Delhi High Court
Master M vs State Of Nct Of Delhi on 17 April, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on : 23.12.2025
Judgment pronounced on : 17.04.2026
+ CRL.REV.P. 564/2023 & CRL.M.A. 13482/2023
MASTER M .....Petitioner
versus
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI .....Respondent
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Applicant :Mr. Hrishikesh Baruah, Mr. Kumar Kshitij,
Ms. Pragya Agarwal, Mr. Utkarsh Dwivedi,
Ms. Nishtha Sacha & Mr. Yashashwy Ghosh,
Advs.
For the Respondent : Mr. Sunil Kumar Gautam, APP for the
State.
SI Prabash, PS- DIV/ North
Mr. Shri Singh & Ms. Arunima Nair, Advs.
for victim.
CORAM
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
1. The present criminal revision petition has been filed under Section
102 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2015 (‘JJ Act‘), assailing the order dated 18.03.2023, passed by the
learned Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board-III, Delhi,
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whereby the Board proceeded to frame notice/charges against the
Petitioner/Master M, a Child in Conflict with Law (‘CCL’), for the
offence punishable under Section 304 Part-II of the Indian Penal
Code, 1960 (‘IPC‘), along with offences punishable under Sections 3,
4 read with Section 181 and Sections 134 and 187 under the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 (‘MV Act‘). The Petitioner/CCL has also
challenged the Notice dated 23.03.2023 issued under Section 251 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC‘).
QUINTESSENTIAL FACETS GOVERNING THE PRESENT
ISSUE: –
2. Succinctly stated, the case of the prosecution originates from a
PCR call received via DD No. 28A on 04.04.2016 at about 8:55 PM,
informing the police that a person had been found injured due to an
accident near Shyam Nath Marg, Civil Lines, Delhi. On receipt of the
said information, the officers reached the spot, where a Mercedes Benz
car bearing registration no. DL-2 FCM-3000 C-200 compressor was
found stationed, in an accidental condition, near the red light. Upon
inquiry, it was revealed that the injured person, later identified as
Siddharth Sharma, had already been shifted to Sant Parmanand
Hospital. At that stage, the injured was declared unfit for statement.
No eye-witness was stated to have been found either at the spot or in
the hospital at that time.
3. Consequently, FIR No. 118/2016 dated 04.04.2016 was registered
at Police Station Civil Lines, initially for the offences punishable
under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC against the Petitioner/CCL.
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4. The victim, however, succumbed to his injuries on 05.04.2016 and
thus, DD No. 3A was recorded and section 337 was substituted with
section 304A of the IPC.
5. During the course of investigation, on 05.04.2016, three
eyewitnesses, namely Mr. Girish Kumar, Mr. Pradeep Satia and Mr.
Narender Singh were examined by the IO and in their statements
under section 161 of the CrPC, they stated that at 08.45 PM, offending
Mercedes car bearing No. DL 2F CM 3000, came in a very high speed
and hit the deceased/ Shiddharth Sharma, who was crossing the road
and consequently that person fell on the road after bouncing 15/20 feet
in the Air and sustained injuries. After the accident 6-7 boys, aged
about 15-18 years, de-boarded the car and ran away from the spot.
Thereafter, they shifted the injured to Sant Parmanand Nand Hospital.
6. It is alleged that during the inquiry, the owner of the vehicle was
traced and found to be Mr. Manoj Agarwal i.e. the father of the
Petitioner/CCL herein. Though one Kapil Sharma, the driver
employed with Mr. Manoj Agarwal, initially claimed to be driving the
offending vehicle on the date of the accident, however, during
interrogation, it was revealed that the vehicle was allegedly being
driven by the present Petitioner/CCL, who was 17 years, 11 months
and 26 days old at the time of the incident.
7. It is alleged that on 08.04.2016, since it emerged that the CCL has
a history of traffic violations and his father also did not stop the
Petitioner/CCL from driving the car, Section 109 of the IPC was
added. On the basis of the CCTV footage obtained, which
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demonstrated that the offending vehicle was being driven at a very
high speed and in a manner endangering human life, Section 304 of
the IPC was also added.
8. It is alleged that on 04.06.2016, the learned JJB directed that the
present Petitioner/CCL be treated as an adult and after dismissal of the
surrender-cum-bail application filed by the Petitioner/CCL, he was
apprehended and produced before the learned JJB and 2 days custody,
under the supervision of Welfare officer, was granted.
9. During inquiry, six other occupants i.e. the friends of the
Petitioner/CCL namely – Ansh Malhotra, Ayush Malhotra, Sanath
Goel, Shrey Monga, Dhruv Gautam and Ayush Mohan Rastogi, who
were also stated to be present in the offending vehicle at the time of
the incident, were traced. Their statements under Section 161 and 164
of the CrPC were recorded and it is alleged that all the boys have
essentially stated that on 04.04.2016, while they were playing Football
and Cricket at Mall Apartment Ring Road, the Petitioner/CCL asked
them to accompany him to his Apartment in his Mercedes Bens car No
DL 2F CM 3000. Initially, even Dhruv Gautam refused to travel in the
Petitioner’s car, stating that he drives the car rashly and at a high
speed. After convincing, Dhruv Gautam sat on lap of Ansh Malhotra
on front seat, while the Petitioner/CCL was on driving seat and Sanat,
Ayush Malhotra, Ayush Rastogi and Shrey were on rear seat of the
offending car. It is alleged that the Petitioner/CCL started driving the
car in a rash and dangerous manner and they had even warned and
requested him multiple times, but the Petitioner/CCL did not pay any
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heed to such requests and advice and he drove the vehicle in a manner
that could result in the death of any person. Even two motorcycle
riders also had a very narrow escape near Khyber Pass, before the
accident.
10. The prosecution has also alleged that Shrey and Ansh Malhotra
have specifically stated that the Petitioner/CCL was driving the car at
the speed of 80-85 Kmph and Dhruv mentioned that the
Petitioner/CCL usually overspeed’s and drives rashly, in a zig zag
manner and hence, he does not like to travel with the Petitioner/CCL
in his car.
11. It is further alleged that during investigation, it emerged that the
Petitioner’s Mercedes had also met with an accident with the vehicle
of one Varun Jain on 16.02.2016 and the Petitioner/CCL managed to
settle the matter vide Compromise settlement dated 16.02.2016. The
statement under Section 161 of the CrPC of Mr. Varun Jain was also
recorded and it is alleged that on that date as well, the Mercedes was
being driven by a boy who did not have a license.
12. It is further alleged that, details of challan were obtained from
Todapur Traffic Office, and it was found that he had been challaned
thrice i.e. on 25.02.2014 under sections RRR 17(1)/177 MV Act; on
19.09.2014 under sections CMVR 138(3)/177 MV Act; and on
17.06.2015 under sections 112.1/183(1) MV Act.
13. It is further alleged that on 18.04.2016, another witness, namely
Amanjit Singh Bhata Aman, was also examined under Section 161 of
the CrPC, who has stated that on 04.04.2016, while he was travelling
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on his motorcycle with his friend, they had a narrow escape from the
offending Mercedes car, which was being driven at about 100 kmph
and when they followed the car, they reached the spot of the accident
where the victim was found seriously injured and occupants of the car
managed to escape.
14. It is further alleged that the PCR caller namely, Vijender Nagar
was also examined under sections 161 of the CrPC, who has also
stated that on 04.04.2016, while he was on his motorcycle, he had a
narrow escape from the offending vehicle, which was being driven at
about 100 Kmph and after following the same, he reached the accident
spot, where the victim was lying in an injured condition. The boys in
the car, aged 16-17 years ran away from the spot and he along with
other people who had gathered there, shifted the victim to SPN
Hospital.
15. Hence, the chargesheet was filed on 14.05.2016, under sections
304/201 of the IPC, read with Sections 4/181 and 34/187 of the M.V.
Act, since there was sufficient material to demonstrate that the
Petitioner/CCL had knowledge that his act is likely to cause death and
since he was merely 4 days short from attaining majority, he also
possessed the mental capacity/maturity to understand the
consequences of his actions and is thus, liable to be treated as an adult.
16. In the interim, the appeal filed against Order dated 04.06.2016,
vide which the Petitioner/CCL was directed to be treated as an adult,
was dismissed on 11.02.2019. The same was assailed vide Criminal
Revision Petition bearing No. 351/2019 and this Court vide order
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dated 01.05.2019 set-aside the order dated 11.02.2019 by holding that
the offence committed by the Petitioner/CCL does not come in the
category of “heinous offences” and therefore, the present
Petitioner/CCL cannot be tried as an ‘adult’. The Crl. Appeal No. 34
of 2020 challenging the same was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court vide Order dated 09.01.2020.
