Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Union Of India vs Ram Awatar Nai (2026:Rj-Jd:14082-Db) on 17 March, 2026
Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
[2026:RJ-JD:14082-DB] (1 of 23) [CW-18009/2018]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18009/2018
1. Union Of India, Through The Secretary, Government Of
India, Ministry Of Agriculture, Department Of Animal
Husbandry, Dairying And Fisheries, Krishi Bhawan, New
Delhi.
2. Director (FF), Department Of Animal Husbandry, Dairying
And Fisheries, Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi.
3. Director, Regional Station For Forage Production And
Demonstration, Suratgarh, Rajasthan- 335804
4. Tehsildar (Revenue), Sadulsahar, Rajasthan.
5. Shri Yogendra Kumar, Fodder Agronomist, R.s.f.p. And F,
Kalyani(West Bengal)
----Petitioners
Versus
1. Ram Awatar Nai S/o Shri Bheru Ram, Aged About 62
Years, Vpo Manaksar, Suratgarh, District Sri Ganganagar
(Office Address- Worked As Regional Station For Forage
Production And Demonstration, Suratgarh As Storekeeper
Under Ministry Of Agriculture)
2. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Bench At Jodhpur.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Nimesh Suthar for U.O.I.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Shyam Prashad Singh
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP SHAH
Order
REPORTABLE:-
17/03/2026
Per Mr. Sandeep Shah, J:
1. The present writ petition has been filed laying challenge to
the order dated 04.04.2016 (Annexure-2) passed in O.A. No.
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[2026:RJ-JD:14082-DB] (2 of 23) [CW-18009/2018]290/00087/2014 by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal,
Jodhpur, whereby the Tribunal quashed the order dated
26.02.2014, by which the services of respondent No.1 were
dismissed with immediate effect, with direction to reinstate of
respondent No.1 with all consequential benefits, while granting
liberty to initiate an inquiry afresh, if so advised.
Factual Matrix:
2. Brief facts of the case are that a notification dated
30.11.1972 was issued for one post of Peon (LDC) of unreserved
category. Condition no. 9 of the notification stipulated that
preference would be given to SC/ST candidates in the Department
of AHD & Fishing. The respondent No.1 got selected and was
appointed to the said post. There was a specific requirement in the
appointment order dated 14.12.1973, wherein condition no. 10
proposed production of a valid SC certificate within one month,
failing which, services were liable to be terminated. The
respondent No.1 had produced a Scheduled Caste certificate as he
belonged to a community called Nai (Barber), which, as per him,
was considered a scheduled caste at that time. However, in 1994,
the Government Authority vide another certificate, designated his
category as OBC. In 1998, respondent No.1 again produced the
same SC certificate at the time of promotion to the post of Store
Keeper (UDC), availing age relaxation of five years available
exclusively to SC candidates. Brusquely, a complaint was filed
against respondent No. 1 on 08.04.2010 by a person claiming
himself to be a resident of Haryana. The complaint alleged that
the ‘Nai’ caste does not fall under the SC category and respondent
No.1 fraudulently obtained the certificate. The Government
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[2026:RJ-JD:14082-DB] (3 of 23) [CW-18009/2018]notifications placed on record elucidated the fact that ‘Nai’ was
included in the OBC category and not SC category.
3. The Department initiated verification with certificate issuing
authorities i.e. Tehsildar, Sadulshahar, who categorically denied
issuing any such certificate. A memorandum of charges dated
23.04.2013 was served, wherein respondent was alleged to be
contravening Section 3 of Central Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 [hereinafter referred to as Rules
of 1965 for brevity] and inquiry under Rule 14 of Rules of 1965
was proposed to be held. The department alleged that respondent
No.1 did not cooperated during the inquiry proceedings and also
threatened and misbehaved with the Presiding Officer and the
Inquiry Officer. Consequently, the disciplinary enquiry, by
exercising powers under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1965,
dismissed respondent No.1 from service on the basis of nebulous
grounds.
4. The respondent No.1 challenged the dismissal order before
the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur, whereby the Original
Application of respondent No.1 was allowed and thus, vide order
dated 04.04.2016, the order dated 26.02.2014 dismissing the
services of respondent no.1 was quashed with direction for
reinstatement with all consequential benefits.
5. Aggrieved by the same, the present petitioners had filed a
writ petition before the learned Division Bench of this Court being
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.10655/2016. The same was withdrawn
vide order dated 08.08.2017, while seeking liberty to file review
application before the learned Central Administrative Tribunal.
