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HomeRinku Singh vs Union Of India & Ors on 10 April, 2026

Rinku Singh vs Union Of India & Ors on 10 April, 2026

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Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Rinku Singh vs Union Of India & Ors on 10 April, 2026

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D/L 1
10.04.2026
Rohit,A.R.(Ct.)
ct.no.236
                   IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
                  CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
                           APPELLATE SIDE
                                    WPA 6605 of 2025

                                      Rinku Singh
                                        Versus
                                   Union of India & Ors.

                   Ms. Manika Roy
                                                          ...for the Petitioner

                   Mr. Brojesh Jha
                   Mr. Rameshwar Sinha
                                                    ...for the Respondent No. 1

1. The writ petitioner and the respondent Union

of India and its instrumentalities are

SPONSORED

represented by their respective learned

Advocates.

2. Since the question of maintainability of the

instant writ petition was raised at the

instance of the respondent authorities, I

propose to hear the parties to the instant lis

on the point of maintainability first.

3. Mr. Jha, learned Advocate appearing on

behalf of the respondent authorities at the

very outset draws attention of this Court to

the prayer portion of the instant writ petition.

It is submitted that on perusal of the prayer

of the instant writ petition it would reveal that

the subject matters of challenge before this

Court are the orders dated 09.12.2024 and
2

13.02.2024 as passed by the respondent

authorities vis-à-vis the order dated

24.07.2024 as passed by the Armed Forces

Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kolkata

(hereinafter referred to as the said Tribunal in

short) in connection with O.A. No. 119 of

2024.

4. Drawing attention to Page No. 75 and 102 to

103 of the instant writ petition it is submitted

that undisputedly the delinquent/writ

petitioner was dismissed from the naval

service on 09.12.2024. At this juncture

attention of this Court is drawn to Page No.

27 of the instant writ petition being a copy of

the order dated 13.02.2024 as passed by the

Captain, Capt (PS) being an order passed in a

review petition under Section 163 of the Navy

Act of 1957 whereby and where under the

initial trial proceeding as well as the

punishment of the delinquent was set aside

by the said authority with a direction for

commencement of retrial of the

delinquent/writ petitioner.

5. It is submitted from Page No. 28 to 41 of the

instant writ petition it would reveal further

that challenging the said order dated

13.02.2024 the writ petitioner filed O.A. No.
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119 of 2024 before the said Tribunal and the

same is still pending. Drawing further

attention of this Court to Page 67 of the

instant writ petition being a copy of the order

dated 24.07.2024 as passed by the said

Tribunal it is submitted that from the said

order dated 24.07.2024, it would reveal that

the respondent authorities informed the

Tribunal that pursuant to the order dated

13.02.2024 the re-trial against the

delinquent/writ petitioner was held and

completed.

6. At this juncture attention of this Court is

drawn to Section 27 of the Armed Forces

Tribunal Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as

the said Act of 2007). It is submitted that

Section 27 of the said Act of 2007 deals with

the power of the Chairperson of the Tribunal

to transfer cases from one bench to another.

It is thus submitted that for the sake of

argument even if it is admitted that the

Kolkata Bench of the said Tribunal is not

functional the writ petitioner was at liberty to

approach the Chairperson of the said

Tribunal to transfer the O.A. No. 119 of 2024

before any other bench of the said Tribunal

which is functioning regularly. It is thus
4

submitted that despite availability of the

alternative remedy the writ petitioner has

approached this Court under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India for ventilating his

grievance against the order of the authority

dated 13.02.2024 vis-à-vis the order dated

09.12.2024 whereby and where under order

for re-trial and order of dismissal was passed

by the respondent authorities. It is thus

submitted that on account of availability of

efficacious statutory alternative remedy this

Court may be very slow in entertaining the

instant writ petition and thus the instant writ

petition may be dismissed at the threshold of

its maintainability.

7. In course of his submission, Mr. Jha, learned

Advocate appearing on behalf of the

respondent authorities places his reliance

upon the following reported decisions:-

a) (2014) 1 SCC 603 Commissioner of Income

Tax & Others -Vs- Chhabil Dass Agarwal

b) (2011) 14 SCC 337 Nivedita Sharma-Vs-

Cellular Operators Association of India &

Others

c) (2018) 3 SCC 85 Authorized Officer, State

Bank of Travancore and Another-Vs- Mathew

K.C.
5

8. Per Contra, Ms. Roy, learned Advocate

appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner/

delinquent in course of her submission draws

attention of this Court to Page No. 67, 68 and

69 as well as Page No. 76 to 78 of the instant

writ petitions being copies of several orders as

passed by the said Tribunal in connection

with O.A. No. 119 of 2024. It is contended by

Ms. Roy that on conjoint perusal of the said

orders as passed the said Tribunal it would

reveal that on 24.07.2024 before the said

Tribunal the respondent authorities informed

the said Tribunal with regard to the

completion of the said re-trial.

