Telangana High Court
M/S. Mythrae Reddy, Hyderabad vs District Collector, Hyderabad on 26 March, 2026
Author: K.Lakshman
Bench: K.Lakshman
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HONOURABLESRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN
AND
THE HONOURABLESRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
CITY CIVIL COURT APPEAL No. 33 of 2005
Date: 26.03.2026
Between:
Mythrae Reddy .... Appellant
AND
The District Collector, Hyderabad District
and others ....Respondents
JUDGMENT:
(Per Honourable Sri Justice Vakiti Ramakrishna Reddy)
This Appeal is filed by the appellant/plaintiff assailing the
Judgment and Decree dated 29.01.2005 passed in O.S.No.87 of 2001
(for short ‘the impugned judgment’) on the file of learned XIV
Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court (for short ‘the Trial Court’),
whereby the suit instituted by the plaintiff against the defendants
seeking declaration of title and consequential perpetual injunction in
respect of suit schedule property, came to be dismissed.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be
referred to as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court.
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I. BRIEF FACTS:
3. The brief facts of the case, as borne out from the record, are that
the Plaintiff filed the suit seeking declaration of title and perpetual
injunction in respect of the property bearing Municipal No. 8-2-
269/4/D, Road No.2, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to
as ‘the Suit Schedule Property’). Initially, the plaintiff instituted a suit
for bare perpetual injunction, which was subsequently amended to
include the relief of declaration of title, and thereafter further amended
by raising a plea of title by adverse possession.
4. The plaintiff traces her title to the suit schedule property
through Mr. Shaik Ahmed, the original owner of land admeasuring
Ac.7.00 guntas in Survey No.403/1 of Shaikpet Village, as reflected in
the Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-55. Out of the aforesaid extent,
land to an extent of Ac.5.00 guntas was sold to Smt. B. Venkatlaxmi
and Vijayamani under a registered sale deed dated 15.06.1964,
followed by mutation and revenue entries in their favour.
Subsequently, the said purchasers effected a partition under registered
partition deed dated 10.06.1965, whereunder Smt. B. Venkatalaxmi
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was allotted Ac.3.00 guntas and 3680 square yards and while
Smt.Vijayamani got 6000 square yards.
5. Smt. B. Venkatlaxmi thereafter, sold an extent of 2650 square
yards to Smt. J.Chamanthi under a registered sale deed dated
20.09.1966. In turn, Smt. J.Chamanthi sold 2411 square yards to Sri
B. Gopala Krishna Reddy under a registered sale deed dated
15.06.1967. Owing to an inadvertent mistake in mentioning Survey
No.408/1 instead of 403/1, a rectification deed dated 17.11.1984 was
executed. Thereafter, Sri B. Gopala Krishna Reddy, settled the said
property in favour of the plaintiff, who is his daughter, by way of a
registered settlement deed dated 18.01.1972. Since then, the plaintiff
claims to have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
property. According to the plaintiff, she is presently in possession of
1400 sq. yards, which constitutes the suit schedule property.
6. The plaintiff asserts that her possession has been long,
continuous, and lawful, evidenced by construction of a watchman
room in the year 1992 with permission of the Municipal Corporation
of Hyderabad, assessment of municipal taxes, assignment of house
number, and payment of property tax for several years. It is further
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stated that the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.779 dated 03.11.2000,
proposing allotment of the land to third parties, namely, Nagarani and
Rekha Rani. The said GO was challenged by the plaintiff in writ
proceedings vide W.P.No.22333/2000, wherein this Court disposed of
the said writ petition directing the plaintiff to establish her title before
the competent civil court. Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiff preferred
Writ Appeal No.1741/2000, which was disposed of vide order dated
29.12.2000 observing that the plaintiff shall work out her remedies
before the civil court. Thereafter the Government kept the said G.O.
in abeyance and proposed alternative allotments elsewhere.
7. The cause of action for filing the suit stated to have arisen when
the defendant No.2, i.e., Mandal Revenue Officer, Shaikpet Mandal,
allegedly interfered with the plaintiff’s possession by obstructing the
workmen and threatening dispossession without following due process
of law. The plaintiff, therefore, instituted the suit seeking declaration
of title and perpetual injunction, alternatively pleading that in any
event, she and her predecessors have been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted possession for more than 30 years, thereby perfecting
title by adverse possession.
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8. In reply to the plaint averments, the defendants filed their
written statement inter-alia denying the claim of the plaintiff. It was
contended that the suit schedule property falls in Town Survey
No.1/1/1, Block-B, Ward No.10, corresponding to Survey No.403 of
Shaikpet Village, and is classified as Government land, of which the
Government is the absolute owner and possessor. The plaintiff is
alleged to have filed a speculative suit based on manipulated
documents. It is pleaded that a Town Survey was conducted between
1964 and 1971 in accordance with the Andhra Pradesh Survey and
Boundaries Act, 1923, and the entries published in the Government
Gazette dated 06.08.1977 under Section 13 have attained finality and
conclusive evidentiary value, as the plaintiff failed to challenge them
within the statutory period of three years.
9. It was also pleaded that the Special Court in its decision in
L.G.C. No.45 of 1991, held that the land covered by the said Town
Survey vested in the Government, and that the present land forms part
thereof. The Government subsequently allotted the land to Smt. C.
Nagarani and Smt. G. Rekha Rani, and possession was delivered
under the cover of a panchanama. The defendants therefore,
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contended that the plea of adverse possession is false, malafide, and
unsustainable, as, neither the plaintiff nor her predecessors were ever
in possession of the suit property, which has always remained in
Government possession. It was further pleaded that the suit is liable to
be dismissed for non-issuance of mandatory notice under Section 80
CPC, lack of cause of action, and want of jurisdiction. The plaintiff
alleged to have encroached upon Government land under the cover of
interim orders and is characterized as a land grabber. Accordingly, the
defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit.
II. ISSUES FRAMED BY THE TRIAL COURT:
10. Based on the above pleadings, the learned Trial Court framed
the following issues for determination:
i. Whether the plaintiff has title to and possession in respect of the
schedule property?
ii. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration and perpetual
injunction as prayed for?
iii. To what relief?
11. The following additional issue was also framed on 16.6.2004:
Whether the plaintiff has perfected his title by adverse
possession?
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CCCA No.33_2005III. EVIDENCE ON RECORD:
12. During the course of trial, PWs 1 and 2 were examined and got
marked Exhibits A1 to A19 on behalf of the plaintiff. On the other
hand, DWs 1 and 2 were examined and Exhibits B1 to B20 were
marked on behalf of defendants.