17. Upon filing of the charge-sheet, the matter came up before the
learned JJB, which, heard arguments on the point of framing of notice
and by the impugned order dated 18.03.2023 opined that: –
a) Notice for commission of offence under Section
304 Part-II of the IPC is to be framed against the
Petitioner/CCL as it can be said, without any
conclusive findings, that he had knowledge that his act
of driving the car dangerously at a high speed can
likely cause death though he had no intention to cause
death.
b) Since the Petitioner/ CCL was driving without a
valid driving license on the date of the incident and
thus, Notice under sections 3/181 and 4/181 of the MV
Act is also framed;
c) Since it has been alleged that the Petitioner/CCL
ran away from the place of the incident and abandoned
the victim, Notice under section 134/187 MV Act is
also framed.
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18. Hence, the impugned Notice under section 251 of the CrPC dated
23.03.2023 was served upon the Petitioner/CCL, to which he pleaded
not guilty and claimed inquiry. The relevant extract is reproduced as
under: –
“That this Board has received a complaint that on
04.04.2016 at around 08:45PM, at Shyam Nath
Marg, Civil lines while going from Mall Apartment,
Civil Lines to Oberoi Apartment, Civil Lines, Delhi,
within the jurisdiction of PS Civil Lines, you juvenile
were found driving a car bearing regn. no. DL-
2FCM- 3000 without a valid driving license at a very
high speed of about 80-85 kms. per hour, so as to
endanger public safety and human life of others and
while driving in such manner you struck the victim
(since deceased) Sh. Siddharth Sharma and caused
his death, having knowledge that your driving at a
high speed at that time and place is likely to cause
death and after that the said incident you ran away
from the spot of the incident, thus, you have
committed the offences punishable under 304 Part II
IPC & 3/181, 4/181 and 134/187 of M.V. Act and
within cognizance of this Board.”
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER: –
19. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner/CCL
submits that the impugned orders suffer from a fundamental error of
law, inasmuch as the material placed on record, even if taken at its
highest, does not disclose the essential ingredients of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder, specifically “knowledge that it is
likely to cause death”, so as to attract Section 304 Part-II of the IPC.
Reliance is placed upon Mahadev Prasad Kaushik Vs. State of UP,
2008 (14) SCC 479, Abdul Kalam Musalman and Ors. Vs. State of
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Rajasthan, 2011 Cri. LJ 2507 and Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther and
Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC Online SC 520.
20. It is submitted that the manner of accident does not reflect
attribution of any knowledge to the Petitioner that death was likely to
be caused in all probability. On the contrary, the witnesses
consistently state that the offending vehicle was travelling at the speed
approximately 60-70 kmph and when the Petitioner/CCL reached the
traffic light and realized that there are only 5-6 Seconds for the light to
turn ‘Red’ from ‘Green’, then only the speed of the offending vehicle
was increased to around 80 kmph. It is further submitted that there
was no ‘Zebra Crossing’ where the victim was allegedly hit and even
the light was ‘Green’. It has also come on record that the road was
‘fairly empty’ and there was no traffic at all in the said place.
21. It is further submitted that the Petitioner/CCL had tried to save the
deceased but it is the victim who suddenly got confused and changed
his direction, which led to the accident, which could have been
otherwise avoided. Reliance is placed upon the photographs and the
CCTV footage of the accident.
22. It is further contended that it is no more res integra that mere
speed, even if assumed to be on the higher side, cannot by itself be
equated with the knowledge contemplated under Section 299 of the
IPC and Rashness or recklessness alleged on the basis of high speed
remains within the domain of Section 304A of the IPC. To buttress the
same, reliance is paced upon, Prabhakaran Vs State of Kerala 2007
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(14) SCC 269, State of Karnataka Vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493 and
Abdul Subhan Vs. State 133 (2006) DLT 562.
23. It is further submitted that even the reliance placed by the
prosecution on the judgments of Alister Anthony Pareira Vs. State of
Maharashtra, 2012 (2) SCC 648 and State Vs. Sanjeev Nanda, 2012
(8) SCC 450 is misplaced, as they pertain to situations where the
accused persons/drivers were driving under the influence of liquor and
had run over multiple victims.
24. It is further submitted if the argument of the complainant is
accepted that merely because the accused was a minor and thus, it
implies that he had knowledge that the act is likely to cause death, the
offence of driving by a minor which had resulted in the death of a
person, would necessarily involve framing of a much graver charge
under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC and there can be no case for the
offence to fall under Section 304A of the IPC, which would essentially
mean rewriting the law by striking-off Section 304A from the Statue
Book for the case of a minor.
25. It is further submitted that even otherwise, the Petitioner/CCL was
merely 4 days short of attaining the age of majority, had attained the
discretion to drive a car effectively and cannot be stated to be
“immature”. Even Section 4 of the MV Act, permits a license to a 16-
year-old for riding a 50cc motorcycle. The prosecution has rather
taken a contradictory stand, that on one hand it is pleaded that the
Petitioner/CCL had attained sufficient maturity to understand the
consequences and gravity of his act and should be tried as an adult, but
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on the other hand claims that since he was a minor, he did not possess
the “maturity” to drive a car effectively.
26. It is further submitted that even section 134/187 of the MV Act is
not made out as, after the incident, as stated by Shrey Monga, the
Petitioner/CCL had put the deceased in an auto so that he can be
transported to the hospital and the medical expenses were also
deposited by the Petitioner’s father.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE AND
COMPLAINANT: -
27. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on
behalf of the State and the Counsel for the Complainant, submit that
the impugned orders and the Notice under section 251 of the CrPC, do
not warrant any interference, as the learned JJB has correctly
appreciated the material on record.
28. A preliminary objection with respect to maintainability of the
petition has been pressed. It is contended that the proceedings that led
to the framing of Notice were admittedly based on the procedure
prescribed for trial of summons cases by Magistrates under Chapter
XX of the CrPC and it is well-settled that no detailed arguments could
be led at the stage of notice, which was considered to be a formal
process and there is no scope for an order akin to discharge at the
stage when notice was framed against the accused under Section 251
of the CrPC. Reliance is placed upon Subramanium Sethuraman v.
State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2004) 13 SCC 324.
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29. It further submitted that the element of “knowledge” that the act is
likely to cause death for attracting the offence of 304 Part II, is
discernible from the entirety of the circumstances and the manner of
the accident. Firstly, the Petitioner/CCL was driving the offending car
at a speed of approximately 100 kmph whereas the permissible limit
was 50 Kmph and did not heed to the warnings/requests of his
friends/co-occupants. Secondly, he was a minor and was driving
without a valid licence and there is a presumption that he did know
how to drive a vehicle. Thirdly, there are no skid marks and he not
apply breaks or make any efforts to avoid the accident. Lastly, he has
previous challans, is a repeat offender, has been previously involved in
an accident and he was about to run over other motorcyclists as well.
30. It is further submitted that, as per Ghulam Hassan Beigh v.
Mohammad Maqbool Magrey and Ors., (2022) 12 SCC 657, in such
circumstances where the case can ultimately be proved after the entire
evidence is led, the learned JJB has rightly proceeded under section
304 part II, which is a higher offence, since it would be open for the
accused to persuade the Board at the end of the trial that the case falls
within the ambit of lesser offence and avoid the re-commencing of the
trial afresh if it is found later that the higher offence of 304 part II was
made out.
31. It is further submitted that, without prejudice, even otherwise,
whether the offence falls under Section 304 Part-II or Section 304A of
the IPC is a matter to be decided after evidence is led by the parties
and cannot be decided at this stage.
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32. It is further submitted that the post-incident conduct, as stated by
the eye-witness demonstrates that the victim was abandoned by the
Petitioner/CCL, who neither called the PCR, nor helped the injured
and thus, notice under section 134 of the MV Act has been rightly
framed. Hence, it is prayed that the revision petition be dismissed.
33. Submissions heard and the record along with the written
submissions as well as the judgments have been perused.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS: –
34. The present petition has been preferred under Section 102 of the JJ
Act, which confers revisional jurisdiction only upon High Court and
empowers the High Court to call for records of any proceeding before
a Board, Children’s Court, or Committee to examine the legality or
propriety of any order, acting on its own motion or via application.
The revisional power is supervisory in nature and does not permit
substitution of the Court’s view merely because another view is
possible.
35. The scope of interference by High Courts while exercising
revisional jurisdiction in a challenge to order framing charge/notice of
accusation is well circumscribed. The power ought to be exercised
sparingly, in the interest of justice and it is not open to the Court to
misconstrue the revisional proceedings as an appeal and reappreciate
the evidence unless any glaring perversity is brought to its notice.
36. In the present case, the impugned order and Notice arise at the
stage of Section 251 of the CrPC and it is well settled that at the stage
of Section 251 of the CrPC, the Court is required to state the substance
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of accusation to the accused upon being satisfied that the allegations in
the police report, if taken at face value, disclose the commission of an
offence. The provision does not contemplate a detailed evaluation of
evidence, nor does it require the Court to determine the likelihood of
conviction. The test is confined to whether the ingredients of the
alleged offence are prima facie disclosed on the basis of the material
placed by the prosecution.