Thereafter, a review petition was filed before the Central
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Administrative Tribunal, however, the same was dismissed vide
order dated 26.04.2018. Hence, the present writ petition.
Arguments on behalf of learned counsel for the
petitioners:-
6. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the
certificate of respondent No.1 was based on a false pretext and
was fraudulently obtained since in the State of Rajasthan, the
Caste ‘Nai’ was never included in the Scheduled Caste under the
Schedule Caste and Scheduled Tribes Orders (Amendment) Act,
1956 and later on the Caste Nai came to be included in the OBC
category w.e.f. 06.08.1994. He further submitted that condition
No. 9 of the notification along with condition No. 10 of the
appointment order and Point 2 of the Record of Roster Register
collectively point towards the fact that the appointment of
respondent No.1 was obtained on account of his belonging to SC
category. He further submitted that inquiry under Rule 14 of the
Rules of 1965 was duly conducted and respondent No.1 was
granted ample opportunities for submitting his defence but, he
himself misbehaved and did not cooperate with the inquiry
proceedings. He further submitted that the entire exercise has
been undertaken in consonance with the powers vested in the
authority as per Rule 19 (ii) of the Rules of 1965. He further
submitted that the order itself contains detailed reasons for not
proceeding with the inquiry, and the reasons so specified clearly
demonstrate that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the
inquiry. Thus, the learned counsel prays that the orders dated
04.04.2016 and 26.04.2018 passed by the Central Administrative
Tribunal, Jodhpur Bench, Jodhpur be quashed and set aside.
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Arguments on behalf of learned counsel for the
respondents:-
7. Learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand,
submitted that the dismissal of the Respondent vide order dated
26.02.2014 was against the principles of natural justice as it was
not a well-reasoned order and the respondent No.1 was deprived
of the opportunity of being heard during the departmental inquiry.
He submitted that the entire proceedings, from the very inception,
were undertaken with a pre-determined mind, which is evident
from the order dated 26.02.2014 (Annexure-R-9) issued by the
Under Secretary to the Government of India to the Director-in-
Charge, Regional Station for Forage Production and
Demonstration, Suratgarh, Rajasthan, wherein it was itself
clarified that the inquiry should be dispensed with and the
petitioners should be dismissed. He further submitted that there
was no application of mind by the Disciplinary Authority, and the
alleged reasons stated in the impugned order dated 26.02.2014
for dispensing with the inquiry are not at all germane to the order
passed. No reasons whatsoever have been shown, which could
fortify the factum of there being any impracticability in holding the
inquiry. Therefore, the impugned orders are legally just and
proper and the respondent No.2 has rightly quashed the dismissal
order.
8. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the
material available on record.
Analysis:-
9. Prior to addressing the issue in hand, it would be apposite to
first consider the constitutional provisions applicable to the case at
hand, as well as the position of the rules governing the field. Part
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[2026:RJ-JD:14082-DB] (6 of 23) [CW-18009/2018]
XIV of the Constitution of India deals with services under the Union
and the States. Article 310 postulates the ‘Doctrine of Pleasure’,
while emphasizing that a member of a defence service or a civil
service under the Union, or of an All India Service, holds the post
concerned during the pleasure of the President, and every person
who is a member of a civil service of a State or holds any civil post
under the State holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of
the State. As an exception to the aforesaid Doctrine of Pleasure,
Article 311 provides for certain safeguards to persons prior to their
being dismissed, removed, or reduced in rank. Article 311 reads as
under:-
“Article 311 of the Constitution of India:-
311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed
in civil capacities under the Union or a State:
(1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an
all India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post
under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an
authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.
(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or
reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been
informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable
opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges.
Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose
upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the
basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not
be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making
representation on the penalty proposed:
Provided further that this clause shall not apply —
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or
reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has
led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or
(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or
remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied
that for some reason, to be recorded by that
authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable
to hold such inquiry; or
(c) where the President or the Governor, as the case
may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the
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[2026:RJ-JD:14082-DB] (7 of 23) [CW-18009/2018]security of the State, it is not expedient to hold such
inquiry.
(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question
arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as
is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority
empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in
rank shall be final.”