9. It is further submitted that from the latter

orders as passed by the said Tribunal it would

reveal further that on account of non-

availability of the quorum in the Kolkata

Bench of the said Tribunal, the said Tribunal

could not assemble and as a result whereof

the writ petitioner could not press his interim

relief as made in O.A. No. 119 of 2024. In this

regard attention of this Court is drawn to

Page No. 70 to 73 of the instant writ petition

being a copy of the application for interim

relief being M.A. 137 of 2024 as filed in the

pending original application.

6

10. It is thus submitted by Ms. Roy that

though a Bench of the said Tribunal is

constituted in Kolkata but the same bench is

not functional and as such before the said

Tribunal the writ petitioner is practically

remediless which prompted the writ petitioner

to approach this Court under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India for exercising its

plenary power in its discretionary and

prerogative writ jurisdiction.

11. Placing her reliance upon the judgment as

passed in the case of Rojer Mathew -Vs-

South India Bank Limited represented by

its Chief Manager & Others reported in

(2020) 6 SCC 1, the order dated 19.12.2025 as

passed in MAT 2211 of 2025 (Arnab

Adhikari & Ors. -Vs- State of West Bengal

& Ors.) as passed by a Division Bench of this

Court as well as the judgment dated

13.1.2026 as passed by a Co-ordinate Bench

of this Court in W.P.A 27327 of 2025 (Md.

Masidul Islam -Vs- The State of West

Bengal & Others), it is argued by Ms. Roy

that in the aforementioned three decisions the

Hon’ble Supreme Court, a Hon’ble Division

Bench of this Court and a Co-ordinate Bench

consistently observed that in the event a
7

tribunal is not established or functioning the

litigants must not be remediless and thus

they have a right to invoke the extra-ordinary

writ jurisdiction of the jurisdictional High

Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India for redressal of their grievances.

12. It is thus argued by the Ms. Roy that in

view of the proposition of law as discussed in

the reported decisions as cited from her side

and in view of the practical difficulty as faced

by the delinquent/writ petitioner there cannot

be any occasion to hold that the instant writ

petition is not maintainable.

13. This Court has meticulously perused the

entire materials as placed before this Court.

This Court has given its due consideration

over the submissions of the learned Advocates

for the contending parties. This Court have

also gone through the reported decisions as

cited from the bar.

14. In order to come to a logical finding on the

point of maintainability of the instant writ

petition this Court at the very outset proposes

to look to some of the provisions of the said

Act of 2007.

15. Section 14 of the said Act of 2007 reads as

under:-

8

“14. Jurisdiction, powers and

authority in service matters.-(1) Save as

otherwise expressly provided in this

Act, the Tribunal shall exercise, on and

from the appointed day, all the

jurisdiction, powers and authority,

exercisable immediately before that

day by all Courts (except the Supreme

Court or a High Court exercising

jurisdiction under articles 226 and

227 of the Constitution) in relation to

all service matters.

(2) Subject to the other provisions of

this Act, a person aggrieved by an

order pertaining to any service matter

may make an application to the

Tribunal in such form and

accompanied by such documents or

other evidence and on payment of such

fee as may be prescribed.

(3)…

(4)…

(5)…” `

16. Section 27 of the said Act of 2007 is

quoted hereinbelow in verbatim:-

“27. Power of Chairperson to transfer

cases from one Bench to another.-
9

On the application of any of the

parties and after notice to the parties

concerned, and after hearing such of

them as he may desire to be heard, or

on his own motion without such notice,

the Chairperson may transfer any case

pending before one Bench for disposal,

to any other Bench.”

17. Keeping in mind the aforementioned

legislative provisions if I look to the factual

aspects as involved in the instant writ petition

it reveals that challenging the order of re-trial

dated 13.02.2024 the writ petitioner

approached the said Tribunal by filing O.A.

No. 119 of 2024 wherein the delinquent/writ

petitioner impugned the said order of re-trial.

From the materials as placed before this

Court it reveals that during the pendency of

the said re-trial, more specifically on

24.07.2024 the respondent authorities before

the said Tribunal intimated the said Tribunal

regarding conclusion of the said re-trial and

the same has been recorded by the said

Tribunal in its order dated 24.07.2024.

