Authors: Mustafa Bohra & Divya Raut.
Introduction
The controversy in Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule1 arises at the intersection of the appointment of arbitrators under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “Act”) and the curial control over arbitral timelines under Section 29A of the Act. At its core, the dispute concerns whether applications for extension or termination of an arbitral tribunal’s mandate under Section 29A are to be made exclusively to the “Court” as defined in Section 2(1)(e), or whether such applications lie instead before the High Court or Supreme Court which initially appointed the arbitrator under Section 11. This issue gained particular salience because divergent High Court decisions had created uncertainty on whether the appointing court retained any continuing supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings after constitution of the tribunal, and whether a civil court or commercial court could validly extend the mandate of an arbitrator appointed by a constitutional court.
In resolving this question, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reaffirmed the centrality of the statutory definition in Section 2(1)(e), which designates, in the case of non-international arbitrations, the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes High Courts exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction, while expressly excluding courts of a grade inferior to such principal civil court and courts of small causes. The Court’s approach is consistent with its earlier emphasis that the Act is a self-contained code in which jurisdictional questions must be answered by reference to the statutory text and structure, rather than to general notions of convenience or institutional hierarchy. Read together with the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 under which arbitration related applications that would otherwise lie before the principal civil court are, in specified circumstances, channelled to designated Commercial Courts or Commercial Divisions. The Chowgule decision restores a coherent, statute-focused framework for determining the proper forum for Section 29A applications.
Factual Background:
The dispute arose from a Memorandum of Family Settlement dated 11th January 2021 between members of the Chowgule family. Arbitration was invoked under the settlement clause on 18th May 2021. During the pendency of arbitral proceedings, the presiding arbitrator resigned, prompting an application under Section 11 of the Act before the High Court, which subsequently appointed an arbitrator.
Separately, owing to delay in completion of arbitration, an application under Section 29A of the Act seeking extension of time for making the arbitral award was filed before the Commercial Court. The Commercial Court allowed the application. This order was challenged before the High Court on the ground that, since the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court under Section 11 of the Act, the Commercial Court lacked jurisdiction to extend the mandate.
The Single Judge referred the issue to a Division Bench due to conflicting High Court judgments on whether the “Court” under Section 29A of the Act refers to the Court defined in Section 2(1)(e) or the High Court/Supreme Court which appointed the arbitrator. The Division Bench held that jurisdiction depended on the mode of appointment of the arbitral tribunal. The Single Judge thereafter quashed the Commercial Court’s order. These decisions were challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
Statutory Framework Favouring Civil Court Jurisdiction:
The Hon’ble Supreme Court unequivocally held that the expression “Court” appearing in Section 29A of the Act must be construed strictly in accordance with the definition contained in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. The Court reasoned that Section 2(1)(e) provides an exhaustive definition for the purposes of Part I of the Act and, in the absence of any express statutory departure, the same meaning must govern Section 29A of the Act. It was emphasised that the jurisdiction exercised by the Hon’ble High Court or the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Section 11 is special, limited and stands exhausted upon the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. Once an arbitrator is appointed, the appointing court becomes functus officio and does not retain any supervisory or controlling jurisdiction over the conduct of arbitral proceedings.
The Court further observed that Section 29A forms part of Chapter VI of the Act, which deals with the making of the arbitral award and termination of proceedings, whereas Section 11 falls within Chapter III, which concerns the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. The legislative separation of these chapters reflects a conscious intent to segregate appointment-related functions from post-constitution curial supervision. The authority to extend the mandate of the tribunal or to substitute arbitrators under Section 29A of the Act
is thus a curial function vested in the “Court” as defined in Section 2(1)(e), namely the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or a High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court also reaffirmed that jurisdiction under arbitration law flows solely from statute and cannot be influenced by notions of institutional hierarchy or perceived superiority of courts.
Contrary Judicial Approach in High Court Decisions:
The contrary line of reasoning adopted by several High Courts proceeded on the premise that a contextual interpretation of Section 29A was necessary to avoid jurisdictional anomalies. These courts relied upon the opening words of Section 2(1) “unless the context otherwise requires” to hold that where an arbitrator is appointed by the High Court or the Supreme Court under Section 11, applications for extension of mandate under Section 29A must lie before the same court.
The principal concern expressed was that permitting a Civil Court to extend the mandate or substitute an arbitrator appointed by a constitutional court would result in a conflict of powers and undermine judicial hierarchy. It was further reasoned that the power to extend time or substitute arbitrators under Section 29A is ancillary to the power of appointment under Section 11 and must therefore be exercised by the appointing court alone. Some decisions also expressed apprehension that allowing Section 29A applications before Civil Courts would dilute the exclusive jurisdiction principle embodied in Section 42 of the Act.