10. A perusal of the same would reveal that clause (1) and clause
(2) provide an exception to the Doctrine of Pleasure. However, the
proviso to clause (2) further carves out exceptions under the
following circumstances: (i) where the person concerned is
dismissed, removed, or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct
which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; (ii) where the
authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce
him in rank is satisfied that, for reasons to be recorded by such
authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such
inquiry; and (iii) where the President or the Governor, as the case
may be, is satisfied that, in the interest of the security of the State,
it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. Clause (3) of Article 311
further provides that where a question arises as to whether it is
reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry, as referred to in clause
(2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or
remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final.
11. In the present case, under the Rules of 1965, an identical
provision has been resorted to, namely Rule 19 of the Rules of
1965, which provides as under:-
“19. Special procedure in certain cases:
Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 14 to rule 18-
(I) where any penalty is imposed on a
Government servant on the ground of conduct
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(ii) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied for
reasons to be recorded by it in writing that it is not
reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the
manner provided in these rules, or
(iii) where the President is satisfied that in the
interest of the security of the State, it is not
expedient to hold any inquiry in the manner
provided in these rules,the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of
the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit:
Provided that the Government servant may be given
an opportunity of making representation on the penalty
proposed to be imposed before any order is made in a case
under clause (i):
Provided further that the Commission shall be
consulted, where such consultation is necessary, before
any orders are made in any case under this rule.”11.1 A bare perusal of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India
as well as Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1965 would reveal that,
without undertaking a regular inquiry–which is otherwise
mandated under Article 311(2) the Disciplinary Authority can
straightaway pass an order of dismissal, provided it is satisfied, for
reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably
practicable to hold the inquiry in the manner prescribed under the
Rules of 1965. Except for the exception provided under Rule 19,
the regular procedure for conducting an inquiry is laid down under
Rule 14 of the Rules of 1965, wherein a charge-sheet is required to
be issued, a reply is to be submitted by the delinquent, a
Presenting Officer is to be appointed, and a defence nominee is
also to be appointed. Thereafter, the inquiry is to be conducted by
examining witnesses and exhibiting documents on behalf of the
department, followed by granting an opportunity of hearing to the
delinquent employee to examine his witnesses and produce
documents in defence. Postonthat,
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[2026:RJ-JD:14082-DB] (9 of 23) [CW-18009/2018]to the Disciplinary Authority, who is required to issue a notice with
respect to the proposed punishment to the delinquent, and
thereafter, upon considering the stand of the delinquent, to pass an
order of punishment if the charges are found to be proved. In all
such proceedings, the authority concerned is required to pass a
reasoned order, assigning specific reasons so as to fortify the
finding of guilt against the delinquent concerned.
12. The power under Rule 19(ii), being an exception to the
provisions of Article 311 and Rule 14 of the Rules of 1965, can be
resorted to only in exceptional circumstances and cannot be
invoked in a routine manner merely with a view to frustrate the
holding of an inquiry and give a complete go-by to the principles of
natural justice, which are the golden thread encompassing the rule
of law and constitute one of the essential components of the
adjudicative process, be it by a judicial or a quasi-judicial authority.
13. It would be further apposite to emphasize that the power
under Rule 19(ii) can be exercised, firstly, only by the Disciplinary
Authority; secondly, the authority is required to record reasons to
demonstrate that the holding of the inquiry is not reasonably
practicable. The reasons need not necessarily form part of the
impugned order, but must exist on record. Thirdly, the reasons so
recorded must be cogent and sufficient, and cannot be arbitrary;
rather, they must be based on objective considerations, showing
that the satisfaction arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority is
germane to the case at hand. Thus, in cases where the power
under Article 311(2)(b) or the corresponding provision under Rule
19(ii) of the Rules of 1965 is exercised, it is the duty of the
authority concerned to satisfy that all the conditions, as stated
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hereinabove, stand fulfilled. Consequently, the order so passed
must withstand the test of not being arbitrary and irrational.
14. Certain case laws on this aspect, while dealing with identical
provisions under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India,
would further throw light upon the issue in hand. The Hon’ble Apex
Court, in the celebrated judgment of Union of India v. Tulsiram
Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398, had an occasion to deal with the
Doctrine of Pleasure, the constitutional safeguards under Article
311, as also the scope of judicial review when a challenge is made
to the order in question. While dealing with the provisions of Article
311(2)(b), the Court held as under:-
“130. The condition precedent for the application of clause
(b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that “it is
not reasonably practicable to hold” the inquiry contemplated
by clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent to note is that
the words used are “not reasonably practicable” and not
‘impracticable’. According to the Oxford English Dictionary
‘practicable’ means “Capable of being put into practice,
carried out in action, effected, accomplished, or done;
feasible”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
defines the word ‘practicable’ inter alia as meaning “possible
to practice or perform: capable of being put into practice,
done or accomplished: feasible”. Further, the words used are
not “not practicable” but “not reasonably practicable”.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the
word ‘reasonably’ as “in a reasonable manner: to a fairly
sufficient extent”. Thus, whether it was practicable to hold
the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it
was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or
absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b).