18. From the latter orders of the said Tribunal

as passed in connection with the said O.A. it

reveals that the Kolkata Bench of the said
10

Tribunal could not assemble on successive

occasions on account of lack of quorum and

as a consequence thereof the hearing of the

original application was deferred from time to

time and in the meantime the order of

dismissal dated 09.12.2024 of the

delinquent/writ petitioner came to be passed

which was challenged by filing a interlocutory

application being M.A. No. 137 of 2024

wherein the delinquent/writ petitioner has

prayed for interim order of stay over the order

of dismissal dated 09.12.2024. However, for

non-availability of the quorum the said

application cannot be taken up for hearing by

the Kolkata Bench of the said Tribunal.

19. It is the specific case of the writ petitioner

that in view of the non-availability of the

Kolkata Bench of the said Tribunal the writ

petitioner finding no other alternative but to

file the instant writ petition before this Court

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

20. In view of the chronology of the events as

discussed above, this Court is duty bound to

come to a finding as to whether in the facts

and circumstances of the case, this Court

would entertain the instant writ petition or

not.

11

21. At this juncture I propose to look to the

reported decision of Chhabil Dass Agarwal

(supra) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court

expressed the following view:-

“10. In the instant case, the only

question which arises for our

consideration and decision is whether

the High Court was justified in

interfering with the order passed by

the assessing authority under Section

148 of the Act in exercise of its

jurisdiction under Article 226 when an

equally efficacious alternate remedy

was available to the assessee under the

Act.

11. Before discussing the fact

proposition, we would notice the

principle of law as laid down by this

Court. It is settled law that non-

entertainment of petitions under writ

jurisdiction by the High Court when an

efficacious alternative remedy is

available is a rule of self-imposed

limitation. It is essentially a rule of

policy convenience and discretion

rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly,

it is within the discretion of the High
12

Court to grant relief under Article 226

despite the existence of an alternative

remedy. However, the High Court must

not interfere if there is an adequate

efficacious alternative remedy

available to the petitioner and he has

approached the High Court without

availing the same unless he has made

out an exceptional case warranting

such interference or there exist

sufficient grounds to invoke the

extraordinary jurisdiction under

Article 226. (See State of U.P.V. Mohd.

Nooh [AIR 1958 SC 86], Titaghur Paper

Mills Co. Ltd v. State of Orissa [(1983) 2

SCC 433], Harbanslal Sahnia-V. Indian

Oil Corpn Ltd. [(2003) 2 SCC 107 and

State of H. P. V. Gujarat Ambuja

Cement Ltd.) [(2005) 6 SCC 499]

(Emphasis supplied)”

22. In the judgment of Mathew KC (supra)

and Nivedita Sharma (supra) the Hon’ble

Apex Court expressed almost the same view.

23. As discussed above n course of his

submission Mr. Jha placing reliance upon the

reported decisions of Chhabil Dass Agarwal

(supra), Nivedita Sharma (supra) and Mathew K.C.

(supra) submits before this Court that in the
13

said three reported decisions as well as in the

constitutional bench judgment in the case of

L. Chandra Kumar -Vs- Union of India

reported in 1997 (3) SCC 261 the Hon’ble

Supreme Court deprecated the practice of

approaching the High Court under Article 226

of the Constitution of India directly ignoring

the statutory forum as created by law for

redressal of grievances. It was thus contended

by Mr. Jha that in view of the proposition of

law as decided in the case of Chhabil Dass

Agarwal (supra), Nivedita Sharma (supra) and

Mathew K.C. (supra) the High Court cannot be

the Court of first instance for ventilating the

grievances of the writ petitioner and thus the

instant writ petition may be held not

maintainable.

24. At this juncture I propose to look to the

Paragraph No. 392 of the judgment of Rojer

Mathew (supra) as cited by Ms. Roy in course

of her submission. Paragraph No. 392 reads

as under:-

“392. The litigants cannot wait for

judicial impact assessment and action

by the Government which may or may

not take place. Experience has shown

that the judgments right from

L.Chandra Kumar (supra) to Madras
14

Bar Assn. [(2010) 11 SCC 1] have not

been complied with by the Union in

letter and spirit. Citizens of this

country cannot be denied justice which

is the first promise made in the

Premable. Therefore, I am of the view

that in whichever State/Union

Territory the Bench of a particular

tribunal is not established or

functioning, the litigants of that State

will have a right to invoke the

extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the

jurisdictional High Court under Article

226 of the Constitution for redressal of

their grievances. They cannot be

expected to go to far off distant places

and spend huge amounts of money,

much beyond their means to ventilate

their grievances. The alternative

remedy of approaching a tribunal is an

illusory remedy and not an efficacious

alternative remedy. The self-imposed

bar or restraint of an alternative

efficacious remedy would not apply.

