Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Sri Raja Velugoti Madana Gopala Krishna … vs State Of Punjab1 And Also Placed Another … on 15 April, 2026
APHC010624632011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3397]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
WEDNESDAY,THE FIFTEENTH DAY OF APRIL
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA KRISHNA
RAO
SECOND APPEAL NO: 1250/2011
Between:
Sri Raja Velugoti Madana Gopala Krishna Yachendra (died) ...APPELLANT(S)
and Others
AND
Padidam Jayasree and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1. M RAVINDRA
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. P SRI RAM
The Court made the following:
Reserved on 31.03.2026
Pronounced on 15.04.2026
Uploaded on 15.04.2026
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO
SECOND APPEAL No.1250 of 2011
JUDGMENT:
This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for
short, ‘C.P.C.’) is filed aggrieved against the decree and judgment dated
07.06.2011 in A.S.No.08 of 2005 on the file of the Court of learned III Additional
District Judge (FTC) Nellore, (for short, ‘the first appellate Court’), in reversing
the decree and judgment dated 17.11.2004 in O.S.No.50 of 1994 on the file of
the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge, Gudur, (for short, ‘the trial Court’).
2. The appellant herein is the defendant and the respondents herein are the
plaintiffs before the trial Court. The sole-appellant died during the pendency of
the second appeal and the appellant No.2 is added as the Legal
Representative of the deceased sole-appellant.
3. The plaintiffs initiated action in O.S.No.50 of 1994, on the file of the trial
Court with a prayer for specific performance directing the defendant to execute
a regular sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs basing on the agreement of sale
dated 31.08.1991.
4. The trial Court dismissed the suit. Felt aggrieved of the same, the
unsuccessful plaintiffs in the above said suit filed A.S.No.08 of 2005 on the file
of the first appellate Court. By decree and judgment dated 07.06.2011 in
A.S.No.08 of 2005, the first appellate Court allowed the appeal suit by setting
aside the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court.
VGKR, J.
SA_1250_2011
5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the second appeal will be
referred to as they were arrayed in the original suit.
6. Case of the plaintiffs, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in
O.S.No.50 of 1994, is as follows:
The defendant borrowed a sum of Rs.1,70,000/- from the plaintiffs on
31.08.1991 and executed a stamped agreement of sale in favour of the
plaintiffs agreeing to repay the said amount on or before 30.08.1993, failing
which the defendant will execute a registered sale deed in respect of the plaint
schedule property in favour of the plaintiffs and also deliver the possession of
the same. In spite of demands made by the plaintiffs, the defendant failed to
repay the amount. The plaintiffs pleaded that they got issued a legal notice to
the defendant on 26.02.1994 for which the defendant issued a reply notice on
05.03.1994 with false allegations. Hence, the present suit.
7. The defendant filed written statement before the trial Court. The brief
averments in the written statement filed by the defendant are as follows:
The defendant pleaded that the alleged agreement of sale is a concocted
and fabricated document and brought into existence for unlawful gain. The
defendant pleaded that the market value of the plaint schedule property is
about Rs.4,00,000/- and he never agreed to sell the same for paltry amount.
The defendant further pleaded that the possession said to have been delivered
amounts to a conveyance deed and the plaintiffs are also aware that the plaint
schedule property affected by the land ceiling Act and pending the proceedings
VGKR, J.
SA_1250_2011
under the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act under the
agreement of sale is null and void as per Section 17 of the A.P. Land Reforms
Act and as such the agreement of sale cannot be executed under Section 23 of
the Indian Contract Act. The defendant further pleaded that the Government
was in possession of the land covered under Sy.No.158 of Periyavarama
Village in pursuance of the Land Reforms Tribunal order dated 28.11.1982 and
also took actual possession by the Government on 24.01.1984 and continued
to be in possession till 1993. The defendant pleaded that the agreement of sale
is not valid and as per Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the suit is
liable to be dismissed and as such, he requested for the dismissal of the suit.
8. On the basis of above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following
issues for trial:
1. Whether the agreement of sale dated 31.08.1991 is true, valid and
binding on the defendant?
