Gujarat High Court
Diyalbhai Lavjibhai Mathodiya vs State Of Gujarat on 7 April, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.MA/7267/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/04/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE
FIR/ORDER) NO. 7267 of 2022
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
✔
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DIYALBHAI LAVJIBHAI MATHODIYA & ORS.
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR MAUNISH T PATHAK(5892) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2,3,4
NIYATI V VAISHNAV(6168) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MR. RONAK RAVAL, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER
Date : 07/04/2026
JUDGMENT
1. The present application has been preferred for
quashment of the FIR being C.R. No. 11190002220710
of 2022 dated 01.04.2022, registered with Botad Police
Station, District Botad, for the offences punishable
under Sections 504, 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal
Code, as well as under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)
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(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
2. As per the contents of the FIR lodged by the first
informant, namely Himmatbhai Rajabhai Maru, it is
stated that the complainant had been allotted land by
the Government for Santhni purposes, admeasuring
approximately 12 vighas, and is engaged in cultivation
thereof. It is further alleged that the adjoining land falls
under Zambrala Survey Number and is owned by one
Diyalbhai Lavjibhai Mathodiya, however, he was in the
habit of using the complainant’s land as a passage to
access his own field, which was objected to by the
complainant. It is alleged that on 08.03.2022, while the
complainant and one Dahyabhai Nathubhai Godavariya
were present in the complainant’s field, the accused
persons named in the FIR attempted to use the said land
as a pathway to reach their field. Upon objection being
raised, the accused persons asserted that it was an old
road and that they would continue to use the same. The
complainant is stated to have questioned that if the said
pathway were to be dug up, how the accused would
continue to use it. It is further alleged that, upon such
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exchange, the accused persons became agitated, used
abusive language referring to the caste of the
complainant, and issued threats that if the complainant
proceeded to dig the pathway, he would face dire
consequences. Upon intervention by the said Dahyabhai,
the complainant returned to his residence. It is further
stated that on 09.03.2022, the complainant dug up the
said pathway and thereafter proceeded to Vadodara on
11.03.2022. Subsequently, on 26.03.2022, the
complainant received a telephone call from one
Damjibhai Virabhai Solanki informing him that the
portion which had been dug up had been refilled by the
accused persons, who had resumed using the said
pathway to access their field. On the basis of the
aforesaid allegations, the FIR came to be lodged, which
is the subject matter of challenge before this Court.
3. Heard learned advocate Mr. Maunish Pathak for the
applicant, learned advocate Ms. Niyati Vaishnav for the
complainant and learned APP Mr. Ronak Raval for the
State.
4. Learned advocate Mr. Pathak, appearing for the
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applicant, submits that the alleged incident is stated to
have occurred on 08.03.2022, whereas the FIR came to
be lodged on 01.04.2022, i.e., after a delay of more than
22 days. It is further submitted that there was no
element of “alarm” caused to the complainant, which is
a sine qua non for attracting the provisions of Sections
504, 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. Insofar as
the allegations under the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act are
concerned, it is contended that no statements of any
independent witnesses have been recorded, nor is there
any specific reference to the exact words allegedly used
by the accused in relation to the caste of the
complainant. It is further submitted that, in any case,
the alleged incident cannot be said to have occurred in
“public view,” which is an essential requirement for
constituting an offence under the Atrocities Act, and
therefore, the impugned FIR is nothing but an abuse of
the process of law. It is also contended that a bare
reading of the FIR indicates that the dispute pertains to
the use of a pathway, which is essentially of a civil
nature, and instead of seeking appropriate remedies
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under civil law, the present FIR has been lodged. It is
thus submitted that neither the essential ingredients of
the offences under the Atrocities Act nor those of
criminal intimidation are satisfied in the present case,
and therefore, the present application deserves to be
allowed and the impugned FIR is liable to be quashed
and set aside.
5. Per contra, learned advocate Ms. Vaishnav submits that
the investigation is yet to be concluded, and the
statements recorded by the Investigating Officer prima
facie disclose the commission of cognizable offences. In
such circumstances, it is contended that no interference
is warranted at this stage, and the present application
deserves to be rejected.
6. Learned APP Mr. Raval has also supported the
submissions advanced by the learned advocate for the
complainant and has urged that the present application
be dismissed.
