Legal Updates ( April 6 – April 11, 2026 )
CASE UPDATES
A withdrawal slip drawn on a co-operative society partakes the character of a ‘cheque’ and the society falls within the definition of a ‘banker’, rendering the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act maintainable in law
The Kerala High Court in the case of Clara Dominic vs Tomy Eapen [Criminal MC No. 1782 of 2026] dated March 26, 2026, has held that if the instrument operates as a mandate for payment drawn on an account maintained with an institution carrying on banking functions, it would fall within the ambit of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (N.I. Act). Hence, a withdrawal slip drawn on a co-operative society partakes the character of a ‘cheque’ and the society falls within the definition of a ‘banker’, rendering the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act maintainable in law.
The High Court observed that the expression ‘banker’ under Section 3 of the N.I. Act is of wide amplitude, is inclusive in nature, and extends to any person or institution acting as a banker. Co-operative societies carrying on banking business, notwithstanding the absence of a profit motive or formal licensing under the Regulation Act, fall within the ambit of a ‘banker’ for the purposes of the N.I. Act. Hence, instruments drawn on such institutions, including withdrawal slips operating as payment mandates, cannot be excluded from the sweep of the NI Act merely on technical nomenclature.
The Court noted that the essence of ‘banking’ lies in the acceptance of deposits from the public repayable on demand or otherwise, coupled with the facility of withdrawal by instruments such as cheques, drafts, or orders. Thus, the mere absence of a licence under Section 22 of the Regulation Act does not detract from the character of the activity as banking business, nor can such absence be invoked as a defence to evade legal obligations arising therefrom. The Court clarified that the substance of the transaction, and not its form or nomenclature, is determinative.
Once the statutory period of filing the written statement has elapsed, any subsequent filing of an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC shall not revive the statutory period in any manner whatsoever, and shall not extend the statutory period for filing the written statement
The Delhi High Court in the case of IDBI Trusteeship Services vs Manish Jain [CS(COMM) 800/2025] dated March 23, 2026, has ruled that once the statutory period of filing the written statement has elapsed, any subsequent filing of an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC shall not revive the statutory period in any manner whatsoever, and shall not extend the statutory period for filing the written statement.
The High Court observed that the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint was filed by defendant no. 2 much after the statutory period of 120 days for filing of the written statement had expired. It noted that while a defendant is entitled to file an application for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC before filing the written statement, the liberty to file such an application cannot be made as a ruse for retrieving the lost opportunity to file the written statement.
Referring to the Supreme Court judgment in R.K. Roja Versus U.S. Rayudu [(2016) 14 SCC 275], the Court observed that once the statutory period for filing the written statement has already lapsed, subsequent filing of an application for rejection of plaint will not revive such statutory period. Thus, the Court categorically rejected the plea of defendant no. 2 that its right for filing the written statement ought not to have been closed due to the subsequent filing of the Order VII Rule 11 CPC application.
The Court further observed that the contention of defendant no. 2 regarding the interim moratorium operating under Section 96 of the IBC, on account of which the suit against defendant no. 2 is allegedly not maintainable, is the subject matter of the pending application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint. Accordingly, the Court held that this aspect shall be considered by the Court while adjudicating the said application filed on behalf of defendant no. 2.
When a part of the sum covered by the cheque is paid during the period between the date on which the cheque is drawn and its encashment upon maturity, then the legally enforceable debt on the date of maturity would not be the sum represented on the cheque
The Kerala High Court (Ernakulam Bench) in the case of Danikutti Philip vs Johnykutty J [Criminal Application No. 1965 of 2025] dated March 26, 2026, has ruled that when a part of the sum covered by the cheque is paid during the period between the date on which the cheque is drawn and its encashment upon maturity, then the legally enforceable debt on the date of maturity would not be the sum represented on the cheque.
