Chattisgarh High Court
Ganga Ram Sinha vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 1 April, 2026
1
NAFR
Digitally
VISHAKHA signed by
BEOHAR VISHAKHA
BEOHAR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ACQA No. 363 of 2025
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Station House Officer, Police
Station Gariyaband, District Gariyaband (C.G.)
---Appellant
versus
1 - Gangaram Sinha S/o Shri Kashiram Sinha, Aged About 26
Years R/o Village Majarkatta, District Gariyaband (C.G.)
--- Respondent
For Appellant/State : Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, Deputy
Government Advocate
For Respondent : Mr. Krishna Tandon, Advocate
CRA No. 607 of 2024
1 - Ganga Ram Sinha S/o Kanshiram Sinha Aged About 26 Years
R/o Village Majarkatta, District : Gariyabandh, Chhattisgarh
---Appellant
Versus
2
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer P.S. -
Gariyaband, District : Gariyabandh, Chhattisgarh
... Respondent
For Appellant : Mr. Krishna Tandon, Advocate
For Respondent/State : Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, Deputy
Government Advocate
Division Bench
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal, J. &
Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.
Judgment on Board
01.04.2026
Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.
1. Since both the above-captioned appeals arise out of the
common judgment dated 17.10.2022 passed by the learned
Special Judge (Atrocities), Raipur, in Special Criminal Case
No.06/2020, they are being heard together and disposed of
by this common judgment.
2. Criminal Appeal No.607 of 2024 has been preferred by the
appellant/accused, Gangaram Sinha, under Section 374(2) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, assailing the impugned
judgment dated 17.10.2022 whereby he has been convicted
and sentenced as under:-
Conviction Sentence
3
Under Section 376 of Indian Rigorous imprisonment for
Penal Code (in short, ‘IPC‘) ten years with fine of
Rs.500/-, in default of
payment of fine, further
rigorous imprisonment for
three months
3. Acquittal Appeal No.363 of 2025 has been preferred by the
State under Section 14-A(1) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for
short, “the Act, 1989”), questioning the acquittal of the
accused, Gangaram Sinha, from the charge under Section
3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989.
4. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that victim is a deaf and
mute girl belonging to Scheduled Tribe community. On
26.02.2020, her mother Chameli Bai (PW-2) submitted a
written complaint (Ex.P-6) at Police Station Gariyaband
stating that the victim is her eldest daughter, deaf and mute
since childhood, educated up to Class VIII and capable of
understanding signs. On the date of incident i.e. 26.02.2020,
she and her husband had gone to the agricultural field in the
morning at about 7:00 a.m. At about 10:00 a.m., her son
Satish (PW-3) came to the field and informed that the victim
had gone to the toilet situated in the badi near their house
4
and had not returned for some time. When he went near the
toilet and knocked the door, he heard sounds from inside.
Thereafter, through an opening in the rear wall, he saw
accused- Gangaram Sinha and the victim inside the toilet
without lower garments. Shortly thereafter, accused opened
the door and fled away. It was further alleged that after
returning home, when the victim was asked through signs,
she disclosed that while she had gone to the toilet, accused
followed her, pushed her inside, closed the door, forcibly
removed her clothes and committed sexual intercourse
against her will. It was also stated that accused used to come
near their house for mason work and was known to the
family. On the basis of written complaint, FIR (Ex.P-7) was
registered against accused- Gangaram under Section 376 of
IPC.
5. During the course of investigation, after obtaining consent of
the victim and her mother, victim was sent for medical
examination. PW-1 Dr. Neha Sharma examined her and
opined that no injury was found on her private parts. Her
hymen was found to be torn. The doctor stated that sexual
intercourse had been committed with the victim; however, no
signs of forcible sexual intercourse were noticed. The
medical report is Ex.P-1. The caste certificate of the victim
5
was seized vide Ex.P-4. Undergarment of the victim was
seized vide Ex.P-13, and the vaginal slide was seized vide
Ex.P-26. Accused/respondent was taken into custody vide
Ex.P-3, and his underwear was seized vide Ex.P-17. The
seized articles were sent to the FSL for chemical
examination, and as per the FSL report (Ex.P-23), seminal
stains and human spermatozoa were found on the seized
articles.