2. Whether the wife of the defendant is having any right in the suit property?
3. To what relief the plaintiffs are entitled to?
On 23.11.2000, the trial Court framed the following additional substantial
question of law:
1. Whether the suit is maintainable on the agreement of sale dated
31.08.1991 which is subsequent to the passing of A.P. Land Reforms
(Ceiling on agricultural holdings) Act of 1973 and by virtue of Section 17
of the said Act?
VGKR, J.
SA_1250_2011
9. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiffs,
P.W.1 to P.W.3 were examined and Ex.A-1 to Ex.A-32 were marked. On behalf
of the defendant, D.W.1 and D.W.2 were examined and Ex.B-1 to Ex.B-4 and
Ex.X-1 to Ex.X-11 were marked.
10. The learned trial Judge after conclusion of trial, on hearing the arguments
of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on
record, dismissed the suit. Felt aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful plaintiffs
filed the appeal suit in A.S.No.08 of 2005, wherein the following points came up
for consideration:
1) Whether the agreement of sale dated 31.08.1991 is true, valid and
binding on the defendant?
2) Whether the wife of the defendant has right in the suit schedule property?
3) Whether the agreement of sale Ex.A-21 is null and void in view of Section
17 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (ceiling on agricultural holding)
Act?
4) Whether this appeal is liable to be allowed if so on what ground? and
5) To what relief?
11. The learned first appellate Judge after hearing the arguments, answered
the points, as above, against the defendant and allowed the appeal by setting
aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge. Felt
aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful defendant in O.S.No.50 of 1994 filed
the present second appeal before this Court.
VGKR, J.
SA_1250_2011
12. On hearing both sides, at the time of admission of the second appeal on
23.07.2012, the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh, at Hyderabad,
framed the following substantial questions of law:
1. Whether the decree of the appellate Court granting specific performance
is erroneous and ignoring the settled principles of granting of the
discretionary relief when part of the claim of the plaintiffs with regard to
the possession of the property is not believed?
2. Whether the decree of the specific performance is equitable in the
interest of the parties and the circumstances?
On hearing learned counsel appearing for both sides, this Court on
27.11.2025 framed the following additional substantial question of law:
1. Whether the First Appellate Court has not considered the presumption
under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act which contemplates that
when the parties failed to appear into the witness box to submit for cross
examination, a presumption can be drawn that the case set up by them is
false?
2. Whether the Appellate Court has erred in reversing finding of the trial
Court that Ex.A-21 is not valid as per Section 17 of the Andhra Pradesh
Land Ceiling Act?
13. Heard Sri M.Ravindra, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant/defendant, and Sri Pathanjali Pamidigattam, learned counsel,
representing Sri P.Sri Ram, learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs.
VGKR, J.
SA_1250_2011
14. Law is well settled that under Section 100 of C.P.C., the High Court
cannot interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate Court
which is the final Court of facts except in such cases where such findings were
erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law, or its settled
position on the basis of the pronouncement made by the Apex Court or based
upon inadmissible evidence or without evidence.
15. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that both the Courts
below came to the wrong conclusion that the suit document is an agreement of
sale. He would further contend that though the said document is named as an
agreement, it is not at all an agreement in between both the parties to the suit
and it can be considered as usufructuary mortgage.
16. The suit document dated 31.08.1991 is marked as Ex.A-21 before the
trial Court. As seen from Ex.A-21, it goes to show that the defendant borrowed
a sum of Rs.1,70,000/- from the plaintiffs on 31.08.1991 and agreed to repay
the same within a period of two (02) years, failing which he agreed to execute a
registered document in respect of the plaint schedule property in favour of the
plaintiffs. Therefore, the first contract entered into by the defendant with the
plaintiffs is nothing but to repay the borrowed money to the plaintiffs. If the
defendant is able to repay the amount borrowed within a period of two (02)
years, the second condition will not come into operation. Therefore, the very
recitals in the suit document Ex.A-21 indicate that the defendant has no
intention to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs
have no intention to purchase the property as on the date of Ex.A-21. Even as
VGKR, J.