37. Though the present case arises at the stage of Section 251 CrPC
(summons case) the principles governing framing of charge can be
relied upon to understand the contours of a “prima facie case”, albeit
with greater circumspection, since Section 251 does not contemplate
discharge in the manner provided for in warrant cases. The Hon’ble
Apex Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal : (1979) 3
SCC 4, dealt with the scope of enquiry a judge is required to make
with regard to the question of framing of charges. Inter alia, the
following principles were laid down by the Court:
“10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities
mentioned above, the following principles emerge:
(1) That the Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code
has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the
evidence for the limited purpose of finding out
whether or not a prima facie case against the
accused has been made out.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would
naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it
is difficult to lay down a rule of universal
application. By and large however if two views are
equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the
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accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge
the accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
38. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Sajjan Kumar v. CBI :
(2010) 9 SCC 368, has culled out the following principles in respect
of the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the CrPC while observing that
a prima facie case would depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case. The relevant paragraphs read as under:
“21. On consideration of the authorities about the
scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the
following principles emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the
undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for
the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a
prima facie case against the accused has been made
out. The test to determine prima facie case would
depend upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court
disclose grave suspicion against the accused which
has not been properly explained, the court will be
fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding
with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider
the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of
the evidence and the documents produced before the
court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this
stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros
and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if
he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the
court could form an opinion that the accused might
have committed offence, it can frame the charge,
though for conviction the conclusion is required to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
has committed the offence.
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gone into but before framing a charge the court
must apply its judicial mind on the material placed
on record and must be satisfied that the
commission of
offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court
is required to evaluate the material and documents
on record with a view to find out if the facts
emerging therefrom taken at their face value
disclose the existence of all the ingredients
constituting the alleged offence. For this limited
purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected
even at that initial stage to accept all that the
prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is
opposed to common sense or the broad
probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives
rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave
suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to
discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to
see whether the trial will end in conviction or
acquittal.”
(emphasis supplied)
39. In State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao : (2023) 17 SCC
688, the Hon’ble Apex Court has discussed the parameters that would
be appropriate to keep in mind at the stage of framing of charge, as
under:
“7. It is trite law that application of judicial mind
being necessary to determine whether a case has been
made out by the prosecution for proceeding with trial
and it would not be necessary to dwell into the pros
and cons of the matter by examining the defence of the
accused when an application for discharge is filed. At
that stage, the trial judge has to merely examine the
evidence placed by the prosecution in order to
determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to
proceed against the accused on basis of charge sheet
material. The nature of the evidence recorded or
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documents produced in which prima facie it reveals
that there are suspicious circumstances against the
accused, so as to frame a charge would suffice and
such material would be taken into account for the
purposes of framing the charge. If there is no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused
necessarily, the accused would be discharged, but if
the court is of the opinion, after such consideration of
the material there are grounds for presuming that
accused has committed the offence which is triable,
then necessarily charge has to be framed.
xxx xxx xxx
12. The primary consideration at the stage of
framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima-
facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of
materials on record need not be gone into. This
Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State
of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC
659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6
SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made
by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to
test the existence of prima-facie case. It is also held at
the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a
presumptive opinion to the existence of factual
ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is
not expected to go deep into probative value of the
material on record and to check whether the material
on record would certainly lead to conviction at the
conclusion of trial.”
(emphasis supplied)
40. Hence, the foundational threshold, at this stage, is that the Court is
only required to examine whether the material placed on record, if
taken at face value, discloses a prima facie case regarding the
commission of the offence alleged and the Court is not expected to
conduct a mini trial for the purposing of weighing the evidence.
41. Since the principal submission of the Petitioner is that, even
accepting the prosecution case in its entirety, the essential ingredient
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of “knowledge” as contemplated under Section 299 of the IPC is not
made out, it would be apposite to understand the relevant legal
provisions of the IPC, which are reproduced as under: –
” Section 304 : Punishment for culpable
homicide not amounting to murder.–Whoever,
commits culpable homicide not amounting to
murder shall be punished with (imprisonment of
life), or imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, and shall
also be liable to fine, if the act by which the
death is caused is done with the intention of
causing death, or of causing such bodily injury
as is likely to cause death,
Or with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, or with fine,
or with both, if the act is done with the
knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but
without any intention to cause death, or to
cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death.
Section 304A : Causing death by negligence.–
Whoever causes the death of any person by
doing any rash or negligence act not
amounting to culpable homicide, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to two years, or
with fine, or with both.
Section 299 : Culpable homicide.–Whoever
causes death by doing an act with the intention
of causing death, or with the intention of causing
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or
with the knowledge that he is likely by such act
to cause death, commits the offence of culpable
homicide.”
42. A bare perusal of the above sections reflects that the distinction
between Section 304 Part II and Section 304A IPC lies in the mental
element accompanying the act. While Section 304A contemplates
death caused by rash or negligent conduct, Section 304 Part II is
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attracted where the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to
cause death, though without any intention to cause death.
“Knowledge” in this context denotes an awareness of the likelihood of
fatal consequences arising from the act committed. Such knowledge is
ordinarily inferred from the nature of the act, the surrounding
circumstances, and the degree of risk inherent in the conduct.
43. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in Mahadev Prasad Kaushik (supra),
while highlighting the distinction between Section 299, 304 A and 304
of the IPC, opined as under: –
” 20. The question then is as regards issuance of
summons under Section 304 IPC. Section 304 reads
thus:
“304. Punishment for culpable homicide not
amounting to murder.–Whoever commits culpable
homicide not amounting to murder, shall be
punished with imprisonment for life, or
imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine, if the act by which the death is
caused is done with the intention of causing death,
or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death;
or with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, or with fine,
or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge
that it is likely to cause death, but without any
intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death.”
A plain reading of the above section makes it clear that
it is in two parts. The first part of the section is
generally referred to as Section 304 Part I, whereas
the second part as Section 304 Part II. The first part
applies where the accused causes bodily injury to the
victim with intention to cause death; or
with intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death. Part II, on the other hand, comes into play
when death is caused by doing an act
with knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but
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without any intention to cause death or to cause such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
21. The makers of the Code observed:
“The most important consideration upon a trial
for this offence is the intention or knowledge with
which the act which caused death, was done. The
intention to cause death or the knowledge that
death will probably be caused, is essential and is
that to which the law principally looks. And it is of
the utmost importance that those who may be
entrusted with judicial powers should clearly
understand that no conviction ought to take place,
unless such intention or knowledge can from the
evidence be concluded to have really existed.”
The makers further stated:
“It may be asked how can the existence of the
requisite intention or knowledge be proved, seeing
that these are internal and invisible acts of the
mind? They can be ascertained only from external
and visible acts. Observation and experience
enable us to judge of the connection between men’s
conduct and their intentions. We know that a sane
man does not usually commit certain acts
heedlessly or unintentionally and generally we
have no difficulty in inferring from his conduct
what was his real intention upon any given
occasion.”
22. Before Section 304 can be invoked, the following
ingredients must be satisfied:
(i) the death of the person must have been
caused;
(ii) such death must have been caused by the
act of the accused by causing bodily injury;
(iii) there must be an intention on the part of
the accused:
(a) to cause death; or
(b) to cause such bodily injury which is likely
to cause death (Part I);
(iv) there must be knowledge on the part of
the accused that the bodily injury is such that
it is likely to cause death (Part II).
23. Section 304-A was inserted by the Penal Code
(Amendment) Act, 1870 (Act 27 of 1870) and reads
thus:
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“304-A. Causing death by negligence.–Whoever
causes the death of any person by doing any rash
or negligent act not amounting to culpable
homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to
two years, or with fine, or with both.”
The section deals with homicidal death by rash or
negligent act. It does not create a new offence. It is
directed against the offences outside the range of
Sections 299 and 300 IPC and covers those cases
where death has been caused
without intention or knowledge. The words “not
amounting to culpable homicide” in the provision are
significant and clearly convey that the section seeks to
embrace those cases where there is neither intention
to cause death, nor knowledge that the act done will in
all probability result into death. It applies to acts
which are rash or negligent and are directly the cause
of death of another person.
24. There is thus distinction between Section 304 and
Section 304-A. Section 304-A carves out cases where
death is caused by doing a rash or negligent act which
does not amount to culpable homicide not amounting
to murder within the meaning of Section 299 or
culpable homicide amounting to murder under
Section 300 IPC. In other words, Section 304-A
excludes all the ingredients of Section 299 as also of
Section 300. Where intention or knowledge is the
“motivating force” of the act complained of, Section
304-A will have to make room for the graver and
more serious charge of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder or amounting to murder as the
facts disclose. The section has application to those
cases where there is neither intention to cause death
nor knowledge that the act in all probability will cause
death.