6. After completion of the investigation, statements of the
witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C.
The accused/respondent was charge-sheeted before the
jurisdictional criminal Court, and the case was committed to
the trial Court. The accused- Gangaram, abjured his guilt and
entered into defence, stating that he has not committed the
alleged offence.
7. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined as
many as 10 witnesses and exhibited 26 documents. The
accused, in support of his defence, neither examined any
defence witness nor led any oral evidence, but exhibited two
documents, i.e., Ex.D-1 and Ex.D-2. The statement of the
accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.,
wherein he denied the incriminating circumstances appearing
6
against him in the prosecution evidence, pleaded innocence,
and alleged false implication.
8. The learned trial Court, after due appreciation of the oral and
documentary evidence available on record, acquitted the
accused of the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act,
1989; however, it convicted the accused- Gangaram for the
offence as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the
judgment. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant/accused has
preferred an appeal against his conviction and sentence,
while the State has filed a separate appeal challenging the
acquittal of the accused- Gangaram Sinha for the offence
under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989.
9. Criminal Appeal No.607 of 2024:- Learned counsel for the
appellant/accused submits that the conviction and sentence
of appellant under Section 376 of IPC is unsustainable both
in law and on facts. It is contended that the testimony of the
victim, being a deaf and mute witness, was recorded through
an interpreter and, therefore, required strict scrutiny and
reliable corroboration. According to learned counsel, the
possibility of imperfect interpretation cannot be completely
ruled out. It is further contended that the medical evidence
does not support the allegation of forcible sexual intercourse,
as no external or genital injury and no fresh signs of violence
7
were found on the body of the victim, and the doctor has not
given any definite opinion regarding recent forcible
intercourse. It is also submitted that PW-3 brother of the
victim, did not witness the actual act of penetration and
merely saw the accused and the victim inside the toilet,
which, by itself, is insufficient to establish the offence of rape.
It is further argued that the FSL report (Ex.P-23) only
indicates the presence of semen and does not establish
absence of consent, and thus the possibility of consensual
intimacy cannot be ruled out. On these grounds, it is prayed
that the impugned judgment of conviction be set aside and
the appellant/accused be acquitted of the charge levelled
against him.
10. Per contra, learned State counsel supports the
impugned judgment and submits that the prosecution has
successfully proved the offence beyond reasonable doubt. It
is contended that the trial Court has rightly appreciated the
evidence on record and has justifiably convicted and
sentenced the appellant/accused for the said offence.
Accordingly, it is prayed that the appeal deserves to be
dismissed.
11. Acquittal Appeal No.363 of 2025:- Learned counsel
for the State submits that once the offence of rape against a
8
woman belonging to a Scheduled Tribe stands proved and
the caste certificate establishes her caste status, the learned
trial Court ought to have convicted the accused under
Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act as well. It is contended that
the accused was admittedly known to the family and was
aware of the caste of the victim; therefore, his conviction
under the said provision is warranted.
12. Per contra, learned counsel for the accused- Gangaram
submits that there is no evidence on record to show that the
offence was committed on account of the caste of the victim.
It is argued that mere proof of caste is not sufficient to attract
Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989. Hence, the learned trial
Court has rightly acquitted the accused of the said charge,
and no interference by this Court is called for.
13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties,
considered their rival submissions made herein-above and
perused the records with utmost circumspection.
