Madhya Pradesh High Court
Arjun Singh vs The State Of M.P. on 16 April, 2026
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT Indore
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 16th OF APRIL, 2026
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 376 of 2000
ARJUN SINGH AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF M.P.
Appearance:
Shri Z.A. Khan - Sr. Advocate with Shri Ramesh Chandra Gupta -
Advocate for the appellants.
Shri Apoorv Joshi - Govt. Advocate for the respondent/State.
JUDGMENT
The present appeal u/S 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973[for
short referred to as ‗Cr.P.C‘ hereinafter] is filed assailing the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 24.03.2000 passed by 1st Additional
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Sessions Judge, Dewas, Distt. Dewas in S.T.No. 37/1997 whereby the
appellants/accused Arjun Singh and Fateh Singh were acquitted for the charge
of offence punishable u/S 302 of IPC, but both the accused were convicted for
offences punishable under Section 325 r/W Section 34 of IPC and sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for 04 years with fine of Rs. 7,000/- each with default
stipulation of additional rigorous imprisonment for 06 months.
2. The exposition of facts giving rise to present appeal, in brief, is as under:
(i) As per the accusation, Shaitan Singh and Lokendra Singh reported
to P.S. Kotwali Dewas on 14.11.1996 around 14:45 hours that on the
same day, they were working in the field. Fateh Singh and Arjun Singh
had an altercation with Lokendra Singh over grazing of cattle in the
field. Arjun Singh and Fateh Singh assaulted Lokendra Singh with
wooden stick and pirani. Lokendra Singh sustained injuries. Bheru,
Pannalal and Pappu intervened and rescued him. Both the accused
threatened to kill Lokendra. On such allegations, the P.S. Kotwali,
Dewas registered FIR for offence punishable under Sections 341, 323,
506, 307 and 34 of IPC against Arjun Singh and Fateh Singh. The
injured was forwarded for medico-legal examination. Dr. G.K. Chouhan,
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Medical Officer of Govt. Hospital, Hatpipliya examined Lokendra and
referred him for x-ray and further treatment to District Hospital, Dewas.
Lokendra Singh died on 14.11.1996. The P.S. Hathpipliya registered
unnatural death intimation. The dead body of Lokendra Singh was
forwarded for post-mortem examination. The Medical Officer opined
that Lokendra Singh had died due to asphyxia and reserved the opinion
with regard to exact cause of death. The prosecution for offence
punishable u/S 302 of IPC was added. Arjun Singh and Fateh Singh
were apprehended. One wooden pirani was recovered and seized at the
instance of Arjun Singh and one wooden stick was recovered and seized
at the instance of Fateh Singh. The statements of witnesses were
recorded. The final report was submitted on completion of investigation.
(ii) The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bagli, Distt. Dewas
committed the case to the Court of Sessions vide order dated 27.02.1997.
Learned 1stAdditional Session Judge, Dewas framed charges for offence
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC against
accused – Arjun Singh and Fateh Singh.
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(iii) Learned trial Court acquitted both the accused from the charge of
offence punishable u/S 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and convicted
both the accused for offence punishable under Section(s) 325 read
with34 of IPC vide impugned judgment dated 24.03.2000 and sentenced
them, as stated in para 1 of this judgment.
3. The accused/appellants – Arjun Singh and Fateh Singh filed present
appeal assailing the impugned judgment of conviction on following grounds:
(i) The learned trial Court committed error in convicting the
appellants against the facts and evidence on record. The trial Court relied
on evidence of Urmila (PW-2), sole eye-witness. The testimony of
Urmila suffers from inconsistency and improbability. Other eye-witness
Bheru(PW-3) and Pappu(PW-12) did not support the prosecution. The
father of deceased did not mention Urmila(PW-2) as eye-witness in the
FIR.
(ii) The Medical Officer opined that injuries caused to Lokendra Singh were
simple in nature. Still, the Court convicted the accused for offence
punishable u/S 325 of IPC.
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On these grounds, it is requested that the impugned judgment of
conviction and order of sentence be set aside and the appellants be acquitted.
