Delhi High Court
Shri Manish Kumar & Anr vs Shri Ajay Kumar Sharma & Ors on 7 April, 2026
Author: C. Hari Shankar
Bench: C. Hari Shankar
$~63
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) 4525/2026 and CM APPLs. 22028-22030/2026
SHRI MANISH KUMAR & ANR. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Santosh Kumar Tripathi,
Sr. Advocate with Mr. Arun Panwar and Mr.
Rishabh Srivastava Advocates
versus
SHRI AJAY KUMAR SHARMA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat, SC
GNCTD, Mr. Nitesh Kumar Singh, Ms.
Aliza Alam, Mr Mohnish Sehrawat
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
% 07.04.2026
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
1. We are of the view that this writ petition is completely
unnecessary and has needlessly burdened the docket of this Court.
2. The challenge in this writ petition is to order dated 11
December 2025 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal1 in OA
398/2022, whereby the Tribunal allowed the application of
Respondents 1 and 2, as the applicants before the Tribunal, to amend
the prayer clause in the OA.
1 “the Tribunal” hereinafter
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3. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners, who were the private
respondents before the Tribunal, have instituted the present writ
petition.
4. The challenge in the OA, as well as in the amended OA, deals
with fixation of seniority of Respondents 1 and 2 vis-Ã -vis the present
petitioners. In the original OA, Respondents 1 and 2 had sought
fixation of seniority “in the same manner as has been done in the case
of Sh. Somvir Singh”. However, after the OA was filed with the said
prayer, it appears that the official respondents passed an order on 14
January 2025 rejecting the case of Somvir Singh. In that view of the
matter, Respondents 1 and 2 chose to amend the prayer clause in the
petition, challenging the seniority list as such, removing the reliance
on the case of Somvir Singh.
5. Mr. Tripathi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioners submits that the OA would not be maintainable as the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal could be invoked only after the official
respondents had taken a decision in the matter. He further submits that
his client has been suffering for several years facing litigation and
allowing the amendment would only further add to her agony.
6. These, to our mind, are not ground on which the impugned
order passed by the Tribunal can be challenged.
7. Mr. Tripathi further submits that the amendment alters the very
nature of the cause of action and the relief sought in the OA, as the
relief was, earlier predicated on the case of Somvir Singh and, by the
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amendment, the respondents have abandoned reliance on Somvir
Singh’s case and seeks to set up an independent challenge to their
seniority vis-Ã -vis the petitioners.
8. We are unable to agree.
9. The law relating to amendment now stands settled by the
judgment of the Supreme Court in LIC v. Sanjeev Builders (P) Ltd.2,
from which we may reproduce for advance the following paragraphs:
“18. It is well settled that the court must be extremely liberal in
granting the prayer for amendment, if the court is of the view that
if such amendment is not allowed, a party, who has prayed for such
an amendment, shall suffer irreparable loss and injury. It is also
equally well settled that there is no absolute rule that in every case
where a relief is barred because of limitation, amendment should
not be allowed. It is always open to the court to allow an
amendment if it is of the view that allowing of an amendment shall
really subserve the ultimate cause of justice and avoid further
litigation.
19. In L.J. Leach & Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner & Co3, this
Court at para 16 of the said decision observed as follows :
“16. It is no doubt true that courts would, as a rule,
decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended
claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the
application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in
exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should
be ordered, and does not affect the power of the court to
order it, if that is required in the interests of justice.”
20. Again in T.N. Alloy Foundry Co. Ltd. v. T.N. Electricity
Board4, this Court observed as follows :
“2. … The law as regards permitting amendment to the
plaint, is well settled. In L.J. Leach & Co. Ltd. it was held
that the Court would as a rule decline to allow amendments,2 (2022) 16 SCC 1
3 AIR 1957 SC 357
4 (2004) 3 SCC 392
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if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by
limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor
to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to
whether amendment should be ordered, and does not affect
the power of the court to order it.
3. It is not disputed that the appellate court has a
coextensive power of the trial court. We find that the
discretion exercised by the High Court in rejecting the
plaint was in conformity with law.”
