Parliament is set to debate the Constitution (One Hundred and Thirty-First Amendment) Bill, 2026. According to the Government, the purpose of the Bill is to expedite the implementation of women’s reservation in the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies; implementation that was delayed solely at the behest of the Government itself when it passed the Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth) Amendment Act three years ago. A close reading of the Bill dispels any notion that the current Bill has anything to do with women’s reservation.
The proposed 131st amendment expands the size of the Lok Sabha to 850 seats, ends the fifty-year freeze on inter-state seat distribution in the Lok Sabha, accelerates delimitation on the basis of 2011 census data, and ends the constitutional requirement to conduct delimitations after every census. The Bill represents the single largest change to the design of Parliament in the nation’s history, one that deserves far more parliamentary and public scrutiny than the government appears willing to afford it, with the draft circulated two days prior to Parliament taking it up.
The constitutional context, history (Lok Sabha) (Rajya Sabha), and proposed solutions concerning the delimitation problem have been discussed at length on this blog. This post is limited to the proposed 131st amendment.
Constitutional Background
Articles 81, 82, and 170 of the Constitution, as originally enacted, contemplated that: (i) the redistribution of seats to states in Parliament; (ii) the redrawing of parliamentary constituencies within states; and (iii) the redrawing of state legislative assembly constituencies would be revised based on population data after every census. These exercises were faithfully carried out for the first three decades of the nation’s history. In 1976, however, Parliament amended Articles 81 and 82 to, among other things,freeze the inter-state redistribution of seats based on the 1971 census. The ostensible justification for this freeze was that it would be unfair to take away seats from states that had successfully implemented family planning. Even in 1976, this was largely political rhetoric. By 1976, regional parties had begun to emerge in the states, and it had become politically unpalatable to reduce a state’s representation in Parliament, especially as (discussed in detail here), the Constitution affords few protections to states’ interests. Since 1976, the freeze on redistribution of Lok Sabha seats amongst the states has been extended by governments of all political stripes, bringing us to the present day.
Ending the Freeze on Inter-State Redistribution
Over the last few weeks, the Prime Minister has repeatedly stated that no seat will lose seats in the upcoming delimitation exercise, and that each state’s current proportion in the Lok Sabha will be maintained. But this assurance appears nowhere in the proposed 131st Amendment Bill itself, nor in the accompanying Delimitation Bill. The Bill merely deletes the proviso added to Articles 81 and 82 stating that state re-distribution will continue on the basis of the 1971 census. The effect of this deletion is a reversion to the constitutional default in Art 81(2), which is the redistribution of seats to states on the basis of population.
Thus, the Bill in its current form will result in the reallocation of seats in the Lok Sabha to states based on their populations in the 2011 census. Such a move will automatically advantage states whose populations have grown fastest since 1971. States such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar stand to gain significantly, while Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh would see their proportion of seats in the Lok Sabha drop significantly.
While reverting to a population-based distribution of seats to states may seem consonant with the original intention of the Constitution, and even necessary to preserve the principle of one person, one vote across the country, this change must be appreciated in the broader constitutional context. India’s fiscal and legal centralisation means that key interests of state governments are often subject to partisan politics at the national level. The loss of seats in the Lok Sabha only exacerbates federal anxieties for states not within the Government’s ruling coalition. Further, the states that stand to win and lose from a population-based seat redistribution neatly fall along existing geographic (north/south), linguistic (Hindi/non-Hindi), and economic (rich/poor states) faultlines. This is why, as I have previously written on this blog (here), population-based seat redistribution in the Lok Sabha should be accompanied by a broader set of federal reforms.
Discretionary powers over delimitation and census
The Bill’s treatment of delimitation is troubling in two distinct, but related respects. The demographic basis it adopts for the immediate exercise, and the constitutional framework it establishes for all future exercises.
Beginning with the immediate question, the Delimitation Bill accompanying the current Bill specifies that delimitation will proceed on the basis of the last preceding published census, which today, means the 2011 census. But the 2027 census has already begun. The decision to proceed with the first reallocation of seats to states since 1976 on the basis of 2011 census, rather than waiting for the result of the ongoing census, is indefensible. A delimitation exercise conducted using 2011 census data will be defective from the outset, encoding fifteen-year-old data into a constitutional framework designed to be updated every decade.
The long-term structural changes are arguably even more serious. Under the existing constitutional scheme, delimitation is mandatory after every census. Article 82 expressly contemplates that delimitation will occur “upon the completion of each census…” However, the proposed 131st Amendment severs this connection entirely. Under the framework proposed, delimitation becomes an exercise that may be undertaken whenever Parliament passes a law. This effectively gives the Government-in-Parliament the power to discretionally conduct a delimitation whenever it sees fit. Further, the current Bill also removes the requirement that Parliament use the census data from “the last preceding census,” allowing this too to be prescribed by statute. Taken together, these changes mean that the Government-in-Parliament controls both when delimitation happens and which demographic baseline is to be used. This power extends not just to the delimitation of parliamentary constituencies but also to the delimitation of state legislative assembly constituencies.
One could argue that the constitutional guarantee of periodic representational recalibration was, in any case, paused in 1976, and the Government now merely seeks to recognise this reality. However, the crucial difference is that all previous pauses on delimitation were enshrined in the Constitution itself and had a defined sunset, forcing future parliaments to arrive at a consensus on whether to conduct delimitation or not, with the constitutional default being that upon the expiry of the sunset, there would be a reversion to the norm of periodic recalibration. However, the framework proposed by the 131st amendment does away with this approach, leaving it in the hands of simple majorities in Parliament going forward. Future Governments will face no constitutional compulsion to conduct delimitation or secure a political consensus not to conduct delimitation.
An 850 Member Lok Sabha
The Bill also increases the maximum size of the Lok Sabha to 850, an increase of approximately 54%. A larger house improves the ratio of constituents to representatives but could also reduce the quality of debate within the House. Such trade-offs are a natural part of designing institutions, but such trade-offs should also be made pursuant to a public and deliberative process where all sides are heard. It is unclear how the Government arrived at the number of 850. Why not 800, why not 900? Why not stay at 550? Theoretically, women’s reservation could be implemented without increasing the size of the house – though that would mean some men losing their seats… The rationale for both the expansion of the Lok Sabha and the precise figure chosen is currently entirely unexplained. Notably, no corresponding increases have been proposed for State Legislative Assemblies, making the change appear even more arbitrary.
Conclusion
Expanding the Lok Sabha, ending the freeze on seat distribution, conducting delimitation, and ensuring women’s reservation in Parliament are all questions that a responsible government ought to address. The problem is that the Bill addresses each problem in ways that exacerbate federal tensions, reduce constitutional constraint, and increase the discretion of the Government-in-Parliament. For example, under the proposed framework, a Government-in-Parliament could hypothetically pass a law changing the size of a state legislature, and conducting the delimitation of the State’s Assembly constituencies, at any point. Such a move would fundamentally alter the electoral landscape of the next State Assembly election, in which the same Government-in-Parliament is, politically, an active contestant. The conflict of interest is clear, the potential for abuse clearer still.