4. The learned counsel for the appellants, in addition to the grounds
mentioned in the appeal, contended that the state did not file appeal assailing
the finding of acquittal of accused from charge of offence punishable under
Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC, so this Court cannot reappreciate the
finding regarding the cause of death of Lokendra. Dr. G.K. Chouhan(PW-8)
did not reported any fracture on medical examination of body of Lokendra in
medico-legal examination. Further, Dr. K.N. Tripathi(PW-10), specifically
stated that the injuries were simple in nature, which were not sufficient to cause
death in ordinary course of event. Therefore, the impugned judgment suffers
from patent illegality. Learned counsel further contends that presently, the
appellant no.2 – Fateh Singh is aged around 80 years and appellant no.1 –
Arjun Singh is aged around 50 years. The period of almost 30 years has
elapsed since the incident. Therefore, the impugned sentenced be modified
accordingly.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the State opposed the appeal and
submitted that the trial Court committed no error in convicting the appellants for
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offence punishable under Section 325 of IPC. The impugned judgment does not
suffer from any illegality or impropriety. The appeal is meritless.
6. Heard, learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. The points for determination, in the present appeal, are as under:
1. Whether appellant/ accused Fateh Singh and Arjun Singh
voluntarily caused grievous hurt to Lokendra?
2. Whether the trial Court committed error in convicting the
appellants for offence punishable under Section 325 read with Section
34 of IPC ?
The points for determination no. 1 and 2 – reasons for conclusion
8. Urmila PW-2 deposed that she went to deliver food to her maternal
Uncle Lokendra at his agricultural filed. The bullocks of Fateh Singh and Arjun
Singh were grazing in their field. Lokendra went to expel the bullocks. Fateh
Singh and Arjun Singh abused Lokendra Singh in filthy language. Arjun
assaulted Lokendra with pirana(wooden stick with pointed head). Fateh Singh
assaulted Lokendra with wooden stick(lathi). Lokendra Singh fell down. Fateh
Singh sat on chest of Lokendra Singh and assaulted him with kick and fist
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blows on his chest. Pappu Singh and Bheru Mali intervened and rescued
Lokendra Singh. Accused threatened to kill Lokendra Singh. She informed her
maternal grandfather. Her maternal grandfather Shaitan Singh went to
agricultural field. Next day, she got information that her maternal uncle
Lokendra Singh has expired.
9. The testimony of Urmila(PW-2) remained unrebutted in cross-
examination. Some minor inconsistencies and exaggerations in testimony of
Urmila were revealed on cross-examination with reference to her previous
police statement (Ex. D-1). But, the evidence of Urmila remained trustworthy
on the point that Fateh Singh had assaulted Lokendra with wooden stick(lathi)
and Arjun Singh had assaulted Lokendra Singh with pirana.
10. Pappu (PW-4) corroborated evidence of Urmila (PW-2) initially but
later, he resiled from him earlier evidence and stated that he did not witness the
quarrel in his subsequent evidence recorded after almost one and a half year
after initial evidence. It appears that something has transpired in the period of
one and a half year, which compelled Pappu to resile from his earlier evidence.
