Delhi High Court – Orders
Dharminder Sharma vs State Of Nct Of Delhi & Anr on 7 April, 2026
Author: Prateek Jalan
Bench: Prateek Jalan
$~79
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ BAIL APPLN. 1291/2026, CRL.M.A. 10156/2026, CRL.M.A.
10157/2026
DHARMINDER SHARMA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Madhav Khurana, Sr. Adv
with Mr. Udit Arora, Mr. Teeksh
Singhal, Mr. Md. Sahil Reza Khan,
Advocates.
versus
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sanjeev Bhandari, ASC with
Mr. Arijit Sharma, Ms. Sakshi Jha,
Advocates for State.
Mr. Anurag Ahluwalia, Sr.
Advocate with Mr. Nishant Anand,
Ms. Gunjan Bansal, Mr. Dipanshu
Gaba and Mr. Tarun Choudhary,
Advocates for R-2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN
ORDER
% 07.04.2026
1. By way of this application under Section 482 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the petitioner seeks anticipatory bail in
connection with FIR No. 176/2024, dated 05.09.2024, registered at Police
Station Crime Branch, New Delhi, under Sections 420/120B of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860.
2. I have heard Mr. Madhav Khurana, learned Senior Counsel for the
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petitioner, Mr. Sanjeev Bhandari, learned Additional Standing Counsel
for the State, and Mr. Anurag Ahluwalia, learned Senior Counsel for
respondent No. 2-complainant.
3. Mr. Bhandari has filed a status report, from which the prosecution
case may be summarised as follows:
A. The FIR was registered on 05.09.2024 at the instance of respondent
No. 2 on the allegation that the petitioner and co-accused Gaurav
Verma induced her to invest a substantial amount in a business
investment programme for the purpose of immigration to Canada.
The petitioner represented himself to be Director (Operations) of
GIES Immigration Inc. [hereinafter, “GIES”] and co-accused
Gaurav Verma represented himself to be President and Regulated
Canadian Immigration Consultant of GIES.
B. These individuals induced respondent No. 2 to make an investment
in a restaurant business in Canada, by the name of “Gonga’s Grill”,
with the assurance that such an investment would ensure grant of a
work permit and immigration. Respondent No. 2 was promised
50% share in the said restaurant business.
C. A company by the name of Aadya’s Hospitality Limited
[hereinafter, “AHL”] was registered in Ontario, Canada, and its
only shareholder and Director was an individual, one Dan Cuzack.
The respondent No. 2 was informed that the business of the
aforesaid restaurant would be operated by AHL, which was, in fact,
formed in the name of the daughter of respondent No. 2 – Aadya.
D. On the basis of the aforesaid representations, respondent No. 2
transferred an amount of CAD 2,50,000/- to the account of AHL,BAIL APPLN. 1291/2026 Page 2 of 9
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and also paid a sum of CAD 45,000 to the accused persons towards
their professional fees.
E. Despite the aforesaid, respondent No. 2’s visa application was
rejected on three occasions, and the amount paid by her was also
not refunded by the accused or by Dan Cuzack.
F. In the course of investigation, it was revealed that respondent No. 2
was, in fact, never made a shareholder or Director in AHL, despite
the aforesaid investment.
G. It was also discovered that an amount of CAD 2,25,000 was
transferred into AHL’s account at Royal Bank of Canada by
respondent No. 2 on 29.11.2021, out of which CAD 2,16,000/- was
withdrawn in cash between January and March 2022, giving rise to
the suspension of misappropriation, rather than use for legitimate
business purposes.
H. As far as the role of the present petitioner is concerned, it is stated
in the status report that he was the primary point of contact for
respondent No. 2, and played an active role in structuring the
transaction, facilitating communication with foreign entities, and
also persuaded respondent No. 2 to continue with the aforesaid
transactions, despite rejection of her visa applications.
I. The prosecution relies upon e-mail communications, and
WhatsApp interactions to establish a case of conspiracy between
the petitioner and co-accused Gaurav Verma.
J. The amounts remitted by respondent No. 2 have not yet been
recovered. The money trail, identification of beneficiaries, and
foreign links are still required to be investigated.