What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not
practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a
reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not possible
to enumerate the cases in which it would not be reasonably
practicable to hold the inquiry, but some instances by way of
illustration may, however, be given. It would not be
reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry where the
government servant,
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associates, so terrorizes, threatens or intimidates witnesses
who are going to give evidence against him with fear of
reprisal as to prevent them from doing so or where the
government servant by himself or together with or through
others threatens, intimidates and terrorizes the officer who is
the disciplinary authority or members of his family so that he
is afraid to hold the inquiry or direct it to be held. It would
also not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry where
an atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and
insubordination prevails, and it is immaterial whether the
concerned government servant is or is not a party to bringing
about such an atmosphere. In this connection, we must bear
in mind that numbers coerce and terrify while an individual
may not. The reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is
a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary
authority. Such authority is generally on the spot and knows
what is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is
the best judge of this that clause (3) of Article 311 makes the
decision of the disciplinary authority on this question final. A
disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a
disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior
motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry
or because the Departments case against the government
servant is weak and must fail. The finality given to the
decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not
binding upon the court so far as its power of judicial review is
concerned and in such a case the court will strike down the
order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing
penalty. The case of Arjun Chaubey v. Union of India is an
instance in point. In that case, the appellant was working as
a senior clerk in the office of the Chief Commercial
Superintendent, Northern Railway, Varanasi. The Senior
Commercial Officer wrote a letter to the appellant calling
upon him to submit his explanation with regard to twelve
charges of gross indiscipline mostly relating to the Deputy
Chief Commercial Superintendent. The appellant submitted
his explanation and on the very next day the Deputy Chief
Commercial Superintendent served a second notice on the
appellant saying that his explanation was not convincing and
that another chance was being given to him to offer his
explanation with respect to those charges. The appellant
submitted his further explanation but on the very next day
the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent passed an order
dismissing him on the ground that he was not fit to be
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retained in service. This Court struck down the order holding
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that seven out of twelve charges related to the conduct of the
appellant with the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent
who was the disciplinary authority and that if an inquiry were
to be held, the principal witness for the Department would
have been the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent
himself, resulting in the same person being the main accuser,
the chief witness and also the judge of the matter.
133. The second condition necessary for the valid application
of clause (b) of the second proviso is that the disciplinary
authority should record in writing its reason for its satisfaction
that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry
contemplated by Article 311(2). This is a constitutional
obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writing, the
order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty
following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional.
134. It is obvious that the recording in writing of the reason
for dispensing with the inquiry must precede the order
imposing the penalty. The reason for dispensing with the
inquiry need not, therefore, find a place in the final order. It
would be usual to record the reason separately and then
consider the question of the penalty to be imposed and pass
the order imposing the penalty. It would, however, be better
to record the reason in the final order in order to avoid the
allegation that the reason was not recorded in writing before
passing the final order but was subsequently fabricated. The
reason for dispensing with the inquiry need not contain
detailed particulars, but the reason must not be vague or just
a repetition of the language of clause (b) of the second
proviso. For instance, it would be no compliance with the
requirement of clause (i) for the disciplinary authority simply
to state that he was satisfied that it was not reasonably
practicable to hold any inquiry. Sometimes a situation may be
such that it is not reasonably practicable to give detailed
reasons for dispensing with the inquiry. This would not,
however, per se invalidate the order. Each case must be
judged on its own merits and in the light of its own facts and
circumstances.