25. In Empress of India v. Idu Beg [ILR (1881) 3 All
776] Straight, J. made the following pertinent
observations which have been quoted with approval by
various courts including this Court: (ILR p. 780)
“… criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous
or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and
that it may cause injury, but without intention to
cause injury, or knowledge that it will probably be
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caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of
doing such an act with recklessness or
indifference as to the consequences. Criminal
negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or
failure to exercise that reasonable and proper
care and precaution to guard against injury
either to the public generally or to an individual
in particular, which, having regard to all the
circumstances out of which the charge has
arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused
person to have adopted.”
26. Though the term “negligence” has not been defined
in the Code, it may be stated that negligence is the
omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided upon those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, or
doing something which a reasonable and prudent
man would not do.
27. The learned counsel for the appellant-accused
submitted that by no stretch of imagination, can it be
said that the appellant while administering injections to
deceased Buddha Ram is said to have committed an
offence punishable under Section 304 IPC. It can never
be said that the death of Buddha Ram had been
caused by the appellant by doing the act of giving
injections with intention to cause his death or to cause
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
Likewise, it is impossible to think that the purported
act has been done by the appellant-accused with
the knowledge that in all probability, it would result
into the death of Buddha Ram.”
(Emphasis supplied)
44. Hence, the above judgment, crystalized the conceptual distinction
between the mental elements of intention, knowledge, rashness and
negligence in the context of Sections 299, 304 and 304A of the IPC.
While intention and knowledge constitute the mental elements for
culpable homicide, and rashness constitutes the mental element for
304 A. It is important to note that the concept of “knowledge” appears
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both in the concept of criminal rashness under Section 304A as well
as in Section 304 Part II of the IPC, however, the degree and nature of
such knowledge is fundamentally different. In cases of criminal
rashness, the accused is aware that his act is dangerous and may cause
fatal injury i.e. knowledge that consequence may follow, yet he
proceeds with recklessness or indifference to consequences. However,
for attracting Section 304 Part II, the knowledge required is of a higher
degree, namely the awareness that the act is likely to cause death in
all probability. Thus, while rashness involves knowledge of risk of
fatal injury coupled with reckless disregard, Section 304 Part II
requires conscious awareness of the likelihood of death as a probable
consequence of the act. The distinction therefore lies not merely in the
presence of knowledge, but in the degree of probability of death
contemplated by the accused. Hence only when, intention or
knowledge is the motivating force, the offence would fall within the
ambit of Section 304 Part II.
45. Similar view has been echoed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of Prabhakaran (supra). The case centres around a motor vehicle
accident caused by the accused bus driver, who ran his bus over a 10-
year-old boy. Initially, considering that the bus driver had ignored the
warnings of the pedestrians and the passengers cautioning him to not
drive the bus recklessly (thereby implying that he had knowledge that
death is likely to be caused), he was convicted under Section 304 Part
II by the learned Trial Court as well as the High Court. However,
while allowing the appeal of the accused and convicting him under the
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Section 304 A of the IPC, the Hon’ble Apex Court not only delineated
the boundary between Sections 304 Part II and 304 A but also
explicated the distinction between criminal rashness and criminal
negligence within the framework of Section 304A. On a detailed
evaluation of the evidence on record, it was held that there was no
evidence to suggest that the accused had the knowledge that his act
was likely to cause death, thereby excluding the application of Section
304 Part II. It was re-iterated that criminal rashness connotes an act
done with the consciousness of a risk that evil consequences may
follow, yet with the hope that they will not, whereas criminal
negligence implies a breach of duty to take care, marked by a failure
to exercise reasonable and proper caution expected in the
circumstances. Both concepts fall within the ambit of Section 304A
when death is caused without intention or knowledge. The relevant
extract is reproduced as under: –
“5. Section 304-A speaks of causing death by
negligence. This section applies to rash and negligent
acts and does not apply to cases where death has been
voluntarily caused. This section obviously does not
apply to cases where there is an intention to cause
death or knowledge that the act will in all probability
cause death. It only applies to cases in which without
any such intention or knowledge death is caused by
what is described as a rash and negligent act.
6. A negligent act is an act done without doing
something which a reasonable man guided upon those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct
of human affairs would do or act which a prudent or
reasonable man would not do in the circumstances
attending it. A rash act is a negligent act done
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observed that in rashness the action is done
precipitately that the mischievous or illegal
consequences may fall, but with a hope that they will
not. Lord Atkin in Andrews v. Director of Public
Prosecutions [1937 AC 576 : (1937) 2 All ER 552] AC
at p. 583 observed as under : (All ER p. 556 C-E)
“Simple lack of care such as will constitute civil
liability is not enough. For purposes of the
criminal law there are degrees of negligence, and a
very high degree of negligence is required to be
proved before the felony is established. Probably of
all the epithets that can be applied ‘reckless’ most
nearly covers the case. It is difficult to visualise a
case of death caused by ‘reckless’ driving, in the
connotation of that term in ordinary speech,
which would not justify a conviction for
manslaughter, but it is probably not all-
embracing, for ‘reckless’ suggests an indifference
to risk, whereas the accused may have
appreciated the risk, and intended to avoid it, and
yet shown in the means adopted to avoid the risk
such a high degree of negligence as would justify
a conviction.”
7. “7. Section 304-A applies to cases where there is no
intention to cause death and no knowledge that the act
done in all probability will cause death. The provision
is directed at offences outside the range of Sections
299 and 300 IPC. The provision applies only to such
acts which are rash and negligent and are directly
cause of death of another person. Negligence and
rashness are essential elements under Section 304-A.
Culpable negligence lies in the failure to exercise
reasonable and proper care and the extent of its
reasonableness will always depend upon the
circumstances of each case. Rashness means doing an
act with the consciousness of a risk that evil
consequences will follow but with the hope that it will
not. Negligence is a breach of duty imposed by law. In
criminal cases, the amount and degree of negligence
are determining factors. A question whether the
accused’s conduct amounted to culpable rashness or
negligence depends directly on the question as to what
is the amount of care and circumspection which a
prudent and reasonable man would consider it to be
sufficient considering all the circumstances of the case.
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Criminal rashness means hazarding a dangerous or
wanton act with the knowledge that it is dangerous or
wanton and the further knowledge that it may cause
injury but done without any intention to cause injury or
knowledge that it would probably be caused.
8. As noted above, ‘rashness’ consists in hazarding a
dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is
so, and that it may cause injury. The criminality lies
in such a case in running the risk of doing such an
act with recklessness or indifference as to the
consequences. Criminal negligence on the other hand,
is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise
that reasonable and proper care and precaution to
guard against injury either to the public generally or to
an individual in particular, which, having regard to all
the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen it
was the imperative duty of the accused person to have
adopted.
9. The distinction has been very aptly pointed out by
Holloway, J. in these words:
‘Culpable rashness is acting with the
consciousness that the mischievous and illegal
consequences may follow, but with the hope that
they will not, and often with the belief that the
actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent
their happening. The imputability arises from
acting despite the consciousness (luxuria).
Culpable negligence is acting without the
consciousness that the illegal and mischievous
effect will follow, but in circumstances which show
that the actor has not exercised the caution
incumbent upon him, and that if he had he would
have had the consciousness. The imputability
arises from the neglect of the civic duty of
circumspection.’ (See Nidamarti Nagabhushanam,
In re [7 Mad HCR 119] , Mad HCR pp. 119-20.)
Xxx xxx xxx
8. When the factual scenario of the present case is
analysed, it is crystal clear that the appropriate
conviction would be under Section 304-A IPC and not
Section 304 Part II IPC. Conviction is accordingly
altered. The maximum sentence which can be imposed
for offence punishable under Section 304-A is two years
with fine or with both. The custodial sentence,
therefore, is reduced to the maximum i.e. two years.”
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(emphasis supplied)
46. Crucially, it was underscored that even a high degree of rashness
or negligence does not elevate the offence to Section 304 Part II unless
it is accompanied by the requisite knowledge of the likelihood of
death, which remains the decisive distinguishing element.
Accordingly, in the absence of such knowledge, the conviction was
altered from Section 304 Part II to Section 304A IPC.
47. Similar observations have been made in the judgment passed by a
co-ordinate Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan, in the judgment of
Abul Kalam Musalman (supra), and the judgment passed by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther (supra).
48. Hence, the general trend was that most road accidents resulting in
death were prosecuted under Section 304A of the IPC unless there was
a clear “intention” to cause death or “knowledge” of death as a
consequence, decipherable from the evidence.
49. However, the Hon’ble Apex Court, in Alister Anthony Pareira
(supra), in the context of drunken driving, opined that some motor
vehicle cases are not mere rashness and negligence but culpable
homicide (304 Part II), when the evidence demonstrates that driver
knows that his act is so dangerous that it is likely to cause death. In
the facts of that case, the car driven by the accused, in a drunken state,
ran over laborers sleeping on the pavement, killing seven persons and
causing injuries to about eight persons. The learned Trial Court
initially convicted the accused under Section 304 A and 337 of the
IPC, while the High Court altered the conviction under section 304 A
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to Section 304 Part II. While dismissing the appeal of the accused and
upholding the view adopted by the High Court, it was held as under: –
” 38. Insofar as Section 304-A IPC is concerned, it
deals with death caused by doing any rash or
negligent act where such death is caused neither
intentionally nor with the knowledge that the act of
the offender is likely to cause death. The applicability
of Section 304-A IPC is limited to rash or negligent
acts which cause death but fall short of culpable
homicide amounting to murder or culpable homicide
not amounting to murder. An essential element to
attract Section 304-A IPC is death caused due to rash
or negligent act. The three things which are required to
be proved for an offence under Section 304-A are:
(1) death of human being;
(2) the accused caused the death; and
(3) the death was caused by the doing of a rash or
negligent act, though it did not amount to culpable
homicide of either description.