11. The Supreme Court in the case of Surendra@Khujji v. State of M.P.,
reported in (1991) 3 SCC 627, observed as under-
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7. That brings us to the evidence of PW 1 Komal Chand. Komal Chand’s evidence
was not accepted by the trial court on the ground that he was not a natural witness
and was only a chance witness. PW 1 explained his presence by stating that he had
gone to the market to purchase vegetables and while he was returning therefrom on
foot with his cycle in hand he heard a commotion and saw the incident from a short
distance. Being a resident of Suji Mohalla, the place of occurrence was clearly in the
vicinity thereof and, therefore, his presence at the market place could not be
considered to be unnatural. It is not unnatural for working people to purchase
vegetables at that hour and, therefore, his explanation regarding his presence cannot
be ruled out as false. The sketch map prepared by PW 11 Gaiser Prasad shows that
he had seen the incident from a short distance of hardly 22 feet although PW 1 says
he saw it from the square. Since the incident occurred at a public place with a
lamppost nearby, the possibility of his having identified the assailants could not be
ruled out. The examination-in-chief of this witness was recorded on November 16,
1976 when he identified all the assailants by name. He stated that he knew the six
accused persons in court and they were the persons who had surrounded the rickshaw
and launched an assault on PW 4 and the deceased Gulab. Of them Gopal struck PW
4 with a chain. He also stated that the appellant Khujji and his companions Gudda
and Parsu were armed with knives and when Khujji tried to assault PW 4 with a
knife, Gopal shouted ‗Khujji that man is not Gulab’. Thereupon Khujji and his
companions ran after the deceased Gulab, overtook him and the appellant, Parsu and
Gudda assaulted Gulab with their weapons. Gudda struck Gulab from the front on
his chest, Parsu stabbed him on the side of the stomach while Ram Kishan and Gopal
held him and the appellant attacked him from behind with a knife whereupon Gulab
staggered shouting ‗save save’ and fell in front of the house of advocate Chintaman
Sahu. Thereafter all the six persons ran away. His cross-examination commenced on
December 15, 1978. In his cross-examination he stated that the appellant Khujji and
Gudda had their backs towards him and hence he could not see their faces while he
could identify the remaining four persons. He stated that he had inferred that the
other two persons were the appellant and Gudda. On the basis of this statement Mr
Lalit submitted that the evidence regarding the identity of the appellant is rendered
highly doubtful and it would be hazardous to convict the appellant solely on the basis
of identification by such a wavering witness. The High Court came to the
conclusion and, in our opinion rightly, that during the one month period that
elapsed since the recording of his examination-in-chief something transpired
which made him shift his evidence on the question of identity to help the appellant.
We are satisfied on a reading of his entire evidence that his statement in cross-
examination on the question of identity of the appellant and his companion is a
clear attempt to wriggle out of what he had stated earlier in his examination-in-
chief. Since the incident occurred at a public place, it is reasonable to infer that
the street lights illuminated the place sufficiently to enable this witness to identify
the assailants. We have, therefore, no hesitation in concluding that he had ample
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opportunity to identify the assailants of Gulab, his presence at the scene of
occurrence is not unnatural nor is his statement that he had come to purchase
vegetables unacceptable. We do not find any material contradictions in his
evidence to doubt his testimony. He is a totally independent witness who had no
cause to give false evidence against the appellant and his companions. We are,
therefore, not impressed by the reasons which weighed with the trial court for
rejecting his evidence. We agree with the High Court that his evidence is
acceptable regarding the time, place and manner of the incident as well as the
identity of the assailants.
8. It was faintly submitted by counsel for the appellant that the evidence of eye-
witnesses could not be relied upon as their names did not figure in the inquest report
prepared at the earliest point of time. We see no force in this submission in view of
the clear pronouncement of this Court in Pedda Narayana v. State of A.P. [(1975) 4
SCC 153 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 427 : 1975 Supp SCR 84] Referring to Section 174 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure this Court observed at page 89 as under: (SCC pp. 157-
58, para 11)
―A persual of this provision would clearly show that the object of the
proceedings under Section 174 is merely to ascertain whether a person has
died under suspicious circumstances or an unnatural death and if so what is
the apparent cause of the death. The question regarding the details as to how
the deceased was assaulted or who assaulted him or under what
circumstances he was assaulted appears to us to be foreign to the ambit and
scope of the proceedings under Section 174. In these circumstances,
therefore, neither in practice nor in law was it necessary for the police to
have mentioned these details in the inquest report.‖
We, respectfully agree and see no merit in this submission made by the counsel for
the appellant. (emphasis added)
12. Shaitan Singh (PW-1), father of Lokendra deposed that around 11:00 in
the morning, his granddaughter – Urmila Bai came running from the
agricultural filed and informed that Arjun Singh and Fateh Singh had assaulted
Lokendra. So he went to his agricultural field. He found Lokendra near well in
the agricultural field. When he inquired from Lokendra, he informed that Fateh
Singh had assaulted him over grazing of their bullock in his field. Lokendra
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had complained that Arjun Singh had assaulted him with pirana and Fateh
Singh had assaulted him with wooden stick. He had sustained injuries on left
knee, left side of chest and neck. Bhairo Singh and Pappu were also there. He
took Lokendra to hospital at Hatpipliya. Police had inquired from Lokendra
and recorded his statement. Later, Lokendra was taken to Dewas Hospital, but
Lokendra expired mid-way. The Doctor at Dewas Hospital informed that
Lokendra had expired. There are certain exaggeration and inconsistencies in
the evidence of Shaitan Singh with reference to his previous statements.
