of the fact discovered”

and the information must distinctly relate to that

fact.

Elucidating the scope of this section, the Privy

Council speaking through Sir John Beaumont said:

(AIR p. 70, para 10)

“Normally the section is brought into

operation when a person in police custody

produces from some place of concealment

some object, such as a dead body, a

weapon, or ornaments, said to be

connected with the crime of which the

informant is accused.”

(emphasis supplied)

We have emphasised the word “normally” because

the illustrations given by the learned Judge are not

exhaustive. The next point to be noted is that the

Privy Council rejected the argument of the counsel

appearing for the Crown that the fact discovered is

the physical object produced and that any and every

information which relates distinctly to that object can

be proved. Upon this view, the information given by

a person that the weapon produced is the one used

by him in the commission of the murder will be

admissible in its entirety. Such contention of the

Crown’s counsel was emphatically rejected with the

following words: (AIR p. 70, para 10)

“If this be the effect of Section 27, little

substance would remain in the ban

imposed by the two preceding sections on

confessions made to the police, or by

persons in police custody. That ban was

presumably inspired by the fear of the

legislature that a person under police

influence might be induced to confess by

the exercise of undue pressure. But if all

that is required to lift the ban be the

inclusion in the confession of information

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relating to an object subsequently

produced, it seems reasonable to suppose

that the persuasive powers of the police

will prove equal to the occasion, and that

in practice the ban will lose its effect.”

Then, Their Lordships proceeded to give a lucid

exposition of the expression “fact discovered” in the

following passage, which is quoted time and again by

this Court: (AIR p. 70, para 10)

“In Their Lordships’ view it is fallacious to

treat the ‘fact discovered’ within the

section as equivalent to the object

produced; the fact discovered embraces

the place from which the object is

produced and the knowledge of the

accused as to this, and the information

given must relate distinctly to this fact.

Information as to past user, or the past

history, of the object produced is not

related to its discovery in the setting in

which it is discovered. Information

supplied by a person in custody that ‘I will

produce a knife concealed in the roof of my

house’ does not lead to the discovery of a

knife; knives were discovered many years

ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that

a knife is concealed in the house of the

informant to his knowledge, and if the

knife is proved to have been used in the

commission of the offence, the fact

discovered is very relevant. But if to the

statement the words be added ‘with which

I stabbed A’ these words are inadmissible

since they do not relate to the discovery of

the knife in the house of the informant.”

(emphasis supplied)

128. So also in Udai Bhan v. State of U.P. [1962

Supp (2) SCR 830 : AIR 1962 SC 1116 : (1962) 2 Cri

LJ 251] J.L. Kapur, J. after referring to Kottaya

case [AIR 1947 PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA 65]

stated the legal position as follows: (SCR p. 837)

“A discovery of a fact includes the object

found, the place from which it is produced

and the knowledge of the accused as to its

existence.”

The above statement of law does not run counter to

the contention of Mr. Ram Jethmalani, that the

factum of discovery combines both the physical

object as well as the mental consciousness of the

informant accused in relation thereto. However, what

would be the position if the physical object was not

recovered at the instance of the accused was not

discussed in any of these cases.”

13. As such, for bringing the case under Section 27 of the

Evidence Act, it will be necessary for the prosecution to

establish that, based on the information given by the accused

while in police custody, it had led to the discovery of the fact,

which was distinctly within the knowledge of the maker of the

said statement. It is only so much of the information as

relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered would be

admissible. It has been held that the rationale behind this

provision is that, if a fact is actually discovered in consequence

of the information supplied, it affords some guarantee that the

information is true and it can therefore be safely allowed to be

admitted in evidence as an incriminating factor against the

accused.

14. We will have to therefore examine as to whether the

prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the

recovery of the dead body was on the basis of the information

given by the accused persons in the statement recorded under

Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The prosecution will have to

establish that, before the information given by the accused

persons on the basis of which the dead body was recovered,

nobody had the knowledge about the existence of the dead

body at the place from where it was recovered.

15. The prosecution, insofar as the memorandum under

Section 27 of the Evidence Act is concerned, has relied on the

depositions of Ramkumar (PW-5) and Ajab Singh (PW-18).

According to the prosecution, the statement of Ravishankar

Tandon (accused No. 1) was recorded on 3rd December 2011 at

10:00 am. On the same day, the statement of Umend Prasad

Dhritalhare (accused No. 2) was recorded at 10:30 am, and

that of Dinesh Chandrakar (accused No. 3) at 11:00 am.