21. So far as the answer to the specific plea that the claim of
damages is barred by limitation and cannot be permitted at this
stage is concerned, it becomes necessary to examine the various
judicial pronouncements of this Court. The principles governing an
amendment which may be permitted even after the expiry of the
statutory period of limitation were laid down by the Privy Council
in its judgment in Charan Das v. Amir Khan5. In this case, the
Privy Council laid down the principles thus :
“… That there was full power to make the amendment
cannot be disputed, and though such a power should not as
a rule be exercised where its effect is to take away from a
defendant a legal right which has accrued to him by lapse of
time, yet there are cases : see for example Mohd. Zahoor
Ali Khan v. Rutta Koer6, where such considerations are
outweighed by the special circumstances of the case, and
their Lordships are not prepared to differ from the Judicial
Commissioner in thinking that the present case is one.”
22. It would be useful to also notice the observations of this
Court in Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil7,
wherein this Court considered an objection to the amendment on
the ground that the same amounted to a new case and a new cause
of action. In this case, this Court laid down the principles which
would govern the exercise of discretion as to whether the court
ought to permit an amendment of the pleadings or not. This Court
approved the observations of Batchelor, J., in Kisandas
Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba Shilwant8, when he laid down the
principles thus : (Pirgonda Hongonda Patil case)
“10. … ‘… All amendments ought to be allowed which
satisfy the two conditions (a) of not working injustice to the
other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of
determining the real questions in controversy between the
5 AIR 1921 PC 50
6 (1866-67) 11 Moo IA 468
7 AIR 1957 SC 363
8 ILR (1909) 33 Bom 644
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parties. … but I refrain from citing further authorities, as, in
my opinion, they all lay down precisely the same doctrine.
That doctrine, as I understand it, is that amendments should
be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in
the same position as if the pleading had been originally
correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury
which could not be compensated in costs. It is merely a
particular case of this general rule that where a plaintiff
seeks to amend by setting up a fresh claim in respect of a
cause of action which since the institution of the suit had
become barred by limitation, the amendment must be
refused; to allow it would be to cause the defendant an
injury which could not be compensated in costs by
depriving him of a good defence to the claim. The ultimate
test therefore still remains the same : can the amendment be
allowed without injustice to the other side, or can it not?’ “
23. This Court has repeatedly held that the power to allow an
amendment is undoubtedly wide and may be appropriately
exercised at any stage in the interests of justice, notwithstanding
the law of limitation. In this behalf, in Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar9,
this Court held thus :
“22. … The power to allow an amendment is undoubtedly
wide and may at any stage be appropriately exercised in the
interest of justice, the law of limitation notwithstanding.
But the exercise of such far-reaching discretionary powers
is governed by judicial considerations and wider the
discretion, greater ought to be the care and circumspection
on the part of the Court.”
24. Again in Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram10, this Court
laid down the principles thus :
“4. It is clear from the foregoing summary of the main
rules of pleadings that provisions for the amendment of
pleadings, subject to such terms as to costs and giving of all
parties concerned necessary opportunities to meet exact
situations resulting from amendments, are intended for
promoting the ends of justice and not for defeating them.
Even if a party or its counsel is inefficient in setting out its
case initially the shortcoming can certainly be removed
generally by appropriate steps taken by a party which must
no doubt pay costs for the inconvenience or expense caused
to the other side from its omissions. The error is not
incapable of being rectified so long as remedial steps do not9 (1974) 2 SCC 393
10 (1978) 2 SCC 91
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unjustifiably injure rights accrued.”
25. The principles applicable to the amendments of the plaint
are equally applicable to the amendments of the written statements.