Shaitan Singh (PW-1) and Urmila (PW-2) had exaggerated that accused Fateh
Singh sat on chest of Lokendra Singh and assaulted with kick and fist blows on
his chest and neck. Their testimony with regard to assault by wooden stick and
pirana remained unrebutted and trustworthy.
13. In Balaka Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in (1975) 4 SCC 511, the
Supreme Court considered the effect of inconsistencies, improvements and
exaggerations in the testimony of prosecution witness, placing reliance upon
earlier judgment in Zwinglee Ariel v. State of M.P. reported in (1952) 2 SCC
and held as under :
―8. … the Court must make an attempt to separate grain from the chaff, the truth
from the falsehood, yet this could only be possible when the truth is separable from
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the falsehood. Where the grain cannot be separated from the chaff because the grain
and the chaff are so inextricably mixed up that in the process of separation the Court
would have to reconstruct an absolutely new case for the prosecution by divorcing
the essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and
the background against which they are made, then this principle will not apply.‖
14. In Sukhdev Yadav v. State of Bihar reported in (2001) 8 SCC 86, it
was held that :
―3. It is indeed necessary, however, to note that there would hardly be a witness
whose evidence does not contain some amount of exaggeration or embellishment–
sometimes there would be a deliberate attempt to offer the same and sometimes the
witnesses in their over anxiety to do better from the witness box detail out an
exaggerated account.‖
15. In case of Paulmeli v. State of T.N., reported in (2014) 13 SCC 90, it
was observed that-
26. A similar view has been reiterated in Appabhai v. State of Gujarat 1988 Supp
SCC 241, wherein this Court has cautioned the courts below not to give undue
importance to minor discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the
prosecution case. The court by calling into aid its vast experience of men and matters
in different cases must evaluate the entire material on record by excluding the
exaggerated version given by any witness for the reason that witnesses nowadays go
on adding embellishments to their version perhaps for the fear of their testimony
being rejected by the court. However, the courts should not disbelieve the evidence
of such witnesses altogether if they are otherwise trustworthy.
27. In Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab (2003) 7 SCC 643, this Court had taken note of
its various earlier judgments and held that even if major portion of the evidence is
found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, it is
the duty of the court to separate grain from the chaff. Falsity of particular material
witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The
maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) has
no application in India and the witness cannot be branded as a liar. In case this
maxim is applied in all the cases it is to be feared that the administration of criminal
justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery
to a story, however, truth is the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case
as to what extent the evidence is worthy of credence, and merely because in some
respects the court considers the same to be insufficient or unworthy of reliance, it
does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all
respects as well.
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16. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the prosecution mainly
relies on testimonies of Urmila. But, Urmila was not named as witness in FIR
(Ex.P-1) lodged by Shaitan Singh (PW-1). Therefore, the presence and evidence
of Urmila(PW-2) is not reliable.
17. Learned trial Court in para 14-19 of the judgment had extensively dealt
with the contention with regard to testimony of Urmila and concluded that
presence of Urmila alias Pappi is proved beyond doubt. Her testimony is
trustworthy. The reasoning of trial Court is appropriate and based on the
evidence on record. Further, the First Information Report (Ex.P-1) and the field
map (Ex. P-3) proved by Sub Inspector Abdul Hakeem(PW-11) clearly
establish presence of Urmila on the spot of incident at the relevant time. The
testimony of Urmila(PW-2) is corroborated by the evidence of Pappu (PW-4)
and Shaitan Singh (PW-1). Further, the evidence of Shaitan Singh (PW-1)
reveals dying declaration of Lokendra Singh with regard to cause of injury.