138. Where a government servant is dismissed, removed or
reduced in rank by applying clause (b) or an analogous
provision of the service rules and he approaches either the
High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32,
the court will interfere on grounds well established in law for
the exercise of power of judicial review in matters where
administrative discretion is exercised. It will consider whether
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clause (b) or an analogous provision in the service rules was
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properly applied or not. The finality given by clause (3) of
Article 311 to the disciplinary authority’s decision that it was
not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry is not binding
upon the court. The court will also examine the charge of
mala fides, if any, made in the writ petition. In examining the
relevancy of the reasons, the court will consider the situation
which according to the disciplinary authority made it come to
the conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold
the inquiry. If the court finds that the reasons are irrelevant,
then the recording of its satisfaction by the disciplinary
authority would be an abuse of power conferred upon it by
clause (b) and would take the case out of the purview of that
clause and the impugned order of penalty would stand
invalidated. In considering the relevancy of the reasons given
by the disciplinary authority the court will not, however, sit in
judgment over them like a court of first appeal. In order to
decide whether the reasons are germane to clause (b) the
court should put itself in the place of the disciplinary authority
and consider what in the then prevailing situation a
reasonable man acting in a reasonable way would have done.
The matter will have to be judged in the light of the then
prevailing situation and not as if the disciplinary authority
was deciding the question whether the inquiry should be
dispensed with or not in the cool and detached atmosphere of
a court- room, removed in time from the situation in
question. Where two views are possible, the court will decline
to interfere.”
14.1 Thus, essentially emphasizing that the decision passed by the
Disciplinary Authority, while exercising the aforesaid power, is
subject to judicial review, and the satisfaction to be arrived at by
the authority for dispensing with the inquiry is always open to
scrutiny as to examine whether the reasons were germane to the
controversy and whether the order was passed mala fide, or
whether the reasons assigned are such as a reasonable person
would find justifiable in the facts of the case at hand. The Hon’ble
Apex Court, however, cautioned that the Court concerned shall not
sit over the relevancy of the reasons as a Court of First Appeal;
nevertheless, the reasons assigned must be germane to the
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exercise of power under Article 311(2)(b) and cannot be arbitrary
or merely made-up reasons.
15. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of “Workmen of
Hindustan Steel Limited & Ors. v. Hindustan Steel Limited &
Ors., 1984, Supp, SCC 554″, also considered the same provision
and held as under:-
“4. ….The appointing authority is invested with power to
dispense with enquiry. And in case of persons belonging to
Class IV services, the appointing authority may be some-one
in the lower administrative hierarchy and such an officer is
invested with such draconian powers. Where such a power is
conferred, on an authority entitled to impose penalty of
dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, before it can
dispense with the inquiry, it must be satisfied for reasons to
be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to
hold such an enquiry. Power to dispense with enquiry is
conferred for a purpose and to effectuate the purpose power
can be exercised. But power is hedged in with a condition of
setting down reasons in writing why power is exercised.
Obviously therefore the reasons which would permit exercise
of power must be such as would clearly spell out that the
inquiry if held would be counter-productive. The duty to
specify by reasons the satisfaction for holding that the
inquiry was not reasonably practicable cannot be dispensed
with. The reasons must be germane to the issue and would
be subject to a limited-judicial review. Undoubtedly Sub-art.
(3) of Article 311 provides that the decision of the authority
in this behalf is final. This only mean that the Court cannot
inquire into adequacy or sufficiency of reasons. But if the
reasons ex-facie are not germane to the issue namely of
dispensing with enquiry the Court in a petition for a writ of
certiorari can always examine reasons ex-facie and if they
are not germane to the issue record a finding that the pre-
requisite for exercise of power having not been satisfied, the
exercise of power was bad or Without jurisdiction. If the
court is satisfied that the reasons which prompted the
concerned authority to record a finding that it was not
reasonably practicable to hold the enquiry, obviously the
satisfaction would be a veneer to dispense with the inquiry
and the court may reject the same. What is obligatory is to
specify the reasons for the satisfaction of the authority that
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it was not reasonably practicable to hold such an inquiry.
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Once the reasons are specified and are certainly subject to
limited judicial review as in a writ for certiorari, the court
would examine whether the reasons were germane to the
issue or was merely a cloak, device or a pretence to
dispense with the inquiry and to impose the penalty. Let it
not be forgotten what is laid down A by a catena of decisions
that where an order casts a stigma or affects livelihood
before making the order, principles of natural justice namely
a reasonable opportunity to present one’s case and
controvert the adverse evidence must have full play Thus
even where the Constitution permits dispensing with the
inquiry, a safeguard is introduced that the concerned
authority must specify reasons for its decision why it was
not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry.”
