Chattisgarh High Court
Chief Engineer vs Chameli Bai on 9 April, 2026
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2026:CGHC:16370
Digitally
NAFR
signed by
JYOTI
JYOTI SHARMA
SHARMA Date:
2026.04.09
17:11:27
+0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ARBA No. 80 of 2025
Chief Engineer, Public Works Department, National Highway Zone, NH
Campus Pension Bada, Raipur (C.G.), Through Executive Engineer,
Public Works Department, National Highway Division, Bilaspur (C.G.)
... Appellant(s)
versus
1. Chameli Bai W/o W/o Shri Kartikram Aged About 50 Years R/o
Masaniyakala, Tahsil Sakti, District Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh.
2. Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue)-Cum-Competent Authority Under
Land Acquisition, Champa, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
(The cause title is as per the Memo of Appeal)
For Appellant(s) : Mr. R.K. Mishra, DSGI
For Respondent No. 1 : Mr. Ramakant Patel and Mr. Shubham
Patel Advocate
For Respondent/ State : Mr. Santosh Soni, Govt. Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge
Order on Board
09/04/2026
1. Heard on I.A. No. 2 of 2025, application for condonation of delay
of 101 days in filing this arbitration appeal filed under Section 37
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
2. The present appeal arises out of land acquisition proceedings
initiated under the National Highways Act, 1956 for widening of
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National Highway No. 200 (New 49), wherein land of the private
respondent was acquired and an award dated 16.04.2018 was
passed by the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA)
determining compensation. Being dissatisfied, the private
respondent preferred an application under Section 3G(5) of the
Act seeking enhancement of compensation. The learned
Arbitrator, instead of re-determining the compensation, remanded
the matter to the CALA for passing a revised/modified award vide
arbitral award dated 21.02.2023. The appellant challenged the
said award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996; however, the learned District Court, vide order dated
27.09.2024, dismissed the application while observing that the
Arbitrator had acted beyond the scope of Section 3G(5).
Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred the present
appeal.
3. Learned DSGI appearing for the appellant submits that the
present appeal has been filed along with an application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of
101 days in filing the appeal. He further submits that the appeal
was filed on 02.04.2025, beyond the prescribed period of
limitation. It is further submitted that after the impugned order
dated 27.09.2024 was passed and the certified copy was
obtained, the appellant sought legal opinion from its counsel, who
advised filing an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. The matter was thereafter placed before
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the superior authority for approval and, upon approval, entrusted
to counsel for drafting. During this period, the then Executive
Engineer (officer-in-charge) superannuated and the post remained
vacant for some time. Subsequently, after the new officer
assumed charge and the winter vacation intervened, the draft was
approved and the appeal was filed. He also submits that the delay
occurred due to these administrative and procedural
circumstances, and not deliberately or with malafide intention. It is
therefore prayed that the delay may be condoned considering the
plausible explanation offered by the appellant..
4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondents submit that
the issue involved in the present arbitration appeal, regarding
delay, has already been considered and decided by this Court
vide judgment dated 02.02.2026 passed in ARBA No.62 of 2025
(Sumitra Bai vs. Executive Engineer, PWD & Ors.) placing
reliance upon the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the
matter of Government of Maharasthra (Water Resources
Department) vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors
Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2021) 6 SCC 460. Learned counsel further
submits that the delay of 219 days has not been satisfactorily
explained and the grounds urged are vague and general in nature,
which do not constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is contended that the appellant
has been grossly negligent in prosecuting the matter and the
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application has been filed only to overcome the statutory bar of
limitation.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record.
6. In the case at hand, the appellant has failed to demonstrate any
sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the stipulated
period prescribed under the provisions of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, except citing certain administrative and
procedural circumstances, which themselves do not constitute a
satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay. In fact, there
was a long delay of 101 days beyond the prescribed period. The
explanation feel woefully short of making out any sufficient cause.
It is also noteworthy to mention here that merely because
sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of a given case,
there is no vested right in the appellant to have delay condoned.
7. The Supreme Court in the matter of Borse Brothers Engineers
and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. (supra) held thus at para 62, 63 & 68 :
“62. Also, it must be remembered that merely because
sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of a given
case, there is no right in the appellant to have delay
condoned. This was felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa
Coalfields Ltd. as follows: (SCR p. 771: AIR p. 365, para
12)–
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“12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even
after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not
entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a
matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a
condition precedent for the exercise of the
discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section
5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has
to be done; the application for condoning delay has to
be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause
is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its
discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of
the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all
relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of
the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration;
but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the
discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown
would naturally be limited only to such facts as the
Court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an
enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all
the time available to it. In this connection we may point
out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence
are always material and relevant when the Court is
dealing with applications made under Section 14 of
the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the
Court is called upon to consider the effect of the
6combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore,
in our opinion, considerations which have been
expressly made material and relevant by the
provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent
and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with
applications which fall to be decided only under
Section 5 without reference to Section 14.”
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal
sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and
the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section
37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116
and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of
the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30
days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of
exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a
party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent
manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the
discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in
mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite
party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what
may now be lost by the first party’s inaction, negligence or
laches.
68. This explanation falls woefully short of making out any
sufficient cause. This appeal is therefore allowed and the
condonation of delay is set aside on this score also.”
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8. In the absence of any sufficient cause and explanations, the
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be
entertained as a matter of routine, particularly, when the delay in
filing of the instant appeal is for a period of 101 days.
9. Applying the well settled principles of law laid down by the Apex
Court in the matter of Borse Brothers Engineers and
Contractors Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and further considering the fact
that the identical issue has already been considered and decided
by this Court in Sumitra Bai (supra); and for the reasons
mentioned in the application, I.A. No.2, for condonation of delay of
101 days in filing the appeal is hereby rejected.
10. Consequently, the instant arbitration appeal is also dismissed on
this score alone. Sd/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru)
JUDGE
Jyoti