Thus, the trial Court committed no error in concluding that accused – Fateh
Singh had assaulted Lokendra Singh with wooden stick and accused – Arjun
Singh had assaulted Lokendra Singh with pirana. Lokendra Singh sustained
injury on his left knee, left hand and chest.
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18. Dr. G.K. Chouhan(PW-8) deposed that he had examined Lokendra S/o
Shaitan Singh on 14.11.1996 at Government Hospital, Hatpipliya. He had found
one contusion on left knee of Lokendra, one contusion size1 x ½ inch on left
side of his chest and one contusion on left hip. All the three injures were caused
by hard and blunt object within 24 hours of examination. He had referred the
injured for X-ray examination at District Hospital, Dewas. Dr. Chouhan, further
stated that injured was normal, healthy and conscious at the time of
examination. Injuries were simple in nature, in absence of any abnormality in
the x-ray.
19. Dr. K.N. Tripathi (PW-10) deposed that he conducted post-mortem
examination of dead body of Lokendra S/o Shaitan Singh at 10:15 a.m on
15.11.1996. He examined three injuries on dead body of Lokendra.
(i) a contusion on left knee
(ii) a contusion- size 1 x ½ inch on left side of chest
(iii) a contusion - size 3 x ½ inchon left buttock.
In his opinion, Lokendra had died due to asphyxia. No exact cause of death was
found. The injuries were not sufficient to cause death in natural course of the
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events. However, if a person is assaulted with fist blows on chest for long
duration, asphyxia is possible.
In cross-examination, Dr. Tripathi admitted that if there is no fracture in
ribs, the heart would not get damaged. The injuries were simple in nature, which
may be caused by fall on earth.
20. Learned trial Court considering this evidence, concluded in para 48 to 51
of the impugned judgment that the injuries caused in the incident were not
sufficient to cause death of Lokendra Singh. Therefore, the injuries were not
the causation of death of Lokendra Singh. Learned trial Court acquitted the
accused for offence punishable u/S 302 r/w 34 of IPC. However, learned trial
Court concluded that the accused caused the injury on chest of Lokendra
Singh, which was dangerous to life. Therefore, the injury was grievous in
nature in view of EIGHTLY of Section 320 of IPC. The trial Court convicted
accused – Fateh Singh and Arjun Singh for offence punishable under Section
325 read with 34 of IPC.
21. 320. Grievous hurt – The following kinds of hurt only are designated as
“grievous”:
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First-Emasculation.
Secondly-Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.
Thirdly-Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear.
Fourthly-Privation of any member or joint.
Fifthly-Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member
or joint.
Sixthly- Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.
Seventhly- Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.
Eighthly- Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer
to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable
to follow his ordinary pursuits.
Thus, the eighth clause of section 320 of the Indian panel code defines
any hurt as grievous hurt, which is either (i) Endangers life or, (ii) causes the
sufferer to be in severe bodily pain for a period of 20 days or unable to follow
their ordinary pursuits for 20 days. There should be clear medical evidence that
the injury meets one of these specific criteria. The contusion or bruiseson non-
vital body parts caused by a stick, with no fracture and the injuries explicitly not
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, the hurt does not fall
within the definition of “grievous hurt” under aforementioned clause eighthly.
The phrase” endangers life” under clause eighthly refers to the injuries
that create an imminent or actual danger to life from the injury itself, such that
the death might result, if the injury is not promptly treated. It does not
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encompass every possible heart that could indirectly lead to complications. The
endangerment to life must be direct and inherent to the nature, extent and
location of the injury. “Endangers life” requires imminent peril from the injury
itself, not hypothetical or indirect consequences. The medical opinion must
specify the injury as ―dangerous to life‖ to invoke clause eightly of section 320
IPC. Mere potential risk to life or subsequent complications like asphyxia not
directly attributable to the injuries would not suffice.