15.1 Thus, emphasizing that the reasons so assigned must be
germane to the issue, and the order in question will undoubtedly
fall within the scope of judicial review if the reasons assigned are
not germane to the question of dispensing with the inquiry. In such
a situation, the Court, while exercising the power of judicial review,
ought to set aside the order. The Court further emphasized that the
reasons should not be a mere cloak or device to dispense with the
inquiry and to impose the penalty by the appointing authority.
16. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of “Ex-Constable
Chhote Lal v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 196”, where the
departmental authority had exercised the powers under Article
311(2)(b), assigning the reason that the delinquent, being a police
constable, could have influenced the witnesses, held as under:-
“4. Having examined the rival contentions of the parties and
bearing in mind the law laid down by this Court indicating the
circumstances under which the inquiry under Article 311(2),
second proviso, clause (b) of the Constitution can be dispensed
with and applying the same to the facts and circumstances and
the reasons advanced by the authorities in arriving at the
decision, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that
the order dispensing with the departmental inquiry is not in
accordance with law and necessarily the order of dismissal
cannot be sustained. We
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[2026:RJ-JD:14082-DB] (16 of 23) [CW-18009/2018]dismissal passed against the appellant and permit the
departmental authority to hold an inquiry if so desired, in
accordance with law and come to the conclusion in the said
proceeding.”
17. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of “Sudesh Kumar v.
State of Haryana & Ors., (2005) 11 SCC 55”, dealt with a
situation where the departmental inquiry was dispensed with on
the ground that the main prosecution witness was a foreigner and
might leave the country in the midst of the departmental
proceedings, as also on the ground that the witness was not likely
to support the case against the delinquent officer in view of a letter
written by him. Repelling the said justification, the Hon’ble Apex
Court held as under:-
“5. It is now established principle of law that an inquiry under
Article 311(2) is a rule and dispensing with the inquiry is an
exception. The authority dispensing with the inquiry under
Article 311(2)(b) must satisfy for reasons to be recorded that
it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. A reading
of the termination order by invoking Article 3,11(2)(b), as
extracted above, would clearly show that no reasons
whatsoever have been assigned as to why it is not reasonably
practicable to hold an inquiry. The reasons e disclosed in the
termination order are that the complainant refused to name
the accused out of fear of harassment; the complainant,
being a foreign national, is likely to leave the country and
once he left the country, it may not be reasonably practicable
to bring him to the inquiry. This is no ground for dispensing
with the inquiry. On the other hand, it is not disputed that, by
order dated 23-12-1999, the visa of the complainant was
extended up to f 22-12-2000. Therefore, there was no
difficulty in securing the presence of Mr Kenichi Tanaka in the
inquiry.
6. A reasonable opportunity of hearing enshrined in Article
311(2) of the Constitution would include an opportunity to
defend himself and establish his innocence by cross-
examining the prosecution witnesses produced against him
and by examining the defence withesses in his favour, if any.
This he can g do only if inquiry is held where he has been
informed of the charges
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[2026:RJ-JD:14082-DB] (17 of 23) [CW-18009/2018]case, the mandate of Article 311(2) of the Constitution has
been violated depriving reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the appellant.
18. The Hon’ble Apex Court, again in the case of “State of
Punjab & Ors. v. Harbhajan Singh, (2007) 15 SCC 217″, dealt
with a matter where the departmental inquiry was dispensed with
on the ground of the delinquent being involved with terrorists. The
Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:-
“3. Learned counsel then contended that no departmental
enqiury could be held against the respondent in view of his
involvement with terrorists. In the suit, the State did not
place any material to establish that any case was made out
for dispensation of a regular departmental enquiry as
required under clause (2) to Article 311 of the Constitution
of India. The question is now covered by a recent decision of
this Court in Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab wherein this
Court has opined that if no material is brought to the notice
of the Court on the date of passing of the impugned order in
support of the allegations contained therein as to why it was
impractical to hold a regular disciplinary proceeding, the
order or termination would not be sustainable.”
19. A perusal and thorough analysis of the judgments referred to
hereinabove would reveal that the law crystallized by the Hon’ble
Apex Court is that an inquiry can be dispensed with only in
exceptional circumstances, as provided under Article 311(2) of the
Constitution of India. For exercising powers under Article 311(2)
(b), the Disciplinary Authority (i.e., the authority empowered to
dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank), and no other
authority, is required to apply its mind and assign reasons, to be
recorded in writing, demonstrating that it is not reasonably
practicable to hold the inquiry. The reasons so assigned must be
germane to the exercise of power under Article 311(2)(b) and
should not be a mere cloak or device to dispense with the inquiry
and bypass the regular procedure. Such reasons must have a direct
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[2026:RJ-JD:14082-DB] (18 of 23) [CW-18009/2018]
nexus with the dispensing of the inquiry, clearly indicating that the
holding of the inquiry was not reasonably practicable. The power of
judicial review of the High Court under Article 226 and of the
Hon’ble Apex Court under Article 32 is always available, albeit for a
limited purpose, to examine whether the reasons so specified are
germane to the issue in hand and whether they are such as a
reasonable person, in the circumstances of the case, would arrive
at for the purpose of dispensing with the inquiry.