The High Court clarified that when part payment is made and the indorsement mandated under Section 56 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act) failed to be recorded, presenting the cheque for the whole sum, of which a part payment has already been paid, does not represent the legally enforceable debt; thus no offence under the NI Act would lie in case of dishonour of such a cheque.
The Court observed that Sections 15 and 56 of the NI Act assume significance, noting that Section 56 provides that where an amount has been partly paid, a note to that effect may be indorsed on the instrument, which may then be negotiated for the balance. If the drawer of the cheque pays a part or whole of the sum between the period when the cheque is drawn and when it is encashed upon maturity, then the legally enforceable debt on the date of maturity would not be the sum represented on the cheque. It noted that the complainant launched prosecution claiming Rs. 10.90 lakhs as such, shown in the cheque itself, without disclosing the part payments in the complaint.
The Court therefore observed that the prosecution could not be held as one consequent to dishonour of a cheque which represent a legally enforceable debt coming to Rs. 10.90 lakhs, and when the prosecution is not for a legally enforceable debt in full on the date of presentation of the cheque, no offence under Section 138 of the NI Act gets attracted.
A document titled ‘Deed of Hypothecation’ that contains a covenant whereby the hypothecator undertakes to cause the borrower to pay or repay the borrower’s dues, constitutes a contract of guarantee, rendering the executing party a Corporate Guarantor under Section 5(5A) of the IBC, irrespective of the nomenclature of the document
The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), New Delhi Bench, in the case of J.C. Flowers Asset Reconstruction vs Imagine Habitat Private Limited [C.P.(IB) – 30/ND/2026] dated April 07, 2026, has held that a document titled ‘Deed of Hypothecation’ that contains a covenant whereby the hypothecator undertakes to cause the borrower to pay or repay the borrower’s dues, constitutes a contract of guarantee, rendering the executing party a Corporate Guarantor under Section 5(5A) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, irrespective of the nomenclature of the document.
The Tribunal explained that under Section 60(2) and 60(3) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, an application relating to the insolvency resolution of a Corporate Guarantor must be filed before the same National Company Law Tribunal Bench where the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process of the Principal Debtor is pending, overriding the general territorial jurisdiction rules based on the registered office of the Corporate Guarantor.
The Tribunal therefore held that consistent with the principles of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the liability of the principal borrower and the surety is co-extensive, permitting separate or simultaneous insolvency proceedings to be initiated under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 against both the Corporate Debtor and the Corporate Guarantor.
The Tribunal observed that the execution of the Deed of Hypothecation by the Corporate Debtors made them liable as Corporate Guarantors. Clause 1 of the Deed explicitly contained a covenant that the Hypothecators ‘shall cause the Borrower(s) to pay/repay the Borrower’s Dues’. Relying on the Supreme Court judgment in China Development Bank vs. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C. [(2025) 7 Supreme Court Cases 729], the Tribunal noted that the nomenclature of a document is not decisive; a contract becomes a guarantee when it is an undertaking to perform the promise or discharge the liability of a third person in case of default. Therefore, the Corporate Debtors stood as sureties for the repayment of the debt procured by the Principal Debtor.
Addressing the contention that no default had occurred and that the Arbitral Award was under challenge, the Tribunal observed that the default was crystallized in terms of Clauses 12.1 and 12.2 of the Loan Agreement, which allowed the lender to recall the loan upon a ‘Material Adverse Effect’. The Tribunal further observed that under Section 238 of the IBC, the provisions of the Code have an overriding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law. It reiterated that a decree or final adjudication, such as an Arbitral Award, gives rise to a fresh period of limitation, and the pendency of a Section 34 challenge does not bar proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC.
Dues arising during the CIRP period cannot be classified as “insolvency resolution process costs” merely because they accrued during that period; and they must be directly related to the CIRP and expressly approved by the Committee of Creditors as mandated by Regulation 31(e) of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016
The Mumbai Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Kohinoor City Office Towers Industrial Estate vs Santanu T [IA No. 4520/2025] dated April 02, 2026, has held that maintenance dues and property tax dues arising during the liquidation period, even in respect of assets that stood attached by the Enforcement Directorate (provided they have not been confiscated and continue to vest in the Corporate Debtor), directly serve the purpose of preservation and protection of the liquidation estate and bear the character of ‘liquidation costs’ within the meaning of Regulation 2(1)(ea) of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016.