22. The second part of clause eighthly requires that the hurt causes the
victim to suffer severe bodily pain or be unable to follow ordinary pursuits, viz
daily activities like work or self-care, for a period of 20 days. Mere
anticipation, minor discomfort or short term effects of the injury, would not
make out the case for “unable to follow ordinary pursuits”. If the victim dies or
recovers before 20 days and no proof of the suffering making it “unable to
follow ordinary pursuit” for the period of 20 days is available, it would not be
considered a grievous hurt. It demands proof of severe pain or inability, not
mere hospitalization or brief discomfort.
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23. In the matter of Abdul Sajid Abdul Sadiq v. State of Maharashtra,
reported in 2003 SCC OnLine Bom 305: (2003) 4 Mah LJ 306, the Bombay
High Court considered precedents on the issue, as under-
14. In the light of the above principles of use of punctuations in the interpretation, I
shall now deal with the controversy in question which pertains to clause 8 of section
320, which reads as under:-
“Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the
space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary
pursuits.”
This clause can be divided into three parts, namely, (a) any hurt which endangers life,
(b) which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily
pain, and (c) or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. The first part is totally
independent and it deals with any hurt which endangers with life. In so far as second
part is concerned, there is no ambiguity since it provides for case of any hurt which
causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain. The
problem only arises since after the second clause there is a comma and then follows
the third clause, “or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits”. If the third clause is read
totally independent it would mean that if a person is not able to follow his ordinary
pursuits even for one day as a result of any hurt it may lead to conviction under section
326 of the Penal Code, 1860 which is punishable with life imprisonment or with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extent to ten years, and shall
also be liable to fine which obviously does not appear to be the intention of the
Legislature. The dominant object of clause 8 of section 320, Penal Code, 1860 is that it
makes any simple hurt as grievous if it endangers life or causes severe bodily pains to
a person during twenty days and he is unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. The third
clause has to be read ejusdem generis in the light of earlier two clause in order to give
meaning to it. The first clause deals with any hurt which endangers life and second
clause deals with any hurt which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty
days in severe bodily pain. It is in this light that the third clause is required to be given
a meaning and in order to give meaning to the same as also to the intention of the
legislature the use of comma in between the word ‘pain’ and ‘or’ has to be ignored. If
the comma is ignored then it follows that in order to make any hurt fall within the
ambit of clause 8, the injured person should be unable to follow his ordinary pursuits
during the space of twenty days. In fact, this view gets support indirectly from a large
number of authorities of different Courts in which, of course, the implication of
existence of comma in between the words ‘pain’ and ‘or’ in clause 8 of section 320 has
not been specifically dealt with.
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15. In Queen Empress v. Vasta Chela, 1895 I.L.R. Bombay Series (Vol. XIX) 247,
the question which came up before the Division Bench of this Court was that the
injured had remained in hospital for a space of twenty days and the Joint Sessions
Judge had drawn inference that the injured was during that period unable to follow his
ordinary pursuits, it was held that in the absence of any evidence to that effect it was
not possible legally to draw such inference inasmuch as an injured person may be
quite capable to follow his ordinary pursuits long before twenty days are over and yet
for the sake of permanent recovery or greater ease or comfort be willing to remain as a
convalescent in a hospital, especially if he is fed at the public expenses. It was pointed
out that mere fact that the sufferer did not attend his duty for the statutory period or
that he remained in hospital for that period is no indication of his ability to do so.
16. In Mathu Paily v. State of Kerala, 1962 (1) Cri.L.J. 652, the evidence was to the
effect that the injured was in-patient in the hospital for more than twenty days, but the
doctor had not been questioned whether the hurt caused the sufferer to be during the
space of twenty days in severe bodily pain or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. It
was pointed out that it is only if there is such proof that it would be safe to conclude
that the injury would come in under the description of grievous injury. The Kerala
High Court quoted with approval the following observations made by the Division
Bench of this Court in Queen Empress v. Vasta Chela (supra) to the following
effect:-
“An injured man may be quite capable of following his ordinary pursuits long
before twenty days are over and yet for the sake of permanent recovery or
greater ease or comfort be willing to remain as a convalescent in a hospital,
especially if he is fed at the public expense.”
