Telangana High Court
P. Kumara Swamay vs Union Of India on 7 April, 2026
Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka
Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka
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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITION No. 28668 of 2025
07thApril, 2026
Between:
P. Kumara Swamy, S/o P. Ramanayya, and others
... Petitioner
AND
1. Union of India, and others
... Respondents
ORDER:
The petitioners state that the authorities began land acquisition by
issuing a notification under Section 3A of the National Highways Act,
1956 (“NH Act“) on 10.03.2021, published in the Gazette and newspapers
on 25.03.2021, for acquiring lands in about ten villages in Parkal,
Shayampet, and Damera Mandals for a four-lane Greenfield National
Highway. They contend that the notification mentioned only survey
numbers and land extents, without landowner details, maps, or plans at the
CALA office. No Grama Sabha was held, and publication in “Mana
Telangana” and “The Hindu” had little reach in their village. Being small
farmers, they claim they were denied a meaningful opportunity to file
proper objections, though some common objections were submitted.
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1.1. A public hearing for environmental clearance was later
conducted where objections were recorded. After that, there was no
communication for nearly a year until a public notice dated 04.02.2023
under Section 3G of the NH Act was published on 15.02.2023, asking
landowners to submit compensation claims. The petitioners state that only
through this notice did they learn about the Section 3D declaration dated
08.03.2022. They submitted representations alleging illegalities and
seeking to stop further action.
1.2. Some landowners from Damera Mandal challenged the
notifications in W.P. No. 5187 of 2023, claiming they were issued before
environmental clearance. This Court granted interim stay for over six
months but later dismissed the case in October 2023 after clearance was
obtained. A writ appeal is said to be pending. After dismissal, the
authorities continued the process and issued further Section 3G notices and
awards.
1.3. The petitioners state that additional Section 3A and 3D
notifications were later uploaded on the NHAI website covering further
lands, including theirs. They claim they were not individually informed
and learned of these only by chance. When Section 3E possession notices
were issued without supplying award copies, some landowners filed W.P.
No. 10431 of 2024 challenging the notifications and notices. On
03.05.2024, this Court granted interim protection from dispossession,
which is still in force. Believing their lands were similarly covered, the
petitioners did not approach the Court immediately. They state that copies
of the awards were given to them only in February 2025 after repeated
requests.
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1.4. The petitioners allege that from June-July 2025, officials with
police entered their lands, warned them not to cultivate, and pressured
them to accept compensation before Dusshera, failing which amounts
would be deposited in Court and possession taken. They claim their
objections were never properly decided and that the disposal order dated
20.11.2021 was non-speaking.
1.5. They argue that the multiple Section 3A notifications dated
10.03.2021 and 08.05.2022 contained incomplete and incorrect details,
violating Section 3A(2) and principles of natural justice. They contend that
the Section 3D notification dated 08.03.2022 was based on an invalid
report. They further argue that compensation should be governed by the
RFCTLARR Act, 2013, as applied through the Removal of Difficulties
Order, 2015, and not merely by Section 3G of the NH Act. They claim
market value was not revised properly before the 3A notification, leading
to unfair compensation and discrimination due to different rates applied in
January 2024 awards. They also state that compensation for structures and
trees was not determined at that time.
1.6. The petitioners dispute the respondents’ claim that valid
awards were passed and that possession can be taken under Section 3E.
They argue that possession cannot be taken without full and proper
determination and payment of compensation, including for structures,
trees, and rehabilitation benefits.
1.7. In summary, the petitioners allege procedural illegality,
improper consideration of objections, discriminatory compensation, and
violation of statutory provisions under the NH Act and the RFCTLARR
Act. They state that they face imminent dispossession and have therefore
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filed these writ petitions under Article 226 seeking to quash the
notifications, notices, and awards and restrain the authorities from taking
possession of their lands in Pulukurthy Village for the NH-163G project.
1.8. They specifically challenge the awards dated 05.01.2024 and
31.01.2024, the multiple Section 3A and 3D notifications, the Section 3G
public notice dated 04.02.2023, and the Section 3E possession notices.
They contend that taking possession based on these awards would deprive
them of livelihood and violate their constitutional rights under Articles 14,
19, 21, and 300A.