7. Having considered the submissions advanced by the
learned advocates for the respective parties, and upon
perusal of the FIR registered for the offences punishable
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under Sections 504, 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal
Code, as well as under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) and
3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, this Court
deems it appropriate, at this stage, to refer to the
relevant statutory provisions, which are reproduced
hereinbelow:-
“Section 504 of IPC – Intentional insult with intent to provoke
breach of the peace:
Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to
any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such
provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to
commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to two years, or
with fine, or with both.
Section 506 of IPC – Punishment for criminal intimidation:
Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
If the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the
destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence
punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to
impute unchastity to a woman, such punishment may extend to
imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or
with fine, or with both.
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Section 114 of IPC – Abettor present when offence is committed:
Whenever any person who, if absent, would be liable to be
punished as an abettor, is present when the act or offence for
which he would be punishable in consequence of the abetment is
committed, he shall be deemed to have committed such act or
offence.
Section 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Attrocities) Act, 1898:
Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe, intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to
humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in
any place within public view, shall be punishable.
Section 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Attrocities) Act, 1898:
Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe, abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view,
shall be punishable.
Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Attrocities) Act, 1898:
Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe, commits any offence specified in the Schedule to
the Act against a person or property, knowing that such person is
a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, shall be
punishable with such punishment as provided for the offence
under the Indian Penal Code, and shall also be liable to fine.”
8. For attracting the provisions of Sections 504 and 506(2)
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of the Indian Penal Code, it is imperative that there is a
specific reference to the abusive language alleged to
have been used. Ordinarily, the nature and tenor of the
abusive language constitute the determinative factor in
assessing whether such language amounts to an
intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to
commit a breach of peace, and not the particular
temperament or conduct of the complainant. Mere use
of abusive or discourteous language, rudeness, or
insolence would not, by itself, amount to an intentional
insult within the meaning of Section 504 of the IPC,
unless such conduct contains the necessary element of
being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a
breach of peace or any other offence. Furthermore, it
must also be established that the accused intended, or
knew it to be likely, that such provocation would cause
the person insulted to breach the peace. To constitute an
offence under Section 504 of the IPC, the insult must be
of such a nature as is calculated to cause the aggrieved
party to lose self-control and to act in a manner that
would disturb public peace. Only upon satisfaction of
these essential ingredients can the provisions of
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Sections 504 and 506(2) of the IPC be said to be
attracted.
9. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the
decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Om
Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra reported
in (2026) 2 SCC 622, wherein the relevant paragraph
is reproduced hereinbelow:-
15. Insofar as Section 294IPC is concerned, this Court in N.S.
Madhanagopal v. K. Lalitha [N.S. Madhanagopal v. K. Lalitha,
(2022) 17 SCC 818] has explained the true purport and scope of
Section 294. We quote the relevant observations as under: (SCC
pp. 821-22, paras 6-9)“6. Section 294(b)IPC talks about the obscene acts and songs.
Section 294IPC as a whole reads thus:
‘294. Obscene acts and songs.–Whoever, to the annoyance of
others–
(a) does any obscene act in any public place, or
(b) sings, recites or utters any obscene songs, ballad or words, in
or near any public place,shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with
both.’
7. It is to be noted that the test of obscenity under Section
294(b)IPC is whether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are openPage 9 of 24
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to such immoral influences. The following passage from the
judgment authored by K.K. Mathew, J. (as his Lordship then was)
reported in P.T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko [P.T. Chacko v. Nainan
Chacko, 1967 SCC OnLine Ker 125 : 1967 KLT 799] explains as
follows: (SCC OnLine Ker paras 5-6)‘5. The only point argued was that the 1st accused has not
committed an offence punishable under Section 294(b)IPC, by
uttering the words abovementioned. The courts below have held
that the words uttered were obscene and the utterance caused
annoyance to the public. I am not inclined to take this view. In
R. v. Hicklin [R. v. Hicklin, (1868) LR 3 QB 360] , QB at p. 371
Cockburn, C.J. laid down the test of “obscenity” in these words:
(QB p. 371)
“… the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences….”