Whereas the statement of Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.

4) was recorded on 6th December 2011 at 07:00 pm. It will be

relevant to refer to the relevant part of the evidence of

Ramkumar (PW-5), which reads thus:

“2. In front of me, accused Ravishankar have told to

the police that at the behest of accused Dinesh, they

have killed Dharmender for Rs. 90,000 and made a

plan and Ravishankar called Dharmender called him

to buy silver and killed him in Bhatgaon stuffed his

dead body in a sack and threw it in the pond. On

being shown the memorandum statement of Exhibit

P- l0 have told to be his signature on Part A to A.

3. Umed had also told the police in front of me that

Sattu along with Ravi Shankar had killed

Dharmendra and threw him in Bhatagaon’s lake on

the advice of Dinesh. Witness Memo statement is

Exhibit P-11 and accepts his signature on part A to

A.

4. Dinesh had told in front of me that 6 months back

he had made a deal with Ravishankar and sattu to

kill Dharmender for 90 thousand rupees. Dinesh also

told that Shankar had said that the work is done, give

him the money. On being shown Exhibit P-12,

accepted to have his signature on Part A to A.

Witness states that it was seized from the pond in

front of me.

5. Village Kunda is 16 km away from my village. It is

correct that Dharmendra had come to know about

the murder on 3rd. Witness states that it was

informed by the police. On that other morning, at

about 7 -8 o’clock in the morning, it is correct that

on my arrival in village Kunda, my brother-in-law

and nephew Narendra had told me about the murder

which was done by the accused. By that time we did

not reach the spot that’s why whether it was

Dharmender’s body or not I cannot.”

6. I went from Kunda to Bhatgaon on 2nd with the

police, then he says that at that time it was about two

and a half o’clock in the evening. It is correct that

when I reached Bhatgaon there were many people of

the village. It is correct that because of dead body

there were many people there. It is correct to say that

police have brought the dead body to Mungeli police

station where PM was done.

7. It is correct that accused were brought to Mungeli

police station. It is incorrect that I had taken the

signature of accused at Mungeli police station.

Accused have given the statement at Kunda police

station, in front of me. Apart from the accused we

were 5-6 other family members in the Police station

Kunda. The police took the statement at around 12

o’clock.

…………..

14. We have reached Bhatgaon at 4.30-5. And

reached Mungeli before sunset. It is incorrect to· say

that the police have taken my signature Witness itself

states that I have signed in Bhatgaon. It is incorrect

to say that I did not read the papers before signing

them. Witness says that the I have read the main

part. It is incorrect to say that I am seeing accused

for the first time today. It is incorrect to say that I

know accused by name only, witness states that I

know him by face also. It is incorrect to say that the

name of the accused was revealed by my brotherin-:

law and Narendra it was told by the police.”

16. It is to be noted that Ramkumar (PW-5) is the brother-inlaw

of the deceased. A perusal of his evidence would reveal

that he has admitted that, on his arrival in village Kunda, he

was informed by his brother-in-law and nephew Narendra

Kumar (PW-2) about the murder of the deceased which was

done by the accused persons. He stated that, by that time they

had not reached the spot and that is why they were not aware

as to whether it was the body of Dharmendra or not. He

further admitted that when they reached Bhatgaon, many

people of the village were there. He has also admitted that

because of the dead body, many people were there. He has

further admitted that the accused persons had given their

statements at Kunda police station. He has further admitted

that they had reached Bhatgaon at around 04:30 pm to 05:00

pm and had reached Mungeli before sunset. He has also stated

that he had signed the panchnama at Bhatgaon.

17. It could thus be seen that, according to this witness (PW-

5), though the statement was taken at Kunda, it was signed at

Bhatgaon.

18. Ajab Singh (PW-18) is another witness on the

memorandum recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act

and the subsequent recovery of the dead body. He states that

Ravishankar informed the police that Dharmendra had been

killed and thrown into the pond. However, he states in

examination-in-chief that Umend and Dinesh did not tell

anything to the police in front of him. It will be relevant to

refer to his cross-examination, which reads thus:

“4. It is true that I used to work as Kotwari. It is true

that I did not have read the paper. It is true that I

had signed 3-4 papers on the instructions of the

police. It is true that due to being Kotwar had to visit

police station regularly. It is true that I signed on

documents on the instructions of the police. It is

wrong to say that I signed in police station, Kunda.