Conversely, the Tribunal clarified that the dues arising during the CIRP period cannot be classified as “insolvency resolution process costs” merely because they accrued during that period; and they must be directly related to the CIRP and expressly approved by the Committee of Creditors as mandated by Regulation 31(e) of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016.
The Tribunal observed that under Section 5(13) of the IBC read with Regulation 31(e) of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016, a cost qualifies as a CIRP cost only if it is directly related to the CIRP and has been approved by the Committee of Creditors (CoC). In the present case, the CoC had not approved the maintenance dues to be treated as CIRP costs, and the mere fact that the dues arose during the CIRP period is not determinative for them to be classified as CIRP costs.
The Tribunal noted that ‘liquidation cost’ under Regulation 2(1)(ea) of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 includes costs incurred by the Liquidator for preserving and protecting the assets of the Corporate Debtor. Maintenance charges payable to a cooperative housing society are indispensable to the continued functionality and marketability of the units, as non-payment entitles the Society to restrict access to common amenities, thereby rendering the units inaccessible and commercially unviable.
This deterioration would prejudice the interests of all stakeholders by diminishing the realizable value of the asset and impairing the Liquidator’s ability to present a clean and encumbrance-free asset for sale. Therefore, the payment of maintenance dues and property tax dues is a necessary incident of the preservation and protection of the assets, added the Tribunal.
On the effect of ED attachment under PMLA, the Tribunal observed that the subject properties had been exempted from confiscation under the PMLA. A provisional or confirmed attachment order under the PMLA freezes the property but does not extinguish the title of the owner or transfer it to the government; and only confiscation has the effect of vesting the property in the Union of India.
Since no confiscation took place, the properties retained their character as assets of the Corporate Debtor and became part of the liquidation estate under Section 36 of the IBC, and the Liquidator’s obligation to preserve and protect these assets is not extinguished or suspended merely by reason of a PMLA attachment, added the Tribunal.
Lastly, the Tribunal held that property tax dues accruing prior to the liquidation commencement date cannot be accorded priority treatment as CIRP costs because they were not approved by the CoC. However, property tax dues accruing after the liquidation commencement date are treated mutatis mutandis to maintenance dues and qualify as liquidation costs.
If the drawer does not dispute the issuance of the cheque or deny his signature, the statutory presumption as contemplated under Section 139 of the N.I. Act comes into play. Consequently, the burden shifts to the drawer to prove that the cheque was not issued for any legally enforceable debt or liability, an exercise that must be undertaken during the trial
The Supreme Court in the case of Renuka vs State of Maharashtra [2026 INSC 327] dated April 07, 2026, has held that at the stage of issuance of process, the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act) cannot be dislodged in a summary manner merely by contending that the cheque issued was not for any legally enforceable debt or liability. Once the basic ingredients of Section 138 of the NI Act are duly satisfied by the complainant, the rebuttal of the statutory presumption by the drawer can only be made during the course of trial.
The Court observed that at the stage of issuance of process by the Metropolitan Magistrate, what is prima facie required to be seen is the issuance of the cheque by the drawer, its dishonour on presentation, issuance of the statutory notice, and filing of the complaint within the prescribed statutory period.
The Court clarified that if the drawer does not dispute the issuance of the cheque or deny his signature, the statutory presumption as contemplated under Section 139 of the N.I. Act comes into play. Consequently, the burden shifts to the drawer to prove that the cheque was not issued for any legally enforceable debt or liability, an exercise that must be undertaken during the trial.