39. Like Section 304-A, Sections 279, 336, 337 and 338
IPC are attracted for only the negligent or rash act.
The scheme of Sections 279, 304-A, 336, 337 and 338
leaves no manner of doubt that these offences are
punished because of the inherent danger of the acts
specified therein irrespective of knowledge or
intention to produce the result and irrespective of the
result. These sections make punishable the acts
themselves which are likely to cause death or injury to
human life.
40. The question is whether indictment of an accused
under Section 304 Part II and Section 338 IPC can
coexist in a case of single rash or negligent act. We
think it can. We do not think that the two charges are
mutually destructive. If the act is done with the
knowledge of the dangerous consequences which are
likely to follow and if death is caused, then not only
that the punishment is for the act but also for the
resulting homicide and a case may fall within Section
299 or Section 300 depending upon the mental state of
the accused viz. as to whether the act was done with
one kind of knowledge or the other or the intention.
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Knowledge is awareness on the part of the person
concerned of the consequences of his act of omission
or commission indicating his state of mind. There may
be knowledge of likely consequences without any
intention. Criminal culpability is determined by
referring to what a person with reasonable prudence
would have known.
41. Rash or negligent driving on a public road with
the knowledge of the dangerous character and the
likely effect of the act and resulting in death may fall
in the category of culpable homicide not amounting to
murder. A person, doing an act of rash or negligent
driving, if aware of a risk that a particular
consequence is likely to result and that result occurs,
may be held guilty not only of the act but also of the
result. As a matter of law–in view of the provisions of
IPC–the cases which fall within the last clause of
Section 299 but not within clause “Fourthly” of Section
300 may cover the cases of rash or negligent act done
with the knowledge of the likelihood of its dangerous
consequences and may entail punishment under Section
304 Part II IPC. Section 304-A IPC takes out of its
ambit the cases of death of any person by doing any
rash or negligent act amounting to culpable homicide
of either description.
42. A person, responsible for a reckless or rash or
negligent act that causes death which he had
knowledge as a reasonable man that such act was
dangerous enough to lead to some untoward thing
and the death was likely to be caused, may be
attributed with the knowledge of the consequence and
may be fastened with culpability of homicide not
amounting to murder and punishable under Section
304 Part II IPC. There is no incongruity, if
simultaneously with the offence under Section 304
Part II, a person who has done an act so rashly or
negligently endangering human life or the personal
safety of the others and causes grievous hurt to any
person is tried for the offence under Section 338 IPC.
43. In view of the above, in our opinion there is no
impediment in law for an offender being charged for
the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC and also
under Sections 337 and 338 IPC. The two charges
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under Section 304 Part II IPC and Section 338 IPC can
legally coexist in a case of single rash or negligent act
where a rash or negligent act is done with the
knowledge of likelihood of its dangerous consequences.
44. By charging the appellant for the offence under
Section 304 Part II IPC and Section 338 IPC–which is
legally permissible–no prejudice has been caused to
him. The appellant was made fully aware of the
charges against him and there is no failure of justice.
We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of
Mr U.U. Lalit that by charging the appellant for the
offences under Section 304 Part II IPC and Section 338
IPC for a rash or negligent act resulting in injuries to
eight persons and at the same time committed with the
knowledge resulting in death of seven persons, the
appellant has been asked to face a legally
impermissible course.
45. In Prabhakaran v. State of Kerala [(2007) 14 SCC
269 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 873] this Court was
concerned with the appeal filed by a convict who was
found guilty of the offence punishable under Section
304 Part II IPC. In that case, the bus driven by the
convict ran over a boy aged 10 years. The prosecution
case was that the bus was being driven by the appellant
therein at enormous speed and although the passengers
had cautioned the driver to stop as they had seen
children crossing the road in a queue, the driver ran
over the student on his head. It was alleged that the
driver had real intention to cause death of persons to
whom harm may be caused on the bus hitting them. He
was charged with offence punishable under Section 302
IPC. The trial court found that no intention had been
proved in the case but at the same time the accused
acted with the knowledge that it was likely to cause
death, and, therefore, convicted the accused of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder punishable under
Section 304 Part II IPC and sentenced him to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for five years and pay a fine of
Rs 15,000 with a default sentence of imprisonment for
three years. The High Court dismissed the appeal and
the matter reached this Court.
46. While observing that Section 304-A speaks of
causing death by negligence and applies to rash and
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negligent acts and does not apply to cases where there
is an intention to cause death or knowledge that the act
will in all probability cause death and that Section 304-
A only applies to cases in which without any such
intention or knowledge death is caused by a rash and
negligent act, on the factual scenario of the case, it was
held in Prabhakaran case [(2007) 14 SCC 269 : (2009)
1 SCC (Cri) 873] that the appropriate conviction would
be under Section 304-A IPC and not Section 304 Part II
IPC. Prabhakaran [(2007) 14 SCC 269 : (2009) 1 SCC
(Cri) 873] does not say in absolute terms that in no
case of an automobile accident that results in death of
a person due to rash and negligent act of the driver,
the conviction can be maintained for the offence
under Section 304 Part II IPC even if such act (rash
or negligent) was done with the knowledge that by
such act of his, death was likely to be
caused. Prabhakaran [(2007) 14 SCC 269 : (2009) 1
SCC (Cri) 873] turned on its own facts.
47. Each case obviously has to be decided on its own
facts. In a case where negligence or rashness is the
cause of death and nothing more, Section 304-A may be
attracted but where the rash or negligent act is
preceded with the knowledge that such act is likely to
cause death, Section 304 Part II IPC may be attracted
and if such a rash and negligent act is preceded by
real intention on the part of the wrongdoer to cause
death, offence may be punishable under Section 302
IPC.
Xxx xxx xxx
Re : Question (iii)
67. The crucial question now remains to be seen is
whether the prosecution evidence establishes beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of offences under
Section 304 Part II IPC, Section 338 IPC and Section
337 IPC against the appellant.
Xxx xxx xxx
74. The above evidence has been considered by the
High Court quite extensively. The High Court, on
consideration of the entire prosecution evidence and
having regard to the deficiencies pointed out by the
defence, reached the conclusion that (1) the accused
at the time of driving the car was under the influence
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of liquor; (2) he drove the car in a drunken condition
at a very high speed; and (3) he failed to control the
vehicle and the vehicle could not be stopped before it
ran over the people sleeping on the pavement.
Xxx xxx xxx
75. The High Court observed that the accused could
not concentrate on driving as he was under the
influence of liquor and the vehicle was being driven
with loud noise and a tape recorder being played in
high volume. The High Court held that the accused
had more than 22 ft wide road for driving and there
was no occasion for a driver to swing to the left and
cover a distance of more than 55 ft; climb over the
footpath and run over the persons sleeping on the
footpath.
Xxx xxx xxx
78. We have also carefully considered the evidence let
in by the prosecution–the substance of which has been
referred to above–and we find no justifiable ground to
take a view different from that of the High Court. We
agree with the conclusions of the High Court and have
no hesitation in holding that the evidence and
materials on record prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the appellant can be attributed with knowledge
that his act of driving the vehicle at a high speed in a
rash or negligent manner was dangerous enough and
he knew that one result would very likely be that
people who were asleep on the pavement may be hit,
should the vehicle go out of control.
79. There is a presumption that a man knows the
natural and likely consequences of his acts. Moreover,
an act does not become involuntary act simply
because its consequences were unforeseen. The cases
of negligence or of rashness or dangerous driving do
not eliminate the act being voluntary. In the present
case, the essential ingredients of Section 304 Part II
IPC have been successfully established by the
prosecution against the appellant. The infirmities
pointed out by Mr U.U. Lalit, learned Senior Counsel
for the appellant, which have been noticed above are
not substantial and in no way affect the legality of the
trial and the conviction of the appellant under Section
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304 Part II IPC. We uphold the view of the High Court
being consistent with the evidence on record and law.”