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4. Prior to filing the present bail application, the petitioner had
approached the Sessions Court, and was granted interim protection vide
order dated 22.01.2026, subject to joining and cooperating in the
investigation. His application was, however, ultimately rejected by the
Sessions Court vide order dated 20.02.2026, inter alia, on the ground that
the petitioner had joined investigation, but did not produce the documents
regarding the money trail, particularly concerning the amount deposited
by respondent No. 2 in the account of AHL. The Sessions Court declined
anticipatory bail, also having regard to the gravity of offence and the fact
that the investigation was at the initial stage.
5. Mr. Khurana, in support of this application, submits as follows:
a) The petitioner was merely an employee of GIES, and the main
mastermind of the said concern was, in fact, co-accused Gaurav
Verma.
b) The petitioner did not own or control any account into which
remittances were made by respondent No. 2, and that the
transaction albeit for the purposes of immigration, was essentially
an investment transaction between respondent No. 2 and Dan
Cuzack, with whom she was also directly in contact.
c) The FIR itself shows that the main grievance of respondent No. 2
relates to non-refund of the money remitted by her, for which the
present petitioner is not responsible.
d) Respondent No. 2 was, in fact, referred to the petitioner by one
Pankaj Joshi, Managing Director of Nysa Global, but these leads
have not been investigated at all, despite the petitioner having
disclosed their involvement to the Investigation Officer [“IO”].
BAIL APPLN. 1291/2026 Page 4 of 9
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e) The petitioner had fully cooperated with the IO, during the period
he was granted interim protection by the Sessions Court, and
undertook that the petitioner will continue to cooperate with the
investigation.
6. Mr. Bhandari and Mr. Ahluwalia, on the other hand, oppose the
grant of anticipatory bail, relying upon the contents of the aforesaid status
report, and on the ground that the investigation remains ongoing. They
submit that the alleged offences are grave, with respondent No. 2 having
been induced to part with a sum of CAD 2,95,000 [equivalent to
approximately Rs. 1.83 crores]. As far as the prima facie case against the
petitioner is concerned, learned counsel handed over a copy of agreement
dated 14.04.2021, between GIES and respondent No. 2, in which GIES
undertook to perform services including “net-worth assessment and
business plan finalisation” as well as “arranging approval for federal
application”. The agreement also provided for the fees of CAD 45,000/-
to be paid to GIES. This agreement was signed by the petitioner
describing himself as “Director of GIES”. The said agreement is taken on
record. Learned counsel also handed over a copy of the account statement
of AHL showing the credit of CAD 2,25,000 on 29.11.2021, and cash
withdrawals of over CAD 2,15,000/- between 01.12.2021 and
07.03.2022. The account statements are also taken on record.
7. Before dealing with the facts of the present case, it may be borne in
mind that the petitioner seeks anticipatory bail, which the Supreme Court
has described as an “extraordinary” remedy. Reference in this connection
BAIL APPLN. 1291/2026 Page 5 of 9
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may be made to Srikant Upadhyay and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr.1,
where the Court observed as follows:
“30. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is
an extraordinary power. Though in many cases it was held that bail
is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said
that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule and the
question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious
discretion by the court depending on the facts and circumstances of
each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the court
concerned has to be very cautious as the grant of interim protection
or protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to miscarriage
of justice and may hamper the investigation to a great extent as it
may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We
shall not be understood to have held that the court shall not pass an
interim protection pending consideration of such application as the
section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an individual against
unwarranted arrest and we say that such orders shall be passed in
eminently fit cases…..”2
8. While adjudicating an application for anticipatory bail, the Court is
thus required to balance the public interest in a fair and effective
investigation, with the interest of the accused in his personal liberty. The
Court has, in State v. Anil Sharma3, emphasised the effectiveness of
custodial interrogation, as opposed to investigation when the accused is
clothed with the protection of the Court:
“6. We find force in the submission of the CBI that custodial
interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation-oriented than
questioning a suspect who is well ensconced with a favourable order
under Section 438 of the Code. In a case like this effective
interrogation of a suspected person is of tremendous advantage in
disinterring many useful informations and also materials which would
have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the
suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a
pre-arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often
interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The
argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of1
(2024) 12 SCC 382.
2
Emphasis supplied.
3
(1997) 7 SCC 187.