IV. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT:
13. Upon consideration of the rival pleadings and the evidence on
record, the learned Trial Court, by judgment and decree dated
29.01.2005, dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff failed to
establish either valid title or lawful possession over the suit schedule
property and that the land forms part of Survey No.403/1 which stands
classified as Government land under final Town Survey entries and as
declared by the Special Court under the A.P. Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short ‘the Act, 1982’). The learned Trial
Court further observed that the plaintiff could not prove the
foundational documents tracing title from Shaik Ahmed and that the
plea of adverse possession was not made out as the plaintiff failed to
establish open, continuous, and hostile possession for over 30 years.
Consequently, the learned Trial Court held that plaintiff was not
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entitled to declaration of title or perpetual injunction, resulting in
dismissal of the suit with costs.
14. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the Plaintiff has
preferred the present Appeal seeking to set aside the impugned
judgment and decree.
15. Heard Sri J.V. Prasad, learned counsel representing
Sri K. Krishna, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Pottigari Sridhar
Reddy, learned Special Government Pleader for official respondents
and Sri E. Venkata Siddhartha, learned counsel for the unofficial
respondent.
V. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES: a) Submissions on behalf of the Appellant/Plaintiff:
16. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff submits that the
impugned Judgment and Decree passed by the learned Trial Court are
contrary to law, facts, and the material evidence on record. It was
contended that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the long,
continuous, and settled possession and enjoyment of the appellant
over the suit schedule property, which stands established through
documentary evidence and admissions on record. It is further
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submitted that the finding of the learned Trial Court that the
Government was in possession of the suit property, particularly by
applying the principle that possession follows title in respect of vacant
land, is erroneous, especially when the surrounding properties are
occupied by private individuals, who have raised permanent
constructions.
17. It is further contended that the learned Trial Court committed a
grave error in discarding Ex. A15, being the proceedings of the
District Revenue Officer, without assigning valid reasons, despite the
same having been passed after due enquiry and notice to the
Government authorities. It is also submitted that the Defendants had
knowledge of the possession of private parties over the land since
1991. The learned Trial Court also failed to consider Ex. A19 i.e., the
Judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Composite State of Andhra
Pradesh in its proper perspective, particularly when the said judgment
was confirmed by the Honourable Supreme Court.
18. The learned counsel further submits that the learned Trial Court
erred in holding that Exs. A1 to A4 were not proved, despite the fact
that the defendants did not dispute the execution of the said
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documents. The learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that once
execution is not in dispute, the evidentiary burden stands substantially
discharged. The learned Trial Court further failed to consider that the
title history of the plaintiff is identical to that of the writ petitioners in
W.P. No.22323 of 1996, which was decided under Ex. A19, and
therefore, the learned Trial Court ought to have concluded that the
appellant is in possession of the suit schedule property. It is further
urged by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the Government,
having admitted possession of several other plot holders in the same
survey number by initiating land-grabbing proceedings, is estopped
from denying the possession of the Appellant/Plaintiff.
19. It is also contended that the learned Trial Court failed to
appreciate that the appellant has perfected title by adverse possession,
having been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, and hostile possession
along with her predecessors for more than 30 years, as supported by
Exs.A1 to A12. The learned counsel further submits that even
assuming that the declaration of title could not be granted, the learned
Trial Court ought to have granted at least the relief of perpetual
injunction, as the possession of the appellant/plaintiff stood clearly
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established through municipal records, tax receipts, electricity bills,
and Government Orders under Exs.A5 to A14. It is also contended
that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the settled legal
principle that an injunction can be granted independently of a
declaration of title, where possession is established. It is further
submitted that the learned Trial Court also erred in ignoring the
statutory presumption available under Section 90 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 in respect of documents more than 30 years old.
20. The learned counsel for the Appellant further contends that the
Trial Court committed a grave error in ignoring the settled legal
position that revenue records such as Khasra Pahani, Faisal Patti,
Vasool Baki Register, mutation orders, and tax receipts carry
presumptive evidentiary value unless specifically rebutted by cogent
evidence.
21. In support of the said submissions, reliance is placed on the
decisions in Kasturchand and another v. Harbilash and others 1, State
of A.P. v. Pratap Karan 2, The Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District
1
(2000) 7 SCC 611
2
(2016) 2 SCC 82
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and another v. D. Narsingh Rao and others3, and Shikharchand Jain
v. Digamber Jain Prabhanand Kharini Sabha and others4, wherein it
was held that entries in Khasra Pahani constitute a record of rights
carrying presumptive evidentiary value, akin to the Telangana Record
of Rights, and therefore, the learned Trial Court ought to have given
due weight to such documents while adjudicating the question of title
and possession.
22. The learned counsel for the Appellant further contends that the
learned Trial Court gravely erred in treating the TSLR entries as
conclusive proof of ownership, contrary to the settled position of law.
It is submitted that a consistent line of judicial precedents, including
Sogra Begum and another v. State of AP, Revenue Dept. and ors.5,
Hyderabad Potteries Private Limited v. Collector, Hyderabad District
and another 6 and State of Andhra Pradesh v. Hyderabad Potteries
Private Limited 7 unequivocally hold that TSLR entries are not
documents of title and cannot be regarded as conclusive proof of
ownership.
3
(2015) 3 SCC 695
4
(1974) SCC 675
5
2001 SCC Online AP 1255
6
2001 (3) ALT 200 (APHC)
7
(2010) 5 SCC 382
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b) Submissions on behalf of the Respondents/Defendants:
23. Per Contra, the learned Special Government Pleader appearing
for the defendants contends that the plaintiff failed to establish either
title or lawful possession over the suit schedule property. The land in
question forms part of Survey No.403/1 of Shaikpet Village, which
stands classified as Government land under final Town Survey entries
published under the Andhra Pradesh Survey and Boundaries Act,
1923. The appellant never challenged the said entries within the
statutory period, and therefore they attained finality.
24. Learned counsel for the respondents/defendants further submits
that the plaintiff failed to establish the root of the title. It is contended
that none of the foundational documents such as the Khasra Pahani,
the alleged sale deed in favour of Smt. B. Venkatlaxmi and
Vijayamani, the partition deed, or the mutation records, have been
duly proved. It is further submitted that the Special Court under the
A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 in L.G.C. No.45 of 1991,
categorically held that Shaik Ahmed had no title and that the
purchasers tracing title through him were land grabbers. It is also
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urged that the proceedings of the District Revenue Officer dated
25.05.1991 (Ex. A15), were declared irregular and devoid of legal
sanctity by the Special Court.