2. A counter affidavit is filed by the 6th respondent-Project Director,
NHAI, on behalf of respondents 2 to 6. It states that the land acquisition
for NH-163G from Km 88.418 to Km 111.762 was conducted strictly
under the NH Act and applicable provisions of the RFCTLARR Act. The
project is described as a greenfield corridor aimed at improving
connectivity and economic development. The 4th respondent was
appointed as CALA. The first Section 3A notification dated 10.03.2021
was published in the Gazette and newspapers, giving 21 days for
objections, and no objections were received within time. A Section 3D
declaration was issued on 08.03.2022.
2.1. An additional Section 3A notification dated 21.04.2022 was
issued to include missing extents, followed by a Section 3D declaration
dated 29.07.2022. Upon Section 3D publication, land vests absolutely in
the Central Government. Environmental clearance was granted on
05.07.2023.
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2.2. Public notices under Section 3G were issued in February 2023
and January 2024, and enquiries were conducted. Awards were passed on
05.01.2024 and 31.01.2024 after enquiry. A separate structure award was
passed on 11.11.2025. Arbitrator awards under Section 3G(5) were also
delivered in 2025. However, possession has not been taken due to interim
orders of this Court.
2.3. The respondents state that compensation was calculated under
Sections 26 to 30 of the RFCTLARR Act, including solatium, additional
market value, and multiplication factor. They contend that only
compensation provisions and limited rehabilitation benefits apply to NH
Act acquisitions, not the entire RFCTLARR Act.
2.4. The respondents deny that notifications were defective or that
objections were ignored. They state that additional notifications were
issued only to include missing extents and that Section 3G continues to
apply.
2.5. They contend that the petitioners are not “displaced families”
and are not entitled to full rehabilitation and resettlement benefits, as only
small portions of land were acquired. Allegations of police threats and
coercion are denied.
2.6. The respondents state that any grievance against the awards
must be pursued through arbitration under Section 3G(5) and thereafter
under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, not through writ petitions.
They emphasize that the project is of national importance and that delay
increases public cost.
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3. A counter affidavit is also filed by the 4th respondent-CALA,
stating that the entire process for NH-163G was conducted strictly
according to law and that due opportunity was given at every stage.
3.1. It is stated that the project forms part of the Nagpur-
Vijayawada Greenfield alignment approved by NHAI. The Section 3A
notification dated 10.03.2021 was published, objections were heard, and
rejected by proceedings dated 20.11.2021. A Section 3D declaration
followed on 08.03.2022.
3.2. An additional Section 3A notification dated 21.04.2022 was
issued to include missing extents, followed by further Section 3D
declarations. Publications were made in required newspapers.
3.3. Environmental clearance was granted on 05.07.2023. Awards
dated 05.01.2024 and 31.01.2024 were passed after hearing objections.
Compensation was calculated under Section 26 of the RFCTLARR Act. A
supplementary award for structures and trees was issued on 11.11.2025.
3.4. The Arbitrator enhanced compensation in 2025, and most
landowners have accepted it. Only the petitioners and a few others have
not.
3.5. The respondent denies that Section 3G has ceased to apply
and states that only compensation provisions of the RFCTLARR Act apply
to NH acquisitions.
3.6. It is emphasized that the project is linear, causing minimal
displacement, and that upon Section 3D declaration, land vests absolutely
in the Government and cannot be questioned in Court.
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3.7. The respondent reiterates that grievances against awards must
be pursued through arbitration and that the writ petition is liable to be
dismissed.
4. A reply affidavit is filed by the petitioners. They argue that the
appointment of CALA preceded the decision on alignment, showing
procedural irregularity. They contend that alignment cannot be treated as
final before proper consideration of objections under Section 3C.
4.1. They state that copies of awards dated January 2024 were
given only in February 2025 after repeated requests. The supplementary
award for structures and trees was passed only in November 2025 without
proper enquiry. Yet, possession notices were issued earlier.
4.2. They contend that their objections under Section 3C were
rejected without proper reasoning and that publications were inadequate.
They state they were unaware of later notifications and that disposal orders
were not properly communicated.
4.3. They challenge the Section 3D declaration on the ground that
no environmental clearance existed at that time and rely on pending
litigation and Supreme Court directions against post-facto clearance.
4.4. They argue that the original compensation was flawed, as
shown by the Arbitrator’s later enhancement. They claim market value was
not properly updated before the Section 3A notification and that no valid
Rehabilitation and Resettlement award was passed under the applicable
law.