(emphasis supplied)
50. Similarly, the case of Sanjeev Nanda (supra) relates to an
unfortunate motor vehicle accident, caused by the accused, who under
the influence of alcohol, ran over his BMW car over 7 persons. On the
basis of the evidence placed forth, the learned Trial Court convicted
the accused under section 304 Part II of the IPC, however, the appeal
against the same was allowed and the High Court converted the
conviction of the accused from Section 304 part II to 304 A, observing
that there was no “knowledge” of causing death. The Hon’ble Apex
Court restored the conviction under Section 304 Part II, holding that
from the aggravated circumstances and the manner of accident i.e.
driving a high-powered vehicle in a drunken condition at high speed in
a public place, and continuing to drive even after hitting persons,
clearly reflected that the accused had the knowledge that his act was
likely to cause death. It was further emphasized that knowledge can be
inferred from the circumstances and the nature of the act and that such
cases cannot be treated as mere negligence. The relevant extract is
reproduced as under: –
” 26. After having critically gone through the evidence
available on record, we have no doubt in our mind that
the accident had occurred solely and wholly on account
of rash and negligent driving of BMW car by the
respondent, at a high speed, who was also intoxicated
at that point of time. This fact has been admitted by the
respondent-accused at the appellate stage in the High
Court that at the relevant point of time, the respondent
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even then, it would be only his rash and negligent act,
attracting Section 304-A IPC only. Even though it is
difficult to come to the aforesaid conclusion, since he
was in an inebriated condition. For the simple reason
that he had already driven almost 16 km from the place
where he had started, to the point where he actually
met with the accident without encountering any
untoward incident would not go absolutely in favour of
the respondent. There is no evidence on record that
they had consumed more liquor on their way also. No
such material objects were recovered from the vehicle,
to suggest that even while driving they were consuming
liquor. One may fail to understand if one could drive
safely for a distance of 16 km, then whether the effect of
intoxication would rise all of a sudden so as to find the
respondent totally out of control. There is nothing of
that sort but it cannot be denied that he must have been
a little tipsy because of the drinks he had consumed
some time back. It is, indeed, extremely difficult to
assess or judge when liquor would show its effect or
would be at its peak. It varies from person to person.
Xxx xxx xxx
29. It has also come on record that seven persons were
standing close to the middle of the road. One would not
expect such a group, at least, at that place of the road,
that too in the wee hours of the morning, on such a
wintry night. There is every possibility of the accused
failing to see them on the road. Looking to all this, it
can be safely assumed that he had no intention of
causing bodily injuries to them but he had certainly
knowledge that causing such injuries and fleeing away
from the scene of accident, may ultimately result in
their deaths.
30. It is also pertinent to mention that soon after hitting
one of them, the accused did not apply the brakes so as
to save at least some of the lives. Since all the seven of
them were standing in a group, he had not realised that
impact would be so severe that they would be dragged
for several feet. Possibility also cannot be ruled out
that soon after hitting them, the respondent, a young
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to a halt. He must have then realised the blunder he
committed.
31. The respondent, instead of rendering a helping
hand to the injured, ran away from the scene, thus
adding further to the miseries of the victims. It is not a
good trend to run away after causing motor road
accidents. An attempt should be made to render all
possible help, including medical assistance, if required.
Human touch to the same has to be given.
32. An aspect which is generally lost sight of in such
cases is that bodily injuries or death are as a
consequence of accidents. “Accident” has been defined
by Black’s Law Dictionary as under:
“Accident.–(1) An unintended and unforeseen
injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in
the usual course of events or that could not be
reasonably anticipated.”
Thus, it means, if the injury/death is caused by an
accident, that itself cannot be attributed to an intention.
If intention is proved and death is caused, then it would
amount to culpable homicide.
33. It is to be noted that in Alister Anthony Pareira
case [(2012) 2 SCC 648 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 953 :
(2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 848] , the earlier two judgments of
this Court in State of Gujarat v. Haidarali
Kalubhai [(1976) 1 SCC 889 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 211]
and Naresh Giri v. State of M.P. [(2008) 1 SCC 791 :
(2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 324] , both rendered by a Bench of
two learned Judges of this Court, were neither cited
nor have been referred to. Thus, the ratio decidendi of
these cases has not at all been considered in Alister
case [(2012) 2 SCC 648 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 953 :
(2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 848] .
34. In the former case, it has been held in paras 4 and 5
as under: (Haidarali Kalubhai case [(1976) 1 SCC 889
: 1976 SCC (Cri) 211] , SCC p. 891)
“4. Section 304-A carves out a specific offence where
death is caused by doing a rash or negligent act and
that act does not amount to culpable homicide under
Section 299 IPC or murder under Section 300 IPC. If
a person wilfully drives a motor vehicle into the midst
of a crowd and thereby causes death to some persons,
it will not be a case of mere rash and negligent driving
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and the act will amount to culpable homicide. Each
case will, therefore, depend upon the particular facts
established against the accused.
5. The prosecution in this case wanted to establish a
motive for committing the offence against the
Sarpanch. It was sought to be established that there
was enmity between the Sarpanch and the accused
and his relations on account of panchayat elections.
Some evidence was led in order to prove that the
accused and his relations were gunning against the
Sarpanch for some time after the latter’s election as
Sarpanch. Even an anonymous letter was received by
the Sarpanch threatening his life which was handed
over to the police by the Sarpanch. Both the Sessions
Judge as well as the High Court did not accept the
evidence appertaining to motive. Mr Mukherjee,
therefore, rightly and very fairly did not address us
with regard to that part of the case. Even so, the
learned counsel submits that the act per se and the
manner in which the vehicle was driven clearly
brought the case under Section 304 Part II IPC.”
35. It is further held in the same judgment at para 10 as
under: (Haidarali Kalubhai case [(1976) 1 SCC 889 :
1976 SCC (Cri) 211] , SCC p. 892)
“10. Section 304-A by its own definition totally
excludes the ingredients of Section 299 or Section 300
IPC. Doing an act with the intent to kill a person or
knowledge that doing of an act was likely to cause a
person’s death are ingredients of the offence of
culpable homicide. When intent or knowledge as
described above is the direct motivating force of the
act complained of, Section 304-A has to make room
for the graver and more serious charge of culpable
homicide.”
36. It is interesting to note that this judgment
in Haidarali case [(1976) 1 SCC 889 : 1976 SCC (Cri)
211] had been a sheet anchor of arguments of both the
learned Senior Counsel appearing for parties. They
have read it differently and have tried to put different
interpretations to the same.
37. In the latter case of Naresh Giri [(2008) 1 SCC 791
: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 324] it has been held in the
headnote as under: (SCC pp. 791-92)
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“Section 304-A IPC applies to cases where there is no
intention to cause death and no knowledge that the act
done in all probability will cause death. The provision
is directed at offences outside the range of Sections 299
and 300 IPC. Section 304-A applies only to such acts
which are rash and negligent and are directly the cause
of death of another person. Negligence and rashness
are essential elements under Section 304-A.
Section 304-A carves out a specific offence where death
is caused by doing a rash or negligent act and that act
does not amount to culpable homicide under Section
299 or murder under Section 300. If a person wilfully
drives a motor vehicle into the midst of a crowd and
thereby causes death to some person, it will not be a
case of mere rash and negligent driving and the act will
amount to culpable homicide. Doing an act with the
intent to kill a person or knowledge that doing an act
was likely to cause a person’s death is culpable
homicide. When intent or knowledge is the direct
motivating force of the act, Section 304-A has to make
room for the graver and more serious charge of
culpable homicide.”
38. We may profitably deal with the definition of
“reckless” as defined in The Law Lexicon, which reads
as under:
“Reckless.–Characterized by the creation of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to others and
by a conscious (and sometimes deliberate) disregard
for or indifference to that risk; heedless; rash. Reckless
conduct is much more than mere negligence: it is a
gross deviation from what a reasonable person would
do. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edn., 1999)
‘Intention cannot exist without foresight, but foresight
can exist without intention. For a man may foresee the
possible or even probable consequences of his conduct
and yet not desire them to occur; none the less if he
persists on his course he knowingly runs the risk of
bringing about the unwished result. To describe this
state of mind the word “reckless” is the most
appropriate. …'”
39. For our own benefit it is appropriate to reproduce
Section 304 IPC, which reads thus:
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“304.Punishment for culpable homicide not
amounting to murder.–Whoever commits culpable
homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished
with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years,
and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the
death is caused is done with the intention of causing
death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death;
or with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with
both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is
likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause
death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death.”
A critical and microscopic analysis thereof shows that
once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is
established but without any intention to cause death,
then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend
to 10 years or with fine or with both.
This extract is taken from State v. Sanjeev Nanda,
(2012) 8 SCC 450 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 487 : (2012) 3
SCC (Cri) 899 : 2012 SCC OnLine SC 582 at page
471
40. Now, we have to consider if it is a fit case where
conviction should be altered to Section 304 Part II IPC
and sentence awarded should be enhanced.
41. We are of the considered view that looking to the
nature and manner in which the accident had taken
place, it can safely be held that the respondent had no
intention to cause death but certainly had the
knowledge that his act may result in death.