25. It is further submitted that the plaintiff has misconstrued
Ex. A-19 being the judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra
Pradesh. It is submitted that the High Court never declared title in
favour of the purchasers; on the contrary, it affirmed the title of the
Government and merely directed regularization of possession of
certain parties upon payment of compensation, having regard to the
conduct of the State. It is further submitted that the dismissal of the
Special Leave Petition does not amount to affirmation of title in
favour of the plaintiff.
26. It is further contended that the plea of adverse possession set up
by the plaintiff is wholly untenable and self-contradictory. According
to the respondents, a party claiming title through registered
conveyances, cannot simultaneously assert hostile possession against
the true owner, namely, the Government. It is further contended that
the plaintiff failed to prove open, continuous, uninterrupted, and
hostile possession for the statutory period of over 30 years,
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particularly when the alleged constructions were made only after 1990
and were repeatedly removed by the Government authorities.
27. Learned Special Government Pleader further submits that the
suit was liable to be dismissed in limine for non-compliance with
Section 79 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as the State has
not been properly impleaded as a party. It is contended that the
District Collector or revenue authorities cannot be treated as the
“State” for the purpose of institution of a suit, and in the absence of
proper impleadment of the State Government, the suit is not
maintainable. In support of this contention, reliance is placed upon the
decisions in Chief Conservator of Forest, Government of A.P. v.
Collector 8, Jagtu v. Suraj Mal and Others9, Secretary, Ministry of
Works and Housing Government of India v. Mohinder Singh Jagdev
and Others10, and District Collector, Srikakulam v. Bagathi Krishna
Rao and another11, wherein it has been held by the Honourable
Supreme Court that a suit against the Government must strictly
comply with Section 79 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that the
8
2003 SCC Online SC 243
9
2010 SCC Online SC 846
10
1996 Supreme (SC) 1263
11
(2010) 6 SCC 427
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CCCA No.33_2005
proper party representing the State must be impleaded, failing which
the suit is liable to be rejected.
28. It is further submitted that the suit is also barred for want of
mandatory notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
According to the respondents, issuance of prior statutory notice is a
condition precedent for institution of a suit against the Government or
its officers and that non-compliance thereof renders the proceedings
void. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decisions in Odisha
State Financial Corporation v. Vigyan Chemical Industries 12, Bihari
Chowdhary and another v. State of Bihar13, State of Andhra Pradesh
and Others v. Pioneer Builders A.P. 14 and R. Hanumaiah and another
v. The Secretary to Karnataka 15, wherein the Honourable Supreme
Court consistently held that Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure
is mandatory in nature and that even a decree passed without
compliance of the said provision is a nullity in the eye of law.
29. It is further submitted that the plaintiff is not entitled even to the
relief of perpetual injunction, as possession has not been established
12
2025 SCC Online SC 1609
13
1984 SCC Online SC 77
14
2006 (12) 119
15
2010 (5) SCC 203
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independently. It is contended that Municipal tax receipts, electricity
bills, or assessment records do not confer title or lawful possession
against the true owner, namely the Government. It is further submitted
that the principle that possession follows title squarely applies in the
case of vacant Government land, and the plaintiff cannot claim
presumption of possession merely because adjoining plots are
occupied by private individuals.
VI. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION:
30. In view of the rival submissions and upon consideration of the
material available on record, the following points arise for
determination in this appeal:
1. Whether the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing
title to the suit schedule property on the strength of
Exs. A1 to A4 and the accompanying revenue
records including Khasra Pahani?
2. Whether the learned Trial Court was justified in
rejecting the plaintiff’s claim of title by disbelieving
the chain of registered conveyances and by placing
reliance on the Town Survey/TSLR entries and the
findings of the Special Court in LGC No.45 of
1991?
3. Whether the plaintiff has established lawful or
settled possession over the suit schedule property,
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CCCA No.33_2005and if so, whether she is entitled to the relief of
perpetual injunction even in the absence of
declaration of title?
4. Whether the plea of adverse possession set up by the
plaintiff is legally sustainable and duly proved by
establishing open, continuous, uninterrupted and
hostile possession for the statutory period?
5. Whether the suit is liable to be dismissed on the
ground of non-joinder of necessary party under
Section 79 of the Code of Civil Procedure and /or
for non-compliance with the mandatory requirement
of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil
Procedure?
6. What is the legal effect of the earlier proceedings,
including the decision of the special Court in LGC
No. 45 of 1991 and the Judgment of the High Court
(Ex.A19), on the claim of the plaintiff?
7. Whether the impugned Judgment and Decree dated
29.01.2005 passed by the learned Trial Court
warrants interference by this Court?
31. The aforesaid points are interrelated and arise out of the same
set of facts and evidence. They are, therefore, taken up together for
consideration and are being dealt with issue-wise, to the extent
necessary, in the ensuing Analysis.
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VII. ANALYSIS:
Point No.1: Whether the plaintiff established title through a
valid and continuous chain of registered
conveyances?
32. This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions
advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and the
learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the
respondents/defendants. The material on record, including the
pleadings, oral and documentary evidence and the impugned judgment
dated 29.01.2005 passed in O.S.No.87 of 2001 on the file of XIV
Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court have been thoroughly
examined.
33. The core issue that falls for consideration is the possession and
the plea of adverse possession by the plaintiff. The plaintiff traces her
title to the suit schedule property through Exs. A-1 to A-4, which
constitute registered conveyances forming an unbroken chain of title
commencing from the original pattadar, Sri Shaik Ahmed, who was
shown as pattadar of land admeasuring Ac.7.00 guntas in Survey
No.403/1 of Shaikpet Village as per the Khasra Pahani for the year
1954-55. Out of the said extent, Ac.5.00 guntas was conveyed in
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favour of Smt. B. Venkatlaxmi and Vijayamani under a registered sale
deed dated 15.06.1964. Thereafter, Smt. B. Venkatlaxmi sold an
extent of 2650 square yards to Smt. J. Chamanthi under a registered
sale deed dated 20.09.1966. Subsequently, Smt. J. Chamanthi
conveyed 2411 square yards to Sri B. Gopala Krishna Reddy, who in
turn settled the said property in favour of his daughter i.e., the plaintiff
by way of a registered settlement/gift deed dated 18.01.1972. Thus,
Exs. A-1 to A-4 constitute a continuous and unbroken chain of
registered conveyances spanning from 1964 to 1984, culminating in
the title of the plaintiff.