The courts are more generous in allowing the amendment of the
written statement as question of prejudice is less likely to operate
in that event. The defendant has a right to take alternative plea in
defence which, however, is subject to an exception that by the
proposed amendment other side should not be subjected to injustice
and that any admission made in favour of the plaintiff is not
withdrawn. All amendments of the pleadings should be allowed
which are necessary for determination of the real controversies in
the suit provided the proposed amendment does not alter or
substitute a new cause of action on the basis of which the original
lis was raised or defence taken. Inconsistent and contradictory
allegations in negation to the admitted position of facts or mutually
destructive allegations of facts should not be allowed to be
incorporated by means of amendment to the pleadings. The
proposed amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other
side which cannot be compensated by costs. No amendment should
be allowed which amounts to or relates in defeating a legal right
accruing to the opposite party on account of lapse of time. The
delay in filing the application for amendment of the pleadings
should be properly compensated by costs and error or mistake
which, if not fraudulent, should not be made a ground for rejecting
the application for amendment of plaint or written statement.
(See South Konkan Distilleries v. Prabhakar Gajanan Naik11)
26. But undoubtedly, every case and every application for
amendment has to be tested in the applicable facts and
circumstances of the case. As the proposed amendment of the
pleadings amounts to only a different or an additional approach to
the same facts, this Court has repeatedly laid down the principle
that such an amendment would be allowed even after the expiry of
statutory period of limitation.
27. In this behalf, in A.K. Gupta & Sons Ltd. v. Damodar
Valley Corpn.12, this Court held thus:
“7. … a new case or a new cause of action particularly
when a suit on the new case or cause of action is barred
: Weldon v. Neal13. But it is also well recognised that where
the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new
cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts to no
more than a different or additional approach to the same11 (2008) 14 SCC 632
12 AIR 1967 SC 96
13 (1887) LR 19 QBD 394 (CA)
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facts, the amendment will be allowed even after the expiry
of the statutory period of limitation:
28. In entitled, G. Nagamma v. Siromanamma14, this Court
considered the proposed amendment of the plaint and noticing that
neither the cause of action would change nor the relief would be
materially affected, allowed the same. This Court in this case
noticed that in the plaintiff’s suit for specific performance, the
plaintiff was entitled to plead even inconsistent pleas and that in
the present case, the plaintiffs were seeking only the alternative
reliefs. It appears that the plaintiffs had filed a suit for specific
performance of an agreement of re-conveyance. By the application
under Order 6 Rule 17CPC for amendment of the plaint, the
appellants were pleading that the transactions of execution of the
sale deed and obtaining a document for re-conveyance were single
transactions viz. mortgage by conditional sale. They also wanted to
incorporate an alternative relief to redeem the mortgage. At the end
of the prayer, the plaintiff sought alternatively to grant of a decree
for redemption of the mortgage. This amendment was permitted by
this Court.
29. In Pankaja v. Yellappa15, this Court held that it was in the
discretion of the court to allow an application under Order 6 Rule
17 CPC seeking amendment of the plaint even where the relief
sought to be added by amendment was allegedly barred by
limitation. The Court noticed that there was no absolute rule that
the amendment in such a case should not be allowed. It was
pointed out that the court’s discretion in this regard depends on the
facts and circumstances of the case and has to be exercised on a
judicial evaluation thereof.
30. It would be apposite to notice the observations of this Court
in this pronouncement in extenso. The principles were laid down
by this Court thus : (Pankaja case)
“12. So far as the court’s jurisdiction to allow an
amendment of pleadings is concerned, there can be no two
opinions that the same is wide enough to permit
amendments even in cases where there has been substantial
delay in filing such amendment applications. This Court in
numerous cases has held that the dominant purpose of
allowing the amendment is to minimise the litigation,
therefore, if the facts of the case so permit, it is always open
to the court to allow applications in spite of the delay and
laches in moving such amendment application.
14 (1996) 2 SCC 25
15 (2004) 6 SCC 415
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13. But the question for our consideration is whether in
cases where the delay has extinguished the right of the
party by virtue of expiry of the period of limitation
prescribed in law, can the court in the exercise of its
discretion take away the right accrued to another party by
allowing such belated amendments.