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4.5. They maintain that multiple notifications indicate shifting
alignments and that publications and supplementary awards were defective
and incomplete.
4.6. Finally, they assert that the acquisition process suffers from
serious legal defects in publication, consideration of objections,
compensation determination, and rehabilitation benefits, and request that
the writ petition be allowed and the impugned proceedings be set aside.
5. Heard Mr. Ch. Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners;
learned Standing Counsel for NHAI, learned Standing Counsel for
CALA,and Mr. B. Narasimha Sarma, learned Additional Solicitor General
of India. Perused the record.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the acquisition
proceedings were earlier challenged in WP No.5187 of 2023 on the ground
that environmental clearance was not obtained prior to issuance of the
declaration under Section 3D of the NH Act, 1956, and though interim
orders were initially granted, the writ petition was later dismissed and Writ
Appeal No.1190 of 2023 is pending without interim relief; that some
adjoining landowners have separately challenged the Section 3A and 3D
notifications in WP No.10431 of 2024 and obtained interim protection,
leading the petitioners to reasonably believe that the authorities would not
interfere with their possession until final adjudication; that the petitioners
received copies of the Award proceedings only in February 2025; that
multiple notifications under Sections 3A and 3D were issued without
specifying survey numbers, landowner-wise extents, plans, or maps, and
the order under Section 3C dated 20.11.2021 was not communicated to the
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petitioners; that the petitioners came to know about the multiple
notifications only through the NHAI website and were unaware of the
environmental clearance for nearly a year until public notices appeared in
newspapers; that Section 3G of the NH Act, 1956, relating to determination
of compensation, is no longer operative in view of the RFCTLARR
(Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2015 issued under Section 105(3) of the
RFCTLARR Act, 2013, and therefore the provisions of the 2013 Act apply
to acquisitions under the National Highways Act; that consequently,
compensation and rehabilitation benefits ought to have been determined in
accordance with Sections 16 to 18, 21 to 30, 23 and 31 of the RFCTLARR
Act, 2013 and not under Section 3G of the National Highways Act; that the
competent authority failed to revise or update the market value of the
acquired land as required under Section 26 of the RFCTLARR Act prior to
issuance of the Section 3A notification; that two different rates were
adopted while passing the award in January 2024; that the expressions
“amount” and “compensation” used in Sections 3G and 3H of the National
Highways Act include compensation for land, structures, and rehabilitation
entitlements to affected families; that though the petitioners may not be
displaced, they remain an affected family entitled to rehabilitation benefits;
that possession of the land cannot be taken unless complete compensation
including valuation of trees and structures and determination of
rehabilitation entitlements is finalized; that the award proceedings are
unsustainable as compensation for structures and trees has not been
determined and therefore the notice under Section 3E of the National
Highways Act is also liable to be set aside; that the competent authority
ought to have issued notice under Section 21 of the RFCTLARR Act and
conducted award enquiry under Section 23 after following the procedure
under Sections 16 to 18 for identification of eligible persons and
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preparation of a Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme instead of
proceeding under Section 3G of the National Highways Act; that despite
representations expressing unwillingness to part with the land and pointing
out the illegality in the acquisition and compensation determination, the
authorities in June-July 2025 attempted to mark the petitioner’s land with
police assistance and threatened the petitioner not to cultivate the land
despite the existence of standing crops, thereby compelling the petitioner
to approach this Court.
7. Learned counsel for the petitionersrelies on:
4) Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai 4;
9) National Highways Authority of India v. P. Nagaraju alias
Cheluvaiah 9;
10)Ranivr Singh v. National Highways Authority of India 10;
1
W.P. No. 11486 of 2024 (Telangana High Court)
2
(2024) 10 SCC 533
3
(2021) 14 SCC 703
4
(2005) 7 SCC 627
5
W.P. No. 23939 of 2013 (Telangana High Court)
6
W.A. No. 676 of 2023 (Telangana High Court)
7
Neutral Citation No. 2023:AHC:240588 – DB (Allahabad High Court)
8
(1973) 1 SCC 500
9
(2022) 15 SCC 1
10
2023 SCC OnLine All 5276
11
(2014) 6 SCC 564
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12) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh 12
7.1. In Akkala Chandrakala (supra), this Courtconsidered a
dispute over land acquisition for the development of National Highway
765DG. The petitioners, whose homes were being acquired, sought
Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) benefits under the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, while government authorities argued that such
benefits were not applicable to the road-widening project under the
National Highways Act, 1956. This Court, by interim order dated
12.11.2024, rejected the authorities’ prayer to vacate an earlier stay order
and indicated that highway acquisitions remain subject to modern R&R
protections, and granted status quo until final hearing, while allowing
authorities to begin the formal process of determining and awarding R&R
compensation.