34. These documents, being registered instruments, carry a
statutory presumption of validity under the Registration Act.
Recently, the Honourable Supreme Court in Hemalatha (D) per LRs v.
Tukaram (D) per LRs and others 16, held that a registered sale deed
creates a presumption of validity and genuineness. The Honourable
Supreme Court observed at paragraph Nos.31 and 33 as under:
“31. It is a settled position of law that a registered Sale Deed
carries with it a formidable presumption of validity and genuineness.
Registration is not a mere procedural formality but a solemn act that
imparts high degree of sanctity to the document. Consequently, a
Court must not lightly or casually declare a registered instrument as
a “sham”. Adopting the principles enunciated in Prem Singh and16
2026 (1) ALD 278 (SC)
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CCCA No.33_2005Ors. vs. Birbal and Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 3531, Jamila Begum (Dead)
Through Lrs. vs. Shami Mohd. (Dead) Through Lrs. and Anr.,
(2019) 2 SCC 7272, and Rattan Singh and Ors. v. Nirmal Gill &
Ors., (2021) 15 SCC 3003, this Court reiterates that the burden of
proof to displace this presumption rests heavily upon the challenger.
Such a challenge can only be sustained if the party provides material
particulars and cogent evidence to demonstrate that the Deed was
never intended to operate as a bona fide transfer of title.
33. While the aforementioned grounds are illustrative and
not exhaustive, this Court must caution against the growing
tendency to challenge registered instruments ‘at the drop of a hat’. If
the sanctity of registered documents is diluted, it would erode public
confidence in property transactions and jeopardize the security of
titles. In a society governed by the Rule of Law, registered
documents must inspire certainty; they cannot be rendered
precarious by frivolous litigation.”
35. Notably, no specific suggestion was put to PW-1 or PW-2
during cross-examination disputing their execution, validity, or
genuineness. In the absence of any challenge to the execution or
validity of the registered conveyances, the learned Trial Court erred in
discarding the entire chain of title merely on the ground that the
original pattadar did not possess a registered sale deed. When the root
of title is supported by Khasra Pahani carrying presumptive value and
all subsequent transactions are evidenced by registered sale deeds,
rejection of title on such speculative reasoning is legally
unsustainable.
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36. Accordingly, this Court holds that the plaintiff has successfully
established her title through a valid and continuous chain of registered
conveyances.
Point No.2: Evidentiary value of Khasra Pahani and Revenue
Records:
37. It is well settled that Khasra Pahani is a foundational record of
rights carrying presumptive evidentiary value with respect to title and
possession, unless rebutted by cogent evidence. In the present case,
the defendants did not produce any contemporaneous record
disproving the entries in the Khasra Pahani nor did they establish that
the said entries were fabricated. The learned Trial Court, however,
failed to assign due weight to this foundational revenue record and
instead treated the Town Survey and Land Register entries (TSLR) as
conclusive proof of title, which is contrary to settled principles of law.
38. In D. Narsing Rao’s case (supra) the Honourable Supreme
Court observed as follows:
“13. Consequent to the merger of Hyderabad State with India
in 1948 the jagirs were abolished by the Andhra Pradesh
(Telangana Area (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358 Fasli.
‘Khasra pahani’ is the basic record-of-rights prepared by the
Board of Revenue Andhra Pradesh in the year 1954-1955. It was
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CCCA No.33_2005gazetted under Regulation 4 of the A.P. (Telangana Area Record-
of-Rights in Land Regulation, 1358 F. As per Regulation 13 any
entry in the said record-of-rights shall be presumed to be true until
the contrary is proved. The said Regulation of 1358 F was in vogue
till it was repealed by the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar
Passbooks Act, 1971, which came into force on 15-8-1978. In the
2nd Edn. (1997) of The Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar (at p.
1053) ‘Khasra” is described as follows:
‘Khasra –Khasra is a register recording the incidents of a
tenure and is a historical record. Khasra would serve the purpose
of a deed of title, when there is no other title deed.’
39. The Honourable Supreme Court in Kasturchand‘s case (supra),
while considering the evidentiary value of annual village paper it was
observed as follows:
“16. The entries in the annual village papers create a
presumption albeit rebuttable in favour of a person whose
name is recorded. We find that a procedure is prescribed to
challenge the entries made in the annual village papers. The
procedure is contained in the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue
and Tenancy Act of 1950 (for short “the Land Revenue Act“).
Section 45 of that Land Revenue Act specifies that khasra,
jamabandi or khatauni and such other village papers as the
Government may from time to time prescribe shall be annual
village papers. Section 46 enjoins preparation of annual
village papers each year for each village of a district in
accordance with rules made under the Act. Section 52
embodies the presumption that all entries made under that
chapter in the annual village papers shall be presumed to be
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CCCA No.33_2005correct until the contrary is proved and Section 50 prescribes
the method or procedure for correction of wrong entries in the
annual village papers by superior officers. Thus, it is clear that
in the event of wrong entries in the annual village papers the
same is liable to be corrected under Section 50 and unless they
are so corrected the presumption under Section 52 will govern
the position.”
40. In Shikharchand Jain‘s case (supra) the High Court for the
State of Madhya Pradesh held that Khasra is a record of rights under
Section 45(2) of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, and under
Section 80(3), entries therein carry a statutory presumption of
correctness unless rebutted. The burden to disprove such entries lies
on the person asserting otherwise. It was observed as under:
“4. It is now to be seen whether the first appellate
Court’s finding really falls within the grip of Section
100(1)(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In his written
statement Shikharchand has admitted Smt. Rajrani’s
ownership of the land. But he has pleaded that he has become
the owner of the land on account of the adverse possession
for more than 12 years from 1937. The burden of proving the
acquisition of ownership by adverse possession lay on him.
The Khasra entries from 1937-38 to 1941-42 and 1943-44 to
1951-52 are all in favour of Smt. Rajrani. They show that she
was in possession over the land during those years. Khasra is
a record of right according to Section 45(2) of the Central
Provinces Land Revenue Act, I9T7. Section 80(3) of that Act
provides that entries in a record of right shall be presumed to
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KL, J & VRKR, J
CCCA No.33_2005be correct unless the contrary is shown. This provision raises
a presumption of correctness of the aforesaid Khasra
entries….”
41. Therefore, the Khasra Pahani and allied revenue records
substantially support both the title and possession of the plaintiff.