6. This test has been uniformly followed in India. The Supreme
Court has accepted the correctness of the test in Ranjit D. Udeshi
v. State of Maharashtra [Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra,
1964 SCC OnLine SC 52 : AIR 1965 SC 881] . In Roth v. United
States [Roth v. United States, 1957 SCC OnLine US SC 106 : 1 L
Ed 2d 1498 : 354 US 476 (1957)] , Warren, C.J. said that the test
of “obscenity” is the ‘substantial tendency to corrupt by arousing
lustful desires’. Harlan, J. observed that in order to be “obscene”
the matter must “tend to sexually impure thoughts”. I do not
think that the words uttered in this case have such a tendency. It
may be that the words are defamatory of the complainant, but I
do not think that the words are “obscene” and the utterance
would constitute an offence punishable under Section 294(b)IPC.’
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8. It has to be noted that in the instance case, the absence of
words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual
thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence under
Section 294(b). None of the records disclose the alleged words
used by the accused. It may not be the requirement of law to
reproduce in all cases the entire obscene words if it is lengthy,
but in the instant case, there is hardly anything on record. Mere
abusive, humiliating or defamative words by itself cannot attract
an offence under Section 294(b)IPC.
9. To prove the offence under Section 294IPC mere utterance of
obscene words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof
to establish that it was to the annoyance of others, which is
lacking in the case. No one has spoken about the obscene words,
they felt annoyed and in the absence of legal evidence to show
that the words uttered by the appellant-accused annoyed others, it
cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence under Section
294(b)IPC is made out.”
16. We fail to understand how the act of a police officer
assaulting the complainant within public view or public as alleged
would amount to an obscene act. Obscene act for the purpose of
Section 294 has a particular meaning. Mere abusive, humiliating
or defamatory words by themselves are not sufficient to attract
the offence under Section 294IPC.
17. Thus, insofar as Section 294IPC is concerned, we are of the
view that no case is made out to put the appellant-accused to
trial.
18. We shall now deal with Sections 504 and 506IPC, respectively.
19. A two-Judge Bench of this Court, speaking through one of us,
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J.B. Pardiwala, J., in its decision in Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P.
[Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P., (2023) 20 SCC 219] explained what
constitutes an offence of criminal intimidation. We quote the
relevant paragraphs from the said decision as under: (SCC pp.
241-44, paras 25-34)
“25. Chapter XXII IPC relates to Criminal Intimidation, Insult and
Annoyance. Section 503 reads thus:
‘503. Criminal intimidation.–Whoever threatens another with any
injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or
reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with
intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to
do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do
any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means
of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal
intimidation.
Explanation.–A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased
person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this
section.
Illustration
A, for the purpose of inducing B to resist from prosecuting a civil
suit, threatens to burn B’s house. A is guilty of criminal
intimidation.’
26. Section 504 reads thus:
‘504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the
peace.–Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives
provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely
that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or
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of either description for a term which may extend to two years,
or with fine, or with both.’
27. Section 506 reads thus:
‘506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.–Whoever commits,
the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to two years, or with fine, or with both;
If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.–and if the
threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the
destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence
punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to
impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to seven years, or with fine, or with both.’
28. An offence under Section 503 has following essentials:
(1) Threatening a person with any injury;
(i) to his person, reputation or property; or
(ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom that person
is interested.
(2) The threat must be with intent;
(i) to cause alarm to that person; or
(ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally
bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such
threat; or
(iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person
is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution ofPage 13 of 24
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such threat.
29. Section 504IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person
and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace
or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the
person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the
public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not
come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse
in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult
provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public
peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used
intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary
course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to
commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away
from the purview of the section merely because the insulted
person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence
having exercised self-control or having been subjected to abject
terror by the offender.
30. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by
Section 504IPC, the court has to find out what, in the ordinary
circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used
and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his
peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It
is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the
test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional
insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of
the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the
complainant.
31. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not
amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section
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504IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to
incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an
offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke
the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing
that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace.
Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the
light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot
be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under
Section 504IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the
complainant. In R. v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai [R. v. Chunnibhai
Dayabhai, (1902) 4 Bom LR 78] , a Division Bench of the Bombay
High Court pointed out that:
‘To constitute an offence under Section 504IPC it is sufficient if
the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose
his temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be
broken by angry words as well as deeds.’
32. A bare perusal of Section 506IPC makes it clear that a part of
it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal
intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused
had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant.
33. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more
particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled in
the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the offence punishable
under Section 506IPC may probably could be said to have been
disclosed but not under Section 504IPC. The allegations with
respect to the offence punishable under Section 504IPC can also
be looked at from a different perspective. In the FIR, all that the
first informant has stated is that abusive language was used by
the accused persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of
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abuses is not stated in the FIR.
34. One of the essential elements, as discussed above, constituting
an offence under Section 504IPC is that there should have been an
act or conduct amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is
the use of the abusive words, it is necessary to know what those
words were in order to decide whether the use of those words
amounted to intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is
not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult
is present.”
(emphasis in original)
20. Applying the principles as explained aforesaid, we are of the
view that none of the ingredients to constitute the offence
punishable under Sections 504 and 506IPC, respectively, are borne
out.
21. We fail to understand how the Magistrate could have directed
the police to investigate into the offence of defamation punishable
under Section 500IPC. We are at a loss to understand as to why
this aspect was not looked into even by the High Court.
22. The aforesaid reflects the mechanical manner in which the
order came to be passed for police investigation under Section
156(3)CrPC. It was expected of the High Court to look into all
these relevant aspects before rejecting the petition filed by the
appellant herein under Section 482CrPC.
23. The allegations as regards simple hurt also do not inspire any
confidence.
24. This Court in a plethora of its decisions, more particularly in
Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat [Ramdev Food
Products (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 6 SCC 439 : (2015) 3
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SCC (Cri) 192] , has laid emphasis on the fact that the directions
under Section 156(3) should be issued only after application of
mind by the Magistrate. Para 22 of the said decision reads thus:
(SCC p. 456)
“22. Thus, we answer the first question by holding that:
22.1. The direction under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after
application of mind by the Magistrate. When the Magistrate does
not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to postpone
issuance of process and finds a case made out to proceed
forthwith, direction under the said provision is issued. In other
words, where on account of credibility of information available, or
weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to
straightaway direct investigation, such a direction is issued.
22.2. The cases where the Magistrate takes cognizance and
postpones issuance of process are cases where the Magistrate has
yet to determine “existence of sufficient ground to proceed”.
Category of cases falling under para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari [Lalita
Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524]
may fall under Section 202.
22.3. Subject to these broad guidelines available from the scheme
of the Code, exercise of discretion by the Magistrate is guided by
interest of justice from case to case.”
25. Thus, there are prerequisites to be followed by the
complainant before approaching the Magistrate under Section
156(3)CrPC which is a discretionary remedy as the provision
proceeds with the word “may”. The Magistrate is required to
exercise his mind while doing so. He should pass orders only if he
is satisfied that the information reveals commission of cognizable
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offences and also about the necessity of police investigation for
digging out of evidence neither in possession of the complainant
nor can be procured without the assistance of the police.
29. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that no
case is made out to put the appellant-accused to trial for the
alleged offence. Continuance of the investigation by the police will
be nothing short of abuse of the process of law.
42. The impugned order [Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of
Maharashtra, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 13471] passed by the High
Court is set aside. The order passed by the Magistrate directing
police investigation under Section 156(3)CrPC is also set aside.”
10. Applying the aforesaid ratio to the facts of the present
case, it is an admitted position that the FIR came to be
lodged after a delay of 22 days, without specifying the
exact words allegedly used by the accused for abusing
the caste of the complainant. The only allegation is to
the effect that the complainant was threatened with dire
consequences if he proceeded to dig the field. However,
despite such alleged threat, the complainant dug the
field on 09.03.2022, which was subsequently refilled by
the accused persons to facilitate passage to their field.
In this factual backdrop, it cannot be said that the
complainant was either intentionally insulted or
provoked by the accused persons in a manner that would
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lead to a breach of public peace or the commission of
any offence. The essential ingredients required to attract
the provisions of Sections 504 and 506(2) of the Indian
Penal Code, therefore, do not appear to be satisfied.
Insofar as the allegations under the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act
are concerned, it is an admitted position that the
complainant has not specified the exact words allegedly
used to insult his caste. To constitute an offence under
Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the said Act, it is
necessary that the accused intentionally insults or
intimidates a member of a Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe with an intent to humiliate such person
in any place within public view.