14. In the present case, the first and principal witness is the
victim. Since she is admittedly deaf and mute, her evidence
was recorded with assistance of interpreter Sheila Yadav
(PW-7). Before appreciating such evidence, it is necessary to
notice that Section 119 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
expressly recognizes testimony of a witness unable to speak
9
through writing or signs and such evidence is substantive
oral evidence if properly interpreted in open Court. PW-7
Sheila Yadav, Interpreter, has stated that she is trained in
dealing with speech and hearing impaired persons, having
completed D.Ed. in special education, and has worked as a
teacher and thereafter as Principal of Vidyanidhi Multi
Disability Special Residential School, Kokdi, District
Gariyaband. She was called by the police to interpret the
signs of the victim. She examined the victim and found that
she was capable of understanding signs and expressing
herself through gestures.
15. Through the signs interpreted by PW-7 Sheila Yadav,
the victim clearly identified the accused- Gangaram Sinha
present in the Court and stated that he dragged her into the
toilet, closed the door, removed her clothes, mounted upon
her, and committed rape upon her. She further indicated that
she raised alarm, but the accused gagged her mouth, and
she could not escape as the door was closed. She also
stated that her brother (PW-3) came near the toilet, after
which, the accused fled away. In cross-examination, she
remained consistent and specifically denied the suggestion of
any love affair with the accused. She also stated that she
resisted, but the accused tied her hands with a cloth, due to
10
which, she could not defend herself. Nothing material has
been elicited in her cross-examination to discredit her
testimony. Her evidence appears natural, consistent, and
trustworthy, and there is no reason to infer false implication,
particularly in the absence of any prior enmity.
16. It is well settled that merely because a witness is deaf
and dumb, her testimony cannot be discarded. Evidence
given through gestures or signs with the assistance of a
competent interpreter is admissible and can form the basis of
conviction if it inspires confidence.
17. In this regard, in the matter of State of Rajasthan v.
Darshan Singh, (2012) 5 SCC 789 , it has been held as
under:
“26. The object of enacting the provisions of
Section 119 of the Evidence Act reveals that
deaf and dumb persons were earlier
contemplated in law as idiots. However, such a
view has subsequently been changed for the
reason that modern science revealed that
persons affected with such calamities are
generally found more intelligent, and to be
susceptible to far higher culture than one was
once supposed. When a deaf and dumb person
is examined in the court, the court has to
exercise due caution and take care to ascertain
before he is examined that he possesses the
11
requisite amount of intelligence and that he
understands the nature of an oath. On being
satisfied on this, the witness may be
administered oath by appropriate means and
that also with the assistance of an interpreter.
However, in case a person can read and write,
it is most desirable to adopt that method being
more satisfactory than any sign language. The
law requires that there must be a record of
signs and not the interpretation of signs.
27. In Meesala Ramakrishan v. State of A.P.
[(1994) 4 SCC 182], this Court has considered
the evidentiary value of a dying declaration
recorded by means of signs and nods of a
person who is not in a position to speak for any
reason and held that the same amounts to a
verbal statement and, thus, is relevant and
admissible. The Court further clarified that
“verbal” statement does not amount to “oral”
statement. In view of the provisions of Section
119 of the Evidence Act, the only requirement
is that the witness may give his evidence in any
manner in which he can make it intelligible, as
by writing or by signs and such evidence can
be deemed to be oral evidence within the
meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act.
Signs and gestures made by nods or head are
admissible and such nods and gestures are not
only admissible but possess evidentiary value.
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28. Language is much more than words. Like
all other languages, communication by way of
signs has some inherent limitations, since it
may be difficult to comprehend what the user is
attempting to convey. But a dumb person need
not be prevented from being a credible and
reliable witness merely due to his/her physical
disability. Such a person though unable to
speak may convey himself through writing, if
literate or through signs and gestures, if he is
unable to read and write. A case in point is the
silent movies which were understood widely
because they were able to communicate ideas
to people through novel signs and gestures.
Emphasised body language and facial expression enabled the audience to comprehend the intended message.