20. Coming to the facts of the present case, a bare perusal of the
record would reveal that after issuance of the charge-sheet, the
respondent No.1 had time and again requested for providing him
with copies of the documents for the purpose of filing his reply and
submitting his defence.
21. The correspondence dated 08.03.2013, 08.05.2013,
19.08.2013 and 30.08.2013 fortify the aforesaid stand. The said
request letters were received by the authority concerned and the
same has been admitted by the petitioners in their reply filed
before the learned Central Administrative Tribunal. Upon such
correspondence, the petitioner-Department itself issued a
communication dated 14.06.2013, admitting that certain
documents were not supplied, as the same were available with the
office of Shri Yogendra Kumar, Ex Director In-charge of the Station,
and that the same would be made available as and when received
from him. Post that the proceedings were initiated, and as per the
averments made in the impugned order itself, the first date of the
regular inquiry was fixed as 17.09.2013, on which date time was
sought by the original applicant/delinquent on the ground that his
defence assistant was engaged elsewhere. Subsequently, on the
next date i.e. 09.10.2013, the reply was filed by the delinquent.
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[2026:RJ-JD:14082-DB] (19 of 23) [CW-18009/2018]
Thereafter, the Presiding Officer retired on 31.10.2013, and a new
Presiding Officer was appointed, who was not ready with the
proceedings on 11.11.2013; therefore, the matter was adjourned
to 07.01.2014. On 07.01.2014, the inquiry proceedings were
undertaken, wherein the delinquent employee, along with his
defence assistant, raised serious objections with regard to the
appointment of the new Presiding Officer, as well as the manner in
which the inquiry was being conducted, inasmuch as, the Presiding
Officer had proceeded in a manner suggestive of pre-determining
the guilt of the delinquent without properly undertaking the inquiry.
On the same date, the statements of SW-1 Shri Yogendra Kumar
and SW-2 Shri Mohanlal were recorded; however, the delinquent
did not cross-examine them and instead sought time to do so after
receiving the documents, earlier demanded.
22. A perusal of the note-sheet (Annexure-A-11) pertaining to the
entire proceedings dated 07.01.2014 would reveal that there is not
even a single whisper therein with regard to any threatening or
abusive language having been used by the delinquent or his
defence assistant. Rather, the order-sheet records that the next
date of the inquiry shall be intimated later, after taking necessary
steps for submission of the recruitment file and complaint file, and
after taking a decision regarding change of the Presenting Officer,
as per the Rules. This clearly emphasizes that certain documents,
as demanded by the delinquent, were not provided and the
department itself was contemplating for the supply of the same.
Surprisingly, without there being any intervening date reflected in
the proceedings, it has been alleged that Dr. R.P. Shrivastava, vide
his letter dated 28.01.2014 (which has not been placed on record
by the petitioners), had informed that the delinquent and his
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[2026:RJ-JD:14082-DB] (20 of 23) [CW-18009/2018]
defence assistant were creating a law and order problem by
threatening the Inquiry Officer and the Presenting Officer, and by
using abusive, rude and unparliamentary language against them.
An identical letter is alleged to have been submitted by Shri
Yogendra Kumar on 11.02.2014, stating that he had come to know
from reliable sources that the delinquent might resort to
untoward physical harassment against him, and had
recommended that the inquiry be conducted at some other place.