14. The law in this regard is also quite clear and
consistent that there is no absolute rule that in every case
where a relief is barred because of limitation an amendment
should not be allowed. Discretion in such cases depends on
the facts and circumstances of the case. The jurisdiction to
allow or not allow an amendment being discretionary, the
same will have to be exercised on a judicious evaluation of
the facts and circumstances in which the amendment is
sought. If the granting of an amendment really subserves
the ultimate cause of justice and avoids further litigation the
same should be allowed. There can be no straitjacket
formula for allowing or disallowing an amendment of
pleadings. Each case depends on the factual background of
that case.
*****
16. This view of this Court has, since, been followed by
a three-Judge Bench of this Court in T.N. Alloy Foundry
Co. Ltd.. Therefore, an application for amendment of the
pleading should not be disallowed merely because it is
opposed on the ground that the same is barred by limitation,
on the contrary, application will have to be considered
bearing in mind the discretion that is vested with the court
in allowing or disallowing such amendment in the interest
of justice.
*****
18. We think that the course adopted by this Court
in Ragu Thilak D. John case16 applies appropriately to the
facts of this case. The courts below have proceeded on an
assumption that the amendment sought for by the appellants
is ipso facto barred by the law of limitation and amounts to
introduction of different relief than what the plaintiff had
asked for in the original plaint. We do not agree with the
courts below that the amendment sought for by the plaintiff
introduces a different relief so as to bar the grant of prayer
for amendment, necessary factual basis has already been
laid down in the plaint in regard to the title which, of
16 Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan, (2001) 2 SCC 472
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course, was denied by the respondent in his written
statement which will be an issue to be decided in a trial.
Therefore, in the facts of this case, it will be incorrect to
come to the conclusion that by the amendment the plaintiff
will be introducing a different relief.”
31. From the above, therefore, one of the cardinal principles of
law in allowing or rejecting an application for amendment of the
pleading is that the courts generally, as a rule, decline to allow
amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred
by limitation on the date of filing of the application. But that would
be a factor to be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion
as to whether the amendment should be ordered, and does not
affect the power of the court to order it, if that is required in the
interest of justice.
32. In Ragu Thilak D. John, this Court also observed that
where the amendment was barred by time or not, was a disputed
question of fact and, therefore, that prayer for amendment could
not be rejected and in that circumstance the issue of limitation can
be made an issue in the suit itself like the one made by the High
Court in the case on hand.
33. In a decision in Vishwambhar v. Laxminarayan17, this
Court held that the amendment though properly made cannot relate
back to the date of filing of the suit, but to the date of filing of the
application.
34. Again, in Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera18, this
Court held that if a prayer for amendment merely adds to the facts
already on record, the amendment would be allowed even after the
statutory period of limitation.”
10. There is no change in the reliefs that the Respondents 1 and 2
sought before the Tribunal, as a result of the amendment. Both prior
and after the amendment, Respondents 1 and 2 were challenging the
fixation of their seniority vis-a-vis the petitioners.
11. The only difference was that the Respondents 1 and 2 were
earlier predicating their case on the case of Somvir Singh and, by the
17 (2001) 6 SCC 163
18 (1984) 3 SCC 352
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amendment, were no longer relying on the case of Somvir Singh and
were independently ventilating their case of seniority.
12. In fact, the amendment is not even so much an amendment of
the prayer clause as merely a change of the ground on which the
challenge to seniority was based.
13. As the dominus litus, we see no reason why Respondents 1 and
2 could not be permitted to amend the OA as sought. It is for the
respondents, as the applicants before the Tribunal, to choose the
ground on which they press their claim for seniority vis-Ã -vis the
petitioners. Whether to predicate their claim on the case of Somvir
Singh, or independently thereof, is, therefore, entirely the respondents’
prerogative. The mere fact that the respondents do not now choose to
rely on the case of Somvir Singh cannot, therefore, be said to
constitute any fundamental change in the cause of action, or the lis
agitated before the Tribunal.
14. We, therefore, find no error in the impugned judgment of the
Tribunal whereby the amendment has been allowed.
15. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed in limine.
16. Needless to say, however, all defences which may be available
in law shall be open to the petitioners to be raised by way of response
to the amended OA.
17. We do not express any view on any of these aspects.
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18. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J
APRIL 7, 2026/yg
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