29. To sum up, a deaf and dumb person is a
competent witness. If in the opinion of the
court, oath can be administered to him/her, it
should be so done. Such a witness, if able to
read and write, it is desirable to record his
statement giving him questions in writing and
seeking answers in writing. In case the witness
is not able to read and write, his statement can
be recorded in sign language with the aid of
interpreter, if found necessary. In case the
interpreter is provided, he should be a person
of the same surrounding but should not have
any interest in the case and he should be
administered oath.”
13
18. This Court further finds support from the settled legal
position laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Meesala
Ramakrishan v. State of Andhra Pradesh , reported in
(1994) 4 SCC 182, wherein it has been held that a witness
who is unable to speak can give evidence by signs or
gestures and such evidence is admissible and can form the
basis of conviction, provided the Court records satisfaction
regarding the competency of the witness and her ability to
understand and respond. In the present case, the trial Court
has duly recorded such satisfaction and the testimony of the
victim has been properly interpreted and recorded.
Therefore, her evidence cannot be discarded merely on
account of her physical disability.
19. The Supreme Court in the matter of Rai Sandeep @
Deenu v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2012 (8) SCC 21 held as
under:-
“22. In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling
witness’ should be of a very high quality and
caliber whose version should, therefore, be
unassailable. The Court considering the
version of such witness should be in a position
to accept it for its face value without any
hesitation. To test the quality of such a
witness, the status of the witness would be
immaterial and what would be relevant is the
14
truthfulness of the statement made by such a
witness. What would be more relevant would
be the consistency of the statement right from
the starting point till the end, namely, at the
time when the witness makes the initial
statement and ultimately before the Court. It
should be natural and consistent with the case
of the prosecution qua the accused. There
should not be any prevarication in the version
of such a witness. The witness should be in a
position to withstand the cross-examination of
any length and howsoever strenuous it may be
and under no circumstance should give room
for any doubt as to the factum of the
occurrence, the persons involved, as well as,
the sequence of it. Such a version should have
co-relation with each and everyone of other
supporting material such as the recoveries
made, the weapons used, the manner of
offence committed, the scientific evidence and
the expert opinion. The said version should
consistently match with the version of every
other witness. It can even be stated that it
should be akin to the test applied in the case
of circumstantial evidence where there should
not be any missing link in the chain of
circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the
offence alleged against him. Only if the version
of such a witness qualifies the above test as
well as all other similar such tests to be
applied, it can be held that such a witness can
15
be called as a ‘sterling witness’ whose version
can be accepted by the Court without any
corroboration and based on which the guilty
can be punished. To be more precise, the
version of the said witness on the core
spectrum of the crime should remain intact
while all other attendant materials, namely,
oral, documentary and material objects should
match the said version in material particulars
in order to enable the Court trying the offence
to rely on the core version to sieve the other
supporting materials for holding the offender
guilty of the charge alleged.”
20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Deepak
Kumar Sahu vs. State of Chhattisgarh 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 1610 has held as under:-
“5.5.3. The medical evidence may not be
available in which circumstance, solitary testimony
of the prosecutrix could be sufficient to base the
conviction.
“The conviction can be sustained on the
sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it
inspires confidence. The conviction can
be based solely on the solitary evidence
of the prosecutrix and no corroboration
be required unless there are compelling
reasons which necessitate the courts to
insist for corroboration of her statement.
Corroboration of the testimony of the
16
prosecutrix is not a requirement of law;
but a guidance of prudence under the
given facts and circumstances. Minor
contractions or small discrepancies
should not be a ground for throwing the
evidence of the prosecutrix.”
(Para 11)
5.5.4. It may be true that in the present case the
evidence of the medical officer (PW-17) spoke
about absence of external injury marks on the
genitals of the victim. However, the proposition
that the corroboration from the medical evidence
is not sine qua non when the cogent evidence of
the victim is available, was reiterated in a recent
judgment of this Court in Lok Mal alias Loku v.