7.2. In Bimal Kumar Shah (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
broadened the understanding of the constitutional right to property under
Article 300-A of the Constitution of India by stating that lawful land
acquisition requires more than just public purpose and compensation. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court identified seven essential procedural sub-rights–
including the right to notice, the right to be heard, and the right to a
reasoned decision–along with requirements for an efficient process and
fair rehabilitation. Ruling against the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, the
Supreme Court held that any State action that ignores these safeguards is
invalid.
12
1963 SCC OnLine SC 23
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7.3. In B.K. Ravichandra (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
clarified the limits of Government power over private property. The
Supreme Court held that although the right to property is no longer a
fundamental right, it remains a constitutional safeguard under Article 300-
A of the Constitution of India, protecting both physical land and intangible
assets, and the government cannot occupy private land indefinitely without
proper legal authority, as prolonged possession amounts to unlawful
deprivation of property. Emphasizing the rule of law, the Court rejected
any notion that the State can act with “royal prerogative” and insisted that
all State actions must be backed by clear statutory authority. As a result,
the Court ordered the return of land that had been held by the government
for over thirty years and directed that fair compensation be paid to the
rightful owners.
7.4. In Darius Shapur Chenai (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court examined the procedural safeguards required under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 during the acquisition of private property. The
Supreme Court focused on whether the State had genuinely considered the
landowner’s objections as required under Section 5-A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. It held that the right to object and be heard under
Section 5-A is a significant safeguard–comparable in importance to a
fundamental right–and must involve a real and careful consideration by
the government rather than a mere formality. The Court further ruled that
when such decisions are challenged, the government must produce its
records to demonstrate that a fair decision-making process was followed.
Since the State failed to provide adequate evidence or a proper counter-
affidavit, the Court upheld the quashing of the acquisition, reinforcing that
laws allowing the taking of private property must be strictly interpreted to
prevent arbitrary state action.
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7.5. In K. Ramachandram(supra), this Courtexamined whether
the government had followed the required statutory procedures while
attempting to acquire the petitioner’s land; and held that although the
preliminary notification remained valid because it had been properly
extended, the later declaration was unlawful due to the authorities’ failure
to prepare and publish mandatory rehabilitation and resettlement schemes
under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Finding that these
procedural safeguards are essential to protect the landowner’s rights, the
declaration was quashed with a direction to the government to strictly
comply with the Act if it wishes to proceed with the acquisition, while also
encouraging both parties to pursue an amicable settlement through land
exchange or fair monetary compensation.
7.6. In Madi Satyavati v. State of Telangana 13, the Division
Bench of this Court dealt with a matter pertaining to land acquisition for a
railway project; and held that not only the mother, but also her three
daughters, qualify as an affected family under Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013; and modified a prior order to ensure that rehabilitation benefits
are determined for the daughters in addition to the mother’s solatium and
allowed the appellants to seek a formal reference if they are dissatisfied
with the final monetary compensation, reinforcing that the rights of all
affected family members must be recognized in land acquisition cases.
7.7. In Manorama Devi (supra), the Allahabad High Court
adjudicated a petition filed by Manorma Devi against the National
Highway Authority of India. The Allahabad High Court addressed her
13
W.A. No. 676 of 2023 (Telangana High Court)
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claim for rehabilitation and resettlement benefits, which she had not
received despite being compensated for her land. The Court observed that
her grievance aligned with previous cases under the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, where affected landowners were entitled to
additional support. It directed the authorities to prepare a formal proposal
within six months to provide the petitioner with entitlements for housing,
employment, and relocation as outlined in the Second Schedule of the Act,
and granted legal relief consistent with earlier, similar judgments.
7.8. In Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court examined whether the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act
violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India by allowing the State to
acquire property at lower compensation rates than standard national laws.
The Supreme Court held that the Government cannot justify paying
different amounts for similar lands based solely on which authority
conducts the acquisition or the stated public purpose. Emphasizing the
principle of equal protection, the judgment affirmed that landowners are
entitled to consistent, market-value compensation regardless of the
acquiring body, and dismissed the appeal, ruling that discriminatory
treatment in compensation or statutory bonuses is unconstitutional.