23. Surprisingly, these documents have also not been placed on
record by the petitioners. However, the petitioners themselves have
placed on record a correspondence dated 26.02.2014 (Annexure-R-
9), along with the reply to the OA, wherein a decision to dispense
with the inquiry was taken by the Under Secretary to the
Government of India (i.e., not the authority competent to dismiss,
remove, or reduce in rank the delinquent) under Rule 19(ii) of the
Rules of 1965. Strangely, a draft speaking order was also annexed
with the said correspondence, directing passing of the impugned
order and even suggesting lodging of an FIR immediately. Based
upon the same, the impugned order dated 26.02.2014, as
challenged before the learned Central Administrative Tribunal,
came to be passed, emphasizing that it was not possible to hold
the departmental inquiry in a peaceful manner due to alleged
threats, intimidation, and the creation of a fearsome atmosphere
by the charged officer during the course of the inquiry. The
Disciplinary Authority, thus, proceeded to pass the impugned order
by exercising powers under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1965,
dispensing with the inquiry on the ground that it was not
reasonably practicable to hold the same, and consequently, the
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[2026:RJ-JD:14082-DB] (21 of 23) [CW-18009/2018]
original applicant/deliquent came to be dismissed by way of the
said impugned order.
24. The aforesaid facts, in themselves, clearly demonstrate that
the dispensing with the inquiry was not germane to any alleged
threat or use of unparliamentary language by the delinquent during
the course of the inquiry. Rather, the inquiry appears to have been
dispensed with solely on the basis of the correspondence dated
26.02.2014 issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of
India, wherein directions were issued and even a draft format of
the order was annexed, indicating that the inquiry should be
dispensed with under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1965.
Furthermore, it is evident that there is no independent satisfaction
recorded by the Disciplinary Authority, i.e., the author of the order
dated 26.02.2014. On the contrary, the order apparently is founded
entirely upon the said correspondence of the same date issued by
the Under Secretary to the Government of India. The petitioners
themselves have admitted this position in their reply to the OA.
Thus, the essential requirement of satisfaction of the competent
authority is conspicuously absent in the present case. Not only
this, a perusal of the proceedings dated 07.01.2014 would reveal
that there is not even a whisper of any allegation regarding the
delinquent attempting to derail the disciplinary proceedings or
using any unparliamentary or improper language. Consequently,
the reasons assigned for dispensing with the inquiry in the order
dated 26.02.2014 appear to be nothing but a cloak or device
adopted by the appellants to avoid conducting a regular inquiry.
Further, it is significant to note that the petitioners have not even
placed on record the alleged correspondence of Dr. R.P. Shrivastava
dated 28.01.2014 or that of Shri Yogendra Kumar dated
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[2026:RJ-JD:14082-DB] (22 of 23) [CW-18009/2018]
11.02.2014, which are sought to be relied upon to justify the
impugned action.
25. Needless to emphasize that even in the correspondence
referred to hereinabove, there is merely a reference to knowledge
from a “reliable source” regarding a possible apprehension that the
delinquent might indulge in some untoward physical harassment.
However, there is no foundation for such an assertion, nor is there
any disclosure of the identity of the alleged source on the basis of
whose information Shri Yogendra Kumar purportedly apprehended
a threat during the course of the inquiry. Furthermore, respondent
No.1 has specifically levelled allegations of mala fides against Shri
Yogendra Kumar in paragraph 13 of the OA and has impleaded him
as a party respondent in person in the OA. Despite the same, Shri
Yogendra Kumar has chosen not to appear before the Tribunal;
consequently, the allegations of mala fides remain uncontroverted.
Thus, reliance upon the alleged correspondence, issued by Shri
Yogendra Kumar, as one of the grounds for dispensing with the
inquiry, is wholly arbitrary and unjustified.
26. Ideally, it would have been preferable if the learned Tribunal
had assigned detailed reasons while quashing and setting aside the
impugned order in the first instance. However, the said lacuna in
the original order stood cured while deciding the review petition,
wherein the learned Tribunal, by way of order dated 26.04.2018,
assigned detailed reasons for quashing and setting aside the
impugned order dated 26.02.2014. The reasoning so given by the
learned Tribunal is found to be correct, and the petitioners have not
been able to show any justification for dispensing with the inquiry.
Moreover, the learned Tribunal has already granted liberty to the
petitioners to continue the proceedings against the delinquent from
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[2026:RJ-JD:14082-DB] (23 of 23) [CW-18009/2018]
the stage of issuance of the charge-sheet and to proceed with a
regular inquiry. This Court, therefore, does not find the impugned
orders to be erroneous on any aspect.
Conclusion:-
27. The present Civil Writ Petition, being bereft of merit, is
therefore dismissed, while upholding the orders dated 04.04.2016
and 26.04.2018 passed by the learned Central Administrative
Tribunal, Jodhpur.
28. All pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of
accordingly.
(SANDEEP SHAH),J (DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J
108-devrajP/-
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