The Court noted that the Sessions Court misdirected itself by giving more weightage to the fact that the agreement dated 12th January 2022 was not signed by the second respondent, thereby ignoring that the basic ingredients for attracting the provisions of Section 138 of the N.I. Act had been duly satisfied for the issuance of process. Concluding that the cheque was not issued for a legally enforceable debt at the pre-trial stage itself, without granting an opportunity to the complainant to substantiate her case by leading evidence, amounts to ignoring the statutory presumption. Such an approach results in the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act getting washed away even prior to the commencement of the trial.
NCLT under the IBC does not possess the jurisdiction or power to direct the refund of TDS deducted on interest accruing on fixed deposits; and that the exercise of powers regarding the refund of TDS is the exclusive prerogative of the Income Tax Authorities under the prevailing income tax laws
The Chennai Bench of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of S. Dhanapal vs Income Tax Officer [Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins) No. 644/2025] dated April 02, 2026, has held that the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 does not possess the jurisdiction or power to direct the refund of TDS deducted on interest accruing on fixed deposits; and that the exercise of powers regarding the refund of TDS is the exclusive prerogative of the Income Tax Authorities under the prevailing income tax laws.
The Tribunal clarified that the determination of whether a Liquidator is entitled to exemptions under Section 140 of the Income Tax Act regarding the verification and filing of income tax returns falls strictly within the decision-making domain of the Income Tax Authorities. Any challenge or appeal preferred before the NCLT or NCLAT prior to such determination by the Income Tax Authorities is premature and not maintainable.
The overriding effect of Section 238 of the IBC over the Income Tax Act cannot be invoked prematurely; it can only be subjected to judicial scrutiny after the Income Tax Authorities have made a definitive decision regarding the exemptions claimed, particularly because the IBC, 2016 is silent on the specific aspect of TDS refunds.
The Tribunal observed that the direction issued by the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) was merely an enabling direction for the Liquidator to submit a simpliciter account showing the income and expenditure of the Corporate Debtor during the liquidation period, which was required before the Income Tax Authorities could consider the refund request. The Tribunal noted that the Appellant’s challenge was a ‘challenge in premonition’, attempting to forestall the process and nip the problem at its bud based on an apprehension that the Income Tax Authorities would demand regular returns.
The Tribunal observed that under the IBC, 2016, there is no provision conferring power on the Adjudicating Authority to issue directions for the refund of TDS already made on the interest accruing on the fixed deposit. The exercise of powers for the refund of TDS is the prerogative of the Income Tax Authorities under prevailing income tax laws.
The intricacies of Section 140 of the Income Tax Act, its judicial interpretation, and the conditions for TDS deduction are questions required to be considered by the competent income tax authority itself, as the refund must flow from the Income Tax Authorities and not from authorities constituted under the IBC, added the Tribunal.
Regarding the Appellant’s argument on the inconsistency of law and the overriding effect of Section 238 of the IBC over Section 140 of the Income Tax Act, the Tribunal observed that taxation laws operate within their own domain. The aspect of inconsistency would only come into play when the Income Tax Authorities actually take a decision pertaining to the extension or denial of the benefit under Section 140 of the Income Tax Act.
The Tribunal further noted that the IBC is silent on the aspect of refund of TDS, and inconsistency prevails only when both laws have equivalent, contradictory provisions on the subject matter. The actual cause of action to approach the competent authorities under the IBC would only arise after a decision is rendered by the Income Tax Authorities.
No proceedings under Section 9 of IBC could have been drawn by an entity, which did not have the juristic authority in the eyes of law, and vested authority to litigate as a juristic entity. Thus, company petition filed by non-existing entity at time of institution of Section 9 application of IBC, is not maintainable
The Chennai Bench of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of Samunnati Agri Value Chain Solutions vs Nekkanti Sea Foods [Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins) No. 337 / 2025] dated April 02, 2026, has held that that no proceedings under Section 9 of IBC could have been drawn by an entity, which did not have the juristic authority in the eyes of law, and vested authority to litigate as a juristic entity. Mere order of condonation of delay application will not itself make the entity of M/s. Samunnati Agri Value Chain Solutions Private Limited, to be a Company being a juristic status. The Application under Section 9 of IBC, was showing the Applicant as M/s. Samunnati Agro Solutions Private Limited, which was a name in much distinction to Samunnati Agri Value Chain Solutions Private Limited.