When the patient is treated in a hospital, the opinion of the Medical Officer attending
on him on the point of his disability is very important. Unfortunately that is lacking in
this case.”
It was, therefore, held that the mere fact that the sufferer did not attend his duty for the
statutory period or that he remained in the hospital for that period is no indication of
his inability to do so.
17. In State of Gujarat v. Samaj, AIR 1969 Gujarat 337, after following the
judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Queen Empress v. Vasta Chela
(supra), it has been laid clown:-
“What is required to be established under S. 320(8) of the Penal Code is that there
must be hurt caused to the person and that he was unable to follow his ordinary
pursuits during the space of 20 days. Both the ingredients have got to be established by
the prosecution and it would not be enough to say that he remained in the hospital for
20 days. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital would not be enough to
conclude that he was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits during that period: (1895)
ILR 19 Bom. 247, Rel. on.”
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18. In Ponni alias Ponibas v. Savarimuthu Nadar, 1989 (1) Crimes 414, it was found
that the victim was in hospital for 48 days. After referring to the judgment in Joseph
@Duraian, 1985 M.L.J. Cri. I, it was contended that the description of injury whether
it is simple or grievous by the Doctor is not decisive and that it is for the Court to
decide finally upon the matter. It is pointed out that as per section 320. Penal Code,
1860 eighth clause, a person who is unable to follow his ordinary pursuits during the
space of 20 days on account of the injury is deemed to have sustained a grievous
injury. It was further contended that the fact of being in the hospital itself would not be
a sufficient proof that the person was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits, and for
this proposition reliance was placed on Jaina Pradhan v. State, 1982 Cri.L.J. (NOC)
217 (Orissa) and State of Gujarat v. Samaj (supra). In Jain Pradhan v. State (supra), it
was held that the fact of victim for remaining in hospital for about a month would not
be a proof that he sustained grievous injury in the absence of evidence that the hurt
caused to the sufferer to be during the space of 20 days, in severe bodily pain or
unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. In State of Gujarat v. Samaj (supra), it was held
that the mere fact that he remained in hospital would not be enough to conclude that he
was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits during that period. of course, in this
judgment, the view taken was altogether different and it was pointed that unless
special circumstances are alleged, the fact that injured was in government hospital will
by itself prove that he was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. With due respect, I
find it difficult to agree with this view.
19. In Dau Dayal s/o Jag Mohan v. The State of Rajasthan, 1991 Cri.L.J. 2321, the
injured was admitted in the hospital for 13 days; none of the injuries were dangerous
to life and there was no evidence to show that he suffered severe bodily pain for
twenty days. It was held that the injury did not fall within definition of grievous under
section 320, Penal Code, 1860 and conviction under section 326, Penal Code, 1860
was not maintainable. It was pointed out that merely because some doctors state that a
particular injury is grievous or dangerous to life cannot become so, unless it falls
within the definition of the same as given under the Penal Code. It was further pointed
out that there was no evidence on record to show that even though he was discharged
from the hospital he could not perform for 20 days his ordinary pursuits or that he was
in severe bodily pain for 20 days.
21. In Pritam Singh v. State, 1996 Cri.L.J. 7, the allegations were that the accused in
quarrel inflicted injury on the victim by blade of scissor and there was no evidence
that the victim was in severe bodily pain or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits and
as such clause 8 of section 320 was not attracted merely because the victim remained
in hospital for twenty days. An injury was found to be simple in nature caused by
sharp weapon and as such conviction under section 326 altered to one under section
324 of the Penal Code, 1860. The High Court noticed that the doctor had nowhere
stated that the injured was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits though he remained
in the hospital for 20 days. It was pointed out that clause 8 of section 320 of Penal
Code, 1860 speaks of two things, (i) any hurt which endangers life and (ii) any hurt
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:10305
which causes the sufferer to be during the space of 20 days, and (iii) (a)any severe
bodily pain, or (b) or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.