SA_1250_2011
per the recitals of Ex.A-21 but only as a default clause it was agreed to execute
a registered sale deed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiffs. Therefore,
the relationship between both the parties is only as a creditor and debtor, but
not as a vendor and vendee.
17. The golden rule of construction; it has been said, is to ascertain the
intention of the parties to the instrument after considering all the words in their
ordinary, natural sense. To ascertain this intention, the Court has to consider
the relevant portion of the document as a whole and also to take into account
the circumstances under which the particular words were used. In the case at
hand, the intention of the defendant as per Ex.A-21 suit document is that he will
repay the borrowed amount of Rs.1,70,000/- within a period of two (02) years.
There is no recital in Ex.A-21 itself that the defendant offered to sell the plaint
schedule property to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs also agreed to the same.
18. As stated supra, in the case at hand the suit document itself reflects that
there is no mutual agreement between both the parties. The agreement must
create mutual rights and obligations between both the parties. The plaint
averments itself go to show that Ex.A-21 is said to have been executed by the
defendant in favour of the plaintiffs about borrowing of money of Rs.1,70,000/-
by the defendant. Ex.A-21 is not a contract to sell under Section 2 (g) of the
Indian Contract Act. The recitals in Ex.A-21 go to show that it is not a contract
to sell the property. Both the Courts below concurrently held that the
possession is not delivered to the plaintiffs through Ex.A-21, though there is a
specific recital in Ex.A-21 that the possession was delivered to the plaintiffs. In
VGKR, J.
SA_1250_2011
the plaint and in Ex.A-22 legal notice the plaintiffs asserted that the defendant
borrowed money of Rs.1,70,000/- on 31.12.1991 with a promise to repay the
same within a period of two (02) years, failing which he will execute a registered
document in respect of the plaint schedule property. Both the Courts below
without considering the nature of the document, the recitals of the document
came to a wrong conclusion that the suit document is an agreement.
19. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that in view of the
bar under Section 17 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on
Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, the alleged Ex.A-21 agreement transaction is
void and Ex.A-21 is not at all a valid document.
20. Section 17 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on agricultural
holdings) Act, 1973, defines as follows:
17. Prohibition of alienation of holding –
(1) No person whose holding, and no member of a family unit, the holding of all the
members of which in the aggregate, is in excess of the ceiling area as on the 24 th
January, 1971 or at any time thereafter, shall on or after the notified date, alienate his
holding or any part thereof by way of sale, lease, gift, exchange, settlement, surrender,
usnfructuary mortgage or otherwise, or effect a partition thereof, or create a trust or
convert an agricultural land into non-agricultural land, until he or the family unit, as the
case may be, has furnished a declaration under section 8, and the extent of land, if any,
to be surrendered in respect of his holding or that of his family unit has been determined
by the Tribunal and an order has been passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer under
this Act taking possession of the land in excess of the ceiling area and a notification is
published under section 16; and any alienation made or partition effected or trust
created in contravention of this section shall be null and void and any conversion so
made shall be disregarded.
VGKR, J.
SA_1250_2011
(2) For the purposes of determining whether any transaction of the nature referred
to in sub-section (1) in relation to a land situated in this State, took place on or after the
notified date, the date on which the document relating to such transaction was
registered shall, notwithstanding anything in section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908
(Central Act 16 of 1908), be deemed to be the date on which the transaction took place,
whether such document was registered within or outside the State.
(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply to any transaction of the nature
referred to therein in execution of a decree or order of a civil court or of any award or
order of any other authority.
21. As noticed supra, the very suit document itself goes to show that the
defendant has no intention to sell away the plaint schedule property to the
plaintiffs, but only as a default clause, he agreed to sell the plaint schedule
property. The very recitals of the suit document itself reveal that for borrowing
money only Ex.A-21 document was executed and there is no relationship of
vendor and vendee between both the parties. The relationship between both
the parties is creditor and debtor only. Moreover, as noticed supra, there is no
vendor and vendee relationship between both the parties and their relationship
is only creditor and debtor. Therefore, if the suit document is proved in
accordance with law, the plaintiffs are entitled to a money decree from the
defendant.
22. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the First Appellate
Court has not considered the presumption under Section 114 of the Indian
Evidence Act, which contemplates that the parties failed to appear into the
witness box to submit for cross-examination, the presumption can be drawn
and the case set up by him is false. He would further contend that the plaintiffs
did not enter into the witness box. In the present case, the husband of the
VGKR, J.
SA_1250_2011
plaintiff No.1 is examined as P.W.2. Section 120 of the Indian Evidence Act
empowers P.W.2, being the husband of the plaintiff No.1, to give evidence on
behalf of his wife. The relationship between the plaintiffs and P.W.2 is not at all
disputed by the defendant. P.W.2 asserted that he is having personal
knowledge about the suit transaction. Therefore, P.W.2 is a competent witness
to depose on behalf of the plaintiffs.
23. In order to prove the suit document Ex.A-21, the plaintiffs relied on the
evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3. P.W.2 is none other than the husband of the
plaintiff No.1. P.W.3 is one of the attestors to the suit document. The material
on record reveals that the suit document was sent to the handwriting expert for
comparison of the signature of the defendant and also for report on an
application filed by the plaintiffs before the trial Court. The said handwriting
expert is examined as P.W.1. The evidence of P.W.1 goes to show that
Ex.A-21 is said to have been executed by the defendant and the signature on
Ex.A-21 is that of the defendant. The evidence of P.W.3 clinchingly establishes
that the suit document was executed by the defendant and the signature on
Ex.A-21 belongs to the defendant. In cross-examination, the evidence of P.W.3
is not at all disturbed on the material aspects of the case. The evidence of
P.W.2 also clearly supports the case of the plaintiffs about the execution of the
suit document. The evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.3 clinchingly establish about the
execution of suit document by the defendant in favour of the plaintiffs. The
factum of lending of an amount of Rs.1,70,000/- by the plaintiffs to the
defendant under Ex.A-21 is proved through the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.3.
VGKR, J.
SA_1250_2011
Admittedly, the suit is filed within three (03) years from the date Ex.A-21 suit
document. Both the Courts below came to a conclusion that Ex.A-21 suit
document is true and proved in accordance with law. I do not find any illegality
in the said concurrent finding arrived at by the trial Court as well as the learned
First Appellate Court.
24. It was represented by the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit
document Ex.A-21 is specifically denied by the defendant, but without
appreciating the entire evidence on record in a proper manner both the Courts
below came to a wrong conclusion that Ex.A-21 is true and proved by the
plaintiffs. As noticed supra, to prove Ex.A-21 suit document, the plaintiffs relied
on the evidence of P.W.1. P.W.1 is the expert who examined the document by
comparing the admitted signatures of the defendant with the signatures on the
suit document. The expert/P.W.1 asserts that the signatures on the suit
document are that of the defendant. The evidence of P.W.1 is well corroborated
by the evidence of P.W.3, who is the attestor to the suit document. In the
instant case, the evidence of the expert/P.W.1 is well corroborated by the
evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3.
25. The learned counsel for the respondents placed a case law in Magan
Bihari Lal Vs. State of Punjab1 and also placed another case law in Murari
Lal S/o Ram Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh2, wherein the Hon’ble Apex
Court held as follows:
1
(1977) 2 SCC 210
2
1980 SCR (2) 249
VGKR, J.
SA_1250_2011
“It is well settled that expert opinion must always be received with great caution and
perhaps none so with more caution than the opinion of a handwriting expert”
26. In the present case, the evidence of expert/P.W.1 is well corroborated by
the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3. After carefully analyzing the evidence of
P.W.1 and P.W.3 together with P.W.2, both the Courts arrived at a concurrent
finding that the suit document Ex.A-21 is proved and executed by the
defendant. Therefore, there is no subsistence in the contention of the learned
counsel for the appellant that the suit document is not proved in accordance
with law.