The Tribunal observed that since the Company Petition itself was preferred on Sep 19, 2024, the entity which was alleged to be holding a juristic authority and juristic existence to file the Company Petition, in fact was rather a non-existing entity. M/s. Samunnati Agro Solutions Private Limited, was not legally in existence at that point of time and there was no reservation of right reserved, to sue or be sued.
The Tribunal explained that as on the date of institution of the proceedings under Section 9 of IBC, it was filed by M/s. Samunnati Agro Solutions Private Limited, which was a non-existing company as its existence did not persist in the eyes of law even much prior to the institution of the Application, having merged into the parent company as on Dec 23, 2022.
Thus, the Tribunal upheld the dismissal of the Company Petition, as the company was not into existence in the eyes of law at the time of the institution of Section 9 Application of Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). Owing to the said fact, since the proceedings was drawn by a non-existing entity, it was not maintainable and the same has been rightly dismissed by the NCLT.
Merely signing a Board Resolution does not establish that a director was in charge of and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of a company, and therefore cannot by itself justify prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
The Supreme Court in the case of Saroj Pandey vs Govt of NCT of Delhi [2026 INSC 324] dated April 07, has held that merely signing a Board Resolution does not establish that a director was in charge of and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of a company, and therefore cannot by itself justify prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Court reiterated that liability of a director under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act requires a specific averment that the person was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company’s business at the relevant time.
The Court observed that a Board Resolution is a document that is signed by the members of the Board of Directors for decisions taken or conclusions arrived at for matters placed before the Board for consideration and decision. This may be inter alia regarding hiring of personnel at management levels, acquisition or liquidation of assets affecting the overall position of the assets and liabilities of the Company or any other such major directional issue. This, however, does not in any manner mean that each and every member of the Board of Directors is aware of all decisions taken in the everyday transactions that are involved in running a business concern.
The Court emphasised that the statutory requirement is not satisfied merely by establishing the person’s designation as a director, and that deemed liability cannot be inferred without specific factual assertions. The Court also noted that there was no direct allegation in the complaint against the appellant that she was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Thus, the Court quashed the criminal proceedings initiated against the director in a cheque dishonour case, observing that there was no specific allegation demonstrating her active role in the conduct of the company’s business.
Where the adjudication of a dispute between the parties is exclusively in the domain of the NCLT, such as a dispute regarding the premature recovery or default in repayment of a loan/deposit under Section 45 QA of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit or grant any injunction in that matter
Referring to Section 430 of the Companies Act, 2013, the Allahabad High Court in the case of Shivam Traders And Hire Purchase Pvt Ltd vs Madhusudan Vehicles Pvt Ltd [2026:AHC:67074] dated March 31, 2026, has held that where the adjudication of a dispute between the parties is exclusively in the domain of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), such as a dispute regarding the premature recovery or default in repayment of a loan/deposit under Section 45 QA of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit or grant any injunction in that matter.
Further, a litigant who suppresses material facts, such as the prior institution of proceedings before the NCLT, does not approach the court with clean hands, is disentitled from obtaining the discretionary and equitable relief of injunction, added the Court.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Sandeep Jain observed that the defendant had already filed a petition under Section 45 QA of the RBI Act read with Rule 73 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 before the NCLT on Sep 09, 2020, prior to the plaintiff filing the instant suit on Jan 01, 2021. This fact was in the knowledge of the plaintiff but was deliberately suppressed and concealed while filing the suit.