22. Dr. Sir Hari Singh Gour’s in Penal Law of India, 11th Edition, Volume 3, sub
heading “Disabling sufferer from following ordinary pursuits” at page 3212, has stated
that the test of grievousness is the sufferer’s inability to attend to his ordinary duties
for a period of twenty days. What is required to be established is that there must be
hurt caused to the person and that he was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits during
the space of 20 days. It is also pointed out that doctor should be questioned whether
the hurt caused the sufferer to be during the space of 20 days severe bodily pain or
unable to follows his ordinary pursuits and it is only when the is such proof that the
hurt caused the sufferer to be during the space of twenty daw in severe bodily pain or
unable to follow his ordinary pursuits that it would be safe conclude that the injury
would come under the description of grievous injury.(Sachchidanand Pathak v. State,
1982 SCC OnLine All 331 also relied)
24. Learned trial Court concluded that the injury of contusion on left side of
chest of Lokendra Singh was of such a nature that it endangered his life. The
medical opinion of Dr. G.K. Chouhan and Dr. K.N. Tripathi is on record. They
have specifically stated that the contusion of size 1 x ½ inch on left side of chest
of Lokendra was simple in nature and it was not sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature. Thus, the trial Court has concluded that this injury
endangered life of Lokendra against the express medical evidence on record.
The size of contusion shows that it was a minor superficial injury. There was no
corresponding fracture of ribs or effect on internal organs revealed by the post-
mortem examination report. Therefore, it is apparent that learned trial Court
committed manifest error in concluding that the injury of contusion 1‖ x ½‖
inch on left side of chest of Lokendra was sufficient to endanger his life.
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25. In view of above discussion, this Court is of considered opinion that the
trial Court had committed manifest impropriety and legal error in convicting
the accused- Fateh Singh and Arjun Singh for offence punishable under
Section 325 read with 34 of IPC. This finding is set aside.
26. However, the prosecution has proved beyond doubt that the accused-
Fateh Singh and Arjun Singh had assaulted Lokendra Singh with hard and blunt
object of pirana and wooden stick and voluntarily caused him simple injuries.
Therefore, accused- Fateh Singh and Arjun Singh are convicted for the offence
punishable under Section 323 of IPC.
27. Now, the propriety of sentence is considered. Although the prosecution
has failed to prove that Lokendra Singh had died in consequence of the injuries
caused by appellant- Fateh Singh and Arjun Singh, but the fact remains that he
died on same day, the appellants had assaulted him and caused injuries. In view
of the overall circumstances, the appellants/accused does not deserve benefit of
the Probation of Offenders Act.
28. The appellant- Arjun Singh was aged 21 years and Fateh Singh was
aged 51 years at the time of incident on 14.11.1996. Almost 30 years have
elapsed since incident. The bitterness and sad memories of the incident might
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have diminished between the parties, who are neighbouring agriculturists. The
incident of assault obviously arose over petty issue of grazing of cattle;
therefore, grave criminality was not involved in the incident. Considering this
aspect of the matter, the sentence is modified to the effect that each of the
appellants/accused – Fateh Singh and Arjun Singh, is sentenced of rigorous
imprisonment for 06 (six) months and fine of Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees One
Thousand Only). The defaulting appellants/accused shall undergo rigorous
imprisonment for 03 months in default of payment of fine. The period of
custody undergone by the accused shall be set off in the sentence of
imprisonment. The fine amount already deposited shall be set off. The order of
trial Court regarding disposal of property is affirmed.
29. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed.
Let a copy of this judgment be forwarded to the trial Court alongwith the
original record.
C.C. as per rules.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
sh
Digitally signed by SEHAR HASEEN
SEHAR
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA
PRADESH BENCH AT INDORE,
2.5.4.20=900ec6fc757798eaeb3df7a32860b
d3298415a4d1c2d91436213f2568c8f27da,
ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
HASEEN
BENCH AT INDORE,CID – 7059964,
postalCode=452007, st=Madhya Pradesh,
serialNumber=e7dbba955b262c04b841325
1ce7fb6f0b7dba610c57f1559c08bf6c6f5dd
40d4, cn=SEHAR HASEEN
Date: 2026.04.17 19:10:49 +05’30’
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:10305
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