7.9. In P. Nagaraju alias Cheluvaiah (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court addressed the determination of fair compensation and
clarified the role of Courts in reviewing arbitral awards under Section 34
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court held that
an arbitrator’s failure to provide adequate and intelligible reasoning for
compensation constitutes a ground of “patent illegality,” justifying judicial
intervention. Emphasizing equitable treatment for landowners, including
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solatium and interest, the ruling aligned compensation practices with
constitutional protections and remanded the matter for recalculation of the
property’s market value using proper evidence and updated guideline rates.
7.10. In Ranivr Singh (supra), the Allahabad High Court
addressed petitions by displaced families who claimed that the National
Highway Authority of India had failed to provide mandatory rehabilitation
and resettlement benefits under the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013. The Court held that the status of affected families must be properly
assessed, rejecting the authorities’ contention that linear road projects
cause minimal disruption. It directed the competent authority to conduct a
thorough inquiry and submit a resettlement proposal to the District
Collector, ensuring that eligible landowners receive entitlements such as
housing units, employment opportunities, or relocation allowances as part
of their compensation.
7.11. In Shiv Raj (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Courtconsidered
the validity of land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894. The Supreme Court highlighted procedural lapses, including
violations of natural justice where objections were heard by one official
but the final report was issued by another without a fresh hearing. It also
examined the impact of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 on older
cases where the government delayed possession or failed to provide
compensation for over five years.
7.12. InSinghara Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
addressed the admissibility of oral testimony regarding a defendant’s
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confession, arising from a Second-Class Magistrate’s failure to follow
procedures under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
8. Learned Standing Counsel for NHAI contends that the competent
authority awarded adequate and lawful compensation to the petitioners in
accordance with the National Highways Act, 1956 and the RFCTLARR
Act, 2013; that the Respondent No.4-CALA passed awards dated
05.01.2024 and 31.01.2024 in Proceedings No. B/85/2021-08-NH-163G
after considering objections and providing opportunity of hearing to all
concerned, and the compensation amounts were received by the petitioners
except petitioner Nos. 4 and 6; that if the petitioners are aggrieved by the
determination of compensation, they have an efficacious alternative
remedy under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act by approaching the Arbitration-
cum-District Collector and any challenge to the arbitral award lies before
the District Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996; that the petitioners do not fall within the definition of a displaced
family under Section 3(k) of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 as they have
neither been relocated nor resettled from the affected area; that the
petitioners have failed to produce any documentary evidence establishing
displacement or loss of livelihood so as to qualify as an “affected family”
under Section 3(c) of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 or to claim benefits under
the Second and Third Schedules of the said Act; that only a portion of the
petitioners’ land has been acquired and the remaining land continues to be
available for their livelihood, thereby negating any claim of deprivation of
livelihood; that where substantial monetary compensation has been
awarded, the landowners can utilize such compensation for acquiring
alternative land or assets and therefore cannot insist on rehabilitation or
resettlement benefits; that even otherwise, the petitioners failed to raise
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NBK, Jspecific objections before the competent authority demonstrating that the
compensation awarded was insufficient to enable rehabilitation or
resettlement; that any claim for rehabilitation or resettlement requires
cogent evidence demonstrating that the compensation determined is
grossly inadequate to secure such rehabilitation; that entitlement to benefits
under the Second Schedule of the RFCTLARR Act arises only when the
competent authority certifies that the family has been displaced or
dislocated, which is not the case here; that preparation of a Social Impact
Assessment (SIA) report is not mandatory for acquisitions under the
National Highways Act, 1956; that the provisions of the RFCTLARR Act,
2013, particularly those relating to Social Impact Assessment and
rehabilitation and resettlement under Chapter II, do not automatically
apply to acquisitions under the National Highways Act unless specifically
extended by notification under Section 105 of the Act of 2013, and no such
notification applies in the present case; that since only part of the
petitioners’ land has been acquired and they have not been dislocated, there
is no requirement to frame a rehabilitation and resettlement scheme; that
injunction against an infrastructure project is barred under Section 20-A of
the Specific Relief Act, 1963; that the present project is a public
infrastructure project of national importance and cannot be stalled, and
therefore the acquisition proceedings cannot be challenged merely on the
ground of dissatisfaction with the compensation, particularly when an
effective statutory remedy for enhancement of compensation is available
under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act.