State of Uttar Pradesh, [(2025) 4 SCC 470],
observed:
“Merely because in the medical evidence,
there are no major injury marks, this
merely cannot a be a reason to discard
the otherwise reliable evidence of the
prosecutrix. It is not necessary that in
each and every case where rape is
alleged there has to be an injury to the
private parts of the victim and it depends
on the facts and circumstances of a
particular case. We reiterate that
absence of injuries on the private parts of
the victim is not always fatal to the case
of the prosecution.(para 4)
17
5.6. It is an opt-reiterated dictum of law that in
cases of rape, the testimony of the prosecutrix
alone may be sufficient and sole evidence of the
victim, when cogent and consistent, could be
properly used to arrive at a finding of the guilt. In
the State of Himachal Pradesh v. Manga Singh,
(2019) 16 SCC 759, this Court in terms stated that
conviction can be rested on the testimony of the
prosecutrix alone.
The conviction can be sustained on the
sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it
inspires confidence. The conviction can
be based solely on the solitary evidence
of the prosecutrix and no corroboration
be required unless there are compelling
reasons which necessitate the courts to
insist for corroboration of her statement.
Corroboration of the testimony of the
prosecutrix is not a requirement of law,
but a guidance of prudence under the
given facts and circumstances. Minor
contractions or small discrepancies
should not be a ground for throwing the
evidence of the prosecutrix.”(Para 10)
5.6.1. It was further asserted that corroboration is
not an essential requirement for conviction in the
cases of rape.
It is well settled by a catena of decisions
of the Supreme Court that corroboration
is not a sine qua non for conviction in a
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rape case. If the evidence of the victim
does not suffer from any basic infirmity
and the “probabilities factor” does not
render it unworthy of credence. As a
general rule, there is no reason to insist
on corroboration except from medical
evidence. However, having regard to
the circumstances of the case, medical
evidence may not be available. In such
cases, solitary testimony of the
prosecutrix would be sufficient to base
the conviction, if it inspires the
confidence of the court. (Para 11)
5.6.2. In Gurmit Singh (supra) it was observed to
reiterate that in all cases, the corroboration to the
statements made by the victim in her evidence
could not be insisted upon as a rule of thumb:
In cases involving sexual molestation,
supposed considerations which have no
material effect on the veracity of the
prosecution case or even discrepancies
in the statement of the prosecutrix
should not, unless the discrepancies are
such which are of fatal nature, be
allowed to throw out an otherwise
reliable prosecution case. The inherent
bashfulness of the females and the
tendency to conceal outrage of sexual
aggression are factors which the courts
should not overlook.(Para 8)
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5.6.3. It was asserted that only compelling
reasons would justify rejection of testimony of a
rape victim, and not otherwise:
“….the courts should find no difficulty to
act on the testimony of a victim of
sexual assault alone to convict an
accused where her testimony inspires
confidence and is found to be reliable.
Seeking corroboration of her statement
before relying upon the same, as a rule,
in such cases amounts to adding insult
to injury…..”(Para 8)5.6.4. From a recent decision in Raju alias
Umakant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2025 SCC
OnLine SC 997), following observations could be
noticed:
“…….a woman or a girl subjected to
sexual assault is not an accomplice but
a victim of another person’s lust and it
will be improper and undesirable to test
her evidence with suspicion. All that the
law mandates is that the Court should
be alive to and conscious of the fact
that it is dealing with the evidence of a
person who is interested in the outcome
of charge levelled by her and if after
keeping that aspect in mind if the Court
is thereafter satisfied that the evidence
is trustworthy, there is nothing that can
stop the Court from acting on the sole
20
testimony of the prosecutrix. [See State
of Rajasthan v. N.K. the Accused,
(2000) 5 SCC 30, Rameshwar v. State
of Rajasthan, 1951 SCC 1213, State of
Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewal
Chand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550, State of
Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC
384]” (para 18)
21. This apart, the testimony of the victim receives
immediate and strong corroboration from PW-3 brother of the
victim. He has deposed that on the date of the incident, he had
gone to the village to attend a Bhagwat programme and
returned home in the morning to take food. At that time, the
victim indicated through signs that she was going to the toilet.