Whether TSLR entries constitute conclusive proof of title:
42. With regard to the TSLR entries, this Court finds that the
learned Trial Court has committed a manifest error in holding that the
entries in the Town Survey Land Register constitute conclusive proof
of ownership. It is trite law that TSLR is only a revenue record
prepared for fiscal and survey purposes and does not, by itself, confer,
create, extinguish, or transfer title. Title to immovable property must
be established through lawful conveyances or other legally recognized
modes, and not merely on the basis of survey entries.
43. It is an admitted position that no notice was issued either to the
plaintiff or to her predecessors-in-title prior to the conduct of the
Town Survey between 1964 and 1971. The defendants neither pleaded
nor proved compliance with the mandatory procedure under the
Survey and Boundaries Act before finalization of the entries. In spite
of this, the learned Trial Court treated the Gazette publication dated
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06.08.1977 rendering the entries as final and conclusive. Such an
approach overlooks the settled principle that TSLR is only a survey
and revenue record prepared for fiscal purposes and does not confer
any title. In Sogra Begum‘s case (supra) this Court categorically held
that TSLR entries are not conclusive proof of title. It was further
observed that where survey entries are made without issuance of
notice to the affected pattedar or interested party, such recording is
vitiated in law. The relevant portion of the judgment is being extracted
hereunder:
“14….It is thus clear that an entry in TSLR itself cannot be
the conclusive proof of title or lack of it, and the decision either to
grant or refuse permission cannot be taken solely on the basis of an
entry made in TSLR. IT may be one of the factors that may have to
be taken into consideration along with the other material available
on record. An entry made in TSLR per se could not create any
doubt or cloud on the right, title and interest of a person in respect
of any land.”
44. Similarly, in Hyderabad Potteries Private Limited‘s case
(supra) this Court held that an entry in the TSLR cannot, by itself, be
treated as conclusive proof of title or lack thereof. It was further held
that revenue entries are only an evidence of possession for fiscal
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purposes and cannot override the substantive title established through
registered documents.
45. In view of the settled legal principles discussed above, this
Court is of the opinion that the learned Trial Court committed an error
in treating the TSLR entries as conclusive proof of title, while at the
same time ignoring the Appellant’s registered sale deeds and revenue
records which carry presumptive value. The approach adopted by the
learned Trial Court is contrary to established legal position and
therefore cannot be sustained in law.
Point No.3: Whether the plaintiff has established long, open and
continuous possession?
46. It is further evident from the record that the plaintiff and her
predecessors-in-title have been asserting rights over the suit land for
several decades. The plaintiff produced municipal permissions, tax
assessments, electricity bills and other public records evidencing her
enjoyment and possession over the subject property. Even assuming
that the title of the original vendor was imperfect or clouded, the
material on record establishes long, open and continuous assertion of
ownership, adverse to the State. The Government, despite being aware
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of such possession as reflected in earlier proceedings, did not take
effective steps against such possession for several decades. The
repeated demolitions alleged by the defendants themselves reinforce
that the plaintiff was exercising physical control and asserting
dominion over the property.
Point No.4: Whether the plea of adverse possession is made out?
And
Point No.6: Effect of Land Grabbing Proceedings (Land
Grabbing Case No.45 of 1991)
47. With regard to the Khasra Pahani, Exhibit A-15, being the order
of the District Revenue Officer, Hyderabad, dated 25-11-1991, it is a
matter of record that the said order emanated from statutory suo motu
proceedings initiated under Section 15(2) of the Record of Rights Act,
1358 Fasli, upon a complaint made by the Deputy Director, Survey &
Land Records, wherein due notice was issued to all concerned parties
and a detailed enquiry was conducted; and though the Khasra Pahani
itself was not formally marked as an exhibit, the District Revenue
Officer, upon due verification of the official records, categorically
held that Sri Shaik Ahmed was the pattadar and title holder, whose
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name was duly reflected in the Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-55 in
respect of Sy. No. 403/1 of Shaikpet Village admeasuring Ac. 7-00
guntas. Against the said order of the DRO, proceedings in L.G.C. No.
45 of 1991 were initiated, and aggrieved thereby, W.P. Nos. 22323 of
1996 and batch were filed before this Court, wherein this Court,
categorically held that the documents produced by the petitioners
therein, namely Khasra Pahani, Faisala Patti, Vasool Baqui Register,
mutation orders and municipal tax receipts, clearly established that the
constructions made by them were not unauthorized and that they were
in possession of the schedule property not as land grabbers but as
lawful owners. Further, it was held that the entries contained in the
said revenue records carry presumptive value, which had not been
rebutted by the State by adducing any evidence in contrary, and in the
absence of such rebuttal, the said entries must be given due
evidentiary weight. This Court also observed that despite alleging land
grabbing, the State had remained silent for several decades without
initiating any action and failed to establish that the petitioners had
illegally taken possession or were in occupation without lawful
entitlement, and consequently, taking note of the conduct of the
Government, this Court adopted a balanced approach by permitting
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the petitioners to continue in possession and enjoyment of the property
while safeguarding the interest of the State by directing payment of
compensation.
48. At this juncture, it is necessary to examine the legal tenability of
the plaintiff raising a plea of adverse possession alongside a claim of
title.
49. It is true that, in strict legal theory, a plea of adverse possession
proceeds on the footing that the claimant does not derive title from
lawful origin but asserts ownership against the true owner by reason
of long, continuous and hostile possession. In that sense, a plea of
adverse possession is conceptually inconsistent with a plea of lawful
title. However, civil jurisprudence has consistently recognized that
alternative and even inconsistent pleas are permissible, provided they
are not mutually destructive in a manner that renders the case
inherently contradictory. The purpose of such pleading is to enable the
Court to adjudicate the real controversy between the parties in the
event the primary plea is not accepted.
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50. In cases where the defendant disputes the very title of the
plaintiff, it is open to the plaintiff to assert, firstly, that she has valid
title based on lawful conveyances, and secondly, in the alternative,
that even assuming any defect in title, her long, open and
uninterrupted possession has matured into ownership by adverse
possession. What is crucial is not the theoretical inconsistency of the
pleas, but whether the factual foundation exists for each plea and
whether such pleas are clearly structured as alternatives and not as
simultaneous assertions of the same legal character.