9. Learned Standing Counsel for the Competent Authority for Land
Acquisition (CALA) contends that environmental clearance for the project
was obtained on 05.07.2023 vide File No.10/29/2021-IA-III and the
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NBK, Jadditional notification under Section 3A of the NH Act, 1956 was issued
only for the purpose of covering certain missing structures; that the
competent authority passed awards dated 05.01.2024 and 31.01.2024
determining compensation for the acquired lands and subsequently passed
a supplementary award dated 11.11.2025 determining compensation for
structures; that several landowners who were aggrieved by the
compensation approached the Arbitrator-cum-District Collector under
Section 3G(5) of the NHActand the arbitrator revised the market value and
enhanced compensation through awards dated 09.05.2025, 23.07.2025,
04.08.2025 and 23.10.2025; that the provisions of Sections 16 to 18, 21
and 23 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 are not applicable to acquisitions
under the National Highways Act as the project is a linear infrastructure
project where the affected area is confined to the right of way and therefore
identification of eligibility for rehabilitation benefits and preparation of a
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme is not mandatory; that benefits
under the Second Schedule of the RFCTLARR Act can be claimed only
when the competent authority certifies that the petitioner’s family has been
displaced or dislocated from the area; that objections filed under Section
3C of the National Highways Act were duly received and disposed of and
additional notifications were issued only to acquire certain missing extents
of land, following which notification under Section 3D was issued and the
land vested with the Central Government free from all encumbrances; that
out of 1035 landowners whose lands were acquired or are in the process of
acquisition, 859 landowners have already received compensation and only
the petitioner and a few others have not accepted the amount; that the
petitioner has raised untenable objections and approached this Court with
the intention of stalling the land acquisition process; that Section 3G of the
NHAct continues to govern determination of compensation for lands
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2013 relating to determination of compensation under the First Schedule
and Rehabilitation and Resettlement benefits under the Second Schedule
are applicable to such acquisitions, and therefore the writ petition is liable
to be dismissed.
10. Learned Additional Solicitor General relies on several judgments in
support of his contention that a writ remedy is not maintainable in the
instant case; particularly on Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of
Maharashtra14 and contends that the Courts have to weigh the public
interest vis-Ã -vis the private interest while exercising the power and there
are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong, and
that quashing of acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress.
10.1. He also relies on Nerajala Nageswara Rao v. Union of
India15, to contend that alternative remedy harsh one should not be
resorted in public purpose projects and larger public purpose prevails over
individual interest. He also relies on N.G. Projects Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar
Jain16, to contend that construction of road is an infrastructure project and
keeping in view the intent of the legislature that infrastructure projects
should not be stayed, the High Court would have been well advised to hold
its hand to stay the construction of the infrastructure project.
10.2. He also relies on Bluepark Seafoods (P) Ltd v. District
Collector17 and contends that in case of acquisition for benefit of general
public, the landowner can stake claim for reasonable compensation and14
1997 (1) SCC 134
15
2017 SCC Online Hyd 250
16
2022 (6) SCC 127
17
2011 SCC OnLine AP 267
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NBK, Jnothing beyond that. Relying on NHAI v. Sayedabad Tea Company
Ltd 18, it is contended that National Highways Act is a special enactment
and a comprehensive code which provides an inbuilt mechanism for
initiating acquisition until culmination of the proceedings in determining
the compensation and its adjudication by arbitrator under Section 3-G(5) of
the NH Act.
10.3. He also relies on the judgment of the High Court of
Karnataka, at Bengaluru, in W.P.No.10103 of 2020 (LA-RES) and
batch, dated 19.07.2022, and contends that in the said case, the High
Court of Karnataka has set aside the awards passed by the CALA and
directed the authority to redetermine the compensation afresh, and if the
parties are aggrieved by the fresh awards passed by the CALA, the parties
can approach the arbitrator.
10.4. He also relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
M/s Tirupati Developers v. The Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar
Haveli19, and contends that the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed the
Collector to give one opportunity to the appellant therein to submit its
objections, followed by personal hearing and thereafter pass appropriate
award after holding inquiry under Section 23 of the RTCTLARR Act, and
therefore similar dispensation is attracted in the present writ petition in
view of similarity of facts.