Witnesses say that it was signed in Dandaon.”

19. It could thus be seen that Ajab Singh (PW-18) has clearly

admitted that he did not read the papers before putting his

signature on them. He has admitted that he had signed 3-4

papers on the instructions of the police. He has also stated

that he had signed the statement at Dandaon.

20. Narendra Kumar (PW-2) is the brother of the deceased.

He has stated that, after his brother went missing; on the next

day at around 08:00 o’clock in the morning, the police came

to his place and informed that his brother Dharmendra had

been killed by Ravishankar, Satnami, Umend and Satyendra.

After that, they went to Bhatgaon with the police. The extract

of the evidence of Narendra Kumar (PW-2) is as under:

“3. At around 8 in morning the police came to my

place and informed that my brother Dharmendra was

killed by Ravishankar, Satnami, Umend and

Satyendra. After that we went to Bhatgaon with the

police. Ramkumar, Krishna, Banshee had gone with

me.”

21. A perusal of the evidence of Narendra Kumar (PW-2) read

with that of Ramkumar (PW-5) would clearly reveal that the

police as well as these witnesses knew about the death of

Dharmendra Satnami occurring and the dead body being

found at Bhatgaon prior to the statements of the accused

persons being recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

All the statements are recorded after 10:00 am whereas

Ramkumar (PW-2) stated that at around 08:00 am, police

informed him about the accused persons killing the deceased

and thereafter they going to Bhatgaon. Ramkumar (PW-5) also

admitted that he arrived at village Kunda and on his arrival,

he was informed by his brother-in-law and nephew about the

murder which was done by the accused persons.

22. We therefore find that the prosecution has utterly failed

to prove that the discovery of the dead body of the deceased

from the pond at Bhatgaon was only on the basis of the

disclosure statement made by the accused persons under

Section 27 of the Evidence Act and that nobody knew about

the same before that. It is further to be noted that Ajab Singh

(PW-18) has clearly admitted that he had signed the papers

without reading them and that too on the instructions of the

police.

23. The evidence of Ramkumar (PW-5) would show that

though his statement was taken at Kunda police station, it was

signed at Bhatgaon. As such, the possibility of these

documents being created to rope in the accused persons

cannot be ruled out. In any case, insofar as the statement of

Dinesh Chandrakar (accused No. 3) is concerned, even the

statement recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not

at all related to the discovery of the dead body of the deceased.

As a matter of fact, nothing in his statement recorded under

Section 27 of the Evidence Act has led to discovery of any

incriminating fact.

24. Another aspect that needs to be noted is that, the only

evidence with regard to recording of the memorandum of

accused persons under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is

concerned, is that of B.R. Singh, the then Investigating Officer

(IO) (PW-16). The relevant part thereof reads thus:

“1. ….I wrote the statement of accused Ravi Shankar

as per memorandum Ex. P-10 after taking him into

custody in which my signature is on part B to B. I

wrote the statement of accused· Um end as per his

memorandum Ex. P-11 and accused Dinesh as per

his memorandum Ex. P-12 in which my signature is

on part B to B.”

25. It could thus be seen that the IO (PW-16) has failed to

state as to what information was given by the accused persons

which led to the discovery of the dead body. The evidence is

also totally silent as to how the dead body was discovered and

subsequently recovered. We find that therefore, the evidence

of the IO (PW-16) would also not bring the case at hand under

the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Reliance in this

respect could be placed on the judgments of this Court in the

cases of Asar Mohammad and Others v. State of Uttar

Pradesh3 and Boby v. State of Kerala4.

26. We therefore find that the prosecution has utterly failed

to prove any of the incriminating circumstances against the

appellants herein. In any case, the chain of circumstances

must be so complete that it leads to no other conclusion than

the guilt of the accused persons, which is not so in the present

case.

27. In the result, we pass the following order:

(i) The appeals are allowed;

(ii) The judgment dated 2nd January 2023 passed by the

High Court and the judgment dated 5th February 2013

passed by the trial court are quashed and set aside;

and

3 (2019) 12 SCC 253 : 2018 INSC 985

4 2023 SCC OnLine SC 50 : 2023 INSC 23

24

(iii) The appellants are directed to be acquitted of all the

charges charged with and are directed to be released

forthwith, if not required in any other case.

28. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

………………………….J.

[B.R. GAVAI]

………………………….J.

[SANDEEP MEHTA]

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 10, 2024.