When she did not return for some time, he became suspicious
and went near the toilet situated at a distance of about 100
feet from the house. He found the door closed from inside and
heard sounds from within. On peeping through an opening in
the rear wall, he saw the accused and the victim inside in a
naked condition. Thereafter, he broke open the door,
questioned the accused, and assaulted him with a stick,
whereupon the accused fled by jumping over the boundary
wall. He immediately informed his parents, who were in the
agricultural field. His conduct appears natural and probable,
and nothing material has been elicited in his cross-
21
examination to cast doubt on his presence or credibility. His
testimony clearly establishes the presence of the accused with
the victim inside a closed toilet in a naked condition and lends
material support to the prosecution case.
22. Similarly, PW-2 Chameli Bai, the mother of the victim,
has stated that after being informed by PW-3 Satish, she
returned from the field and enquired from the victim through
signs, whereupon the victim indicated that the accused had
followed her into the toilet, gagged her mouth, and committed
the wrongful act forcibly. She has duly proved the written
complaint (Ex.P-6), FIR (Ex.P-7), and seizure proceedings.
Though she is not an eyewitness to the actual occurrence, her
testimony is relevant as it relates to the immediate disclosure
made by the victim and the prompt reporting of the incident.
23. Besides the above, the medical evidence is furnished
by PW-8 Dr. Neha Sharma, who examined the victim on the
same day. She found no external injury and no injury on the
private parts; however, she opined that sexual intercourse
had occurred with the victim, though no definite opinion
regarding recent forcible intercourse could be given. The
medical evidence, though not indicating signs of force, clearly
establishes that sexual intercourse had taken place with the
victim and thus lends support to the version of the victim. It is
22
well settled that absence of injuries is not decisive,
particularly in cases involving a physically disabled and
vulnerable victim. In such circumstances, the credible and
consistent testimony of the victim assumes greater
significance and cannot be discarded merely on the ground
that no injuries were found.
24. Moreover, the most significant corroboration is provided
by the scientific evidence. The FSL report (Ex.P-23) reveals
the presence of semen stains and human spermatozoa on
the vaginal slide of the victim, her undergarment, as well as
the undergarment of the accused. The presence of semen on
the vaginal slide and the seized clothes, when read in
conjunction with the ocular evidence and surrounding
circumstances, lends strong support to the prosecution case.
The accused has offered no explanation regarding the
presence of semen on his undergarment. Thus, the
cumulative effect of the evidence on record clearly
establishes that the accused had committed rape upon the
victim.
25. Thus, from the above evidence, it is quite evident that
the prosecution has successfully proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused committed sexual intercourse with the
victim against her will and without her consent. The testimony
23
of the victim, though recorded through an interpreter on
account of her being deaf and mute, is cogent, consistent,
and trustworthy, and stands duly corroborated by the
evidence of PW-2 mother and PW-3 brother of the victim, the
medical evidence of PW-1 Dr. Neha Sharma, and the FSL
report (Ex.P-23). The defence has failed to bring on record
any material contradiction or to offer any plausible
explanation for the incriminating circumstances, particularly
the presence of semen on the seized articles. The plea of
consent or false implication is not supported by the evidence
on record.
26. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no
illegality or perversity in the manner in which the learned trial
Court has assessed the competency and credibility of the
deaf and mute victim. Her testimony inspires full confidence
and constitutes reliable substantive evidence forming the
foundation of the conviction and sentence recorded against
the accused/appellant. Consequently, the findings of the
learned trial Court on this aspect are affirmed. The present
criminal appeal (CRA No.607 of 2024) being devoid of merit
is accordingly dismissed.