11. Having considered the respective contentions and perused the
record, it may be noted that the grievance of the petitioners essentially is
that multiple notifications under Sections 3A and 3D of the National18
(2020) 15 SCC 161
19
Civil Appeal No.4952 of 2023, dated August 7, 2023
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NBK, JHighways Act were issued with incomplete information, inadequate
publication, and without providing proper landowner-wise details, maps, or
an effective opportunity to file objections with regard to the acquisition of
their agricultural lands for the proposed four-lane National Highway-163G,
and that their objections were not properly considered. It is also contended
that the authorities proceeded with the declaration and award process even
before obtaining environmental clearance, issued additional notifications
without informing the affected landowners, and passed incomplete
compensation awards without determining compensation for structures and
trees, and without granting rehabilitation and resettlement benefits as
required under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 and the Removal of Difficulties
Order, 2015. They also allege discriminatory and outdated valuation of
land, denial of statutory entitlements, and attempts by the authorities to
forcibly take possession of their lands without paying lawful
compensation, thereby threatening their livelihood as small and marginal
farmers. It is also their grievance that the compensation cannot be confined
only to the land on the mere ground that the land is an agricultural extent,
and that compensation should also be granted for the structures existing on
the land, and rehabilitation and resettlement benefits should be extended to
the petitioners.
11.1. On the contrary, the essential contention of the respondents
(NHAI and CALA authorities) is that the acquisition of the petitioners’
land for the construction of the four-lane National Highway-163G
(Mancherial-Warangal Greenfield Corridor) has been carried out strictly in
accordance with the procedure prescribed under the National Highways
Act, 1956 and the applicable provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, and
that all statutory steps–issuance of notifications under Sections 3A and
3D, consideration of objections under Section 3C, conduct of enquiry, and
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NBK, J
passing of compensation awards under Section 3G–were duly followed.
According to them, adequate opportunity was given to the landowners, and
compensation has been determined and deposited as per law.It is also their
contention that the entire village or villages have not been acquired,
requiring the villagers, along with their houses, cattle, and livelihood, to be
shifted/relocated to an alternative location, or re-establish the village at
some other place entirely; but only such extent of land(s) that is under
alignment would go into the highway project, and only such limited
extents of land(s) were acquired, and therefore there cannot be any
contentions of displacement of persons requiring rehabilitation and
resettlement under the RFCTLARR Act because they are not “displaced
families”. It is contended that any grievance regarding compensation must
be pursued through the statutory remedy of arbitration under Section 3G(5)
of the National Highways Act rather than through a writ petition, and the
petitioners’ allegations are unfounded. They further contend that the
interim order restraining the project may be vacated since it delays a
project of national importance and public interest.
12. At this juncture, it is to be noted that the project concerns the laying
of a four-lane National Highway (Mancherial-Warangal Greenfield
Corridor), and that land acquisition has been undertaken for the said
highway. In land acquisition for a National Highway of this nature,
connecting highways across States, the acquisition process or the laying of
the highway per se cannot be stalled indefinitely by taking recourse to the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Ultimately, the sole grievance that
can be agitated by the aggrieved persons is confined to the compensatory
benefits in lieu of the lands acquired, which is pecuniary in nature.
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NBK, J
12.1 Further, the petitioners’ grievance with regard to entitlement
to compensation for structures, trees, standing crops, or even alternative
rehabilitation/resettlement benefits is also justiciable, provided such
structures are legally permitted, and the CALA has certified that the
structures/crops, etc., have been affected in the land acquisition process, in
a way that resettlement and rehabilitation is necessary.
12.2 Be that as it may, in land acquisition for a public purpose,
unless there are proven malafides, neither is the acquisition liable to be set
aside, nor can the opinion of experts–either with regard to the alignment
of the highway or with regard to the determination of factual aspects such
as the extent of land acquired and the monetary compensation payable–be
substituted by exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226.
13. At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Kushala Shetty 20, wherein it
was held as follows:
“24. Here, it will be apposite to mention that NHAI is a
professionally managed statutory body having expertise in the
field of development and maintenance of National Highways. The
projects involving construction of new highways and widening
and development of the existing highways, which are vital for
development of infrastructure in the country, are entrusted to
experts in the field of highways. It comprises of persons having
vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway development
and maintenance. NHAI prepares and implements projects relating
to development and maintenance of National Highways after
thorough study by experts in different fields. Detailed project20
(2011) 12 SCC 69
24
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NBK, Jreports are prepared keeping in view the relevant factors including
intensity of heavy vehicular traffic and larger public interest. The
Courts are not at all equipped to decide upon the viability and
feasibility of the particular project and whether the particular
alignment would subserve the larger public interest. In such
matters, the scope of judicial review is very limited. The Court can
nullify the acquisition of land and, in rarest of rare cases, the
particular project, if it is found to be ex facie contrary to the
mandate of law or tainted due to mala fides.”