BAIL APPLN. 1291/2026 Page 6 of 9
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the person being subjected to third-degree methods need not be
countenanced, for, such an argument can be advanced by all accused
in all criminal cases. The Court has to presume that responsible police
officers would conduct themselves in a responsible manner and that
those entrusted with the task of disinterring offences would not conduct
themselves as offenders.”4
The same view has been recently expressed in P. Krishna Mohan
Reddy v. State of A.P.5.
9. Even in the absence of a requirement of custodial interrogation, the
Court is required to be circumspect while considering applications for
anticipatory bail, with the prima facie material available being a
significant factor. The Supreme Court in Sumitha Pradeep v. Arun Kumar
C.K.6, held as follows:
“12. We are dealing with a matter wherein the original complainant
(appellant herein) has come before this Court praying that the
anticipatory bail granted by the High Court to the accused should be
cancelled. To put it in other words, the complainant says that the High
Court wrongly exercised its discretion while granting anticipatory bail
to the accused in a very serious crime like Pocso and, therefore, the
order passed by the High Court granting anticipatory bail to the
accused should be quashed and set aside. In many anticipatory bail
matters, we have noticed one common argument being canvassed that
no custodial interrogation is required and, therefore, anticipatory bail
may be granted. There appears to be a serious misconception of law
that if no case for custodial interrogation is made out by the
prosecution, then that alone would be a good ground to grant
anticipatory bail. Custodial interrogation can be one of the relevant
aspects to be considered along with other grounds while deciding an
application seeking anticipatory bail. There may be many cases in
which the custodial interrogation of the accused may not be required,
but that does not mean that the prima facie case against the accused
should be ignored or overlooked and he should be granted
anticipatory bail. The first and foremost thing that the court hearing
an anticipatory bail application should consider is the prima facie
case put up against the accused. Thereafter, the nature of the offence4
Emphasis supplied.
5
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1157, paragraph 19.
6
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1529.
BAIL APPLN. 1291/2026 Page 7 of 9
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should be looked into along with the severity of the punishment.
Custodial interrogation can be one of the grounds to decline
anticipatory bail. However, even if custodial interrogation is not
required or necessitated, by itself, cannot be a ground to grant
anticipatory bail.”7
10. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, I am of
the view that this is not a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail to the
petitioner for the following reasons:
a) The offence involved is a serious one, with respondent No. 2
having parted with a large sum of money [approximately Rs.1.83
crores] on the assurance of the accused that her immigration to
Canada would be thus facilitated.
b) The investigation is still ongoing and is at a nascent stage.
c) The petitioner appears prima facie to have been a principal point of
contact, who was in touch with respondent No. 2 from the
inception of the transactions. In fact, the petitioner is the person
who has signed the agreement on behalf of GIES with respondent
No. 2.
d) His designation as Director of GIES in the said agreement, prima
facie belies his assertion that he was merely an employee, acting on
the instruction of co-accused Gaurav Verma. Even in his response
to the questionnaire furnished by the IO, he has described himself
as Director (Operations) in GIES, but has not provided the details
of the Director/shareholders of GIES.
e) The fact that respondent No. 2 was induced to make a substantial
investment in AHL, without any share or directorship having been7
Emphasis supplied.
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transferred into her name, is also significant, particularly when
coupled with the fact that the vast proportion of the amount
remitted was withdrawn in cash within a short period.
f) Quite apart from the sum remitted by respondent No. 2 to AHL, a
substantial sum of CAD 45,000/-, was allegedly remitted to GIES
itself, which also remains un-refunded. The prosecution, in my
view, rightly urges that further investigation is required to trace the
aforesaid amounts.
g) In the face of these materials, I also do not find merit in Mr.
Khurana’s submission that Pankaj Joshi and Nysa Global have not
been investigated by the IO, as the investigation is still in progress.
11. Having regard to the petitioner’s role in facilitating the transaction,
I am of the view that the requirement of custodial interrogation cannot be
ruled out at this stage, and that, in any event, the prima facie material
lends credibility to the prosecution case with regard to his involvement in
the offence.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, the present application for anticipatory
bail, alongwith pending applications, is dismissed.
13. It is clarified that this Court has not made any observation on the
merits of the case, and all rights and contentions of the parties in any
future application are left open.
PRATEEK JALAN, J
APRIL 7, 2026
‘Bhupi’/AD/
BAIL APPLN. 1291/2026 Page 9 of 9
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