42. Thus, looking to the matter from all angles, we
have no doubt in our mind that knowledge can still be
attributed to accused Sanjeev that his act might cause
such bodily injuries which may, in ordinary course of
nature, be sufficient to cause death but certainly he
did not have any intention to cause death. He was not
driving the vehicle with that intention. There is
nothing to prove that he knew that a group of persons
was standing on the road he was going to pass
through. If that be so, there cannot be an intention to
cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause
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death. Thus, in our opinion, he had committed an
offence under Section 304 Part II IPC. We
accordingly hold so.
Xxx xxx xxx
47. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the appeal
is partly allowed. The judgment [Sanjeev
Nanda v. State, (2009) 160 DLT 775] and order of
conviction passed by the Delhi High Court is partly set
aside and the order of conviction of the trial court is
restored and upheld. The accused is held guilty under
Section 304 Part II IPC. Looking to the facts and
circumstances of the same, we deem it appropriate to
maintain the sentence awarded by the High Court,
which he has already undergone. However, we make it
clear that this has been held so, looking to the very
peculiar facts and features of this particular case and it
may not be treated as a precedent of general
proposition of law on the point, for other cases.
Xxx xxx xxx
K.S.P. RADHAKRISHNAN, J. (supplementing [Ed.:
Deepak Verma, J. has signed this opinion as well.] )–
Section 304 Part II or Section 304-A IPC
102. We may in the above background examine whether
the offence falls under Section 304 Part II IPC or
Section 304-A IPC from the facts unfolded in this case.
Shri Raval, appearing for the State, as already
indicated, argued that the facts of this case lead to the
irresistible conclusion that it would fall under Section
304 Part II IPC. The learned counsel pointed out that
the accused after having noticed that the speeding car
had hit several persons, left the spot without giving any
medical aid or help knowing fully well that his act was
likely to cause death. The learned counsel pointed out
that in any view, it would at least fall under Section 304
Part II IPC.
Xxx xxx xxx
111. In Jagriti Devi v. State of H.P. [(2009) 14 SCC
771 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 245] a Bench of this Court
held that it is trite law that Section 304 Part II comes
into play when the death is caused by doing an act
with knowledge that it is likely to cause death but
there is no intention on the part of the accused either
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to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death.
114. The principle mentioned by this Court in Alister
Anthony Pareira [(2012) 2 SCC 648 : (2012) 1 SCC
(Cri) 953 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 848] indicates that the
person must be presumed to have had the knowledge
that, his act of driving the vehicle without a licence in a
high speed after consuming liquor beyond the
permissible limit, is likely or sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death of the pedestrians on
the road. In our view, Alister Anthony Pareira [(2012)
2 SCC 648 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 953 : (2012) 1 SCC
(Civ) 848] judgment calls for no reconsideration.
Assuming that Shri Ram Jethmalani is right in
contending that while he was driving the vehicle in a
drunken state, he had no intention or knowledge that
his action was likely to cause death of six human
beings, in our view, at least, immediately after having
hit so many human beings and the bodies scattered
around, he had the knowledge that his action was likely
to cause death of so many human beings, lying on the
road unattended. To say, still he had no knowledge
about his action is too childish which no reasonable
man can accept as worthy of consideration. So far as
this case is concerned, it has been brought out in
evidence that the accused was in an inebriated state,
after consuming excessive alcohol, he was driving the
vehicle without licence, in a rash and negligent manner
in a high speed which resulted in the death of six
persons. The accused had sufficient knowledge that
his action was likely to cause death and such an
action would, in the facts and circumstances of this
case, fall under Section 304 Part II IPC and the trial
court has rightly held so and the High Court has
committed an error in converting the offence to
Section 304-A IPC.
115. We may now examine the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances and decide as to whether
the punishment awarded by the High Court is
commensurate with the gravity of the offence.
116. The mitigating circumstances suggested by the
defence counsel are as follows:
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(i) The accused was only 21 years on the date of the
accident, later married and has a daughter;
(ii) Prolonged trial and judicial unfairness caused
prejudice;
(iii) The accused has undergone sentence of two years
awarded by the High Court and, during that period, his
conduct and behaviour in the jail was appreciated;
(iv) Accident occurred on a foggy day in the early
hours of morning with poor visibility;
(v) The accused had no previous criminal record nor
has he been involved in any criminal case
subsequently;
(vi) The accused and the family members contributed
and paid a compensation of Rs 65 lakhs, in total, in the
year 1999 to the families of the victims;
(vii) The accused had neither the intention nor
knowledge of the ultimate consequences of his action
and that he was holding a driving licence from the
United States.
117. Following are, in our view, the aggravating
circumstances unfolded in this case:
(i) Six persons died due to the rash and negligent
driving of the accused and the car was driven with the
knowledge that drunken driving without licence is
likely to cause death.
(ii) Much of the delay in completing the trial could have
been avoided if wisdom had dawned on the accused
earlier. Only at the appellate stage the accused had
admitted that it was he who was driving the vehicle on
the fateful day which resulted in the death of six
persons and delay in completion of the trial cannot be
attributed to the prosecution as the prosecution was
burdened with the task of establishing the offence
beyond reasonable doubt by examining sixty-one
witnesses and producing several documents including
expert evidence.
(iii) The accused did not stop the vehicle in spite of the
fact that the vehicle had hit six persons and one got
injured and escaped from the spot without giving any
helping hand to the victims who were dying and crying
for help. Human lives could have been saved, if the
accused had shown some mercy.
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(iv) The accused had the knowledge that the car driven
by him had hit the human beings and human bodies
were scattered around and they might die, but he
thought of only his safety and left the place, leaving
their fate to destiny which, in our view, is not a normal
human psychology and no court can give a stamp of
approval to that conduct.
(v) Non-reporting the crime to the police even after
reaching home and failure to take any steps to provide
medical help even after escaping from the site.
Xxx xxx xxx
Sentencing
119. We have to decide, after having found on facts,
that this case would fall under Section 304 Part II,
what will be the appropriate sentence. Generally, the
policy which the court adopts while awarding sentence
is that the punishment must be appropriate and
proportional to the gravity of the offence committed.
Law demands that the offender should be adequately
punished for the crime, so that it can deter the offender
and other persons from committing similar offences.
Nature and circumstances of the offence; the need for
the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the
offence; to afford adequate deterrence to the conduct
and to protect the public from such crimes are certain
factors to be considered while imposing the sentence.
Xxx xxx xxx
121. The High Court, in our view, has committed an
error in converting the conviction to Section 304-A
IPC from that of Section 304 Part II IPC and the
conviction awarded calls for a relook on the basis of
the facts already discussed, otherwise this Court will
be setting a bad precedent and sending a wrong
message to the public. After having found that the
offence would fall under Section 304 Part II IPC, not
under Section 304-A, the following sentence awarded
would meet the ends of justice, in addition to the
sentence already awarded by the High Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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51. From the conspectus of the above judgments, it is evident that
cases of motor vehicle accidents resulting in death are heavily fact-
dependent, and the applicability of Section 304A or Section 304 Part II
depends primarily upon the manner of the accident and the mental
element attributable to the accused, which has to be gathered from the
evidence. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles the facts of the
present case are required to be examined.
52. In the present case, firstly, the Petitioner/CCL, aged 17 years 11
months 26 days, was driving his Mercedes car bearing No. DL-2FCM-
3000, on the date of the incident without a valid license, at a speed of
approximately 80-100 kmph, in a zone where the permissible speed
limit was 50 kmph. The prosecution has also relied upon the FSL
report which suggests that the speed of the offending vehicle was 90-
95 Kmph.
53. Secondly, the other six co-occupants of the offending vehicle, have
categorically stated in their statements under section 161 and 164 of
the CrPC that the Petitioner/CCL was driving the vehicle at a very
high speed, he has a habit of over speeding and driving his vehicle in a
rash manner and despite repeated requests to drive carefully and to
reduce the speed of the offending vehicle, the Petitioner/CCL did not
pay heed to the warnings.
54. Thirdly, the eyewitnesses, namely Mr. Girish Kumar, Mr. Pradeep
Satia and Mr. Narender Singh as well as Mr. Amanjeet Bhatia and Mr.
Vijender Nagar have stated in their statement under section 161 of the
CrPC that the offending Mercedes car bearing No. DL 2F CM 3000,
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came at a very high speed of about 100 Kmph and hit the
deceased/Shiddharth Sharma, who was crossing the road and
consequently that person fell on the road after bouncing 15/20 feet in
the air and sustained fatal injuries. The occupants of the vehicle, i.e.
few boys aged between 15-18 years, de-boarded the vehicle and ran
away and it was these eye-witnesses who helped the injured reached
SPN Hospital.
55. Fourthly, it has also come on record that the Petitioner had also
dodged two motor-cyclists and Mr. Amanjeet Bhatia and Mr. Vijender
Nagar had a narrow escape from the offending vehicle, while was
being driven at a speed of about 100 Kmph. The same is also
supported by the statement of Shrey Monga, Ayush Rastogi and Sanad
Goel as well.