24
27. It is stated at the Bar that the accused- Gangaram
Sinha is in jail. He shall serve out the sentence as ordered by
the trial Court.
28. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to
the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the
Appellant/accused- Gangaram Sinha is undergoing the jail
term, to serve the same on the Appellant informing him that
he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this
Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services
Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
29. So far as acquittal appeal bearing No.363/2025 filed by
the appellant – State is concerned, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of
Kerala reported in (2022) 8 SCC 440 has considered the
scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads
as under:-
“25. While dealing with an appeal against
acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the
appellate court has to consider whether the trial
court’s view can be terms as a possible one,
particularly when evidence on record has been
analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal
adds up to the presumption of innocence in
25
favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court
has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of
the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the
presumption in favour of the accused does not
get weakened but only strengthened. Such a
double presumption that enures in favour of the
accused has to be disturbed only by thorough
scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.”
30. The Supreme Court in the matter of Constable
Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand
reported in (2025) 5 SCC 433, whereby in Para-11 & 12, it
has been held that the High Court should interfere in the
order of acquittal, if the same suffers from perversity and is
based on misreading of material evidence etc. and observed
as under:
“11. Recently, in the case of Babu
Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v.
State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, a
Bench of this Court to which one of us was a
Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to
consider the legal position with regard to the
scope of interference in an appeal against
acquittal. It was observed thus:
“38. First of all, we would like to reiterate
the principles laid down by this Court
governing the scope of interference by the
26
High Court in an appeal filed by the State
for challenging acquittal of the accused
recorded by the trial court.
39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of
Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022)
3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31]
encapsulated the legal position covering the
field after considering various earlier
judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-
83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149“29. After referring to a catena of
judgments, this Court culled out the
following general principles regarding the
powers of the appellate court while
dealing with an appeal against an order of
acquittal in the following words :
(Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State
of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2
SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42
42. From the above decisions, in our
considered view, the following general
principles regarding powers of the
appellate court while dealing with an
appeal against an order of acquittal
emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power
to review, reappreciate and
reconsider the evidence upon which
the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Criminal Procedure Code,
27
1973 puts no limitation, restriction
or condition on exercise of such
power and an appellate court on the
evidence before it may reach its
own conclusion, both on questions
of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal.
Such phraseologies are more in the
nature of “flourishes of language” to
emphasise the reluctance of an
appellate court to interfere with
acquittal than to curtail the power of
the court to review the evidence
and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however,
must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal, there is double
presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to him under
the fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person
28
shall be presumed to be innocent
unless he is proved guilty by a
competent court of law. Secondly,
the accused having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his
innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the
trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions
are possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate
court should not disturb the finding
of acquittal recorded by the trial
court.’ ”
40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of
Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka,
(2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this
Court summarised the principles governing the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing
with an appeal against acquittal under Section
378CrPC as follows :(SCC p. 584, para 8)“8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused
further strengthens the presumption of
innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing
an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to
reappreciate the oral and documentary
evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding
an appeal against acquittal, after
29
reappreciating the evidence, is required
to consider whether the view taken by
the trial court is a possible view which
could have been taken on the basis of
the evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view,
the appellate court cannot overturn the
order of acquittal on the ground that
another view was also possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere
with the order of acquittal only if it
comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on
the basis of the evidence on record was
that the guilt of the accused was proved
beyond a reasonable doubt and no
other conclusion was possible.”
41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that
the scope of interference by an appellate
court for reversing the judgment of acquittal
recorded by the trial court in favour of the
accused has to be exercised within the four
corners of the following principles:
41.1. That the judgment of acquittal
suffers from patent perversity;
41.2. That the same is based on a
misreading/omission to consider material
evidence on record; and41.3. That no two reasonable views are
possible and only the view consistent with
30
the guilt of the accused is possible from
the evidence available on record.”