Such litigants are entitled to file

petitions under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India before the
15

jurisdictional High Court. In L.

Chandra Kumar it was clearly held

that the right of judicial review is a

part of the basic structure of the

Constitution and this right must be

interpreted in a manner that it is truly

available to the litigants and should

not be an illusory right.

(Emphasis supplied)”

25. A Division Bench of this Court in its order

dated 19.12.2025 in the case of Arnab

Adhikari & Ors (supra) expressed the

following view:-

“6….If Tribunal was not functional, it

was obligatory on the part of this

Court to hear the matter otherwise the

party will be remediless.”

26. On perusal of the judgment dated

13.01.2026 in the case of Md. Masidul Islam

(supra) a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court also

placed its reliance upon the judgment of

Roger Mathew (supra) and came to a finding

that any in whichever State or Union Territory

the Bench under particular Tribunal is not

established or functioning, the litigants of

that State shall have a right to invoke the

extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction of a High
16

Court under Article 226 of the Constitution

for redressal of their grievance.

27. Keeping in mind the aforementioned

decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court if we

look to the factual aspects as involved in the

instant writ petition are concerned it appears

that challenging the order of re-trial dated

13.02.2024 the writ petitioner approached the

said Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 119 of 2024

and the same is still pending. Materials have

been placed before this Court that on

successive occasions the Kolkata Bench of the

Said Tribunal could not function on account

of non-availability of the quorum. Materials

have been placed before this Court that

during the pendency of the said O.A. the

respondent authorities reported before the

said Tribunal that re-trial proceeding have

been concluded and the same has been

recorded by the Tribunal in its order dated

24.07.2024.

28. Admittedly the order of dismissal dated

09.12.2024 was passed during the pendency

of the said original application and the

delinquent/writ petitioner soon thereafter

approached the said Tribunal for an interim

relief by filing M.A. No. 137 of 2024 praying
17

for stay of the order of dismissal dated

09.12.2024. This Court has noticed that even

the said interlocutory application for interim

relief cannot be entertained by the said

Kolkata Bench of the said Tribunal on

account of absence of quorum.

29. In view of such there cannot be any

hesitation to hold that the Kolkata Bench of

the said Tribunal was not available for want

of quorum. Admittedly under Section 14 (2 of

the said Act of 2007) it is obligatory on the

part of the delinquent to approach the

Tribunal first. A High Court cannot be a Court

of first instance as has been held by the

Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of L. Chandra

Kumar.

30. However, at this juncture if I look to the

judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

case of Roger Mathew (supra) it appears to

this Court that the Hon’ble Apex Court while

passing the said judgment also considered the

judgment passed in the case of L.Chandra

Kumar (supra) and even then came to a

finding that in the event in a State/Union

Territory the Bench of a particular Tribunal is

not established or functioning the litigants of

that State will have a right to invoke the
18

extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the

jurisdictional High Court under Article 226 of

the Constitution for redressal of their

grievances. The same view was taken by our

High Court in the case of Arnab Adhikari &

Ors (supra) and Md. Masidul Islam (supra).

31. On carful perusal of the three reported

decisions as cited from the respondent

authorities it appears to this Court that in the

said three reported decisions namely Chhabil

Dass Agarwal (supra), Nivedita Sharma (supra),

Mathew K.C. (supra) it has been held by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court that the High Court

must not entertain any petition under Article

226 of the Constitution in the event of

availability of the adequate efficacious

alternative remedy.

32. In the said three reported decisions the

Hon’ble Apex Court had no occasion to

consider the circumstances as involved in the

instant writ petition as well as the facts and

circumstances as involved in the judgment of

Rojer Mathew (supra) and thus, those

reported decisions as cited on behalf of the

respondents are distinguishable.

33. At this juncture if I look to Section 27 of

the said Act of 2007 in the light of the

judgment of Rojer Mathew (supra) vis-à-vis
19

the judgments passed by our High Court

either in the Division Bench or in the Single

Bench, it appears that it would be highly

unjust if the writ petitioner is asked to

approach the Chair-person of the said

Tribunal for transfer of O.A. No. 119 of 2024

to any other bench since it would cause

tremendous injustice to a litigant since the

same involves not only huge expenditure but

also to travel far distance.

34. In view of the discussion made

hereinabove this Court thus holds

thatwhether the instant writ petition is

maintainable.

35. List this matter for further consideration

(on merit) in the week commencing from April

13, 2026 as Item No.1.

36. It is made clear that on the adjourned date

no prayer for accommodation from either side

will be considered.

37. On the adjourned date, the parties are

directed to file list of dates and events

positively.

(Partha Sarathi Sen, J.)



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