51. In A. Krishnappa v. Thimmaraayappa and others 17 the High
Court for the State of Karnataka held as under:
“5. The Counsel for the appellant, relied on the ruling of
Division Bench of this Court in Karnataka Wakf Board, Bangalore
v. State of Karnataka and Ors., wherein this Court has held thus:
“The plaintiff has taken up an alternative plea
that it has perfected its title to the suit property by
adverse possession also. It is well-settled that the
plaintiff can take an alternative plea. The plea regarding
the title and the plea of adverse possession pleaded by
the plaintiff in this case, cannot be said to be
inconsistent with one another. Since the defendants have
been putting forward a claim to the suit property since
ancient times, the possession of the plaintiff is
necessarily hostile to the claim of title made by the
defendants and is to their knowledge. The period of
plaintiffs possession being well over the statutory period17
MANU/KA/0432/2001
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KL, J & VRKR, J
CCCA No.33_2005under Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the learned
Trial Judge has rightly held that the plaintiff has
established its title to the suit property by adverse
possession”.
6. In view of the ruling of the Division Bench of this
Court, it is well-within the right of the party in a suit to set up title
on one part and also can take up plea of adverse possession in
alternative. Both the pleas are held to be alternative and
permissible. In view of the law laid down by the Division Bench,
the law laid down in Danappa Revappa Kolli’s case, supra, by the
learned Single Judge is no longer good law and so also the law
laid down in Prakash’s case, supra, being contrary to the Division
Bench decision is not a good law. Therefore, it was improper on
the part of the Trial Court in holding that the defendant was not
entitled to take up plea of adverse possession and thus, the
rejection of the plea at the threshold without scrutiny of the
evidence was improper. Thus the finding on Issue No. 4 is
erroneous.”
52. In the case of Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur 18, the
Honourable Supreme Court of India has clarified that title acquired by
adverse possession under the Limitation Act, 1963 can be used both as
a defence and as a basis to file a suit, thereby settling the law on the
doctrine. The Relevant Para is being extracted hereunder:
59. We hold that a person in possession cannot be ousted by another
person except by due procedure of law and once 12 years’ period of
adverse possession is over, even owner’s right to eject him is lost and
the possessory owner acquires right, title and interest possessed by
the outgoing person/owner as the case may be against whom he has
prescribed. In our opinion, consequence is that once the right, title or
interest is acquired it can be used as a sword by the plaintiff as well
as a shield by the defendant within ken of Article 65 of the Act and any
person who has perfected title by way of adverse possession, can file a
suit for restoration of possession in case of dispossession.
18
(2019) 8 SCC 729
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53. Further, in N.S. Spance v. D.S. Kanagarajan19, the High Court
of Madras, held that a plaintiff can raise alternative pleas of title and
adverse possession, and such pleas are not impermissible merely on
the ground of inconsistency. The relevant paragraph is reproduced
hereunder:
“19. In the plaint, the plaintiff claimed title to the suit
property not only on the basis of the document dated 30.10.1972
(A.11), but also on the basis of adverse possession. The learned
counsel for the respondents submitted, that a person, who claimed title
in himself, under a document cannot claim adverse possession also,
since both the pleas are inconsistent, which will prove the absence of
animus to enjoy the property, hostile to the true owner.
20. As an answer to the above said contention, the learned
counsel for the appellant relying upon a decision of the Division
Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Karnataka Wakf Board v. State
of Karnataka (AIR 1996 Karnataka 55) contended that this kind of
plea cannot be described as inconsistent and the same is available to
a party. In the case involved in the above decision, the plaintiff therein
as taken up an alternative plea, as if they had perfected his title to the
suit property by adverse possession. While considering, whether such
a plea is available or not, the division bench has ruled:
“The plaintiff has taken an alternative plea that it
has perfected its title to the suit property by adverse
possession also. In the appeal memo, in para 10 at page
No.7, it is contended that the said plea is inconsistent with
the plea of title under Issue No.1. It is not possible to
accept this contention. It is well settled that the plaintiff
can take an alternative plea. The plea regarding title and
the plea of adverse possession pleaded by the plaintiff in
this case, cannot be said to be inconsistent with one
another.”
19
2005-2-L.W.470
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54. In Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu20, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that the person, who failed in proving his title
to the suit property, can succeeded in securing a decree for possession
on the basis of his prior possession and the relevant portion reads:
“8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned,
the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession
and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable
force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been
wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so
peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser
is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner,
the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take
the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his
possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and
settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force
or taking the law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in
possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law
of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use
of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior
peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the
possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any
property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser
from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being
committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray
or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful
owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of
the cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not
be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner.
9. It is the settled possession or effective possession of a
person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession
even as against the true owner.”
20
(2004) 1 SCC 769
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55. In the present case, the plaintiff has primarily established her
claim of title through a continuous chain of registered conveyances
supported by revenue records. These documents demonstrate lawful
devolution of interest and constitute a strong foundation for asserting
ownership. Independently of the said title, the evidence on record also
discloses that the plaintiff and her predecessors have been in long,
continuous, open and uninterrupted possession of the suit schedule
property for several decades. Such possession is not clandestine but is
supported by public documents, revenue entries and conduct of the
parties, including the initiation of proceedings by the State itself,
which necessarily presupposes knowledge of such possession.
56. The possession of the plaintiff is therefore:
i. Open and notorious, visible to the true owner;
ii. Continuous and uninterrupted, extending over the
statutory period;
iii. Hostile in character,
inasmuch as it is asserted against the State without acknowledgment
of superior title. Thus, even assuming that the plaintiff’s title was to be
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KL, J & VRKR, J
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legal requirements of adverse possession.
57. In that view of the matter, the plea of adverse possession,
having been taken in the alternative and supported by cogent evidence,
does not detract from the plaintiff’s primary claim of title but rather
fortifies her claim to the property from an independent legal
standpoint.
58. Adverse possession requires proof of open, continuous, hostile
and uninterrupted possession for the statutory period. The evidence
placed on record on behalf of plaintiff, particularly the revenue entries
commencing from the Khasra Pahani of the year 1954-55 and the
subsequent chain of registered transactions, clearly demonstrates that
possession of the plaintiff over the subject land was neither
clandestine nor sporadic, but traceable, continuous and documented.
59. It is significant that the Government itself filed L.G.C. No. 45
of 1991 before the Special Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land
Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, alleging that the plaintiff and others
were land grabbers in respect of the subject Town Survey land. The
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very institution of such proceedings necessarily presupposes that the
persons proceeded against were in actual possession of the land;
otherwise, the question of “land grabbing” would not arise. Thus, by
initiating L.G.C. No. 45 of 1991, the Government implicitly
acknowledged the plaintiff’s possession, which materially supports
her plea of continuous possession in respect of suit schedule property
and is relevant while considering the claim of adverse possession.