56. Fifthly, the prosecution has also brought forth the previous traffic
challans and traffic violations by the Petitioner/CCL, including one of
over-speeding, to allege that the Petitioner was not new to driving
without a license as minor and was always aware of the fatal
consequences of his act of driving his vehicle at such a high speed,
without having a valid driving license and requisite skills to drive the
vehicle.
57. Sixthly, the accident has occurred at 8:45 p.m., on a busy public
road at peak traffic hours and not on a secluded road or open ground
where the chances of other pedestrians or vehicles on the road would
be comparatively lesser.
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58. Lastly, the prosecution has also brought on record the FSL report
which prima facie suggests that there are no skid marks and thus, the
Petitioner/CCL did not apply brakes to save the victim and the manner
of accident as reflected in the CCTV footage also prima facie
demonstrates that the manner in which the vehicle was being driven,
death of a person would have been the most likely outcome.
59. Upon consideration of the material placed on record, the learned
JJB formed a prima facie opinion that the element of “knowledge” that
such conduct was likely to cause death is discernible, without
recording any conclusive finding on culpability. The manner of the
accident, coupled with the fact that the Petitioner/CCL was a minor
and ineligible to hold a valid driving licence, reasonably led the Board
to infer lack of requisite driving skill and awareness of the probable
fatal consequences. Accordingly, it was observed that notice for the
offence punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC was liable to be
framed.
60. Now, whether these circumstances ultimately establish
“knowledge” as required under section 304 part II, beyond reasonable
doubt, or the same falls within the lesser offence of 304 A or 279 of
the IPC, if at all, is a matter for trial and cannot be ascertained without
evidence led by parties. Even the defence contentions raised that high
speed or lack of driving license cannot by itself constitute
“knowledge” as required under Section 304 part II or that the traffic
signal was green, that the road was relatively empty, or that the victim
may have suddenly changed direction, are matters which require
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evidentiary evaluation. At this stage this Court cannot embark upon a
comparative assessment of the prosecution and defence versions or
conduct a detailed scrutiny of CCTV footage and the photographs.
61. The determination of the existence of mental elements such as
“intention” or “knowledge”, and whether the act in question amounts
merely to “rashness” or “negligence” or rises to the level of conscious
awareness of a likely fatal consequence, is essentially fact-specific and
can only be conclusively adjudicated upon appreciation of evidence
led by the parties. At the present stage, the Court is not required to and
cannot record definitive findings on such mental state. Hence, since
the material prima facie discloses the ingredients of Section 304 Part
II IPC, it was appropriate for the learned JJB to frame notice for the
said higher offence, leaving it open to the Board, upon conclusion of
inquiry, to determine whether the evidence ultimately sustains the said
charge or whether the case falls within the ambit of a lesser offence
such as Section 304A IPC. Such an approach obviates the possibility
of prejudice or procedural complications that may arise if the evidence
were later to justify the higher offence.
62. This approach has also been endorsed in the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ghulam Hassan Beigh (supra), wherein it
was observed that at the stage of framing of charge, if the material
discloses ingredients of a higher offence, it would be appropriate and
prudent to frame such charge, leaving it open to the trial court, upon
appreciation of evidence, to alter or modify the charge in accordance
with law. It was recognized that framing of a higher charge at the
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initial stage does not cause prejudice to the accused, as the power to
alter to a lesser charge is well preserved and conversely, omission to
frame the appropriate higher charge at the outset may necessitate
recommencement of proceedings if the evidence ultimately so
warrants. The relevant extract is reproduced as under: –
“31. To put it in other words, whether the cause of
death has any nexus with the alleged assault on the
deceased by the accused persons could have been
determined only after the recording of oral evidence
of the eyewitnesses and the expert witness along with
the other substantive evidence on record. The post-
mortem report of the doctor is his previous statement
based on his examination of the dead body. It is not
substantive evidence. The doctor’s statement in court
is alone the substantive evidence. The post-mortem
report can be used only to corroborate his statement
under Section 157, or to refresh his memory under
Section 159, or to contradict his statement in the
witness box under Section 145 of the Evidence Act,
1872. A medical witness called in as an expert to
assist the court is not a witness of fact and the
evidence given by the medical officer is really of an
advisory character given on the basis of the symptoms
found on examination. The expert witness is expected
to put before the court all materials inclusive of the
data which induced him to come to the conclusion
and enlighten the court on the technical aspect of the
case by explaining the terms of science so that the
court although, not an expert may form its own
judgment on those materials after giving due regard
to the expert’s opinion because once the expert’s
opinion is accepted, it is not the opinion of the
medical officer but of the court.
32. The prosecution should have been given
opportunity to prove all the relevant facts including
the post-mortem report through the medical officer
concerned by leading oral evidence and thereby seek
the opinion of the expert. It was too early on the part
of the trial court as well as the High Court to arrive
at the conclusion that since no serious injuries wereSignature Not Verified
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noted in the post-mortem report, the death of the
deceased on account of “cardio respiratory failure”
cannot be said to be having any nexus with the
incident in question.
33. Whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304
Part II IPC could have been decided by the trial
court only after the evaluation of the entire oral
evidence that may be led by the prosecution as well
as by the defence, if any, comes on record.
Ultimately, upon appreciation of the entire evidence
on record at the end of the trial, the trial court may
take one view or the other i.e. whether it is a case of
murder or case of culpable homicide. But at the
stage of framing of the charge, the trial court could
not have reached to such a conclusion merely
relying upon the post-mortem report on record. The
High Court also overlooked such fundamental
infirmity in the order passed by the trial court and
proceeded to affirm the same.
34. We may now proceed to consider the issue on
hand from a different angle. It is a settled position of
law that in a criminal trial, the prosecution can lead
evidence only in accordance with the charge framed
by the trial court. Where a higher charge is not
framed for which there is evidence, the accused is
entitled to assume that he is called upon to defend
himself only with regard to the lesser offence for
which he has been charged. It is not necessary then
for him to meet evidence relating to the offences
with which he has not been charged. He is merely to
answer the charge as framed. The Code does not
require him to meet all evidence led by the
prosecution. He has only to rebut evidence bearing
on the charge. The prosecution case is necessarily
limited by the charge. It forms the foundation of the
trial which starts with it and the accused can
justifiably concentrate on meeting the subject-matter
of the charge against him. He need not cross-
examine witnesses with regard to offences he is not
charged with nor need he give any evidence in
defence in respect of such charges.
35. Once the trial court decides to discharge an
accused person from the offence punishable under
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Section 302 IPC and proceeds to frame the lesser
charge for the offence punishable under Section 304
Part II IPC, the prosecution thereafter would not be
in a position to lead any evidence beyond the charge
as framed. To put it otherwise, the prosecution will
be thereafter compelled to proceed as if it has now to
establish only the case of culpable homicide and not
murder. On the other hand, even if the trial court
proceeds to frame charge under Section 302IPC in
accordance with the case put up by the prosecution
still it would be open for the accused to persuade the
Court at the end of the trial that the case falls only
within the ambit of culpable homicide punishable
under Section 304IPC. In such circumstances, in
the facts of the present case, it would be more
prudent to permit the prosecution to lead
appropriate evidence whatever it is worth in
accordance with its original case as put up in the
charge-sheet. Such approach of the trial court at
times may prove to be more rationale and prudent.
36. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the order
[Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohd. Maqbool Magrey,
2020 SCC OnLine J&K 735] of the High Court as
well as the order of the trial court deserve to be set
aside.
37. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby
allowed. The orders passed by the High Court and the
trial court are hereby set aside. The trial court shall
now proceed to pass a fresh order framing charge in
accordance with law keeping in mind the
observations made by this Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
63. Thus, in view of the aforesaid principles, where the material on
record prima facie discloses the ingredients of Section 304 Part II IPC,
this Court finds no infirmity in the impugned orders framing
Notice/charge for Section 304 part II against the accused/CCL and the
learned JJB can alter or modify or reduce the charge in accordance
with law, after appraisal of the evidence.
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64. As regards the offence under Sections 134/187 of the MV Act, the
learned JJB has directed framing of notice on the basis of the
prosecution material which alleges that the Petitioner, along with the
other occupants of the vehicle, fled from the spot immediately after
the incident, leaving the injured victim behind. The prosecution
version prima facie attracts the ingredients of the said provisions. The
contention raised on behalf of the Petitioner that he had, in fact,
assisted in placing the victim in an auto-rickshaw for being taken to
the hospital and that arrangements for medical treatment were
subsequently made through his father constitutes a matter of defence
which can only be evaluated upon appreciation of evidence.
65. Thus, without expressing any opinion on the ultimate merits of the
case, this Court finds no ground warranting interference in the
impugned orders.
66. It is clarified that the observations made herein are confined to the
adjudication of the present revision petition and shall not be construed
as expressing any conclusive finding on the merits of the case.
67. The learned JJB shall independently assess the evidence and
determine the appropriate offence, in accordance with law,
uninfluenced by any observation contained herein.
68. In view of the above discussion, the present petition is dismissed,
along with pending application(s), if any.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
APRIL 17, 2026
JN
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