27. Learned counsel for the respondents would contend that Section 16(c)
and Section 20 of the Act govern readiness/willingness and equitable discretion
to grant the relief of specific performance of an agreement of sale. The learned
counsel for the respondents placed a case law in R.Kandaswamy (since
dead) Ors., Vs. T.R.K Sarawathy & Anr.,3, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court
held as follows:
“36. Moving further, a perusal of the buyer’s cross-examination reveals her
admission of not having enough fund in either of her bank accounts to pay the balance
sale price. This, in our opinion, is sufficient proof of her financial incapacity to perform
her part of the contract. The husband of the buyer could be a wealthy man having
sufficient balance in his bank account but having perused the credit and debit entries,
we have significant doubts in respect thereof which we need not dilate here in the
absence of him being a party to the proceedings. Suffice is to observe, the transactions
evident from the bank accounts of the buyer’s husband do little to impress us that the
buyer had demonstrated her financial capacity to make payment of the balance sale
price and close the deal.
37. Imperative and interesting it is to note, the buyer sought to return the demand draft
to the sellers on the last day of its validity. As discussed above, along with letter dated
23rd February 2006 of the sellers cancelling the Agreement, they returned the advance
amount received from the buyer vide demand draft dated 11th February 2006. This draft3
2024 INSC 884
VGKR, J.
SA_1250_2011
was retained by the buyer and returned as late as 10th August, 2006 vide letter of even
date (and not along with any of her previous letters). However, the demand draft dated
11th February, 2006 being valid only for a period of 6 (six) months, i.e., 10th August
2006, it has intrigued us as to why the buyer would hold on to the demand draft and not
return it earlier if she was genuinely interested in purchasing the property.”
28. The learned counsel for the respondents placed a case law in
Parswanath Saha Vs. Bandhana Modak (Das)4. The learned counsel for the
respondents also placed another case law in Janardan Das Vs. Durga Prasad
Agrawalla,5, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:
“Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 bars the relief of specific performance
of a contract in favour of a person, who fails to aver and prove his readiness and
willingness to perform his part of contract. In view of Explanation (i) to clause (c) of
Section 16, it may not be essential for the plaintiff to actually tender money to the
defendant or to deposit money in court, except when so directed by the Court, to prove
readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of a contract, which involves
payment of money. However, Explanation (ii) says the plaintiff must aver performance or
readiness and willingness to perform the contract according to its true construction.”
The Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid said case law had further held
as follows:
“The relief of specific performance under the Specific Relief Act, 1963, is
discretionary in nature. Section 20 of the Act (applicable to this case as it predates the
2018 amendment) explicitly stated that the court is not bound to grant such relief merely
because it is lawful to do so. The discretion must be exercised judiciously and based on
sound principles, ensuring that granting specific performance is just and equitable in the
circumstances of the case.”
29. The learned counsel for the respondents also placed another case law in
P.Ravindranathi & Anr. Vs. Sasikala & Ors. 6 The learned counsel for the
respondents also placed another case law in Life Insurance Corporation of
India Vs. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited & Anr., in Civil Appeal No.5909
of 2022.
4
2024 INSC 1022
5
2024 INSC 778
6
2024 INSC 533
VGKR, J.
SA_1250_2011
In the case at hand between both the parties to the suit there are no
mutually agreed terms and there is no buyer and seller relationship between
both the parties. As noticed supra, in the present case, there is no intention to
the defendant to alienate the schedule property to the plaintiffs. The very
recitals of Ex.A-21 reveal that for borrowing money only the said document was
executed. Therefore, the aforesaid case laws relied on by the learned counsel
for the respondents are in no way applicable to the subject matter of the
present suit, since there is no vendor and vendee relationship between both the
parties to the suit.
30. The learned counsel for the respondents placed another case law in
Nazir Mohamed Vs. J.Kamala and Ors.7
The aforesaid case law relates to declaration of title of the parties.
Therefore the facts in the said case law are not at all applicable to the present
case.
31. The learned counsel for the respondents placed another case law in
State of Rajasthan Vs. Shiv Dayal8. The learned counsel for the respondents
also placed another case law in C.Doddanarayana Reddy (D) By Lrs. Vs.