Interpretative Reasoning of the Hon’ble Supreme Court:
The Hon’ble Supreme Court decisively rejected the contrary approach, holding that perceived anomalies, institutional discomfort, or hierarchical considerations cannot supply the “context” required to depart from a statutory definition. The Court clarified that the phrase “unless the context otherwise requires” must be grounded in textual or structural inconsistency within the statute and cannot be invoked on the basis of judicial convenience or speculative conflict. It reiterated that arbitration law is a creature of statute and that jurisdiction cannot be expanded, restricted, or redirected based on assumptions about court hierarchy.
The Court further clarified that Section 42 of the Act has no application to proceedings under Section 11 of the Act, as the Chief Justice or designate exercising powers under Section 11 is not a “Court” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(e). Consequently, the filing of a Section 11 application before the High Court does not anchor jurisdictions for all
subsequent applications under Part I of the Act. Section 29A of the Act, being a provision aimed at ensuring efficiency, discipline, and timely conclusion of arbitral proceedings, must operate strictly within the curial framework prescribed by the statute.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court decisively rejected the “hierarchical anomaly” argument, holding that jurisdiction flows solely from statute, not from notions of superiority or institutional prestige.
Application analogy: Bombay (Presidency Town) versus Thane, Pune and other Districts:
Section 2(1)(e) of the Act defines “Court” to mean, for arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, “the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction”, while excluding any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal civil court and any court of small causes. The Supreme Court has treated this as an exhaustive definition for Part I of the Act, absent an express statutory departure. At the same time, the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 provides that where a Commercial Court has been constituted, all applications or appeals in arbitral matters (other than international commercial arbitrations) which would ordinarily lie before the principal civil court of original jurisdiction are to be filed before, and decided by, the Commercial Court exercising territorial jurisdiction over such arbitration. The Supreme Court has recognised that these provisions were enacted with the object of ensuring the speedy and specialised resolution of commercial and arbitral disputes.
Against this statutory backdrop, an analogy can be drawn for the practical allocation of jurisdiction in Maharashtra as follows:
- Bombay (Presidency Town): In the city of Bombay, the Bombay High Court exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Under Section 2(1)(e), such a High Court is expressly included within the definition of “Court” for the purposes of Part I of the Act, alongside the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. Accordingly, in arbitrations where the subject-matter would, if sued upon, fall within the original civil jurisdictional limits of the High Court, the “Court” for Section 29A is the Bombay High Court on its original side, subject to the routing of such arbitration matters through the Commercial Division under Section 10 of the Commercial Courts Act where the dispute qualifies as a commercial dispute of specified value. In other words, in Bombay city, Section 29A applications are to be made to the High Court (or its Commercial Division, as the case may be) as the designated court of original jurisdiction under the combined scheme of Section 2(1)(e) of the Act and Sections 3 and 10 of the Commercial Courts Act.
- Thane, Pune and other Districts: Outside the original civil jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court, the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district (ordinarily the District Court) satisfies the definition of “Court” under Section 2(1)(e). Following the Commercial Courts Act, where a Commercial Court has been constituted at the district level, all arbitration-related applications in non-international commercial arbitrations which would otherwise lie before the District Court must instead be instituted before the designated Commercial Court exercising territorial jurisdiction over the arbitration. The Supreme Court has confirmed that this legislative design is intended to channel arbitration matters of specified value to Commercial Courts and Commercial Divisions without diluting the centrality of the Section 2(1)(e) definition, and that conferral of such jurisdiction on Commercial Courts does not negate or contradict Section 2(1)(e) but operates harmoniously with it.
Concluding Observations:
The judgment in Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule is a significant reaffirmation of statutory fidelity in arbitration jurisprudence. By holding that applications under Section 29A lie exclusively before the Court defined under Section 2(1)(e), irrespective of who appointed the arbitrator, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has:
- Eliminated jurisdictional uncertainty caused by divergent High Court rulings;
- Reinforced the functus officio principle in Section 11 proceedings;
- Prevented judicial overreach based on hierarchical assumptions; and
- Strengthened the efficiency-driven purpose of Section 29A of the Act.
The decision restores coherence to the arbitral framework and ensures that arbitration remains governed by clear legislative command rather than perceived institutional status. It is a decisive step toward procedural certainty and minimal judicial interference both cornerstones of modern arbitration law.
Mr. Mustafa Bohra, Associate Partner and Ms. Divya Raut, Associate at Solomon & Co.
About Solomon & Co.
Solomon & Co. (Advocates & Solicitors) was founded in 1909 and is amongst India’s oldest law-firms. The Firm is a full-service firm that provides legal service to Indian and international companies and high net-worth individuals on all aspects of Indian law.
“Disclaimer”
The information contained in this article is intended solely to provide general guidance on matters of interest for the personal use of the reader, who accepts full responsibility for its use. The application and impact of laws can vary widely based on the specific facts involved. As such, it should not be used as a substitute for consultation with a competent adviser. Before making any decision or taking any action, the reader should always consult a professional adviser relating to the relevant article posting.
Copyright © Solomon & Co. 2026, All rights reserved.