Effect of Registered Documents – Constructive Notice:
60. It is further significant to note that, this Court finds that the
chain of registered conveyances forming the basis of her claim were
duly registered under the Registration Act, thereby operating as
constructive notice to the whole world, including the Government.
Registration itself amounts to public notice of the plaintiff’s assertion
of rights over the suit schedule property. In Jayesh Dinesh Kadam
and Another v. Andrew David Fernandes 21, it was held by the
Bombay High Court that in accordance with Section 50 of the
Registration Act read with section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act
the very registration of a document constitutes a notice to the public.
The effect of registration of a sale deed is a notice to the whole world
21
2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2549
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KL, J & VRKR, J
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in respect of the property, which is the subject matter of the deed of
conveyance or sale or transfer, mortgage etc., as the case may be.
Despite such public and open assertion of title over the suit schedule
property, the Government did not initiate any effective proceedings to
recover possession from the plaintiff for decades. On the contrary,
proceedings under L.G.C. No.45 of 1991 were instituted alleging that
the plaintiff and others were land grabbers, which itself is an
admission that plaintiff along with others were in possession of the
subject lands.
61. Furthermore, in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ld.Tr.Dir v. State
of Haryana & Another 22, the Honourable Supreme Court has held
that:
“Section 49 of The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides that no
document required by Section 17 to be registered shall, affect any
immovable property comprised therein or received as evidence of any
transaction affected such property, unless it has been registered.
Registration of a document gives notice to the world that such a document
has been executed.”
62. The learned Trial Court erred in holding that adverse possession
cannot be claimed in respect of vacant land in the absence of
22
AIR 2012 SC 206
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permanent construction. It is also well settled that possession over
open land may also mature into adverse possession, provided the acts
of ownership are open and hostile. The plaintiff’s documentary
evidence, read cumulatively, establishes continuity of possession
beyond the statutory period. Accordingly, the plea of adverse
possession also stands established.
Point No.5: Objection under Sections 79 and 80 of the CPC
63. It is pertinent to note that the contention of the
respondents/defendants regarding non-compliance with Section 79 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, is wholly misconceived. The District
Collector, Hyderabad, was arrayed as a defendant in the suit. In
matters concerning Government land, the District Collector functions
as the principal administrative authority and custodian of Government
land records within the district and represent the State in such matters.
By necessary implication, he acts as an instrumentality and limb of the
State. Further, being an authority discharging sovereign and statutory
functions, the District Collector squarely falls within the meaning of
“State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, suing
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the District Collector in matters relating to Government land
substantially amounts to suing the State itself.
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KL, J & VRKR, J
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64. Section 79 of the CPC reads as under:
“79. Suits by or against Government. –In a suit by or
against the Government, the authority to be named as plaintiff or
defendant, as the case may be, shall be
(a) in the case of a suit by or against the Central Government, [the
Union of India], and
(b) in the case of a suit by or against a State Government, the
State.]
65. It is significant that in their written statement, the
respondents/defendants themselves asserted that the suit schedule
property belongs to the Government and further raised a plea
regarding non-issuance of notice under Section 80 of the CPC, thereby
clearly acknowledging that the District Collector was sued in his
representative capacity. Throughout the suit proceedings as well as in
the present appeal, the respondents/defendants have been represented
by the learned Government Pleader, which unmistakably establishes
that the Government was effectively before the Court. Hence, the
objection under Section 79 of the CPC is purely technical in nature
and, at the highest, amounts only to misdescription of the party.
66. Moreover, this objection was not raised at any stage during the
trial, either in the written statement, evidence, or cross-examination,
and has been urged for the first time at the stage of final arguments in
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appeal. The plea is therefore clearly an afterthought and devoid of
merit. The Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh
Jagdev’s case (supra) held that wrong description of a government
authority in the cause title does not invalidate proceedings when the
Government is in substance before the Court. The nomenclature is not
decisive; what is material is effective representation. At best, the
present case involves a mere mis-description and not non-joinder of a
necessary party. In view of Order I Rule 9 of the CPC, no suit shall be
defeated by reason of mis-joinder or non-joinder of parties, and
therefore, the objection under Section 79 of the CPC is liable to be
rejected. The relevant para reads as below:
“Having given due consideration to the contentions of the
counsel and having gone through the facts and circumstances of the
case, first question that arises is whether the appeal has been
competently laid?
It is not disputed and cannot be disputed that the Union of
India can lay the suit and be sued under article 300 of the
Constitution in relation to its affairs. Under Section 79 read with
order 27 Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, in a suit, by or against the
Centra Government, the authority to be named as plaintiff/defendant
shall be Union of India. Secretary, authority to be named as
plaintiff/defendant shall be Union of India. The Secretary, Ministry of
works and Housing is a limb of Union of India transacting its
functions on behalf of the Government under the concerned
Department as per the business rules framed under article 77 of the
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CCCA No.33_2005Constitution. Therefore, the appeal came to be filed the secretary
instead of Union of India, is not conclusive. The meat of the matter is
that the secretary representing the Government of India had filed the
appeal obviously on behalf of Union of India. Accordingly, we reject
the first contention.”
67. Another significant aspect relating to Section 80 of the CPC is
that the said contention of the respondents /defendants is wholly
untenable both on facts and in law. The record reveals that the original
suit for bare injunction was subsequently amended pursuant to the
orders passed by the Court in W.A. No.1741 of 2000, whereby the
plaintiff was granted liberty to seek declaration of title before the
competent Civil Court. Consequent thereto, the plaint was amended
incorporating the relief of declaration and the suit was renumbered as
O.S. No.87 of 2001 and made over to the Court of the Additional
Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. Thus, the present
proceedings are not an independent fresh institution but a continuation
of earlier litigation arising out of urgent circumstances.
68. It is specifically pleaded in paragraph 10 of the amended plaint
that the plaintiff was facing imminent threat of dispossession at the
hands of the revenue authorities and, therefore, sought urgent relief. In
view of such urgency, an interlocutory application under Section 80(2)
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of the CPC was filed seeking leave of the Court to dispense with the
mandatory notice of two months as contemplated under Section 80(1)
of the CPC. This aspect is also recorded in paragraph 5 of the
impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. Once such
leave is sought and the Court entertains the plaint without returning it
under the proviso to Section 80(2) of the CPC, it necessarily implies
judicial satisfaction regarding the existence of urgency. Further,
interim injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff, which clearly
demonstrates that the Court was satisfied about the immediate threat
and the need for urgent adjudication.