12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal
position that the interference with the finding of
acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be
warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of
acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the
same is based on a misreading/omission to consider
material evidence on record; and that no two
reasonable views are possible and only the view
consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible
from the evidence available on record.”
31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gulam
Mustafa vs. State of Karnataka and Another 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 603 has held vide paras 34 & 38 as under:-
“34. Insofar and inasmuch as interference in
cases involving the SC/ST Act is concerned,
we may only point out that a three-Judge
Bench of this Court in Ramawatar v. State of
M.P.22, has held that the mere fact that the
offence is covered under a “special statute”
would not inhibit this Court or the High Court
from exercising their respective powers under
Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482
of the Code, in the terms below: (SCC pp.
641-42, paras 16-17)
31
“16. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences
arising out of special statutes such as the
SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely
circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act
has been specifically enacted to deter acts of
indignity, humiliation and harassment against
members of Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes. The SC/ST Act is also a
recognition of the depressing reality that
despite undertaking several measures, the
Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue
to be subjected to various atrocities at the
hands of upper castes. The Courts have to be
mindful of the fact that the SC/ST Act has
been enacted keeping in view the express
constitutional safeguards enumerated in
Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with
a twin-fold objective of protecting the
members of these vulnerable communities as
well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to
the victims of caste-based atrocities.
17. On the other hand, where it appears to the
Court that the offence in question, although
covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily
private or civil in nature, or where the alleged
offence has not been committed on account of
the caste of the victim, or where the
continuation of the legal proceedings would
be an abuse of the process of law, the Court
can exercise its powers to quash the
32
proceedings. On similar lines, when
considering a prayer for quashing on the basis
of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is
satisfied that the underlying objective of the
SC/ST Act would not be contravened or
diminished even if the felony in question goes
unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is
covered under a “special statute” would not
refrain this Court or the High Court, from
exercising their respective powers under
Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482
CrPC.”
(emphasis supplied)
38.The Court would also note that even if the
allegations are taken to be true on their face
value, it is not discernible that any offence can
be said to have been made out under the
SC/ST Act against the appellant. The
complaint and FIR are frivolous, vexatious
and oppressive.”
32. Also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of
Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto vs. State of
Bihar & Anr. Passed in SLP (CRL.) No. 12144 of 2025 has
held vide para 18 as under:-
“18. In the case at hand, we find that there is
nothing on record to indicate that the alleged
acts of the appellant were motivated for the
reason that the complainant is a member of a
33
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.
Neither the FIR nor the chargesheet contains
any whisper of an allegation of insult or
intimidation by the appellant herein, let alone
one made with the intention to humiliate the
complainant.”
33. When the present case is examined in the light of the
aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, it is evident that
the caste certificate (Ex.P-4) clearly establishes that the
victim belongs to a Scheduled Tribe community. However,
mere proof of caste is not sufficient to attract Section 3(2)(v)
of the Act, 1989. The prosecution is further required to
establish that the offence was committed on the ground that
the victim belonged to a Scheduled Tribe community. On
careful scrutiny of the testimony of the victim (recorded
through interpreter PW-7), her brother (PW-3), her mother
(PW-2), and other evidence on record, no material is found to
indicate that the accused committed the offence on account
of the caste identity of the victim. There is no evidence of any
caste-related expression, caste-based hostility, or any
circumstance from which such motive can be inferred. The
essential ingredient of nexus between the offence and the
caste identity is thus absent. Therefore, the learned trial
Court has rightly acquitted the accused of the aforesaid
34
charge. The view taken by the trial Court is a reasonable and
plausible one and does not call for interference in an appeal
against acquittal.
34. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal filed by the
appellant/State against the acquittal of the accused,
Gangaram Sinha, is hereby dismissed.
35. In the result, Criminal Appeal No.607 of 2024 preferred
by the accused- Gangaram Sinha as well as Acquittal Appeal
No.363 of 2025 preferred by the State, being devoid of merit,
are hereby dismissed.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge Judge
Vishakha