The Court noted that the plaintiff apprehended legal proceedings by the defendant and filed the suit to pre-empt such proceedings or any order that could have been passed against it, which is barred by Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act. It held that since the defendant had already initiated proceedings before the NCLT, the plaintiff had no cause of action to file the instant suit and had not approached the court with clean hands, thereby disentitling it from getting any equitable relief of injunction.
The Court examined Section 45-I(bb) of the RBI Act and observed that the definition of ‘deposit’ expressly includes any receipt of money by way of deposit or loan or in any other form. It held that the plaintiff’s contention that money advanced as a loan to an NBFC is not covered under Section 45 QA is fallacious and liable to be rejected. If an NBFC commits default in repayment of a loan, the entity that advanced the loan can make a complaint under Section 45 QA of the RBI Act to the NCLT for safeguarding its interests.
The Court further observed that under Section 45 QA of the RBI Act, the NCLT is the only judicial authority empowered to decide disputes regarding whether depositors are entitled to claim back their deposit/loan from the NBFC, whether any default was committed, and the manner of refund. It held that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which the Tribunal is empowered to determine under the Act or any other law (which includes the RBI Act).
Consequently, the civil court had no jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining the defendant from prematurely recovering the loan amount, as this dispute fell exclusively within the domain of the NCLT, added the Court.
The right to disclosure is not absolute if the disclosure of any part affects third-party interests. If some portion of the forensic audit report or other material is found to impinge upon third-party rights in the opinion of the bank, the bank can withhold disclosure of those parts of the report
The Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India vs Amit Iron Pvt Ltd [Civil Appeal Nos. 4243-4244 of 2026] dated April 07, 2026, has held that the ruling in State Bank of India vs. Rajesh Agarwal [(2023) 6 SCC 1] did not recognize any right in the borrower to a personal hearing by the banks before classifying their account as a fraud account. The RBI in its Master Directions of July 15, 2024 correctly understood the scope of Rajesh Agarwal judgment and incorporated Clause 2.1.1.1, 2.1.1.2, 2.1.1.3, and 2.1.1.4 as the procedure to be followed before classifying an account as a fraud account.
The Apex Court pointed out that the procedure set out in Rajesh Agarwal, which has been incorporated in the RBI Master Directions of 2024, strikes a fair balance between promptitude and fairness and duly comports with the principles of natural justice. Wherever audit reports are available, including forensic audit reports, the same shall be furnished to the borrower and their representation on the report be elicited. Disclosure by furnishing copies of the audit report to the borrower is mandatory.
If the banks, for reasons to be recorded, establish that the disclosure of any part of the report would affect the privacy of third parties, in that exceptional situation banks would be justified to withhold those portions of the report. Thus, the judgments of the High Courts which have taken a contrary view stand overruled, added the Court.
The Court observed that the judgment in State Bank of India vs. Rajesh Agarwal did not recognize any right in the borrower to a personal hearing from the Banks before classifying their accounts as a fraud account. In the context of the entire judgment, what was contemplated was only a Show Cause Notice, a written representation in the form of a reply, and the mandate that the order passed thereon must be reasoned so as to comport with fairness and indicate due application of mind.
The Court stated that the ultimate objective of the principles of natural justice is to ensure fairness in action and prevent miscarriage of justice, and it is a flexible concept that depends on the facts, circumstances, and framework of the law. Granting a right of personal hearing to each and every borrower would be practically inexpedient considering the large volume of cases. It explained that oral hearing is bound to convert an administrative process intended to be swift into a protracted one, defeating the very purpose of the exercise. It would also provide an opportunity to recalcitrant borrowers to dissipate assets, destroy evidence, or abscond, causing enormous prejudice to public interest.
As far as disclosure of Forensic Audit Reports is concerned, the Court observed that the borrower has a right to be disclosed of the material relevant to the proceeding against him, including the disclosure of the audit report. The furnishing of findings and conclusions alone would not tantamount to compliance with the principles of natural justice, as a complete sense of the findings can only be made after reading the contents of the report.