69. Section 80 of the CPC deals with the Notice reads as under:
“Section 80(2): A suit to obtain an urgent or immediate relief
against the Government (including the Government of the State of
Jammu and Kashmir) or any public officer in respect of any act
purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity,
may be instituted, with the leave of the Court, without serving any
notice as required by sub-section (I); but the Court shall not grant
relief in the suit, whether interim or otherwise, except after giving to
the Government or public officer, as the case may be, a reasonable
opportunity of showing cause in respect of the relief prayed for in the
suit.
Provided that the Court shall, if it is satisfied, after hearing
the parties, that no urgent or immediate relief need be granted in the
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requirements of sub-section (1).”
70. Significantly, the respondents/defendants neither pleaded in
their written statement that leave under Section 80(2) of the CPC was
not granted nor raised any such objection during trial. Further, no
suggestion was put to PW-1 in cross-examination disputing the grant
of leave. The objection has been raised only at the stage of final
arguments in the present appeal, which clearly indicates that it is an
afterthought. It is well settled that the requirement under Section 80 of
the CPC, though mandatory in ordinary circumstances, stands satisfied
when leave under sub-section (2) is sought and the Court proceeds to
entertain the suit. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in
Yashod Kumari and Another v. MCD & Others23, held that once
urgent relief is claimed and the Court grants leave under Section 80(2)
of the CPC, the suit cannot be dismissed on the ground of absence of
prior notice. The relevant para is being extracted hereunder:
“10. In the present case there is no dispute that
appellants had filed an application for grant of leave under
Section 80(2) which was not dealt with and considered by the
Court. On the contrary the Court had proceeded to frame a
preliminary issue on the preliminary objection taken by23
AIR 2004 Del 225
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KL, J & VRKR, J
CCCA No.33_2005respondents in their written statement and dismissed the suit for
want of service of notice under Section 80. This, in our view,
could not have been done, because once the Court was seized of
appellant’s application under Section 80(2) it ought to have
disposed of this application first by either granting leave or
refusing it in which case it was to return the plaint to them which
they could refile after service of two months’ notice. It would not
have dismissed the suit without doing and this renders the
impugned dismissal order straightaway unsustainable. The order
warrants setting aside on this ground alone.”
71. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, where urgency was
specifically pleaded, leave under Section 80(2) of the Code of Civil
Procedure was invoked, the plaint was entertained, and interim relief
was granted, the objection regarding non-issuance of notice under
Section 80 CPC is without substance and liable to be rejected. The
conduct of the defendants in not raising such objection at the
appropriate stage and in participating in the proceedings through the
learned Government Pleader clearly establishes absence of prejudice.
Point No.7: Whether the impugned judgment warrants any
interference:
72. This Court holds that the impugned judgment and decree
warrants interference. The learned Trial Court has misdirected itself
both on facts and in law by disregarding material evidence,
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misapplying settled legal principles relating to title and possession and
treating TSLR entries as conclusive proof of title. The findings are
unsustainable and are accordingly set aside. The point is answered in
favour of plaintiff/appellant.
VIII. CONCLUSION:
73. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion on all the Points, this
Court is of the considered view that the learned Trial Court has
committed manifest errors both on facts and in law.
74. The learned Trial Court erred in discarding the registered chain
of title under Exs. A-1 to A-4 despite there being no substantive
challenge to their execution or genuineness. It further failed to
appreciate the presumptive value attached to revenue records and
erroneously treated TSLR entries as conclusive proof of title, contrary
to settled legal principles.
75. Insofar as the plea of adverse possession is concerned, the
contention of the respondents that the plaintiff cannot simultaneously
claim title and adverse possession cannot be accepted in the facts of
the present case. Though such pleas are conceptually inconsistent, it is
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well settled that a party is entitled to raise them in the alternative,
particularly where the title is disputed by the defendants. What is
required is that the plea of adverse possession must be specifically
pleaded and established by cogent evidence of open, continuous and
hostile possession to the knowledge of the true owner.
76. In the present case, the evidence on record, when read
cumulatively, clearly establishes long, continuous and hostile
possession of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property.
Significantly, the institution of proceedings by the Government
alleging land grabbing necessarily presupposes that the plaintiff was in
possession of the property. Such conduct on the part of the State
constitutes a clear acknowledgment of possession and materially
supports the plaintiff’s plea.
77. Thus, the plea of adverse possession, though taken in the
alternative, stands duly established. The rejection of the said plea by
the learned Trial Court is therefore unsustainable.
78. Equally, the objection raised by the respondents regarding non-
compliance with Sections 79 and 80 of the CPC is untenable. Though
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the State ought to have been formally described in accordance with
Section 79 of the CPC, the impleadment of the District Collector, who
is the principal officer representing the State in matters relating to
Government land, coupled with continuous representation of the
defendants through the learned Government Pleader, clearly
establishes that the State was effectively before the Court throughout
the proceedings.
79. In such circumstances, the objection, at best, relates to a
technical defect in description and does not amount to non-joinder of a
necessary party. No prejudice having been demonstrated, the said
contention cannot defeat substantive rights and is liable to be rejected.
Accordingly, upon a cumulative consideration of the entire material
on record and the settled legal principles governing title, adverse
possession and evidentiary value of revenue records, this Court holds
that the impugned judgment and decree dated 29.01.2005 passed in
O.S. No.87 of 2001 by the learned XIV Additional Chief Judge, City
Civil Court, Hyderabad, suffer from perversity, illegality and material
irregularity warranting interference. The findings recorded by the
learned Trial Court are unsustainable in law and are hereby set aside.
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IX. RESULT:
80. In the result, the Appeal is allowed. The impugned Judgment
and Decree dated 29.01.2005 passed in O.S. No.87 of 2001 by the
learned XIV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, are
set aside. Consequently, the suit in O.S. No.87 of 2001 shall stand
decreed.
81. The plaintiff is declared as the owner of the suit schedule
property. The defendants are permanently restrained from interfering
with plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule
property except in accordance with due process of law. In the facts
and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
As a necessary corollary, all pending miscellaneous/
interlocutory applications, if any, shall also stand closed.
_________________
K. LAKSHMAN, J
_________________________________
VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY, J
Date: 26.03.2026
AS