14. Further, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble
Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.774 of 2024, dated
07.08.2024, which is an appeal filed challenging a Notification for laying a
national highway. The Hon’ble Division Bench, by referring to various
precedent judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, more particularly
Kushala Shetty (supra), held as follows:
“12. In view of aforesaid enunciation of law, it is evident that the
projects involving construction of new highways and widening
and development of existing highways are vital for development of
infrastructure of the country. The projects have been entrusted to
the experts in the field of highways and it comprises of persons
having vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway
development and maintenance. The NHAI is implementing the
project relating to development and maintenance after thorough
study by experts.
13. It is pertinent to note that in pursuance of the notification
issued under the Act, award has already been passed on
10.05.2022 and petitioners No.8 and 11 in W.P.No.24150 of 2021
have even received the compensation. The project is virtually
complete except for a small stretch.”
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NBK, J
15. In this connection, it is to be noted that under Section 3G of the
National Highways Act, determination of compensation is entrusted to the
Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA). Significantly, Section
3G(5) expressly provides that where the amount determined by the
Competent Authority is not acceptable to either of the parties, the matter
shall, on application, be referred to the Arbitrator appointed by the Central
Government–ordinarily the District Collector. Thus, the statute itself
creates a complete adjudicatory mechanism for redressal of disputes
relating to compensation.
16. Further, once the Arbitrator renders an award under Section 3G(5) of
the National Highways Act, 1956, such award is governed by the
provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; and the persons
aggrieved by the arbitral award has a further statutory remedy under
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the competent
Civil Court.
17. Though the existence of an alternative remedy is not a bar to
invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226, its invocation
comes with the rider that there should be exceptional circumstances,
warranting invocation under Article 226 bypassing the statutory remedy. In
this context, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks 21, wherein
the Supreme Court held as follows:
“15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having
regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not
to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon21
1998 (8) SCC 1
26
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NBK, Jitself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and
efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally
exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been
consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least
three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed
for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where
there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or
where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or
the vires of an Act is challenged.”
18. In the instant writ petition, this Court does not find any violation of
fundamental rights per se, or any violation of the principles of natural
justice, or any jurisdictional error on the part of the respondent authorities;
nor does the writ petition challenge the vires of the Act passed by the
competent authority. Further, it is the specific unrebutted contention of the
respondents, borne out by the record, that out of 1035 landowners whose
lands were acquired or in process of acquisition, 859 landowners have
already received compensation; thereby roughly 83% of persons have
received the compensation.
19. The grievance of the petitionersis about (i) determination of
compensation under the awards dated 05.01.2024 and 31.01.2024, (ii)
alleged improper calculation of market value, multiplication factor,
solatium, and other statutory components, and (iii) alleged inadequate
grant of certain benefits under the RFCTLARR framework as applied to
acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956.
20. Though the petitioners contend that they are entitled to certain
rehabilitation and resettlement benefits, it cannot be disputed that the
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competent authority should have certified that the affected landowner has
been displaced. Furthermore, the petitioners have a two-step statutory
remedy, one under the National Highways Act, 1956 and, if still aggrieved,
the second under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and therefore
the petitioners are not remediless.
21. In the light of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kushala
Shetty (supra), and Whirlpool Corporation (supra), and also the
judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench in W.A. No.774 of 2024, dated
07.08.2024, this Court does not find any exceptional circumstances to
entertain the writ petitionbypassing the statutory arbitration mechanism
provided under the National Highways Act, 1956 and the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996.
22. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of, relegating the
petitioners to avail the statutory remedy under Section 3G(5) of the
National Highways Act, 1956 and thereafter, if necessary, under Section 34
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. No costs.Interim orders, if
any, stand vacated. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand
closed.
________________________________
JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
07thApril, 2026
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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITION No. 28668 of 2025
07thApril, 2026
ksm