11. The Apex Court, in the case of Karuppudayar Vs. State
Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent Of Police,
Lalgudi Trichy & Ors. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 215, has elucidated the distinction between the
expressions “any place within public view” and “public
place,” the relevant extract whereof is reproduced
hereinbelow:-
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“10. The term “any place within public view” initially came up
for consideration before this Court in the case of Swaran Singh
and others v. State through Standing Counsel and another2. This
Court in the case of Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand and
another3 referred to Swaran Singh (supra) and reiterated the legal
position as under:
“14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or
intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be
regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration
before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v.
State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC
(Cri) 527] . The Court had drawn distinction between the
expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”.
It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building
e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by
someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then
the lawn would (2008) 8 SCC 435 (2020) 10 SCC 710 certainly be
a place within the public view.
On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but
some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or
friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the
public view (sic) [Ed. :
This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in
the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e,
and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:”Also,
even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members
of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also
it would be an offence since it is in the public view.”] . The
Court held as under : (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28) “28. It has beenPage 20 of 24
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alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was
insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when
he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the
premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public
view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public
view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged
offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the
public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the
building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen
by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the
lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also,
even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members
of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also
it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must,
therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view”
with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private
place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public
place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by
the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon
sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private
persons or private bodies.” (emphasis in original).”
11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within public view’,
the place should be open where the members of the public can
witness or hear the utterance made by the accused to the victim.
If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the
wall where members of the public are not present, then it cannot
be said that it has taken place at a place within public view.
12. If we take the averments/allegations in the FIR at its face
value, what is alleged is as under:
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That on 2nd September 2021, while the complainant was engaged
in his office doing his duty, the accused came to the office in the
morning in order to enquire about the petition given by him
already to the Revenue Divisional Officer regarding entering the
name of his father in the ‘patta’. On such enquiry being made,
the complainant informed the accused that the said petition has
been sent to the Taluk office, Lalgudi and that appropriate action
would be taken after receipt of the reply from the Taluk Office,
Lalgudi. It is alleged that at that stage, the accused asked the
complainant as to what caste he belongs to and stated that the
complainant belongs to ‘Parayan’ caste. Thereafter, the accused
stated that, “if you people are appointed in Government service
you all will do like this only…”. Thereafter, he scolded the
complainant calling his caste name and insulted him using vulgar
words. The further allegation is that thereafter the colleagues of
the complainant came there, pacified the accused and took him
away.
13. Taking the allegations in the FIR at their face value, it would
reveal that what is alleged is that when the complainant was in
his office the accused came there; enquired with the complainant;
not being satisfied, started abusing him in the name of his caste;
and insulted him. Thereafter, three colleagues of the complainant
came there, pacified the accused and took him away.
14. It is thus clear that even as per the FIR, the incident has
taken place within the four corners of the chambers of the
complainant. The other colleagues of the complainant arrived at
the scene after the occurrence of the incident.
15. We are, therefore, of the considered view that since the
incident has not taken place at a place which can be termed to be
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a place within public view, the offence would not come under the
provisions of either Section 3(1)(r) or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST
Act.”
12. Upon perusal of the material collected during the course
of investigation, it emerges that, except for one
Dahyabhai, who also belongs to the same caste as the
complainant, no other person was present at the time of
the alleged incident. In such circumstances, it cannot be
said that the essential ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and
3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act are satisfied.
Furthermore, there is no material on record to indicate
that the alleged incident was witnessed by any
independent person so as to establish that the offence
was committed within “public view,” which is a sine qua
non for attracting the aforesaid provisions.
13. Insofar as the offence under Section 3(2)(va) of the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act is concerned, it is an admitted position
that the foundational ingredients of the scheduled
offence under Section 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code,
as discussed hereinabove, are not satisfied. In such
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circumstances, it is evident that there are no specific
averments on record constituting the alleged offence.
Consequently, the continuation of the proceedings
pursuant to the impugned FIR would amount to an abuse
of the process of law, and therefore, the same deserves
to be quashed and set aside.
14. In view of the aforesaid discussion and circumstances,
the impugned FIR being C.R. No. 11190002220710 of
2022 dated 01.04.2022 is hereby quashed and set aside.
Consequently, all further and consequential proceedings
arising therefrom shall also stand quashed and set aside.
15. In view of the aforesaid, the present application deserves
to be allowed and is accordingly allowed.
16. Rule is made absolute.
(M. K. THAKKER,J)
NIVYA A. NAIR
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