C.Jayarama Reddy (Dead By Lr.9.
In the present case also both the Courts concurrently held that Ex.A-21
was proved, but both the Courts came to a wrong conclusion that Ex.A-21 is an
agreement. The very nature of Ex.A-21 goes to show that it was executed for
7
AIR 2020 Supreme Court 4321
8
AIR Online 2019 SC 849
9
AIR 2020 Supreme Court 4321
VGKR, J.
SA_1250_2011
the purpose of borrowing money only by the defendant, but the defendant is not
having any intention to alienate the schedule property to the plaintiffs and there
is no mutual understanding between both the parties to the suit.
32. The learned counsel for the respondents placed a case law in Hasmat
Ali Vs. Amina Bibi & Ors.10 In the present case both the Courts came to a
wrong conclusion that the suit document is an agreement. As noticed supra, the
very recitals Ex.A-21 reveals that for the purpose of borrowing money only the
defendant executed Ex.A-21 document.
33. Learned counsel for the respondents contends that Section 23 of the
Indian Contract Act is attracted only where an agreement is intrinsically
opposed to public policy or forbidden by law. In the present case, the said
Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act is not at all applicable.
34. The learned counsel for the appellants placed a case law in Lourdu Mari
David and Others Vs. Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy and Others 11 . The
learned counsel for the appellants placed another case law in Vidhyadhar Vs.
Manikrao and Another12. The learned counsel for the appellants also placed
another case law in Pawan Kumar Dutt & Anr. Vs. Shakuntala Devi & Ors. 13
The learned counsel for the appellants also placed another case law in
Jayakantham and Others Vs. Abaykumar.14
10
[2021] 11 S.C.R. 42
11
(1996) 5 Supreme Court Cases 589
12
(1999) 3 Supreme Court Cases 573
13
2003 LawSuit (SC) 1565
14
AIR 2020 Supreme Court 4321
VGKR, J.
SA_1250_2011
34. The ratio laid down in the aforesaid case laws is applicable to the suit for
specific performance of agreement of sale. As noticed supra, Ex.A-21 suit
document reflects that there is no mutual agreement between both the parties
and there are no mutual rights and liabilities between both the parties to the
suit. Therefore, Ex.A-21 cannot be treated as an agreement of sale. The very
nature of Ex.A-21 suit document goes to show that it was executed by the
defendant for the purpose of borrowing money only and the defendant has no
intention to alienate the property to the plaintiffs.
35. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered view that both
the Courts below failed to ascertain the intention of the parties to Ex.A-21 and
have not considered the contents of the document in a proper manner and
came to a wrong conclusion that the suit document is an agreement. In fact,
Ex.A-21 was executed for the purpose of borrowing money only by the
defendant and there is no vendor and vendee relationship between both the
parties. The very suit document itself reflects that there is no interest clause, in
case the defendant fails to repay the said amount within a period of two (02)
years as recited in the agreement. Therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to a
simple money decree in the present case and the plaintiffs are not entitled to
the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale as granted by the First
Appellate Court.
36. In the result, the second appeal in S.A.No.1250 of 2011 is partly allowed
by modifying the decree and judgment dated 07.06.2011 passed by the First
Appellate Court in A.S.No.08 of 2005, as the suit in O.S.No.50 of 1994 on the
VGKR, J.
SA_1250_2011
file of the Senior Civil Judge, Gudur, is partly decreed directing appellant No.2
i.e the legal representative of the deceased appellant No.1 (defendant), to pay
a sum of Rs.1,70,000/- to the plaintiffs with interest @ 12% per annum on
Rs.1,70,000/- from 31.08.1991 till the date of decree and at the subsequent
rate of interest @ 6% per annum from the date of decree till the date of
realization from out of the estate of the deceased appellant No.1 (defendant)
which are in the hands of appellant No.2. In view of the facts and circumstances
of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand disposed of in
consequence.
__________________________
V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J.
Date: 15.04.2026
SRT